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Summary	
	
This	thesis	considers	the	extent	to	which	‘fraud	unravels	all’	explains	the	judicial	response	to	
fraudulent	 marine	 insurance	 claims	 and	 fraud	 in	 documentary	 credit	 transactions.	 The	
simplicity	of	the	maxim	suggests	that	fraud	does	not	unduly	trouble	the	courts	and	gives	the	
impression	of	a	uniform	and	deterrent	approach	to	fraud	within	the	civil	law.	The	comparison	
made	in	this	thesis	demonstrates	this	impression	to	be	misleading;	the	courts	have	conceived	
of	fraud	differently	and	have	employed	context-specific	policy	concerns	to	justify	the	shape	
of	 each	 fraud	 rule.	 The	 insurance	 discussions	 are	 dominated	 by	 deterrence	 with	 legal	
sanctions	placed	at	the	heart	of	the	model.	By	contrast,	the	trade	finance	courts	adopt	a	more	
laissez-faire	attitude	which	prioritises	the	efficiency	of	the	credit	mechanism	and	considers	
deterrence	an	ex	ante	issue	for	the	parties.	Accordingly,	this	thesis	examines	the	respective	
policy	 justifications	 and	 considers	 their	 continued	 validity	 in	 light	 of	 comparative	 and	
empirical	evidence.	In	the	insurance	context,	it	is	argued	that	the	judicial	understanding	of	
deterrence	is	outdated	which	renders	the	resulting	legal	rule	ineffective.	An	examination	of	
approaches	to	fraud	in	other	jurisdictions	then	demonstrates	the	possibility	of	constructing	a	
more	nuanced	remedial	framework	which	would	balance	the	competing	policy	considerations	
of	 deterrence	 and	 proportionality.	 The	 documentary	 credit	 discussion	 contends	 that	 the	
narrow	 English	 approach	 to	 fraud	 is	 not	 an	 inevitable	 policy	 decision	 and	moreover,	 has	
resulted	in	detrimental	consequences	for	the	credit	mechanism.	It	employs	empirical	data	to	
develop	an	explanation	of	deterrence	for	the	duration	of	credit	transactions.	In	both	contexts,	
these	 arguments	 have	 important	 implications	 for	 the	 future	 development	 of	 the	 law.	 In	
summary,	 this	 research	 undermines	 the	 utility	 of	 ‘fraud	unravels	 all’	 and	 calls	 instead	 for	
courts	 and	 academics	 to	 resist	 instinctively	 attractive	 solutions	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 robust,	
empirically-informed	approach	to	fraud.	
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Chapter	One	
Introduction	
	
The	phrase	 ‘fraud	unravels	all’	 is	a	 simple	one.	 It	 is	often	espoused	by	 the	courts	without	
further	examination	or	explanation.	The	maxim	is	presented	as	sufficient	to	dispose	of	claims	
tainted	 by	 fraud.	 It	 hints	 at	 a	 singular	 judicial	 and	 perhaps	 punitive	 approach	 to	 fraud.	 It	
further	suggests	that	the	effect	of	fraud	is	identical	–	an	unravelling	effect	on	the	transaction	
to	which	the	fraud	relates.	
Indeed,	 this	 notion	 of	 simplicity	 is	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 MacDonald	 Eggers’	 excellent	
monograph	 on	 deceit,	 in	which	 he	 commences	 by	 describing	 rules	 on	 fraud	 as	 a	 singular	
entity,	underpinned	by	a	shared	rationale	and	purpose,	
The	existence	and	formulation	of	a	particular	rule	of	law	may	have	its	genesis	in	utility,	
certainty,	or	fairness.	The	law	concerning	fraud	and	deceit,	attested	to	by	such	ancient	
advocates	as	Hyperides,	Aristotle	and	Cicero,	is	underpinned	by	our	moral	duty	to	tell	
the	truth	and	the	social	and	commercial	necessity	of	deterring	untruths	drawing	the	
innocent	to	their	harm.1	
In	Regulating	Contracts,	Professor	Collins	makes	a	similar	point	and	highlights	the	commercial	
consequences	of	deceit,	“rules	against	fraud	and	misrepresentation…serve	to	deter	lying	and	
the	supply	of	misleading	information,	practices	which	would	undermine	the	competitiveness	
of	the	market	and	reduce	trust.”2	
Taken	together	this	would	suggest	that	fraud	rules	are	viewed	as	having	a	uniform	purpose	–	
the	deterrence	of	fraud	–	which	emerges	from	moral	concerns	about,	and	the	commercial	
impact,	of	dishonesty.	Furthermore,	this	suggests	that	fraud	has	a	similar	effect;	to	unravel	
the	entirety	of	the	transaction	to	which	the	fraud	relates.		
A	closer	look	suggests	this	impression	may	be	false.	For	one	thing,	the	unravelling	effect	of	
fraud	may	not	be	solely	dependent	on	the	existence	of	fraud	but	also	on	the	satisfaction	of	
other	 criteria.	 Thus,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 fraud	 unravels	 transactions	may	 depend	 on	 the	
																																																						
1	P	MacDonald	Eggers,	Deceit:	The	Lie	of	the	Law	(Informa	Law,	2009),	[1.4].	
2	H	Collins,	Regulating	Contracts	(OUP,	1999)	75.	
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particular	context	in	which	the	rule	operates.	For	another,	fraud	rules	are	variously	described	
by	the	courts.	 In	certain	contexts,	 fraud	rules	are	characterised	as	serving	an	 instrumental	
role	for	the	broader	societal	good.	In	other	contexts,	the	flexibility	of	the	fraud	rule	may	be	
constrained	by	the	particular	idiosyncrasies	of	the	mechanism	to	which	it	relates.	This	will	in	
turn	constrain	the	rule’s	potential	as	an	instrument	of	social	utility	as	the	court	simultaneously	
gives	effect	to	competing	policy	objectives.		
The	simplistic	maxim	may	therefore	not	be	sufficient	to	explain	what	is	going	on	when	the	
courts	are	faced	with	fraud.	This	thesis	begins	to	address	this	gap	by	exploring	the	effect	of	
fraud	in	two	distinct	but	related	areas;	fraudulent	insurance	claims	and	fraud	in	transactions	
financed	by	documentary	credit.	A	consideration	of	 the	utility	of	 ‘fraud	unravels	all’	as	an	
explanation	of	judicial	action	will	demonstrate	that	the	insurance	and	trade	finance	courts	
have	 conceptualised	 fraud	 in	 different	 ways.	 The	 justification	 for	 these	 particular	
characterisations	depend	on	assertions	which	have	been	repeatedly	endorsed	in	case	law	but	
are	yet	to	be	critically	examined.	This	project	addresses	this	gap	by	subjecting	the	justification	
for	the	scope	of	each	rule	and	respective	judicial	characterisation	to	critique.		
This	thesis	 is	not	a	call	for	all	rules	on	fraud	to	be	identical	 in	all	contexts.	 Instead,	 it	 is	an	
attempt	to	understand	the	contextual	differences	which	call	for	fraud	to	be	thought	of	and	
treated	differently.	While	maxims	expressed	in	Latin	may	be	pithy,	they	fail	to	recognise	the	
nuance,	and	the	reasons	for	that	nuance,	which	exist	in	reality	and	against	the	backdrop	of	
the	piecemeal	common	law	system.	There	is	no	conceptual	difficulty	with	the	law	responding	
to	 fraud	 in	 different	 ways	 across	 areas	 of	 law,	 provided	 there	 is	 a	 minimum	 level	 of	
intervention	on	public	policy	grounds.3		
	
This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	project	 and	undertakes	 several	practical	 tasks.	 The	discussion	
opens	by	highlighting	judicial	concerns	about	commercial	fraud	(I).	It	then	provides	a	sketch	
of	how	fraud	arises	and	 is	 litigated	 in	marine	 insurance	(II)	and	within	documentary	credit	
transactions	(III).	Part	IV	justifies	the	comparison	between	these	areas	of	law	and	defines	the	
																																																						
3	 See	 P	 Todd,	 ‘Non-genuine	 shipping	 documents	 and	 nullities’	 [2008]	 LMCLQ	 547,	 550	 where	 Lord	 Diplock’s	
elaboration	of	 the	 fraud	exception	 for	documentary	credits	 is	described	as	 follows:	“accepting,	albeit	with	not	
obvious	enthusiasm,	that	the	autonomy	principle	must	give	way	to	the	general	rule	of	public	policy,	ex	turpi	causa.”	
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research	questions	addressed	in	this	project.	The	major	argument	is	that	policy	considerations	
used	to	justify	legal	rules	must	be	critically	examined	to	assess	their	(continuing)	validity.	Part	
V,	 therefore,	 places	 the	 project	 in	 context	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 current	 absence	 of	
considered	policy	discussion	in	these	areas.	The	remaining	sections	outline	the	methodology	
(VI)	and	the	ways	in	which	the	thesis	meets	the	requirement	of	originality	(VII).	A	summary	of	
each	forthcoming	chapter	is	provided	in	part	VIII.	
	
I. Judicial	Concerns	about	Fraud	
It	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 courts	 have	 repeatedly	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 fraud	 in	 the	
commercial	arena.4	These	statements	can	be	traced	to	the	time	of	Lord	Mansfield,	the	key	
eighteenth	century	architect	of	the	commercial	law,	in	Pawson	v	Watson.5	There	he	said	that	
fraud,	once	proven,	“vitiates	judgments,	contracts	and	all	transactions	whatsoever.”6	These	
ideas	have	been	endorsed	in	modern	case	law	by	the	Court	of	Appeal7	and,	more	recently,	by	
the	House	of	Lords.8		
Judicial	 intervention	 in	 cases	 of	 fraud	 primarily	 responds	 to	 moral	 concerns	 about	
dishonesty.9	In	some	cases,	intervention	will	consist	of	a	refusal	to	become	embroiled	in	the	
dispute	at	hand	for	fear	of	sullying	the	court’s	integrity.10	In	the	case	which	established	the	
defence	of	illegality,	Holman	v	Johnson,	Lord	Mansfield	remarked	that	the	court	would	not	
lend	“its	aid	to	a	man	who	founds	his	cause	of	action	upon	an	immoral	or	an	illegal	act.”11	In	
other	circumstances,	the	courts	will	take	more	overt	steps	to	prevent	the	fraudster	profiting	
from	his	wrongdoing.	This	may	mean	 that	 the	common	 law	rule	 resembles	an	attempt	 to	
sanction	or	punish	the	wrongdoer.	In	these	cases,	the	court	will	not	be	swayed	by	arguments	
that	 the	 claimant	 in	 some	way	contributed	 to	his	 loss.	 The	Court	of	Appeal	have	 recently	
summarised	this	approach	in	the	following	terms,	“highwaymen	in	commerce	forfeit	the	right	
																																																						
4	J	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	Commercial	and	Standby	Credits	(4th	ed.	AS	Pratt	&	Sons,	2007)	[7-66]:	“Fraud	
has	long	been	a	source	of	major	concern	for	commercial	law.”	
5	Pawson	v	Watson	(1778)	2	Cowp.	785.	
6	Ibid	788	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
7	Lazarus	Estates	Ltd	v	Beasley	[1956]	1	QB	702,	712	per	Denning	LJ.	
8	HIH	Casualty	&	General	Insurance	v	Chase	Manhattan	[2003]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	61,	[15]	[16]	per	Lord	Bingham.	
9	 Standard	 Chartered	 Bank	 v	 Pakistan	 National	 Shipping	 Corp.	 (Nos.	 2	 and	 4)	 [2003]	 1	 AC	 959,	 [20]	 per	 Lord	
Hoffmann:	“moral	disapproval	of	fraud.”	
10	Hall	v	Herbert	[1993]	2	SCR	159,	169	per	McLachlin	J;	Birkett	v	Acorn	Business	Machines	Ltd	[1999]	2	All	ER	Comm	
429	per	Colman	J;	Law	Commission,	The	Illegality	Defence	(Law	Com	CP	189,	2009),	[2.24].	
11	Holman	v	Johnson	1	Cowp	342	(1775),	343.	
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to	just	and	equitable	treatment…In	this	field	it	is	all	or	nothing.”12		For	present	purposes,	the	
judicial	response	to	fraud	in	the	contexts	under	discussion	is	a	clear	attempt	to	prevent	the	
fraudster	profiting	from	his	wrongdoing.	A	finding	of	fraud	will	deprive	the	fraudster	of	his	
entire	right	to	indemnity	or	payment	under	the	policy	or	credit,	respectively.	
By	contrast,	a	more	proactive	response	to	 fraud	–	designed	to	uphold	a	basic	standard	of	
commercial	morality	–	is	often	evident	in	relation	to	wrongdoing	in	the	pre-contractual	phase.	
Courts	will,	for	example,	refuse	to	enforce	a	clause	purporting	to	relieve	one	party	from	the	
consequences	of	his	own	fraud.13	An	explicit	concern	about	morality	is	also	evident	in	the	law	
of	misrepresentation	which	provides	remedies	for	innocent	pre-contractual	misstatements.14	
Without	remedies	in	this	situation,	the	misrepresentor	would	be	permitted	to	take	advantage	
of	a	situation	premised	on	falsity	and	this,	as	Lord	Jessel	MR	held	in	Redgrave	v	Hurd,	would	
be	 “a	 moral	 delinquency.”15	 This	 same	 logic	 underpinned	 the	 law	 of	 non-disclosure	 in	
insurance.16	In	Carter	v	Boehm,	Lord	Mansfield	determined	that	remedies	would	be	available	
even	where	the	non-disclosure	was	inadvertent	because	“still	the	under-writer	is	deceived…	
because	the	risque	run	is	really	different	from	the	risque	understood	and	intended	to	be	run,	
at	the	time	of	the	agreement.”17	Remedies	for	breach	of	the	duty	of	fair	presentation	under	
the	 Insurance	 Act	 are	 now	 tied	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 breach18	 or	 the	 impact	 that	 the	
misstatement	had	on	the	underwriter.19	The	underwriter	remains	entitled	to	a	remedy	in	the	
case	of	inadvertent	non-disclosure	which	demonstrates	the	ongoing	importance	of	upholding	
basic	commercial	morality.	
There	is	also	an	economic	justification	for	common	law	rules	against	fraud.	The	process	of	
contractual	negotiations	enables	the	parties	to	make	provision	for	foreseeable	contingencies	
which	may	arise	during	their	exchange.	There	are	clearly	costs	associated	with	this	process,	
but	 these	 can	 be	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 parties	 know	 their	 rights	 and	 liabilities	 with	
																																																						
12	Standard	Chartered	Bank	v	Pakistan	National	Shipping	Corp.	(No.	2)	[2000]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	511,	[126]	per	Ward	LJ.	
13	S	Pearson	&	Son	Ltd	v	Dublin	Corp	[1907]	AC	351,	353-354	per	Lord	Loreburn	LC.	
14	Misrepresentation	Act	1967	s.2(2).	
15	Redgrave	v	Hurd	(1881)	20	Ch	D	1,	12-13	per	Lord	Jessel	MR.	
16	Carter	v	Boehm	(1766)	3	Burrow	1905.	
17	Ibid	1909	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
18	Insurance	Act	2015	Sched.	1	(2).	
19	Insurance	Act	2015	s.3;	Sched	1.	(3).	For	an	important	consideration	of	what	proportionality	actually	means	in	
this	 context,	 see	 J	 Davey,	 ‘Proportionality	 &	 the	 hypothetical	 bargain:	 The	 Law	 Commission’s	 remaking	 of	
commercial	insurance	law’	(2016)	(Work	in	progress).	
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certainty	from	the	outset.	Fraud	is	a	different	matter.	It	is	not	an	eventuality	which	arises	due	
to	 some	 external	 event	 beyond	 the	 parties’	 control,	 but	 rather	 because	 one	 party	
intentionally	deceives	 the	other.	Accordingly,	 the	risk	of	dishonesty	requires	 the	design	of	
elaborate	protective	 clauses	 and	 this	 imposes	 considerable	 costs	on	 contracting	parties.20	
These	 costs	 cannot	 be	 justified	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 ordinary	 contractual	 clauses	 can	 be.	
Common	 law	 rules	 against	 fraud,	 therefore,	 represent	 an	 attempt	 to	 prevent	 the	wasted	
expenditure	that	would	otherwise	be	incurred	as	a	result	of	negotiating	about	the	fraud	risk	
in	 advance.	 The	 increased	 costs	 associated	 with	 fraud	 also	 extend	 to	 litigation	 and	 this	
necessarily	 impacts	 upon	 the	 courts.	 	 As	 Lord	 Reed	 has	 argued	 extra-judicially,	 sanctions	
should	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 dishonest	 litigant	 because	 such	 dishonesty	 “imposes	 an	
unnecessary	burden	on	court	resources.”21	
Similar	concerns	about	fraud	have	been	voiced	by	the	courts	in	the	specific	contexts	under	
discussion,	marine	 insurance	 claims	 and	documentary	 credit	 transactions.	 Fraud	does	 not	
affect	 these	transactions	 identically;	 it	 involves	different	parties	and	reaches	 the	courts	at	
different	stages	of	the	transaction.	As	a	basis	for	the	forthcoming	discussion,	an	overview	of	
each	mechanism	and	the	impact	of	fraud	is	now	provided.		
	
II. The	Insurance	Context	
The	nature	of	the	insurance	relationship	is	well	known.	It	is	designed	to	provide	the	assured	
with	a	financial	safety	net	in	the	event	of	harm	caused	by	an	insured	peril.	This	safety	net	is	
constructed	 through	 the	 transfer	 and	 spreading	 of	 risks	 in	 the	 market.22	 A	 risk	 averse	
individual	or	entity	transfers	the	risk	of	loss	to	a	professional	risk	taker,	the	underwriter,	in	
exchange	for	the	payment	of	the	premium.23	The	assured	suffers	a	small	financial	loss	in	the	
short	 term	 –	 the	 premium	 –	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 the	 potential	 for	 greater	 loss	 in	 the	
future.24	Risks	are	palatable	to	the	underwriter	because	it	can	pool	assureds	with	similar	risk	
profiles	and	charge	the	same	premium.	Efficient	underwriting	depends	on	sufficient	premium	
																																																						
20	R	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	of	Law	(5th	ed.	Aspen	Publishers,	1998),	123.	
21	 Lord	 Reed,	 ‘Lies,	 damned	 lies:	 Abuse	 of	 process	 and	 the	 dishonest	 litigant”	 3	 (26/10/2012)	 available	 at:	
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121026.pdf	(accessed	12/09/2017).	
22	T	Baker,	Insurance	Law	and	Policy	(Aspen	Publishers,	2003),	2.	
23	Ibid	2.	
24	 H	 Beh	 and	 J	 Stempel,	 ‘Misclassifying	 the	 insurance	 policy:	 The	 unforced	 errors	 of	 unilateral	 contract	
characterization’	[2010]	32(1)	Card.	L	Rev.	85,	105.	
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income	within	a	given	pool	to	indemnify	the	unlucky	few	who	suffer	a	significant	loss.25	This	
enables	the	insurer	to	spread	the	risk	of	loss	throughout	the	group	of	assureds.26	This	process	
of	writing	large	numbers	of	risks	is	facilitated	by	the	law	of	large	numbers;27	it	is	possible	to	
estimate	how	many	ships	will	sink	 in	a	given	year,	 for	example,	but	virtually	 impossible	to	
identify	with	precision	which	ships	will	sink.	
The	premium	is	set	by	reference	to	the	riskiness	of	the	individual	insured.28	This	makes	pre-
contractual	 negotiations	 critical;	 it	 is	 vital	 for	 the	underwriter	 to	 gather	 as	much	 relevant	
information	about	the	risk	as	he	can.	This	process	is	expensive	and	the	underwriter	will	be	
keen	 to	 ensure	 that	 these	 pre-contractual	 expenditures	 do	 not	 exceed	 the	 value	 of	 the	
business.	Accordingly,	the	underwriter	will	need	to	rely	on	the	information	provided	by	the	
prospective	 assured	 and	 this	 necessarily	 creates	 incentives	 for	 the	 assured	 to	 withhold	
information	which	would	tend	to	increase	his	risk.	The	deliberate	suppression	of	information	
at	 this	 stage	would	be	 regarded	as	 fraud	but	 its	 consideration	 is	beyond	 the	scope	of	 the	
project.29	 Payment	 of	 the	 premium	 constitutes	 the	 assured’s	 major	 obligation	 under	 the	
insurance	contract.	In	return	for	this	premium,	the	underwriter	promises	to	hold	the	assured	
harmless	against	covered	perils	or,	to	pay	a	sum	of	unliquidated	damages	to	indemnify	the	
assured	following	a	loss.30		
The	claims	process	is	the	time	at	which	the	insured	holds	the	underwriter	to	his	bargain.	This	
process,	yet	again,	creates	incentives	for	the	assured	to	behave	fraudulently	and	it	is	this	kind	
of	fraud	which	is	the	focus	of	this	project.	Fraud	at	the	claims	stage	may	take	several	forms.	
The	insured	may	(i)	deliberately	destroy	his	property	for	the	purposes	of	making	an	insurance	
claim	or	(ii)	may	exaggerate	his	losses	following	an	insured	event.	Until	the	recent	Supreme	
Court	decision	in	Versloot,31	a	third	category	of	behaviour	–	the	valid	claim	supported	by	false	
																																																						
25	T	Baker,	‘Constructing	the	insurance	relationship:	Sales	stories,	claims	stories,	and	insurance	contract	damages’	
(1993-1994)	72	Tex	L	Rev	1395,	1401.	
26	Baker,	Insurance	Law	(n22)	2.	
27	K	Abraham,	Insurance	Law	and	Regulation	(3rd	ed.	Foundation	Press,	2000),	2;	Baker,	Insurance	Law	(n22)	3.	
28	Abraham,	Insurance	Law	(n27)	2.	
29	For	a	comprehensive	account	of	pre-contractual	fraud	by	the	assured,	readers	are	directed	to	B	Soyer,	Marine	
Insurance	Fraud	(Informa	Law,	2014),	17-68.	Pre-contractual	duties	of	the	commercial	assured	are	now	governed	
by	 Insurance	 Act	 2015	 s.3,	 sched.	 1.	 The	 position	 for	 consumer	 assureds	 is	 contained	 in	 Consumer	 Insurance	
(Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012.	
30	Firma	C-Trade	SA	v	Newcastle	Protection	and	Indemnity	Assn	(The	Fanti	and	The	Padre	Island)	(No	2)	[1991]	2	AC	
1,	35,	per	Lord	Goff.	
31	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	[2016]	UKSC	48	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	
(Supreme	Court)).	
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evidence	–	was	also	treated	as	fraud.32	The	assured	may	also	be	treated	as	a	fraudster	if	he	
fails	to	disclose	the	existence	of	a	defence	to	his	underwriter.	Regardless	of	the	type	of	fraud,	
the	underwriter’s	liability	is	subject	to	the	terms	of	the	contract	and	it	is	not	uncommon	for	
him	 to	 attempt	 to	 identify	 a	 legitimate	 basis	 for	 resisting	 the	 claim.	 The	 validity	 of	 these	
defences	must	be	determined	before	any	payment	will	be	made	to	the	assured.	It	is	correct	
then	to	describe	the	insurance	relationship	as	‘argue	now,	pay	later’.33	Where	the	parties	are	
unable	to	agree	a	settlement,	the	insured	will	need	to	bring	a	claim	against	the	insurer	for	the	
indemnity.34	The	fraud	rule	will	then	be	deployed	by	the	insurer	as	a	defence	to	liability.	The	
action	will,	save	for	the	most	exceptional	of	cases,35	involve	the	allegedly	fraudulent	assured	
and	 the	 insurer.	A	 finding	of	 fraud	at	 trial	will	 cause	 the	assured	 to	 forfeit	his	 claim	 in	 its	
entirety,	 including	 any	 genuine	 loss.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 insurance	 relationship	means	 that	
allegations	of	fraud	must	be	resolved	before	any	indemnity	is	payable.	This,	from	a	structural	
perspective,	is	a	relatively	straightforward	process.	In	this	sense,	the	insurance	fraud	enquiry	
is	much	 less	complicated	than	that	which	occurs	 in	 transactions	 financed	by	documentary	
credit.		
	
III. The	Documentary	Credit	Context	
The	letter	of	credit	is	a	complex	method	of	trade	financing.36	It	creates	a	network	of	contracts	
to	bridge	the	gap	between	buyer	and	seller	and	assuage	mutual	concerns	about	dealing	with	
an	 unknown	 party	 located	 abroad.	 The	 major	 risks	 of	 international	 trade	 concern	 the	
fundamental	contractual	obligations	of	each	party;	the	seller’s	duty	to	send	goods	conforming	
to	 the	 contract	 and	 the	 buyer’s	 obligation	 to	 pay.	 The	 documentary	 credit	mechanism	 is	
designed	 to	 manage	 these	 risks	 by	 introducing	 banks	 into	 the	 contractual	 network.	 The	
primary	payment	obligation	 is	borne	by	 the	bank	and	this	eliminates	 the	seller’s	concerns	
																																																						
32	Agapitos	v	Agnew	(The	Aegeon)	[2003]	QB	556.	A	comprehensive	account	of	the	shifting	common	law	definition	
of	insurance	claims	fraud	will	be	provided	in	Chapter	Two,	see	later,	text	to	fn	186	et	seq.	
33	This	is	the	reverse	of	the	characterisation	of	the	letter	of	credit	contract,	see	G	McMeel,	‘Pay	now,	argue	later’	
[1999]	LMCLQ	5.	
34	J	Feinman,	‘The	regulation	of	insurance	claims	practices’	[2015]	5	UC	Irvine	L	Rev	1319,	1416.	
35	The	claim	for	indemnity	may	be	brought	by	a	representative	of	the	assured	such	as	when	the	assured	has	died	
following	the	occurrence	of	the	loss,	see	The	Aegeon	(n32)	558	per	Mance	LJ.	
36	P	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(2nd	ed.	Informa	Law,	2010),	[4.019].	However,	the	ICC	would	seem	to	disagree	
with	this	characterisation,	see	D	Bischof,	‘Letters	of	credit	(LCs):	recognizing	the	value	of	simple	trade	instruments’	
(12/07/16)	 available	 at:	 	 http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2016/Letters-of-credit-(LCs)-recognizing-the-
value-of-simple-trade-instruments/	(accessed	16/08/16)	where	the	credit	is	described	as	“well-worn	and	simple”.	
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regarding	the	buyer’s	insolvency.	Moreover,	payment	is	contingent	on	the	seller	presenting	
documents	 indicating	he	has	performed	his	obligations,	which	 reduces	 the	buyer’s	 risk	of	
paying	for	poor	quality	or	non-existent	goods.	Effectively,	the	 letter	of	credit	establishes	a	
channel	through	which	documents	representing	the	goods	can	reach	the	buyer	in	exchange	
for	the	price.	The	fundamental	purpose	of	the	mechanism	is	to	ensure	a	swift	and	virtually	
unassailable	means	of	payment	to	finance	international	sales.		
The	letter	of	credit	does	not	remove	the	risks	of	international	trade	entirely.	The	documentary	
nature	of	the	transaction	creates	incentives	for	the	seller	to	commit	fraud	in	the	course	of	his	
obligations.37	 The	 first,	 and	 most	 deliberate,	 type	 of	 fraud	 occurs	 when	 the	 seller	 ships	
worthless	goods	or	nothing	at	all	and	procures	wholly	false	documentation	to	substantiate	
his	 right	 to	payment.	 The	 second	category	of	 fraud	 is	opportunistic	 in	nature.	This	occurs	
when	the	seller	has	shipped	the	contract	goods	but	then	breaches	the	credit	contract,	and	
possibly	also	the	underlying	contract	of	sale,	by	shipping	the	goods	late	or	from	the	wrong	
port.	 The	 fraud	 occurs	 where	 the	 seller	 procures	 fraudulent	 documentation,	 such	 as	 a	
backdated	bill	of	lading,	to	conceal	this	breach.		
The	 fraud	enquiry	 in	 documentary	 credit	 transactions	 is	 particularly	 complex	because	 the	
fraud	 rule	can	be	 raised	both	before	and	after	payment	has	been	made,	and	actions	may	
wholly	exclude	the	alleged	fraudster.	In	addition,	the	fraud	enquiry	is	constrained	by	the	fact	
that	the	court’s	priority	 is	to	ensure	that	the	documentary	credit	remains	a	swift	payment	
mechanism.	 This	 limits	 the	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	 prevention	 since	 the	 investigation	
necessary	to	uncover	fraud	will	inevitably	delay	payment.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	general	
organising	principle	of	documentary	credits	 is	 ‘pay	now,	argue	 later.’38	Aware	of	the	fraud	
potential	in	credit	transactions,	the	courts	have	developed	a	narrow	fraud	exception	which	
can	be	invoked	both	before	and	after	payment	has	been	made	to	the	credit	beneficiary.	From	
the	buyer’s	perspective,	 it	will	 be	preferable	 to	 raise	 fraud	prior	 to	payment	and	 this	will	
require	him	to	obtain	an	interim	injunction	against	the	seller	or	the	paying	bank.	Success	at	
this	stage	is	very	rare,	though	hypothetically	possible,	in	English	law.	The	fraud	exception	is	
more	likely	to	operate	after	the	seller	has	received	payment.	It	is	typically	raised	as	a	defence	
																																																						
37	This	is	to	be	distinguished	from	fraud	committed	by	the	buyer	or	schemes	concocted	between	buyer	and	seller	
to	defraud	the	bank.	These	issues	are	briefly	considered	in	A	Malek	and	D	Quest,	Jack:	Documentary	Credits	(4th	
ed.	Tottel	Publishing,	2009),	[9.20].	
38	McMeel	(n33)	5.	
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by	the	buyer	in	an	action	brought	by	the	bank	for	reimbursement.39	In	these	circumstances,	
the	court	is	effectively	asked	to	apportion	loss	between	two	innocent	parties.	Of	course,	an	
action	 to	 recover	 the	money	 from	 the	 seller	 after	 payment	 is	 theoretically	 possible,	 but	
unlikely	where	the	fraud	was	deliberately	orchestrated	by	a	dishonest	trader.		
The	 fraud	 rule	 in	documentary	 credits	will	 rarely	 target	 the	 fraudster	directly	and	 instead	
typically	operates	as	a	risk	allocation	device	between	two	innocent	parties.	Matters	are	much	
more	 straightforward	 in	 the	 insurance	 context	 where	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 only	 operates	
between	alleged	fraudster	and	potential	victim	in	a	final	trial	of	the	issues.	These	differences	
are	explicable	by	reference	to	the	different	role	of	each	mechanism.	The	credit	is	a	primary	
payment	mechanism	which,	to	serve	its	purpose,	must	be	permitted	to	function	swiftly	and	
with	limited	judicial	intervention.	This	gives	the	potential	victim	only	a	very	short	period	in	
which	to	gather	sufficient	evidence	of	fraud.	By	contrast,	considerations	of	speed	are	far	less	
pressing	in	the	insurance	context.	Once	the	loss	has	occurred,	there	are	few	structural	reasons	
to	prevent	 the	underwriter	 conducting	a	 comprehensive	 investigation	and	presenting	 this	
evidence	to	a	court.	Provided	the	underwriter	submits	sufficient	evidence,	there	is	no	reason	
to	prevent	the	court	reaching	a	conclusion	on	the	fraud	allegation.	The	requirements	of	the	
respective	mechanisms	 affect	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 intervene	 in	 a	 timely	 fashion	 to	
counter	fraud.	This	has	led	the	courts	to	conceptualise	the	fraud	problem	and	the	purpose	of	
judicial	intervention	in	different	ways.	The	following	chapters	will	examine	these	differences	
in	greater	depth	but	an	overview	is	provided	at	this	stage.	
	
The	insurance	courts	have	recognised	fraud	as	a	serious	threat	to	the	insurance	relationship.	
The	narrative	is	one	of	dishonesty	and	deceit	which	portrays	the	law	in	instrumental	terms	to	
discourage	fraud	in	the	claims	process.	By	contrast,	the	narrative	of	the	trade	finance	courts	
largely	marginalises	fraud,	offering	an	image	of	honest	commercial	dealing	in	which	the	needs	
of	the	market	-	a	swift,	certain	payment	mechanism	-	trump	the	security	mechanisms	needed	
to	effectively	detect	and	uncover	fraud.	In	both	contexts,	these	narratives	are	underpinned	
by	 simplistic	 assertions	 about	 how	people	 respond	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 legal	 sanctions	 in	 the	
																																																						
39	For	example,	Gian	Singh	v	Banque	de	l'Indochine	[1974]	1	WLR	1234;	Credit	Agricole	v	Generale	Bank	[1999]	2	All	
ER	Comm	1009;	DCD	Factors	plc	v	Ramada	Trading	Ltd	[2008]	Bus	LR	654.	
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insurance	case,	and	by	reference	to	market	need	in	relation	to	documentary	credits.	These	
assertions	have	not	yet	been	the	subject	of	considered	analysis	and	critique.		
	
IV. A	Justification	of	the	Comparison	
The	differences	in	the	judicial	narrative	surrounding	fraud	demand	further	examination	and	
consideration.	While	the	rules	under	discussion	–	the	forfeiture	rule	in	marine	insurance	and	
the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	credit	–	each	depend,	to	some	extent,	on	ex	turpi	causa,	
this	is	where	the	similarity	ends.	Indeed,	the	rules	have	been	developed	in	different	directions	
by	 the	 courts.	 This	 results	 from	a	different	 characterisation	of	 the	parties	 involved	 in	 the	
relevant	transaction,	constraints	supposedly	dictated	by	the	particular	mechanism	and	the	
intended	purpose	of	 the	 fraud	 rule.	 This	divergence	 in	 judicial	 treatment	makes	 the	 rules	
worthy	comparators.	
The	 comparison	 is	 further	 justified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 mechanisms	 converge	 in	 the	
practical	setting.	The	marine	insurance	policy,	for	example,	is	one	of	the	documents	that	the	
seller	must	present	to	obtain	payment	under	a	documentary	credit.	The	potential	fraudsters	
are	 commercial	 traders	 who,	 over	 the	 course	 of	 their	 careers,	 will	 be	 presented	 with	
opportunities	 to	 commit	 fraud	 both	 as	 seller	 under	 a	 documentary	 credit	 and	 insurance	
policyholder.	This	practical	overlap	often	means	that	issues	connected	to	marine	insurance	
and	 international	 trade	 financing	 are	 examined	 within	 the	 same	 work	 but	 academic	
treatments	 tend	 to	 regard	 these	 areas	 as	 largely	 distinct.40	 This	 project	 continues	 in	 this	
tradition,	 but	 advances	 the	discussion	by	 comparing	 a	 crucial	 aspect	of	 these	 commercial	
mechanisms;	the	respective	fraud	rules	and	how	they	have	been	constructed	by	the	courts.	
The	mechanisms	under	discussion	–	the	insurance	policy	and	the	documentary	credit	–	serve	
very	different	purposes	in	international	trade.	This	project	is	not	then	a	study	of	comparable	
mechanisms	 and	 nor	 does	 it	 suggest	 that	 fraud	 rules	 should	 be	 identical	 irrespective	 of	
context.	Rather,	 it	seeks	to	identify	the	policy	considerations	which	have	shaped	the	fraud	
rule	in	each	context	and	the	extent	to	which	these	considerations	remain	valid.		
																																																						
40	 Examples	would	 include	 Todd,	Maritime	 Fraud	&	 Piracy	 (n36)	 (chs.	 3-4	 concern	 documentary	 credits,	 ch.6	
concerns	marine	insurance);	I	Carr,	International	Trade	Law	(5th	ed.	Routledge,	2014)	(chapter	13	deals	with	these	
topics	distinctly.)	
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Accordingly,	the	following	research	questions	are	posed:	
1. How	is	the	fraud	rule	constructed	in	doctrinal	and	procedural	terms?41	
2. What	policy	arguments	have	been	used	by	the	courts	to	justify	the	scope	of	and	the	
procedural	criteria	required	to	invoke	the	fraud	rule?42	
3. To	what	extent	do	these	policy	justifications	remain	valid	today?43	
	
This	thesis	meets	a	gap	in	the	literature	by	challenging	the	policy	arguments	used	to	justify	
the	scope	of	the	fraud	rules	in	the	law	of	marine	insurance	and	documentary	credits.	At	this	
stage,	it	is	convenient	to	demonstrate	the	current	absence	of	policy	discussion	in	these	areas.	
	
V. The	Absence	of	Policy	Discussion	
The	fraud	rules	under	discussion	have	developed	from	a	similar	starting	point;	the	notion	that	
fraud	unravels	all.44	Despite	this	shared	basis,	the	rules	have	developed	differently.	In	each	
setting,	the	courts	have	relied	on	particular	policy	arguments	deemed	relevant	to	the	context	
at	hand	to	justify	the	particular	scope	and	purpose	of	the	rule.	Considerations	of	deterrence	
have	framed	the	discussion	in	the	insurance	cases,	whereas	an	emphasis	on	commercial	need	
has	been	employed	in	letters	of	credit.			
There	is,	of	course,	no	conceptual	difficulty	with	using	policy	arguments	to	develop	the	law.	
Indeed,	such	arguments	are	routinely	adopted	by	the	courts	in	cases	where	“the	rules	of	the	
legal	system	do	not	provide	a	clear	resolution	of	a	dispute.”45	But	since	policy	arguments	are	
simply	“value-judgements”,46	the	policy	construction	employed	in	a	particular	context	is	not	
fixed	nor	inevitable,	but	open	to	question	in	subsequent	cases.	Bell’s	suggestion	that	courts	
are	“too	ready	to	assume	that	there	is	no	fundamental	disagreement	about	the	values	to	be	
																																																						
41	This	is	addressed	in	Chapter	Two	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Four	(documentary	credits).	
42	This	is	addressed	in	Chapter	Two	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Four	(documentary	credits).	
43	This	is	addressed	in	Chapter	Three	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Five	(documentary	credits).	
44	For	the	insurance	context	see	Manifest	Shipping	Co	Ltd	v	Uni-Polaris	Co	Ltd	(The	Star	Sea)	[2003]	1	AC	469,	[62]	
per	Lord	Hobhouse;	for	the	documentary	credit	context	see	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	
American	Accord)	[1982]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	1,	6	per	Lord	Diplock,	(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(House	
of	Lords)).	
45	J	Bell,	Policy	Arguments	in	Judicial	Decisions	(Clarendon	Press,	1983),	22-23.	
46	Ibid	36.	
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applied”47	is	certainly	applicable	in	the	insurance	and	trade	finance	contexts.	This	absence	of	
critique	is	particularly	problematic	when	one	appreciates	that	many	of	these	arguments	were	
developed	in	the	nineteenth	century	or	by	analogy	to	much	older	commercial	mechanisms.	
The	nature	of	commerce	has	changed	dramatically	in	the	intervening	years.	It	is	certainly	not	
a	given	that	modern	courts	would	be	as	influenced	by	these	arguments	if	they	were	starting	
from	scratch	today.	
Firstly,	the	marine	insurance	context.	The	discussion	in	The	Star	Sea	confirms	that	the	rule	
prohibiting	fraudulent	claims	is	analogous	to	ex	turpi	causa,			
The	law	is	that	the	insured	who	has	made	a	fraudulent	claim	may	not	recover	the	claim	
which	 could	 have	 been	 honestly	 made.	 The	 principle	 is	 well	 established	 and	 has	
certainly	existed	since	the	early	19th	century…	Just	as	the	law	will	not	allow	an	insured	
to	commit	a	crime	and	then	use	it	as	basis	for	recovering	an	indemnity	(Beresford	v	
Royal	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1937]	2	KB	197),	so	it	will	not	allow	an	insured	who	has	made	
a	fraudulent	claim	to	recover.	48	
This	is	not,	however,	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	This	is	because	the	court	
usually	refuses	to	engage	with	issues	of	illegality	and	this	leaves	the	loss	to	lie	where	it	fell.49	
The	consequences	of	forfeiture	are	more	severe;	the	assured	also	loses	his	claim	for	genuine	
loss	and	is	required	to	return	any	sums	paid	prior	to	the	discovery	of	the	fraud.50	This	cannot	
be	explained	by	reference	to	ex	turpi	causa	but	instead	depends	on	considerations	of	policy,51	
namely	the	deterrence	of	fraud.	As	Lord	Hobhouse	continued	in	The	Star	Sea,		
The	logic	is	simple.	The	fraudulent	insured	must	not	be	allowed	to	think:	if	the	fraud	
is	successful,	then	I	will	gain;	if	it	is	unsuccessful,	I	will	lose	nothing.52	
																																																						
47	Ibid	36.	
48	The	Star	Sea	(n44)	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	See	also,	Britton	v	Royal	Insurance	Co	(1866)	4	F&F	905.	
49	 (Lord)	 J	 Sumption,	 ‘Reflexions	 on	 the	 law	 of	 illegality’	 (Speech	 to	 Chancery	 Bar	 Association,	 23	 April	 2012)	
available	 at:	 http://www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/annual-lectures/reflections-on-the-law-of-
illegality.pdf	(accessed	18/09/2017),	3.	
50	Axa	General	Insurance	Ltd	v	Gottlieb	[2005]	1	All	ER	(Comm)	445,	[29]	per	Mance	LJ.	
51	Ibid	[29]	per	Mance	LJ.	
52	The	Star	Sea	(n44)	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
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The	 view	 that	 legal	 sanctions	 are	 required	 to	 prevent	 widespread	 claims	 fraud	 has	 been	
repeated	in	case	law	since	the	1860s53	and	is	typically	endorsed	in	academic	commentary.	
Professor	Bennett,	for	example,	reiterates	the	above	excerpt	from	The	Star	Sea	before	going	
on	to	comment	that	“[i]f	fraud	carried	no	risk,	there	would	be	no	deterrent.		On	the	contrary,	
there	would	be	a	perverse	incentive	to	be	fraudulent.”54	Professor	Todd	has	also	confirmed	
the	overriding	importance	of	deterrence	in	the	construction	of	the	forfeiture	rule,		
The	intention	is	clear	enough,	to	discourage	the	assured	from	presenting	fraudulent	
claims,	of	fraudulently	embellishing	claims.55	
The	 ‘forfeiture	 as	 deterrent’	 narrative	 remained	 largely	 unchallenged	 until	 the	 recent	
litigation	in	Versloot.56	Earlier	scepticism	of	the	deterrent	effect	of	the	civil	law	appeared	in	
Professor	Clarke’s,	Law	of	Insurance	Contracts,57	in	which	he	noted	that	the	civil	law	was	not	
usually	tasked	with	punishing	offenders58	and	continued,			
Moreover,	 the	 case	 for	 penal	 sanctions	 rests	 partly	 on	 their	 efficacy	 for	 social	
engineering	for	deterrence,	which,	in	this	context	at	least,	is	doubtful.		The	assumption	
is	that	it	works.59			
Clarke	repeated	the	argument,	originally	made	by	Mustill	LJ,60	that	the	civil	law	cannot	deter	
if	the	major	threat	of	the	criminal	law,	imprisonment,	has	not	dissuaded	the	offender.61	He	
continued,	
Of	course	fraud	is	not	murder,	but	to	a	significant	degree,	surely,	the	same	can	be	said	
of	cold	blooded	crimes	such	as	fraud,	if	the	fraudsters	think	that	their	chances	of	being	
																																																						
53	Britton	(n48)	909	per	Willes	J;	Galloway	v	Guardian	Royal	Exchange	(UK)	Ltd	[1999]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	209,	213	per	
Lord	Woolf	MR;	The	Star	Sea	(n44)	62	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
54	H	Bennett,	The	Law	of	Marine	Insurance	(2nd	ed.	OUP,	2006),	719.	
55	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n36)	[6.048].	
56	The	case	reached	the	Supreme	Court,	see	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n31).	
57	M	Clarke,	Law	of	 Insurance	Contracts	 (4th	ed.	Service	 Issue	35	1	April	2016)	 (hereafter	referred	to	as	 ‘Clarke	
(looseleaf)’)	
58	Ibid	[27-2C3].	
59	 Ibid	 [27-2C3].	 The	 judgment	 in	 Versloot	 Dredging	 BV	 v	 HDI-Gerling	 Industrie	 Versicherung	 AG	 (The	 DC	
Merwestone)	[2014]	EWCA	Civ	1349;	[2015]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	32	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	
prompted	further	consideration	of	the	deterrent	effect	of	forfeiture,	see	P	Rawlings,	and	J	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud:	
The	“convoluted	and	confused”	state	of	the	law’	[2016]	LQR	96,	98;	P	Rawlings	and	J	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	
the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(2017)	80(3)	MLR	525,	537	et	seq.	
60	M	Mustill,	‘Fault	and	marine	losses’	[1988]	LMCLQ	310,	319.	
61	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n57)	[27-2C3].	
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caught	are	small.		The	courts,	however,	appear	to	have	taken	a	different	view,	for	the	
prospect	 of	 deterrence	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 policy	 factor	 in	 decisions	 such	 as	
Galloway,	and	more	recently	in	Axa	v	Gottlieb.62	
It	 is	correct	to	suggest	that	pre-Versloot,	Clarke’s	sceptical	account	of	the	rule	was	unique	
amongst	the	major	academic	commentaries	on	insurance	law.	Indeed,	his	scepticism	was	the	
inspiration	for	the	author’s	LLM	dissertation	which	critiqued	the	Law	Commission’s	proposals	
for	 reform	from	a	criminological	perspective.63	 	This	project	continues	 in	a	 similar	vein	by	
providing	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	
forfeiture	rule	as	deterrent.		
The	leading	English	account	of	the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	credits	is	traced	to	Lord	
Diplock’s	judgment	in	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada.64	Much	like	its	insurance	
comparator,	the	fraud	rule	was	explained	as		
a	clear	application	of	the	maxim	ex	turpi	causa	non	oritur	actio	or,	if	plain	English	is	to	
be	preferred,	fraud	unravels	all.65	
Policy	 considerations	 have	 been	 equally	 influential	 in	 this	 context,	 enabling	 the	 courts	 to	
justify	the	particular	scope	and	purpose	of	the	fraud	exception.	Notably,	however,	the	policy	
arguments	 employed	 in	 relation	 to	 documentary	 credits	 are	 different	 to	 those	 deemed	
relevant	 in	 the	 insurance	 setting.	 This	 is	 not	 altogether	 surprising	 since	 the	nature	of	 the	
documentary	credit	transaction	means	that	fraud	raises	different	considerations	and	involves	
different	 parties.	 In	 particular,	 the	major	 policy	 argument	 employed	 by	 the	 trade	 finance	
courts	is	the	idea	that	commercial	parties	require	a	payment	mechanism	which	is	only	subject	
to	judicial	intervention	in	limited	circumstances.	Indeed,	Lord	Diplock	used	the	‘commercial	
need’	argument	to	reject	a	broader	fraud	exception,		
This	 proposition	 which	 does	 not	 call	 for	 knowledge	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
seller/beneficiary	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 inaccuracy	 would	 embrace	 the	 fraud	
exception	and	render	it	superfluous.	My	Lords,	the	more	closely	this	bold	proposition	
																																																						
62	Ibid	[27-2C3].	
63	 K	Richards,	 ‘Deterring	 insurance	 fraud:	A	 critical	 and	 criminological	 analysis	 of	 the	 English	 and	 Scottish	 Law	
Commissions’	current	proposals	for	reform’	(2013)	24	ILJ	16.	
64	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n44)	6-7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
65	Ibid	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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is	subjected	to	legal	analysis,	the	more	implausible	it	becomes;	to	assent	to	it	would,	
in	my	view,	undermine	the	whole	system	of	financing	international	trade	by	means	of	
documentary	credits.66	
Academic	commentaries	of	documentary	credit	 fraud	typically	repeat	the	salient	points	of	
Lord	Diplock’s	judgment	before	identifying	the	procedural	criteria	which	the	claimant	must	
satisfy.67	There	is,	as	far	as	the	author	can	identify,	no	suggestion	that	commercial	need	is	an	
inappropriate	basis	by	which	to	develop	the	rule.		The	issue,	however,	is	the	nature	of	the	
reasoning	which	 enabled	 the	House	 of	 Lords	 to	 reach	 their	 conclusions	 on	 fraud	 and	 the	
related	 questions	 of	 forgery	 and	 nullity.68	 Professor	 Goode’s	main	 contention	 is	 that	 the	
judgment	in	United	City	Merchants	misstates	the	contractual	basis	of	the	credit	mechanism	
and	undermines	the	major	doctrines	on	which	the	documentary	credit	depends.	69	This	had	
significant	 consequences	 for	 the	 judicial	 elaboration	of	 the	 fraud	exception	 in	United	City	
Merchants.	While	 Goode	 does	 not	 suggest	 that	 the	 policy	 arguments	 were	 incorrect,	 his	
explicit	critique	of	the	judicial	reasoning	in	the	House	of	Lords	is	a	notable	exception	to	the	
general	pattern	of	acceptance.	
As	a	critique	of	the	policy	approaches	adopted	by	the	courts,	this	project	fits	within	a	broader	
tradition	 in	 private	 law,	 most	 notably	 in	 relation	 to	 insurance	 law.	 One	 of	 the	 earliest	
examples	of	such	work	is	Harnett	and	Thornton’s	critique	of	the	doctrine	of	insurable	interest	
from	a	socio-economic	perspective.70	There	the	authors	noted	the	value	of	such	work;	it	was	
required	“to	prevent…	deterioration	into	a	set	of	fixed	and	unyielding	‘principles’,	constant	
and	vigilant	re-evaluation	of	concepts	is	necessary	to	enable	legal	concepts	to	keep	pace	with	
adjustments	in	external	variables.”71	More	recently,	Professor	Davey	has	employed	a	similar	
																																																						
66	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
67	For	example,	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n37)	[9.8]-[9.19];	P	Ellinger	and	D	Neo,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	Documentary	
Letters	of	Credit	(Hart	Publishing,	2010),	138	et	seq.;	N	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	of	Letters	of	Credit	
and	Demand	Guarantees	(OUP,	2011),	[5.10].	
68	R	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	in	P	Cane	and	J	Stapleton	(eds.),	Essays	for	Patrick	Atiyah	(Clarendon	
Press,	 1991)	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘Goode,	 ‘Abstract	 payment	 undertakings’);	 E	 McKendrick,	 Goode	 on	
Commercial	 Law	 (4th	 ed.	 Penguin,	 2010);	 D	 Horowitz,	 Letters	 of	 Credit	 and	 Demand	 Guarantees:	 Defences	 to	
Payment	(OUP,	2010),	[3.18].	See	also	EP	Ellinger,	‘Fraud	in	documentary	credit	transactions’	[1981]	JBL	258.	
69	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n68)	228,	232.	
70	B	Harnett	and	J	Thornton,	‘Insurable	Interest	in	Property:	A	Socio-Economic	Re-evaluation	of	a	Legal	Concept’	
(1948)	48	Col	L	Rev	1162.	
71	Ibid	1162.	
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approach	in	a	number	of	areas	of	insurance	law,72	explicitly	subjecting	the	judicial	approach,	
most	notably	that	of	Lord	Mance,	to	critique.73	
Having	identified	the	academic	tradition	in	which	this	project	sits,	it	is	convenient	at	this	stage	
to	consider	the	specific	methodology	employed	here.	
	
VI. Methodology		
As	a	critique	of	common	law	rules	on	fraud,	this	thesis	has	been	a	desk-based	project.	The	
purpose	of	the	project	was	to	unpick	the	policy	reasoning	which	has	been	used	to	construct	
fraud	 rules	 in	 the	marine	 insurance	and	documentary	 credit	 contexts.	 This	necessitated	a	
close,	doctrinal	analysis	of	 the	 relevant	case	 law	and	associated	academic	commentary	 to	
determine	the	policy	basis/bases	underpinning	the	respective	fraud	rules.		
Academic	commentators	and	subsequent	courts	typically	endorse	the	policy	arguments	used	
to	justify	the	fraud	rules	without	considering	their	validity	or	explanatory	power.	By	contrast,	
this	project	critically	examines	these	policy	arguments	and	considers	whether	they	remain	a	
valid	explanation	of	 judicial	 intervention	 in	 fraud	 cases.	 In	developing	 these	 critiques,	 the	
project	 drew	 comparisons	 with	 foreign	 jurisdictions	 and	 literatures	 beyond	 law.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 highlight,	 however,	 that	 as	 each	 rule	 is	 premised	 on	 context-specific	 policy	
considerations,	the	critiques	necessarily	differ	both	in	content	and	the	sources	on	which	they	
depend.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	a	single	theoretical	framework	is	not	developed	in	this	thesis.		
Both	critiques	adopt	a	comparative	approach.	In	the	insurance	context,	a	comparison	is	made	
with	 the	 approach	 to	 fraudulent	 insurance	 claims	 in	 Australia	 and	 the	 English	 courts’	
approach	to	fraudulent	claims	in	criminal	and	personal	injury	law.	In	the	documentary	credit	
chapter,	the	English	approach	is	contrasted	with	approaches	adopted	in	other	jurisdictions,	
primarily	 the	 USA	 and	 Singapore.	 The	 more	 expansive	 approaches	 adopted	 in	 foreign	
																																																						
72	J	Davey,	‘Honesty	&	the	relational	commercial	contract:	Towards	a	law	of	post-contractual	misrepresentation’,	
(Insurance	Fraud	Symposium,	University	of	Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016),	5.	
73J	Davey	and	K	Richards,	‘Deterrence,	human	rights	and	illegality:	The	forfeiture	rule	in	insurance	contract	law’	
[2015]	LMCLQ	315;	J	Davey,	‘The	reform	of	insurance	warranties:	A	behavioral	economics	perspective’	(2013)	JBL	
118;	J	Davey,	‘Remedying	the	remedies:	The	shifting	shape	of	insurance	contract	law’	[2013]	LMCLQ	476;	J	Davey,	
‘Claims	notification	clauses	and	the	design	of	default	rules	in	insurance	contract	law’	(2012)	23	ILJ	245.	
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jurisdictions	are	used	to	reflect	on	the	English	emphasis	on	commercial	need	as	a	basis	for	
the	narrow	fraud	rule.	
The	project	also	adopts	empirical	work	on	the	use	of	documentary	credits.	The	data	was	no	
longer	 available	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing74	 and	 so	 the	 project	 draws	 upon	 commentaries	
explaining	 the	 original	 survey.75	 This	 data	 fits	 within	 empirical	 legal	 scholarship	 which	
demonstrates	a	divergence	between	the	 law	on	paper	and	the	 law	 in	action.	This	broader	
context	is	a	useful	perspective	from	which	to	consider	the	continued	popularity	of	the	credit	
mechanism	and	to	reconceptualise	fraud	and	deterrence	in	credit	transactions.	
Broadly	speaking,	the	methodology	adopted	in	this	project	builds	on	the	approach	taken	in	
earlier	work.	 In	 the	 author’s	 LLM	dissertation,	 criminological	 theories	 of	 deterrence	were	
used	to	analyse	the	Law	Commission’s	proposals	 for	the	reform	of	 insurance	 law.76	 In	this	
project,	insights	from	law	&	economics,	behavioural	economics	and	relational	contract	theory	
are	 used	 to	 critique	 the	 policies	 said	 to	 underpin	 fraud	 rules	 in	 the	 insurance	 and	
documentary	 credit	 contexts.	 In	 this	project,	 the	author	 views	 theory	 in	 the	 same	way	as	
suggested	by	Professor	Roger	Brownsword,	
the	purpose	of	theory	is	to	offer	us	a	critical	vantage	point	from	which	we	can	assess	
the	appropriateness	of	the	standards	and	values	embodied	in	particular	regimes	of	
contract	law.77	
The	methodology	employed	in	this	thesis	was	developed	with	the	research	questions	in	mind.	
The	 combination	 of	 close	 doctrinal	 work	 and	 theoretical	 insights	 enabled	 the	 author	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 insurance	 claims	 fraud	 and	 fraud	 in	 transactions	
financed	by	documentary	credit.	
	
																																																						
74	In	personal	correspondence	with	Professor	Mann	he	has	confirmed	that	the	data	are	no	longer	available,	see	
statement	by	Professor	Ronald	Mann	(Personal	email	correspondence,	20	May	2015)	(on	file	with	the	author).	
75	 R	Mann,	 ‘The	 role	 of	 letters	 of	 credit	 in	 payment	 transactions’	 (1999-2000)	 98	Mich	 L	 Rev	 2494;	 AW	Katz,	
‘Informality	 as	 a	bilateral	 assurance	mechanism.	Comments	on	Ronald	Mann’s	 ‘The	 role	of	 letters	of	 credit	 in	
payment	transactions’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2554;	C	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals.	Comments	on	Ronald	
Mann’s	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	payment	transactions’’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2537.	
76	This	was	subsequently	published	as	Richards	(n63).		
77	R	Brownsword,	‘Maps,	methodologies,	and	critiques:	Confessions	of	a	contract	lawyer’	in	M	van	Hoecke	(ed.),	
Methodologies	of	Legal	Research	(Hart	Publishing,	2011)	133.	
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VII. Originality	
A	doctoral	thesis	must	contribute	to	the	existing	body	of	knowledge	and	this	project	satisfies	
this	criterion	in	several	ways.	At	the	outset,	it	is	important	to	note	the	rarity	of	a	simultaneous	
consideration	of	fraud	in	the	marine	insurance	and	documentary	credit	contexts.	Although	
these	 areas	 of	 law	 often	 converge	 in	 practice,	 they	 do	 not	 typically	 form	 the	 basis	 of	
comparative	research.	 	Moreover,	 this	practical	 inseparability	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	each	
area	of	law	has	developed	a	different	response	to	fraud.	This	is	striking	and	merits	further	
enquiry.	The	suggestion	made	here	 is	not	 that	 rules	against	 fraud	should	be	 identical,	but	
rather	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 context	 in	understanding	 the	 limits	of	 a	 rule	and	of	
interrogating	the	policies	which	have	dictated	these	limits.		
The	insurance	discussion	depends	largely	on	the	use	of	deterrence	literature	from	the	fields	
of	criminology	and	psychology.	These	insights	have	now	begun	to	permeate	the	policymaker	
and	judicial	debate	because	of	submissions	made	in	part	by	the	author	on	this	topic.78	This	
project	builds	on	earlier	work	in	which	these	ideas	were	used	to	suggest	that	the	forfeiture	
rule	 is	 an	 ineffective	 deterrent79	 in	 two	 ways.	 Firstly,	 by	 providing	 a	 more	 sophisticated	
account	 of	 the	 law	&	 economics	 literature	 and	 how	 this	 accords	with	 a	 consideration	 of	
insurance	fraud.	In	addition,	discussions	of	deterrence	usually	focus	on	the	exaggerated	claim	
whereas	the	discussion	here	extends	the	analysis	to	include	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim.	
Discussions	 of	 fraud	 in	 the	 documentary	 credit	 context	 have	 largely	 concerned	 whether	
exceptions	to	autonomy	should	be	extended.	This	project	changes	the	focus	of	the	debate	by	
considering	whether	the	policy	factors	underpinning	the	narrow	conception	of	fraud	are	valid.	
It	 does	 this	 by	 adopting	 a	 comparative	 approach	 and	 by	 highlighting	 the	 detrimental	
consequences	flowing	from	the	House	of	Lords’	reasoning	in	United	City	Merchants.	Though	
																																																						
78	Law	Commission,	Insurance	Contract	Law:	Business	Disclosure;	Warranties;	Insurers’	Remedies	for	Fraudulent	
Claims;	 and	 Late	 Payment	 (Law	 Com	No	 353,	 2014)	 218,	 [23.10];	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce,	 Insurance	 Fraud	
Taskforce	 Final	 Report	 (2016)	 available	 at:	 	 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insurance-fraud-
taskforce-final-report	(accessed	13/09/2016),	40;	 Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce,	 Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce	 Interim	
Report	 (2015)	 available	 at:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413146/PU1789_Insurance_Fr
aud_Taskforce_interim_report_-_final.pdf	(accessed	13/09/2016),	16-17.	
79	The	author’s	LLM	dissertation	represents	the	beginning	of	this	work	and	was	subsequently	published	as	Richards	
(n63).		
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these	are	not	necessarily	new	criticisms,	the	originality	exists	in	the	facts	they	are	discussed	
together	and	to	demonstrate	that	they	undermine	the	very	construction	of	the	fraud	rule.	
One	of	the	major	areas	of	originality	lies	in	the	presentation	of	empirical	work	conducted	in	
the	United	States.	This	has,	as	yet,	not	permeated	the	UK	discussion	of	documentary	credits.80	
The	empirical	work	presents	a	radically	different	account	of	the	practical	use	of	credits	and	
develops	an	analysis	which	explains	parties’	continued	use	of	the	mechanism.	The	particular	
contribution	 in	 this	 project	 is	 to	 adapt	 this	 data	 to	 the	 fraud	 context	 and	 develop	 a	 new	
account	of	fraud	deterrence	in	overseas	transactions	financed	by	documentary	credit.		
	
	
VIII. Chapter	Outlines	
For	ease	of	exposition,	and	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	direction	of	this	thesis,	a	summary	
of	each	chapter	is	now	provided.	As	a	comparison	of	fraud	rules	in	two	contexts,	the	project	
follows	a	pattern;	a	chapter	on	the	doctrinal	limits	of	the	relevant	rule	is	followed	by	a	chapter	
in	which	the	policy	construction	is	critiqued.		
Following	the	introduction	in	this	chapter,	Chapter	Two	assesses	the	insurance	forfeiture	rule	
from	a	doctrinal	perspective.	It	sketches	the	contours	of	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction	and	
analyses	the	wealth	of	recent	case	law	and	the	impact	of	the	Insurance	Act	2015.	The	primary	
policy	 justification	 in	 judicial	discussions	 is	 fraud	deterrence.	The	existence	of	 information	
asymmetries	in	the	insured-insurer	relationship	creates	incentives	for	fraud	and	necessitates	
rules	to	protect	the	underwriter.	The	chapter	demonstrates	that	the	courts	have	adapted	an	
expansive	 approach	 to	 questions	 of	 fraud;	 establishing	 relatively	 low	 materiality	
requirements	and	resisting	calls	to	introduce	elements	of	proportionality	into	the	remedial	
framework.	The	recent	decision	in	Versloot81	curtails	the	otherwise	expanding	approach	to	
fraud	by	removing	a	category	of	conduct	sufficient	to	invoke	the	rule.	The	relevance	of	the	
maxim	‘fraud	unravels	all’	in	this	context	is	altered	by	this	decision.	It	would	have	been	correct	
																																																						
80	Several	authors	have	cited	the	work	in	passing	but	have	not	devoted	any	real	time	to	discussion	in	UK	literature,	
see	M	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence	in	international	trade’	in	S	Worthington	(ed.),	Commercial	
Law	and	Commercial	Practice	(Hart	Publishing,	2003)	227	(fn	68	in	original);	J	Ulph,	‘The	UCP	600:	Documentary	
credits	in	the	21st	century’	[2007]	JBL	355,	363	(fn	29	in	original).	
81	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n31).	
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to	 suggest	 that,	 prior	 to	 Versloot,	 any	 degree	 of	 fraud	 by	 the	 assured	 was	 sufficient	 to	
disentitle	him	to	the	indemnity.	The	current	position	is	more	nuanced;	the	maxim	still	bears	
weight	in	relation	to	exaggerated	and	fabricated	claims	but	its	reach	has	been	circumscribed	
at	the	lower	end	of	the	culpability	spectrum.		
Chapter	Three	submits	the	judicial	construction	of	the	forfeiture	rule	to	detailed	critique.	The	
major	premise	 is	 that	 the	avowed	purpose	of	 the	 rule	–	deterrence	–	 is	dependent	on	an	
outdated	model	 of	 decision	making.	Modern	 deterrence	 theory	 suggests	 that	 the	 judicial	
framework	to	counter	fraud	–	harsh	legal	sanctions	–	is	likely	to	be	ineffective.	It	is	further	
contended	that	forfeiture	is	particularly	ineffective	in	response	to	the	most	serious	frauds	–	
the	wholly	fabricated	claim	–	since	the	assured	does	not	have	any	genuine	loss	to	sacrifice.	
The	 third	 critique	 suggests	 that	 modern	 developments	 in	 investigative	 and	 scientific	
techniques	mean	that	the	underwriter	is	no	longer	as	susceptible	to	fraud	as	his	nineteenth	
century	 counterpart.	 The	 final	 argument	 highlights	 that	 information	 asymmetries	 and	 the	
consequent	risk	of	fraud	are	not	unique	to	the	insurance	relationship.	This	means	that	the	
remedial	frameworks	employed	in	comparable	settings	can	be	used	to	examine	the	approach	
developed	by	the	insurance	courts.	 In	this	 light,	 it	will	be	suggested	that	considerations	of	
proportionality	are	directly	relevant	to,	and	should	be	incorporated	into,	the	construction	of	
rules	to	counter	first-party	insurance	fraud.	
The	focus	then	turns	to	fraud	in	documentary	credit	transactions.	Chapter	Four	provides	the	
doctrinal	account	of	the	fraud	exception	to	autonomy	in	credit	transactions.	The	trade	finance	
courts	have	taken	a	narrow	approach	to	questions	of	fraud.	The	operation	of	the	rule	depends	
on	the	satisfaction	of	onerous	criteria	which	must	be	proved	within	a	very	limited	timeframe.	
The	result	is	a	fraud	exception	that	rarely	operates	to	protect	the	innocent	buyer.	As	such,	
the	notion	that	fraud	unravels	all	does	not	adequately	explain	the	judicial	approach	to	fraud	
in	this	setting.	The	construction	of	the	fraud	rule	is	tied	to	the	requirements	of	the	commercial	
community;	in	particular,	a	swift	and	unassailable	payment	mechanism.	The	courts	have	not	
regarded	 fraud	 as	 a	 particular	 risk	 and	have	 assumed	 that	 parties	 limit	 their	 exposure	by	
contracting	with	honest	traders.		
Chapter	Five	critiques	the	construction	of	the	fraud	rule	in	documentary	credits.	The	courts	
have	repeatedly	advanced	a	narrow	exception	premised	on	commercial	need.	The	argument,	
however,	 is	 that	 the	 English	 approach	 is	 a	 distinct	 policy	 choice	 and	 not	 the	 inevitable	
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elaboration	 of	 best	 commercial	 practice.	 Three	 distinct	 arguments	 are	 deployed	 for	 this	
purpose.	The	first	contends	that	a	broader	approach	to	fraud	would	not	have	the	detrimental	
impact	on	trade	that	courts	fear.	This	is	exemplified	by	the	position	in	the	United	States	where	
a	broader	definition	of	fraud	is	enshrined	in	legislation	and	injunctive	relief	is	easier	to	obtain.		
Secondly,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	leading	English	case	on	fraud	made	a	fundamental	misstep	
in	 elaborating	 the	 fraud	 rule.	 The	 courts	 have	 continued	 to	 apply	 this	 version	of	 the	 rule	
notwithstanding	its	consequences	which	are	detrimental	to	the	mechanism	and	commercial	
need.	The	final	argument	adopts	empirical	data	on	the	practical	operation	of	credits	collected	
in	the	United	States.	This	is	used	to	counter	the	judicial	suggestion	that	fraud	deterrence	is	
simply	 an	 ex	 ante	 concern	 and	 presents	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 prevention	 is	 critical	
throughout	the	life	of	the	exchange.		
The	 fraud	 rules	 share	 a	 similar	 juridical	 underpinning	 but	 they	 have	 been	 developed	 in	
different	directions	by	the	courts.	This	project	is	not	a	call	for	rules	to	be	treated	in	the	same	
way	or	shaped	by	the	same	policy	concerns;	after	all,	the	courts	must	be	cognisant	of	context.	
The	discussion	in	these	four	chapters	is	designed	to	illuminate	the	factors	which	have	shaped	
the	 rules	 and	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	 factors	 can	be	 justified.	 The	project	 concludes	 in	
Chapter	 Six	 where	 the	 discussion	 summarises	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 project	 and	 identifies	
directions	for	future	work.	
	
IX. Conclusion	
Rules	on	fraud	are	an	important	part	of	the	law	relating	to	marine	insurance	and	documentary	
credits.	They	respond	to	 judicial	concerns	about	 fraud	 in	 the	marketplace	and	protect	 the	
integrity	of	the	court.	Simple	phrases	such	as	‘fraud	unravels	all’	are	generally	used	to	explain	
judicial	activity	to	counter	fraud	in	these	areas.	These	phrases,	however,	are	far	too	simplistic	
once	 one	 appreciates	 the	 diverse	 circumstances	 in	 which	 fraud	 arises	 and	 the	 variety	 of	
competing	policy	arguments	which	courts	are	required	to	balance.	This	project	will	provide	a	
detailed	examination	of	the	forfeiture	rule	in	insurance	contract	law	and	the	fraud	exception	
in	documentary	credits.	It	will	explore	the	extent	to	which	pithy	phrases	adequately	explain	
what	the	courts	are	doing,	by	identifying	the	contextual	and	policy	considerations	which	have	
shaped	 each	 rule.	 These	 considerations	 are	 then	 critically	 examined	 to	 determine	 their	
(ongoing)	validity.		
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This	 area	 of	 enquiry	 is	 highly	 topical	 in	 the	 insurance	 context.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	 Law	
Commission	have	conducted	a	lengthy	consultation	into	insurance	contract	law,82	including	
the	law	relating	to	fraudulent	claims,	and	this	has	resulted	in	new	legislation	which	elevates	
the	remedy	to	statute.83	The	common	law	courts	have	also	considered	several	issues	relating	
to	the	scope	of	the	fraudulent	claims	rule	over	this	period.84		
The	 law	on	documentary	credits	has	not	provoked	similar	discussion	and	debate	 in	recent	
years.	 English	 policymakers	 have	 preferred	 to	 leave	 general	 matters	 to	 the	 International	
Chamber	of	Commerce	(ICC)	which	routinely	publishes	the	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	for	
Documentary	Credits	(UCP),	an	optional	set	of	rules	embodying	international	practice.	Almost	
all	credit	transactions	incorporate	the	UCP.85	The	UCP,	however,	makes	no	provision	for	fraud	
and	this	leaves	the	issue	to	national	jurisdictions.	As	has	been	suggested,	the	English	fraud	
exception	is	relatively	restrictive	and	this	appears	to	have	made	parties	unwilling	to	litigate	
on	 the	 letter	of	credit	contract.	This	necessarily	 limits	 the	courts’	ability	 to	 reconsider	 the	
scope	 and	 policy	 construction	 of	 the	 exception.	 Beyond	 the	 judicial	 arena,	 however,	 the	
mechanism	remains	important	as	a	method	of	financing86	and	a	new	version	of	the	UCP	is	
reported	to	be	in	the	pipeline.87	Whether	this	new	version	of	the	rules	makes	provision	for	
fraud	remains	to	be	seen	but,	regardless,	a	detailed	consideration	of	the	common	law	rule	is	
important	in	itself,	and	as	a	mapping	exercise	in	light	of	potential	developments.	
Having	outlined	the	purpose	and	direction	of	the	project,	the	substantive	discussion	can	now	
begin.	 Chapter	 Two	 addresses	 the	 first	 and	 second	 research	 questions	 in	 the	 insurance	
context,	by	submitting	the	forfeiture	rule	to	doctrinal	analysis.
																																																						
82	Law	Com	353	(n78).	
83	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12.	
84	The	Aegeon	(n32)	(appropriate	remedy	for	fraudulent	device	claims);	Gottlieb	(n50)	(whether	interim	payments	
were	recoverable	when	claim	was	later	proven	fraudulent.)	
85	F	Lorenzon,	‘International	trade	and	shipping	documents’	in	Y	Baatz	(ed.),	Maritime	Law	(4th	ed.	Informa,	2017)	
116.	
86	Bischof	(n36).	
87	See,	for	example,	Institute	of	International	Banking	Law	and	Practice,	‘The	community	speaks:	The	UCP700	wish	
list’	 (26/03/2015)	 available	 at:	 http://iiblp.org/the-community-speaks-the-ucp700-wish-list/	 (accessed	
12/09/2016).	
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Chapter	Two	
Insurance:	A	Doctrinal	Analysis	of	the	Forfeiture	Rule	
	
I. Introduction	
Insurance	 contracts	 are	 characterised	 by	 information	 asymmetries.	 These	 arise	 both	 at	
formation	–	where	the	assured	has	greater	knowledge	about	the	insured	subject	matter	and	
his	loss	history	–	and	following	a	loss	where	again,	the	assured	knows	more	about	the	cause	
and	 extent	 of	 the	 loss	 than	 his	 underwriter.	 These	 asymmetries	 create	 incentives	 for	 the	
assured	to	lie	and	misrepresent	for	private	gain.1	Following	a	loss	–	the	focus	of	this	chapter	
–	this	incentive	manifests	in	the	submission	of	a	fraudulent	claim,	either	because	the	assured	
invents	a	loss	for	the	purpose	of	making	a	claim	or	seeks	to	exaggerate	or	embellish	an	insured	
loss.	The	data	suggest	that	insurance	claims	fraud	is	a	considerable	problem2	the	cost	of	which	
is	borne	by	the	honest	majority	of	policyholders.3				
	
The	legal	response	to	fraud	has	developed	over	more	than	150	years.4	The	task	has	largely	
been	undertaken	by	the	courts	although,	more	recently,	the	Law	Commission5	and	parliament	
have	entered	the	arena.6	The	result	is	the	forfeiture	rule	whereby	the	assured	loses	the	entire	
claim	to	which	the	fraud	relates,	including	any	genuine	portion	of	loss.	The	rule	is	founded	on	
principles	analogous	to	illegality7	and	policy	considerations,	most	notably	the	deterrence	of	
fraud.8	The	following	description	of	the	forfeiture	rule	offered	by	Mance	LJ,	as	he	then	was,	
demonstrates	the	utility	of	aligning	forfeiture	with	the	notion	that	‘fraud	unravels	all’,		
																																																						
1	 J	 Feinman,	 ‘Insurance	 fraud,	 agency	 and	 opportunism:	 False	 swearing	 in	 insurance	 claims’	 (Insurance	 Fraud	
Symposium,	University	of	Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016),	3.	
2	ABI,	 ‘The	con’s	not	on	–	 Insurers	thwart	2,400	fraudulent	 insurance	claims	valued	at	£25	million	every	week’	
(07/07/2017)	 available	 at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/news/news-articles/2017/07/the-cons-not-on--insurers-
thwart-2400-fraudulent-insurance-claims-valued-at-25-million-every-week/	(accessed	04/09/2017);	ABI,	‘From	Mr	
Whippy	to	giggling	conmen	–	No	let	up	as	insurers	turn	up	the	heat	on	insurance	cheats’	(13/09/2016)	available	at:	
https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2016/09/From-Mr-Whippy-to-giggling-conmen-no-let-up-as-
insurers-turn-up-the-heat-on-insurance-cheats	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
3	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	(The	DC	Merwestone)	(Hearing	on	16/03/16,	morning	
session),	 2h	 12	 per	 Lord	 Mance	 available	 at:	 https://www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-2014-0252/160316-
am.html	(accessed	31/07/16)	2h	16	per	Lord	Sumption,	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	4.	
4	Britton	v	Royal	Insurance	Co	(1866)	4	F&F	905.	
5	 Law	Commission,	 Insurance	Contract	 Law:	Business	Disclosure;	Warranties;	 Insurers’	Remedies	 for	Fraudulent	
Claims;	and	Late	Payment	(Law	Com	No	353,	2014).	
6	Insurance	Act	2015,	ss.12-13.	
7	Manifest	Shipping	Co	Ltd	v	Uni-Polaris	Co	Ltd	(The	Star	Sea)	[2003]	1	AC	469,	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
8	Ibid	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	Axa	General	Insurance	Ltd	v	Gottlieb	[2005]	1	All	ER	(Comm)	445,	[29]	per	Mance	LJ;	
Galloway	v	Guardian	Royal	Exchange	(UK)	Ltd	[1999]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	209,	214	per	Millett	LJ.	
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more	 fundamentally,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 rule	 relating	 to	 fraudulent	claims	operates	
generally	in	a	manner	which	cannot	be	regarded	as	purely	prospective…an	insurance	
indemnity	is	payable	from	the	moment	an	insured	peril	causes	a	loss…so	the	effect	of	
a	fraudulent	claim	is	to	retrospectively	remove	or	bar	the	insured’s	pre-existing	cause	
of	action.9	
	
This	apparent	ease	of	characterising	fraud	as	having	an	unravelling	effect	is	complicated	by	a	
longstanding	tension	in	insurance	contract	law,	namely	the	co-existence	of	the	forfeiture	rule	
alongside	s.17,	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906.	Famously,	s.17	provided	that	insurance	contracts	
were	 underpinned	 by	 a	 duty	 of	 utmost	 good	 faith	 to	 be	 observed	 by	 both	 parties.	 This	
distinguishes	the	insurance	relationship	from	almost	all	other	economic	exchanges	in	English	
law	 and	 is	 traced	 to	 the	 eighteenth-century	 decision	 in	Carter	 v	 Boehm.10	 In	Carter,	 Lord	
Mansfield	 justified	 the	 duty	 of	 good	 faith	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 information	 asymmetries	
present	in	insurance	relationships,		
	
Good	faith	forbids	either	party	by	concealing	what	he	privately	knows,	to	draw	the	
other	into	a	bargain,	from	his	ignorance	of	that	fact,	and	his	believing	the	contrary.11		
The	importance	of	this	duty	was	further	underlined	by	the	remedy	available	to	the	innocent	
party	 if	his	 counterpart	 failed	 to	act	 in	good	 faith;	avoidance	ab	 initio.12	Avoidance	would	
return	 the	 parties	 to	 their	 pre-contractual	 positions	 and	 would	 require	 the	 assured	 to	
reimburse	the	underwriter	for	valid	claims	paid	within	that	policy	term.	Though,	quite	rightly,	
one	would	regard	the	submission	of	a	fraudulent	claim	–	a	deliberate	attempt	to	deceive	the	
underwriter	–	as	the	most	egregious	example	of	a	failure	to	observe	good	faith,13	the	courts	
have	consistently	refused	to	recognise	avoidance	as	an	appropriate	response	to	fraudulent	
claims,	 preferring	 instead	 the	 less	 severe	 remedy	 of	 forfeiture.	 This	 has	 been	 justified	 by	
																																																						
9	Agapitos	v	Agnew	(The	Aegeon)	[2003]	QB	556,	[26]	per	Mance	LJ.	
10	Carter	v	Boehm	(1766)	3	Burr	1905.		
11	Ibid	1910	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
12	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.17	
13	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[2003]	QB	556,	[21]	per	Mance	LJ;	Sir	A	Longmore,	‘Good	faith	and	breach	of	warranty:	Are	we	
moving	forwards	or	backwards?’	[2004]	LMCLQ	158,	167.	
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reference	 to	 the	 disproportionate	 nature	 of	 a	wholly	 retrospective	 remedy.14	 Clearly,	 the	
remedy	 of	 avoidance	 would	 take	 the	 notion	 of	 unravelling	 contractual	 obligations	 to	 its	
extreme	and	thereby	limits	the	extent	to	which	the	forfeiture	rule	can	be	described	in	this	
manner.			
	
The	tension	caused	by	the	co-existence	of	 the	forfeiture	rule	and	the	statutory	remedy	of	
avoidance	has	now	been	resolved	by	the	Insurance	Act	2015.15	It	is	now	settled	that	avoidance	
is	inappropriate	in	this	context	and	that	forfeiture	is	the	sole	statutory	sanction	for	insurance	
claims	fraud.16	Viewed	from	this	perspective,	therefore,	fraud	does	exercise	an	unravelling	
effect	and	ex	 turpi	 causa	 is	useful	 shorthand	 for	 the	operation	of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule.	This	
chapter	 addresses	 the	 first	 and	 second	 research	 questions,	 namely	 by	 identifying	 the	
construction	of	the	forfeiture	rule	in	doctrinal	and	procedural	terms	and	then	by	ascertaining	
the	policy	 considerations	which	 have	been	used	 to	 justify	 this	 approach.	Accordingly,	 the	
chapter	commences	in	Part	II	by	briefly	explaining	the	nature	of	the	insurance	bargain	and	
the	information	asymmetries	present	in	the	relationship.	Part	III	then	discusses	the	scale	of	
the	fraud	problem	with	the	use	of	data	gathered	by	the	insurance	industry.	The	longstanding	
tension	between	the	forfeiture	rule	and	s.17	and	its	eventual	resolution	is	the	focus	of	Part	
IV.	This	enables	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	to	focus	solely	on	forfeiture	and	the	scope	of	
the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction	(V).		
	
	
II. The	Insurance	Relationship	
Risks,	broadly	conceived	as	“event[s]	…	prima	facie	adverse	to	the	interest	of	the	assured”,17	
are	 an	 inevitable	 part	 of	 commercial	 life.	 The	 management	 of	 these	 risks	 is	 critical	 for	
businesses	to	expand	and	undertake	new	ventures.18	Insurance	–	the	transfer	of	risk	from	the	
assured	to	a	professional	risk	taker,	the	underwriter	–	is,	as	Abraham	has	succinctly	explained,		
	
																																																						
14	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[51]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	Law	Commission,	‘Reforming	Insurance	Contract	Law	Issues	Paper	7:	
The	Insured’s	Post-Contract	Duty	of	Good	Faith’	(July	2010),	[7.34].	
15	Insurance	Act	2015	s.14.	
16	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12.	
17	Prudential	Insurance	v	IRC	[1904]	2	KB	658,	664	per	Channell	J.	
18	M	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	of	Insurance	(Clarendon	Law,	1997),	5.	
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a	method	of	managing	risk	by	distributing	it	among	large	numbers	of	individuals	or	
enterprises…By	paying	a	relatively	small	sum	–	the	insurance	premium	–	the	insured	
policyholder	receives	a	promise	from	an	insurance	company	to	pay	the	insured	if	he	
or	she	suffers	a	loss.	The	insured	avoids	the	risk	of	suffering	a	large	loss	by	substituting	
the	certainty	of	suffering	a	small	one.	Assuming	that	the	risks	a	company	covers	are	
largely	 independent	 of	 each	 other,	 the	 insurer	 protects	 itself	 against	 suffering	 net	
losses	 by	 covering	 a	 large	 number	 of	 different	 insureds.	 In	 effect,	 the	 insurer	
distributes	risk	among	all	of	its	insureds.19		
	
The	 resulting	 contract	 of	 insurance	 is	 contingent	 in	 nature,	 meaning	 the	 parties	 do	 not	
perform	their	substantive	obligations	simultaneously.	The	assured	performs	first	by	paying	a	
premium	to	the	underwriter.	This	is	his	consideration	for	the	underwriter’s	acceptance	of	the	
risk.	The	underwriter	calculates	the	premium	by	reference	to	the	riskiness	of	the	assured.	This	
process	depends	on	information	provided	by	the	assured20	as	well	as	the	underwriter’s	ability	
to	predict	the	likelihood	of	loss	by	reference	to	historical	data.21	This	task	is	facilitated	by	the	
law	of	large	numbers	which	states	that	larger	sample	sizes	should	render	predictions	more	
accurate.22	While	it	is	virtually	impossible	to	predict	whether	a	certain	ship	will	sink	in	a	given	
year,	for	example,	it	is	far	easier	to	determine	how	many	ships	in	a	group	of	500	will	be	lost.	
The	underwriter	can	then	combine	“fairly	homogeneous	risks	in	a	common	‘pool’	in	numbers	
large	enough	that	the	actual	losses	of	the	entire	group	can	be	expected	to	fall	within	statistical	
norms.”23	
	
The	insurer	is	only	required	to	perform	as	understood	in	the	colloquial	sense	–	the	payment	
of	an	indemnity	to	make	good	the	loss	the	assured	has	suffered24	–	when	an	insured	loss	has	
occurred.	 On	 a	 formal	 analysis	 of	 the	 insurance	 contract,	 the	 insurer’s	 actual	 primary	
obligation	 is	 to	 hold	 the	 insured	harmless	 from	 the	 specified	 risks.25	Notwithstanding	 the	
																																																						
19	K	Abraham,	Distributing	Risk:	Insurance,	Legal	Theory	and	Public	Policy	(Yale	University	Press,	1986)	1-2.	
20	Insurance	Act	2015	ss.3-4.	
21	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	(n18)	39	citing	P	Henry	(1775)	“I	have	but	one	lamp	by	which	my	feet	are	guided,	
and	that	is	the	lamp	of	experience.	I	know	no	way	of	judging	of	the	future,	but	by	the	past.”	
22	P	Bernstein,	Against	the	Gods	The	Remarkable	Story	of	Risk	(Wiley	&	Sons,	1996)	122-123.	
23	Commissioner	of	Internal	Revenue	v	Treganowan,	183	F	2d	288,	291	(2	Cir,	1950).	
24	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.1	
25	Firma	C-Trade	SA	v	Newcastle	Protection	and	Indemnity	Assn	(The	Fanti	and	The	Padre	Island)	(No	2)	[1991]	2	AC	
1,	35	per	Lord	Goff.	
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conceptual	 difficulties	 of	 the	 hold	 harmless	 doctrine,26	 the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 insured	 loss	
constitutes	breach	of	contract	by	the	insurer	for	which	he	will	be	liable	to	the	assured.	The	
contingent	nature	of	the	underwriter’s	liability	means,	therefore,	that	the	underwriter	may	
never	substantively	perform	in	the	sense	of	paying	an	indemnity	during	the	policy	term.	
	
The	assured	must	prove	that	the	loss	was	caused	by	a	peril	insured	against	to	succeed	in	a	
claim	 for	 indemnity.27	He	must	 also	 comply	with	any	procedural	 and	notice	 requirements	
contained	 in	 the	 policy28	 and	 refrain	 from	 conduct	 contrary	 to	 public	 policy.	 This	 chapter	
focuses	 on	 perhaps	 the	 most	 egregious	 example	 of	 such	 conduct	 –	 the	 submission	 of	 a	
fraudulent	claim	–	which	will	retrospectively	deprive	the	assured	of	his	contractual	right	to	
make	a	claim.29		
	
A	 simplistic	 analysis	 of	 the	 insurance	 relationship	would	 therefore	 suggest	 that	 it	 will	 be	
straightforward	for	the	assured	to	avoid	losing	his	claim	because	of	misconduct;	he	simply	
refrains	 from	 fraudulent	 conduct	 in	 the	 claims	 phase.	 However,	 both	 the	 insurance	
relationship	and	the	claims	process	create	incentives	for	fraudulent	conduct.		
	
As	a	means	of	transferring	and	distributing	risk,	the	insurance	product,	as	described	by	Beh	
and	Stempel,	provides	reassurance	to	the	assured,	
	
Trite	as	it	may	sound,	policyholders	do	pay	premiums	in	order	to	obtain	the	"peace	of	
mind"	of	knowing	that	they	are	protected	from	potential	liability	or	loss.	Insurance	is	
defined	as	the	incurring	of	a	small	but	certain	loss	(the	premium	payment)	in	return	
for	protection	against	a	larger	but	contingent	loss.	Putting	the	peace	of	mind	concept	
more	technically,	the	policyholder	as	part	of	a	risk	management	plan	devotes	a	set	
																																																						
26	M	Clarke,	Law	of	 Insurance	Contracts	 (4th	ed.	Service	 Issue	35	1	April	2016)	 (hereafter	referred	to	as	 ‘Clarke	
(looseleaf)’)	[30-2];	FD	Rose,	Marine	Insurance:	Law	&	Practice	(2nd	ed.,	Informa	Law	2012)	[25.1]	
27	Rose,	Marine	Insurance	(n26)	[26.1];	Rhesa	Shipping	Co.	S.A.	v.	Herbert	David	Edmunds	Rhesa	Shipping	Co.	S.A.	
v.	Fenton	Insurance	Co.	Ltd.	(The	Popi	M)	[1985]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.1,	3	per	Lord	Oakbrook.	
28	Rose,	Marine	Insurance	(n26)	[26.1].	
29	Gottlieb	(n8)	[26]	per	Mance	LJ;	P	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(2nd	ed.	Informa	Law,	2010),	[6.049].	
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portion	of	its	resources	to	the	purchase	of	contractual	protection	against	contingent	
risk.30	
	
On	this	basis,	the	optimum	outcome	of	an	insurance	relationship	would	be	to	reach	the	end	
of	a	policy	term	without	incurring	a	loss.	It	appears	that	some	policyholders,	however,	do	not	
understand	 this	 function	 of	 the	 insurance	 relationship.	 The	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce	 –	
established	by	the	UK	government	in	2015	to	develop	mechanisms	for	reducing	claims	fraud31	
–	outlined	a	common	misperception	of	the	insurance	relationship,	
	
Some	 do	 not	 understand	 that	 insurance	 is	 designed	 to	 cover	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 event	
occurring,	instead	believing	that	they	deserve	a	refund	of	premiums	paid	where	no	
claim	has	been	made.32		
	
This	means	that	 the	policyholder	may	 feel	cheated	or	misled	by	 the	underwriter	when	he	
reaches	the	end	of	a	policy	term	without	any	tangible	benefit.	This	may	cause	the	assured	to	
attempt	to	recover	some	of	his	premium	outlay	by	way	of	a	fraudulent	or	exaggerated	claim.33			
The	structure	of	the	claims	process	has	also	been	shown	to	create	incentives	to	fraudulent	
conduct.34	 These	 incentives	 largely	 stem	 from	 the	 information	 asymmetries	 which	 exist	
between	underwriter	and	assured.35	The	assured	will	 typically	have	far	greater	knowledge	
about	 the	 cause	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 loss	 than	 his	 insurer.	 This	 information	 is	 vital	 for	 the	
underwriter	 to	 determine	 his	 liability	 on	 the	 policy.	 This	 disparity	 in	 knowledge	 gives	 the	
																																																						
30	 H	 Beh	 and	 J	 Stempel,	 ‘Misclassifying	 the	 insurance	 policy:	 The	 unforced	 errors	 of	 unilateral	 contract	
characterization’	[2010]	32(1)	Card.	L	Rev.	85,	105.	See	also	Clarke,	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[1-1];	M	Clarke,	Policies	and	
Perceptions	of	Insurance	Law	in	the	Twenty-first	Century	(OUP,	2005),	3.	
31	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce,	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce	 Final	 Report	 (2016)	 available	 at:		
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insurance-fraud-taskforce-final-report	(accessed	13/09/2016),	3.	
32	Ibid	[2.88].	
33	 Clarke,	 Twenty-first	 Century	 (n30)	 210;	 K	 Gill,	 Insurance	 Fraud:	 Causes,	 Characteristics	 and	 Prevention	
(unpublished	PhD	 thesis,	University	of	 Leicester	2001)	109	available	at:	https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/29106	
(accessed	26/06/2017);	S	Tennyson,	‘Economic	institutions	and	individual	ethics:	A	study	of	consumer	attitudes	
toward	insurance	fraud’	(1997)	32(2)	J	of	Ec	Behavior	and	Organization	247,	249-250;	ABI,	‘Research	Brief:	Deterring	
opportunistic	general	insurance	fraud’	(August	2010)	2-3	available	at:	http://docplayer.net/39000873-Deterring-
opportunistic-general-insurance-fraud.html	(accessed	26/062017)	(Copy	also	on	file	with	author).	
34	K	Richards,	‘Deterring	insurance	fraud:	A	critical	and	criminological	analysis	of	the	English	and	Scottish	Law	
Commissions’	 current	 proposals	 for	 reform’	 (2013)	 24	 ILJ	 16,	 35-37;	 See	 generally	 on	 the	 concept	 of	
criminogenesis,	ML	Needleman	and	C	Needleman,	‘Organizational	crime:	Two	models	of	criminogenesis’	(1979)	
The	Sociological	Quarterly	517.	
35	 S	 Viaene	 and	 G	 Dedene,	 ‘Insurance	 fraud:	 Issues	 and	 challenges’	 (2004)	 29(2)	 Geneva	 Papers	 on	 Risk	 and	
Insurance	313,	315.	
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assured	 the	opportunity	 to	 behave	 fraudulently	 by,	 for	 example,	 exaggerating	 the	 loss	 or	
providing	an	explanation	of	the	casualty	which	omits	details	which	might	otherwise	afford	
the	underwriter	a	defence.	These	incentives	may	be	particularly	tempting	where	the	assured	
finds	 himself	 in	 financial	 difficulty.36	 The	 decision	 to	 commit	 fraud	 may,	 in	 other	
circumstances,	 predate	 the	 occurrence	 of	 loss.	 Such	 fraud	 occurs	 when	 the	 assured	
deliberately	destroys	his	property	or	connives	in	its	loss	for	the	express	purpose	of	submitting	
an	insurance	claim.		
	
Whatever	the	driver	for	fraud	in	a	particular	case,	fabricated	and	exaggerated	claims	threaten	
the	insurance	model.	This	is,	simply	put,	because	insurers	set	premiums	by	reference	to	the	
likelihood	and	extent	of	loss	for	a	class	of	policyholders	over	a	given	period.	The	underwriter’s	
solvency	depends	on	his	ability	to	procure	premium	income	which	exceeds	his	total	liability	
to	policyholders.	If	the	underwriter	makes	payment	on	a	fraudulent	claim,	the	gap	between	
premium	 income	 and	 anticipated	 liability	will	 be	 narrowed.	 This	will	 increase	 the	 cost	 of	
insurance	and,	over	time,	threaten	the	viability	of	insurance	companies.	As	a	result,	several	
contractual	mechanisms	are	designed	to	prevent	the	assured	from	succeeding	in	a	fraudulent	
claim.37	
	
The	first	of	these	mechanisms	is	the	indemnity	principle.	Many	marine	policies	are	indemnity	
contracts	which,	by	definition,	limit	the	assured’s	recovery	to	his	actual	loss.38	Damages	are	
designed	to	indemnify	the	assured	i.e.	to	make	good	the	loss	he	has	sustained.	The	operation	
of	this	principle	will,	therefore,	constrain	the	assured’s	ability	to	claim	in	excess	of	his	actual	
loss.	The	indemnity	principle	is	not,	however,	a	comprehensive	means	of	curtailing	fraud.	This	
is	because	the	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	expressly	permits	parties	to	contract	on	the	basis	
of	a	valued	policy	where	the	value	of	the	subject	matter	is	conclusively	settled	in	advance.39	
The	indemnity	principle	has	limited	utility	in	such	polices	given	that	the	contractually	agreed	
																																																						
36	Clarke,	Twenty-first	Century	(n30)	210.	
37	This	has	been	recognised	more	generally	within	the	insurance	relationship,	see	Abraham,	Distributing	Risk	(n19)	
15:	“because	loss	predictions	are	imperfect	and	behavior	cannot	be	monitored	without	cost,	insurance	may	create	
incentive	effects	that	are	inefficient.	To	some	extent	these	inefficiencies	can	be	counteracted	by	contractual	and	
legal	devices	that	reduce	the	moral	hazard	of	insurance.”	
38	Castellain	v	Preston	(1883)	11	QBD	380,	386	per	Brett	LJ;	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.1.	
39	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.27(2)(3).	
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value	of	 the	 vessel	may	 exceed	 the	 assured’s	 actual	 loss.	 Indeed,	 there	may	be	 a	 further	
incentive	to	fraud	in	valued	policies.40		
	
The	second	mechanism	–	the	principle	of	fortuity	–	reflects	the	fact	that	insurance	provides	
cover	against	risks	and	not	certainties.	Where	the	insured	peril	is	defined	by	an	element	of	
fortuity	–	as	is	the	case	for	perils	of	the	seas,	for	example	–	the	assured	will	only	be	able	to	
recover	where	he	proves	the	fortuitous	nature	of	the	loss.41	Yet	again,	however,	there	are	
limits	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 fortuity	 principle	 as	 a	 means	 of	 preventing	 fraud.	 In	
particular,	the	mechanism	is	unable	to	limit	recovery	in	circumstances	where	the	peril	–	most	
notably,	fire	–	does	not	contain	any	element	of	fortuity.	To	recover	in	respect	of	a	loss	caused	
by	fire,	therefore,	the	assured	need	only	prove	that	fire	was	the	cause	of	the	loss.42		
	
The	inability	of	these	contractual	mechanisms	to	constrain	the	assured’s	propensity	to	fraud	
in	all	circumstances	necessitates	the	development	of	rules	specific	to	fraud	and	fraudulent	
claims.	Two	such	rules	can	be	distinguished.	Firstly,	the	wilful	misconduct	defence	contained	
in	s.55	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906.43	This	precludes	recovery	in	circumstances	where	the	loss	
has	been	deliberately	engineered	by	the	assured.	This	reflects	the	purpose	of	insurance	–	to	
guard	 against	 risks	 and	not	 certainties	 –	but	 also	 responds	 to	public	 policy	 concerns.	 The	
statutory	defence	will	only	be	available	in	circumstances	where	the	assured	has	connived	in	
the	loss	and	the	onus	will	be	on	the	underwriter	to	establish	the	assured’s	wilful	misconduct.	
This	is	no	easy	task.44	Furthermore,	the	wilful	misconduct	defence	cannot	be	invoked	where	
the	fraud	consists	of	something	else,	such	as	exaggeration	of	genuine	loss,	the	suppression	of	
a	defence	or	the	use	of	forged	evidence.	Fraudulent	behaviour	during	the	claims	process	–	as	
distinct	 from	 an	 intentionally	 caused	 loss	 –	 requires	 a	 further	mechanism	 to	 prevent	 the	
assured’s	recovery.	As	was	made	clear	by	the	Law	Commission,		
																																																						
40	B	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(Informa	Law,	2014)	[3-26];	Clarke,	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[28-7]	noting	that	a	valued	
policy	overrides	the	indemnity	nature	of	marine	policies.	Whether	a	particular	policy	is	indemnity	or	valued	will	
depend	on	the	construction	of	the	contract.	
41	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	Sched	1,	r.7	
42	Schiffshypothekenbank	zu	Luebeck	AG	v	Compton	(The	Alexion	Hope)	[1988]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	311,	319	per	Nourse	
LJ	cf.	the	exclusion	to	deliberately	inflicted	loss	within	Institute	Cargo	Clauses	B	and	C	2009	cl.4.7.		
43	Marine	Insurance	Act	s.55(2)(a).	
44	See	Slattery	v	Mance	[1962]	1	QB	676,	681	per	Salmon	J.	
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It	 is	generally	accepted,	however,	that	a	policyholder	who	acts	fraudulently	should	risk	
more	 than	 the	non-payment	of	 the	 fraudulent	part	of	 the	claim.	There	should	also	be	
some	element	of	penalty45		
The	development	of	the	appropriate	legal	response	to	fraud	is	the	focus	of	discussion	in	this	
chapter.	The	Commission’s	reference	to	the	penal	nature	of	the	response	usefully	summarises	
how	the	courts	have	approached	this	task.	The	discussion	is	prefaced	by	establishing	the	scale	
of	the	fraudulent	claims	problem	in	Part	III.		
	
	
III. Insurance	Fraud	Statistics	
There	is	no	shortage	of	publicly	available	data	on	fraudulent	insurance	claims,	most	of	which	
emanates	 from	 the	 Association	 of	 British	 Insurers	 (ABI).	 ABI	 data	 published	 in	 2017	
demonstrated	that	insurers	identified	an	average	of	2,400	fraudulent	claims	worth	£25	million	
per	week	in	2016.46	In	comparison	to	the	data	for	2015,	this	constituted	an	overall	reduction	
in	the	number	and	value	of	fraudulent	claims.47	This	data	is	then	used	to	predict	undetected	
fraud	which	is	estimated	to	cost	the	industry	a	further	£2.1	billion	per	year.48	It	is	not	possible	
to	drill	down	any	further	into	the	publicly	available	data;	the	ABI	statistics	do	not	indicate	the	
scale	 of	 fraudulent	marine	 claims	 or	 the	 category	 of	 behaviour	 in	which	 the	 assured	 has	
engaged.49		
	
The	difficulty	of	obtaining	accurate	statistics	should	be	mentioned	at	this	juncture.50	Firstly,	
the	 data	 is	 largely	 gathered	 by	 the	 insurance	 industry	 which	 has	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	
presenting	an	image	of	widespread	claims	fraud.51		Perhaps	connected	to	this	is	the	fact	that	
the	statistics	we	do	have	may	not	be	particularly	transparent.	For	example,	in	the	Canadian	
context,	fraud	is	typically	estimated	to	infect	between	10	and	15%	of	all	claims	but,	as	Ericson	
																																																						
45	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[2.8].	
46	ABI,	‘The	con’s	not	on’	(n2)			
47	Ibid.			
48	 Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce,	Final	Report	 (n31),	 [2.4]	citing	National	Fraud	Authority,	 ‘Annual	Fraud	 Indicator’	
(2014).	
49	See	later	discussion	on	the	typology	of	fraudulent	claims,	text	to	fn	222	et	seq.	
50	Attempts	to	measure	the	scale	of	claims	fraud	only	began	in	the	1980s,	see	Viaene	and	Dedene	(n35)	317.	
51	J	Feinman,	Delay	Deny	Defend	(Penguin,	2010),	170;	R	Ericson	and	A	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks	of	private	justice:	
The	case	of	insurance	fraud’	in	R	Ericson	and	A	Doyle	(eds.),	Risk	and	Morality	(University	of	Toronto	Press,	2003),	
324.	
50	
	
and	Doyle	have	made	clear,	“few	actually	know	where	this	measurement	came	from	or,	for	
that	matter,	how	accurate	it	is.”52	There	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	this	does	not	translate	
to	the	English	context	where	the	ABI	have	suggested	that	fraud	adds	£50	to	each	household’s	
annual	insurance	bill.53		The	issue	is	that	this	figure	of	£50	has	been	used	for	many	years	but	
has	 not	 been	 revised	 upwards	 to	 reflect	 the	 increasing	 trend	 of	 fraudulent	 claims	
demonstrated	by	industry	data.54		
	
Other	aspects	of	the	insurance	relationship	render	accurate	statistics	elusive.	For	one	thing,	
the	fraudster	is	attempting	to	conceal	his	dishonesty	from	the	underwriter	and	this	creates	
measurement	difficulties.55	A	second	difficulty	exists	in	the	fact	that	suspect	claims	may	be	
settled	by	the	underwriter	and	not	recorded	as	fraud	in	the	official	data.56	In	addition,	there	
is	 some	 suggestion	 that	 underwriters	 may	 be	 prepared	 to	 overlook	 a	 degree	 of	 fraud	
committed	 by	 particularly	 lucrative	 policyholders	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 wish	 to	 retain	
premium	income.57	The	underwriter	may	also	choose	not	to	pursue	fraud	in	circumstances	
where	making	a	‘nuisance	payment’	is	cheaper	than	investigating	the	loss	or	where	adequate	
investigative	methods	do	not	exist.58	
	
In	the	absence	of	more	detailed	and	independent	data,	what	can	be	said	with	certainty	is	that	
the	 courts	 have	 accepted	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 problem.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 not	 uncommon	 to	 see	
reference	to	the	scale	of	claims	fraud	in	judicial	decisions.59	This	perceived	problem	has	been	
used	to	justify	the	particular	contours	of	the	legal	response	to	fraud	–	the	forfeiture	rule	–	
																																																						
52	Ericson	and	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks’	(n51)	325.	See	also,	Feinman,	Delay,	Deny,	Defend	(n51)	170	–	171	for	an	
account	of	a	similar	position	in	the	United	States.	
53	 ABI,	 ‘Fraud’	 available	 at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/Fraud	 (accessed	
09/08/2016).	
54	Personal	email	with	the	ABI	Statistics	department:	“This	is	a	very	high	level	figure	based	on	the	current	amount	
of	 fraud	 in	 the	UK	 and	 the	 total	 number	 of	 policy	 holders	 in	 the	UK,	 please	 do	 treat	 this	 number	 as	 a	 rough	
estimate.”	(08/11/2016).	
55	R	Ericson	and	A	Doyle,	‘Criminalization	in	private:	the	case	of	insurance	fraud’	in	Law	Commission	of	Canada,	
What	is	Crime?	(UBC	Press,	2004),	103;	Viaene	and	Dedene	(n35)	319,	322.	
56	Ericson	and	Doyle,	‘Criminalization	in	private’	(n55)	105;	Ericson	and	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks’	(n51)	324.	
57	Ericson	and	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks’	(n51)	338,	359.	
58	Ericson	and	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks’	(n51)	323,	336;	R	Emerson,	‘Insurance	claims	fraud:	Problems	and	remedies’	
(1991-1992)	46	U	Miami	L	Rev	907,	924.	
59	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	[2016]	UKSC	48	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	
(Supreme	Court)),	[56]	per	Lord	Hughes;	Royal	&	Sun	Alliance	Insurance	Co	v	Fahad	[2014]	EWHC	4480	(QB),	[24]	
per	Spencer	J;	Direct	Line	Insurance	plc	v	Khan	[2002]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	364,	[38]-[39]	per	Arden	LJ;	Khan	v	Hussain	
(16	May	2007,	Huddersfield	County	Court)	[9]	per	Judge	Hawkesworth	QC.	
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and	recent	legislation	elevating	the	rule	to	statute.60	The	industry	too	has	taken	action	and	
report	annual	expenditure	of	£200	million	to	counter	fraud.61	Scepticism	about	the	accuracy	
of	the	data	should	not	be	confused	with	disbelief;	there	is	no	doubt	that	fraud	occurs	and	that	
fraudulent	policyholders	should	be	sanctioned.62	The	scepticism	is	instead	an	explicit	appeal	
for	recognition	of	the	industry’s	incentive	to	present	a	certain	image	of	claims	fraud.63	
	
Until	the	Insurance	Act	2015,64	the	legal	response	to	claims	fraud	was	shaped	entirely	by	the	
courts.	This	jurisprudence	stretching	back	more	than	150	years	provides	much	material	for	
discussion.	The	first	issue	to	consider	relates	to	the	appropriate	remedy	for	insurance	claims	
fraud.	This	has	been	difficult	for	the	courts	to	determine	because	of	a	tension	between	the	
early	 case	 law	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 a	more	 severe,	 and	prima	 facie	 applicable,	 statutory	
provision.	
	
	
IV. Identifying	the	Appropriate	Remedy:	Forfeiture	or	Avoidance	ab	
initio?	
During	 consultation,	 the	 Law	 Commission	 described	 the	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 fraudulent	
claims	 rule	 as	 “convoluted	 and	 confused”.65	 This	 was	 wholly	 attributable	 to	 the	 courts’	
difficulty	in	reconciling	the	common	law	remedy	of	forfeiture	with	the	subsequent	statutory	
remedy	of	avoidance	for	breach	of	good	faith.66	It	is	important,	therefore,	to	consider	how	
the	 courts	dealt	with	 this	 tension	and	 to	 identify	 the	policy	 considerations	used	 to	 justify	
forfeiture,	and	not	avoidance,	as	appropriate	in	this	context.	This	discussion	also	provides	a	
useful	perspective	from	which	to	consider	the	utility	of	the	maxim	‘fraud	unravels	all’	as	a	
description	of	the	judicial	response	to	insurance	fraud.		
	
																																																						
60	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a);	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[19.1],	[19.3],	[21.3],	[21.5].		
61	 ABI,	 ‘Insurers	will	 do	whatever	 it	 takes	 to	 protect	 honest	 customers	 against	 insurance	 fraud’	 (18/01/2016)	
available	 at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-updates/2016/01/Insurers-will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-
protect-honest-customers-against-insurance-fraud	(accessed	09/08/2016).	
62	Feinman,	Delay,	Deny,	Defend	(n51)	170.	
63	Ibid	170-171	where	he	notes	the	US	experience;	official	 industry	figures	compiled	by	the	Insurance	Research	
Council	 were	 not	 backed	 up	 by	 research	 conducted	 by	 the	 quasi-governmental	 agency,	 the	 Massachusetts	
Insurance	Fraud	Bureau.	
64	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12	
65	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[19.3].	
66	Ibid	[19.3],	[20.37].	
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Insurance	 fraud	 first	 arose	 for	 consideration	 in	 the	 context	 of	 fire	 policies	 in	 the	 mid-
nineteenth	 century.	 The	 case	 of	 Britton	 v	 Royal	 Insurance67	 involved	 an	 assured	 who	
exaggerated	his	loss	following	a	fire	at	his	premises.	The	insurance	policy	did	not	contain	any	
express	provisions	relating	to	the	impact	of	fraud	during	the	claims	process.	Willes	J	discussed	
the	legal	response	in	the	following	terms,	
	
…suppose	 the	 insured	made	 a	 claim	 for	 twice	 the	 amount	 insured	 and	 lost,	 thus	
seeking	to	put	the	office	off	 its	guard,	and	in	the	result	to	recover	more	than	he	 is	
entitled	to,	that	would	be	a	wilful	 fraud,	and	the	consequence	 is	that	he	could	not	
recover	anything.	This	is	a	defence	quite	different	from	that	of	wilful	arson.	It	gives	
the	go-bye	to	the	origin	of	 the	 fire,	and	 it	amounts	 to	this	–	 that	 the	assured	took	
advantage	 of	 the	 fire	 to	make	 a	 fraudulent	 claim.	 The	 law	 upon	 such	 a	 case	 is	 in	
accordance	with	justice,	and	also	with	sound	policy.	That	law	is,	that	a	person	who	has	
made	such	a	fraudulent	claim	could	not	be	permitted	to	recover	at	all...And	if	there	is	
wilful	falsehood	and	fraud	in	the	claim,	the	insured	forfeits	all	claim	whatever	on	the	
policy.68	
	
This	result	was	further	explained	by	reference	to	the	nature	of	insurance	contracts,	
	
The	contract	of	 insurance	 is	one	of	perfect	good	faith	on	both	sides,	and	it	 is	most	
important	that	such	good	faith	should	be	maintained…such	a[n]	[express]	condition	is	
only	in	accordance	with	legal	principle	and	sound	policy.69	
	
The	reason	that	the	remedy	 is	 forfeiture	–	rather	than	the	simple	refusal	of	 the	claim	–	 is	
explained	by	 the	 contractual	 relationship	between	underwriter	 and	 assured.	As	 discussed	
above,	the	underwriter	undertakes	to	hold	his	assured	harmless	from	the	perils	specified	in	
the	policy.70	This	means	that	the	underwriter	will	be	 in	breach	upon	the	occurrence	of	an	
																																																						
67	Britton	(n4).	
68	Ibid	909	per	Willes	J.	
69	Ibid	909	per	Willes	J.	
70	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	25	et	seq.	
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insured	loss	and	will	become	immediately	liable	to	the	assured.71	The	effect	of	fraud	during	
the	claims	process	is	to	bar	this	pre-existing	right	to	recovery.72	The	underwriter’s	liability	is	
not	contingent	on	the	presentation	of	an	(honest)	claim73	but	accrues	from	the	date	of	the	
casualty.	
	
The	response	of	nineteenth	century	courts	to	insurance	fraud	was	relatively	straightforward;	
the	assured	would	not	be	permitted	to	recover	at	all	in	respect	of	the	tainted	claim.74	Half	a	
century	 later,	 however,	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Marine	 Insurance	 Act	 1906	 complicated	
matters.	 The	 Act	 did	 not	 make	 any	 express	 provision	 for	 insurance	 claims	 fraud.	 It	 did,	
however,	contain	two	provisions	relevant	to	fraud.	The	first,	contained	in	s.55(2)(a),	 is	the	
wilful	 misconduct	 defence,	 discussed	 above.75	 More	 significantly,	 s.17	 of	 the	 1906	 Act	
characterised	the	insurance	relationship	as	based	on	utmost	good	faith.	This	was	a	mutual	
duty	 –	 applicable	 to	 both	 assured	 and	 underwriter	 –	 breach	 of	 which	 would	 entitle	 the	
innocent	party	to	avoid	the	policy	ab	initio.76	S.17	provided	an	overarching	characterisation	
of	insurance	contracts	before	ss.18-20	identified	specific	instances	of	how	good	faith	would	
manifest	 in	 the	 pre-contractual	 context.	 The	 Act	 did	 not	 make	 specific	 provision	 for	 the	
operation	of	utmost	good	faith	during	the	currency	of	the	policy.	
	
This	existence	of	s.17	–	and	the	remedy	of	avoidance	–	complicated	the	judicial	approach	to	
fraudulent	claims.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	difficult	to	conceive	of	a	more	egregious	breach	of	
good	 faith	 than	 the	 intentional	 submission	 of	 a	 fraudulent	 claim77	 and	 yet	 avoidance,	
requiring	the	assured	to	repay	any	sums	paid	on	account	in	respect	of	the	fraudulent	claim78	
as	well	as	any	prior	valid	claims	submitted	during	that	policy	term,	was	much	more	severe	
than	forfeiture.	 Indeed,	avoidance	as	a	response	to	claims	fraud	would	have	extended	the	
																																																						
71	Chandris	v	Argo	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1963]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	65,	74	per	Megaw	J;	The	Fanti	(n25)	35-36	per	Lord	Goff;	
Rose,	Marine	Insurance	(n26)	[26.1].	
72	Gottlieb	(n8)	[26]	per	Mance	LJ.	
73	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[24]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
74	Britton	(n4)	909	per	Willes	J;	Goulstone	v	The	Royal	Insurance	Co	(1858)	1	F&F	276,	280	per	Pollock	CB;	Loseby	v	
Price	The	Express,	17	August	1866	(Guildford	Assizes),	48	per	Willes	J.	
75	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	43.	
76	Carter	(n10)	1909-1910	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
77	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[21]	per	Mance	LJ;	Longmore	(n13)	167.	
78	See	Gottlieb	(n8)	[27],	[28],	[32];	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(b).	
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“penal	effect	of	the	law…to	its	ultimate.”79	This	tension	continued	to	vex	the	courts	 in	the	
century	 since	 the	 Marine	 Insurance	 Act	 was	 passed.	 In	 particular,	 the	 courts	 needed	 to	
determine	 i)	 whether	 the	 duty	 of	 utmost	 good	 faith	 extended	 into	 the	 post-contractual	
sphere	 and,	 if	 so,	 ii)	 the	 content	of	 that	 duty	 and	 iii)	 the	 appropriate	 remedy	 for	 breach,	
namely	would	 the	 underwriter	 be	 entitled	 to	 remedies	 in	 addition	 to	 forfeiture.80	 As	 the	
following	discussion	will	demonstrate,	the	courts,	in	general,	attempted	to	confine	remedies	
for	fraud	to	forfeiture	but	struggled	to	adequately	reconcile	this	with	the	existence	of	a	more	
severe,	and	prima	facie	applicable,	statutory	response.	
	
In	The	Litsion	Pride,	 the	vessel	was	 rendered	a	constructive	 total	 loss	after	 it	was	hit	by	a	
missile	in	a	restricted	zone.81	The	owner	then	fraudulently	backdated	a	letter	to	advise	the	
underwriter	 that	 the	 vessel	 had	 entered	 the	 zone	 and	 was	 thus	 liable	 for	 an	 additional	
premium.	The	judgment	proceeded	on	the	basis	that	utmost	good	faith	applied	in	the	post-
contractual	phase.	The	only	dispute	related	to	the	extent	and	content	of	this	duty.	Hirst	J	held	
that	“it	must	be	right…to	go	so	far	as	to	hold	that	the	duty	in	the	claims	sphere	extends	to	
culpable	 misrepresentation	 or	 non-disclosure.”82	 This	 was	 more	 extensive	 than	 that	
contended	for	by	 the	assured	–	a	duty	of	honesty	 in	 the	claims	phase83	 -	and	would	have	
required	the	assured	to	disclose	material	information	in	the	post-contractual	phase.	Hirst	J	
derived	support	for	his	position	by	reference	to	the	fact	that	 if	s.17	applied	both	pre-	and	
post-contractually,	there	was	nothing	in	the	statute	to	suggest	that	the	content	of	the	duty	
should	 differ	 in	 any	 way.84	 Accordingly,	 the	 submission	 of	 a	 fraudulent	 claim	 was	 to	 be	
regarded	as	breach	of	utmost	good	faith	which	would	entitle	the	underwriter	to	the	remedy	
of	avoidance	ab	initio.85	As	the	wording	of	s.17	did	not	compel	the	innocent	party	to	avoid	–	
the	original	language	specified	that	“the	contract	may	be	avoided”86	–	the	underwriter	could	
simultaneously	establish	breach	of	good	faith	without	insisting	on	avoidance,87	as	occurred	in	
																																																						
79	DR	Thomas,	‘Fraudulent	insurance	claims:	Definition,	consequences	and	limitations’	[2006]	LMCLQ	485,	513.	
80	H	Bennett,	The	Law	of	Marine	Insurance	(2nd	ed.	OUP,	2006),	[22.101].	
81	Black	King	Shipping	Corporation	and	Wayang	(Panama)	S.A.	v.	Mark	Ranald	Massie	(The	Litsion	Pride)	[1985]	1	
Lloyd’s	Rep.	437.	
82	Ibid	512	per	Hirst	J.	
83	Ibid	509	per	Hirst	J.	 	
84	Ibid	511	per	Hirst	J.	
85	Ibid	515	per	Hirst	J.	
86	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.17	(emphasis	added).	
87	The	Litsion	Pride	(n81)	515	per	Hirst	J	arguing	that	there	was	“much	commercial	good	sense”	in	this	position.	
55	
	
The	Litsion	Pride.	It	was	subsequently	held	in	The	Star	Sea	that	this	“should	not	any	longer	be	
treated	as	a	sound	statement	of	the	law”88	not	least	because	it	“decouples	the	obligation	of	
good	 faith	 both	 from	 section	 17	 and	 the	 remedy	 of	 avoidance	 and	 from	 the	 contractual	
principles	which	would	apply	to	a	breach	of	contract.”89	The	decision	is	also	“questionable”90	
on	the	facts	given	that	the	claim	was	for	a	 loss	caused	by	an	 insured	peril	during	a	period	
when	a	held	covered	clause	was	operating.		
	
A	more	moderate	 approach	was	 adopted	 in	Orakpo	 v	 Barclays	 Insurance.91	 The	 Court	 of	
Appeal	unanimously	agreed	that	s.17	was	relevant	 in	the	context	of	fraudulent	claims	and	
limited	the	duty	to	one	of	honesty,	as	distinct	 from	more	expansive	disclosure	obligations	
during	 the	 claims	 process.92	 Hoffmann	 LJ	 and	 Sir	 Roger	 Parker	 argued	 that	 the	 reasons	
requiring	good	faith	continued	to	exist	post-contractually,	most	notably	because		
	
just	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 risk	will	 usually	 be	within	 the	 peculiar	 knowledge	 of	 the	
insured,	 so	 will	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 casualty;	 it	 will	 rarely	 be	 within	 the	
knowledge	of	the	insurance	company.93		
	
There	was,	however,	confusion	about	the	appropriate	remedy	for	breach	by	the	assured.	On	
the	one	hand,	Staughton	and	Hoffmann	LJJ	limited	the	remedy	to	forfeiture.94	While	Sir	Roger	
Parker	began	his	judgment	by	stating	that	fraud	would	cause	the	claim	to	fall	in	toto,95	he	was	
in	favour	of	avoidance	ab	initio	by	the	end	of	his	judgment,		
	
it	is	contrary	to	reason	to	allow	an	insurer	to	avoid	a	policy	for	material	nondisclosure	
or	 misrepresentation	 on	 inception,	 but	 to	 say	 that,	 if	 there	 is	 subsequently	 a	
																																																						
88	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[71]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
89	Ibid	[71]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
90	Ibid	[71]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
91	Orakpo	v	Barclays	Insurance	Services	[1995]	LRLR	433.	
92	Ibid	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ,	452	per	Sir	Roger	Parker.	
93	Ibid	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	See	also	452	per	Sir	Roger	Parker:	“Just	as	on	inception	the	insurer	has	to	a	large	extent	
to	rely	on	what	the	assured	tells	him,	so	also	is	 it	so	when	a	claim	is	made.	In	both	cases	there	is	therefore	an	
incentive	to	honesty,	if	the	assured	knows	that,	if	he	is	fraudulent,	at	least	to	a	substantial	extent,	he	will	recover	
nothing,	even	if	his	claim	is	in	part	good.”	
94	Ibid	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ,	451	per	Staughton	LJ.	
95	Ibid	452	per	Sir	Roger	Parker.	
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deliberate	attempt	by	fraud	to	extract	money	from	the	insurer	for	alleged	losses	which	
had	never	been	incurred,	it	is	only	the	claim	which	is	forfeit.96	
	
An	attempt	 to	 reconcile	 s.17	with	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	was	next	attempted	by	 the	Court	of	
Appeal	 in	 The	Mercandian	 Continent.97	 Longmore	 LJ	 took	 the	 view	 that	 as	 the	 1906	 Act	
specified	 circumstances	 in	which	 avoidance	was	 available	 for	 pre-contractual	 breaches	 of	
good	 faith,98	 similar	 conditions	 could	 be	 attached	 to	 avoidance	 in	 the	 post-contractual	
context.	He	argued,	therefore,	that	avoidance	would	only	be	an	appropriate	response	to	post-
contractual	 breaches	 of	 good	 faith	 where	 (i)	 the	 fraud	 was	material	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	
affected	 the	 underwriter’s	 ultimate	 liability	 and	 (ii)	where	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 fraud	would	
enable	the	underwriter	to	terminate	for	breach.99	As	the	lie	in	this	case	was	directed	to	third	
parties	 in	an	attempt	to	achieve	a	more	favourable	 jurisdiction	for	the	dispute,	 it	 failed	to	
satisfy	both	limbs	of	Longmore	LJ’s	test.100	The	typical	case	of	fraud	would,	however,	easily	
satisfy	both	criteria101	and	therefore	the	analysis	did	not	assist	in	confining	the	operation	of	
s.17	in	any	real	way.	
	
The	House	of	Lords	then	considered	the	issue	in	The	Star	Sea	and	in	so	doing	clarified	the	
scope	of	utmost	good	faith	in	the	post-contractual	stage.	The	content	of	the	duty	will	vary	
according	 to	 the	 particular	 situation.102	 Where	 the	 underwriter	 is	 called	 upon	 to	 make	
underwriting	decisions	in	the	post-contractual	stage	–	as	will	be	the	case	for	renewals	and	
variations	–	 the	assured	would	be	held	 to	 the	same	expansive	disclosure	obligations	as	at	
inception.103	The	position	is	different	when	the	assured	makes	a	claim	under	the	policy.	The	
duty	 at	 this	 stage	 is	 limited	 to	 one	 of	 honesty104	which	would	 prohibit	 the	 assured	 from	
																																																						
96	Ibid	452	per	Sir	Roger	Parker.	
97	K/S	Merc-Scandia	XXXXII	 v	 Certain	 Lloyd’s	Underwriters	 (The	Mercandian	Continent)	 [2001]	 EWCA	Civ	 1275,	
[2001]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	563.	
98	Marine	 Insurance	 Act	 1906	 ss.18-20;	 the	 remedy	 for	 breach	 in	 these	 circumstances	 has	 been	 amended	 by	
Insurance	Act	2015,	sched	1.	
99	The	Mercandian	Continent	(n97)	[35]	per	Longmore	LJ.	
100	Ibid	[42]	per	Longmore	LJ.	
101	Law	Commission,	Insurance	Contract	Law:	Post	Contract	Duties	and	Other	Issues	(Law	Com	CP	201,	2011),	[6.39];	
The	Aegeon	(n9)	[44]	noting	that	the	first	criterion	would	be	easily	satisfied	where	the	claim	was	wholly	fraudulent	
or	exaggerated.	
102	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[48]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-1A1].	
103	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[54]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	Lishman	v	Northern	Maritime	(1875)	LR	10	CP	179.		
104	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[102],	[111]	per	Lord	Scott.	
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submitting	 a	 fraudulent	 claim	 but	 would	 not	 require	 him	 to	 disclose	 every	 material	
circumstance.105	 This	 difference	 in	 duty	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 doctrine	 in	 the	 pre-
contractual	 setting	 is	designed	 to	prevent	 the	underwriter	 from	being	 saddled	with	a	bad	
bargain	when	material	 information	has	 been	withheld.106	Once	 the	 risk	 has	 attached,	 the	
doctrine	no	longer	serves	this	purpose	but	instead	enables	the	underwriter	to	assess	liability	
and	quantum	accurately.	Lord	Hobhouse	referred	to	this	distinction	in	his	judgment,	
	 	
[Avoidance]	is	appropriate	where	the	cause,	the	want	of	good	faith,	has	preceded	and	
been	material	to	the	making	of	the	contract.	But,	where	the	want	of	good	faith	first	
occurs	 later,	 it	 becomes	 anomalous	 and	 disproportionate	 that	 it	 should	 be	 so	
categorised	and	entitle	the	aggrieved	party	to	such	an	outcome.	But	this	will	be	the	
effect	 of	 accepting	 the	 defendants’	 argument.	 The	 result	 is	 effectively	 penal…This	
cannot	be	reconciled	with	principle.107	
	
Accordingly,	 Lord	 Hobhouse	was	 reluctant	 to	 permit	 avoidance	ab	 initio	 as	 a	 remedy	 for	
fraudulent	claims.	He	expressed	his	concern	in	the	following	way,	
	
The	 potential	 is	 also	 there	 for	 the	 parties,	 if	 they	 so	 choose,	 to	 provide	 by	 their	
contract	for	remedies	or	consequences	which	would	act	retrospectively.	All	this	shows	
that	the	courts	should	be	cautious	before	extending	to	contractual	relations	principles	
of	law	which	the	parties	could	themselves	have	incorporated	into	their	contract	if	they	
had	so	chosen…Where	the	application	of	the	proposed	principle	would	simply	serve	
the	interests	of	one	party	and	do	so	in	a	disproportionate	fashion,	it	is	right	to	question	
whether	the	principle	has	been	correctly	formulated	or	is	being	correctly	applied	and	
it	is	right	to	question	whether	the	codifying	statute	from	which	the	right	contended	
for	is	said	to	be	drawn	is	being	correctly	construed.108	
	
																																																						
105	Ibid	[54],	[57]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	[95],	[96],	[102]	per	Lord	Scott;	H	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	doctrine	of	utmost	
good	faith	in	insurance	contract	law’	[1999]	LMCLQ	165,	198.	The	position	has	now	been	altered	by	the	Insurance	
Act	2015	s.3	which	requires	the	assured	to	make	a	fair	presentation	of	the	risk.	
106	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	doctrine’	(n105)	198.	
107	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[51]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
108	Ibid	[61].	
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Lord	Hobhouse’s	reference	to	the	disproportionate	nature	of	avoidance	reflects	the	fact	that	
although	 the	 duty	 of	 utmost	 good	 faith	 is	 mutual,	 it	 is	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 think	 of	
circumstances	in	which	the	assured	would	make	use	of	this	remedy.109	The	assured’s	priority	
will	be	to	maintain	insurance	coverage	no	matter	the	severity	of	the	underwriter’s	breach.	
These	considerations	suggest	that	avoidance	ab	initio	may	not	be	an	appropriate	remedy	in	
the	post-contractual	phase.	This	view	is	strengthened	by	Lord	Hobhouse’s	insistence	that	the	
earlier	fire	cases	were	authority	for	the	remedy	of	forfeiture.110	The	House	of	Lords	did	not,	
however,	wholly	outlaw	avoidance	in	the	post-formation	stage.111	This	is	attributable	to	the	
fact	that	the	issue	was	not	determinative	on	the	facts	and	their	Lordships	preferred	to	leave	
the	 matter	 open.112	 The	 judgment	 in	 The	 Star	 Sea	 did	 confirm,	 however,	 that	 the	 post-
contractual	duty	of	good	faith	ceased	with	the	commencement	of	litigation.113	The	issue	of	
the	writ	engages	the	Civil	Procedure	Rules	which	contain,	inter	alia,	remedies	for	dishonesty	
during	litigation.114	The	rules	of	the	court	are	far	better	equipped	to	determine	the	rights	and	
obligations	of	parties	involved	in	an	adversarial	dispute.115	
	
The	first	consideration	of	the	role	of	s.17	in	the	context	of	fraudulent	claims	following	The	
Star	 Sea	 occurred	 in	 The	 Aegeon.116	 In	 the	 leading	 judgment,	Mance	 LJ,	 as	 he	 then	was,	
simplified	the	tension	which	had	troubled	previous	courts.	His	solution	was	simply	“to	treat	
the	 common	 law	 rules	 governing	 the	making	 of	 a	 fraudulent	 claim…as	 falling	 outside	 the	
scope	of	s.17	[with	the	result	that]	…No	question	of	avoidance	ab	initio	would	arise.”117	This	
was	 a	 clear	policy	 choice	due	 to	 the	 severity	of	 avoidance	ab	 initio.118	 This	 analysis	 –	 the	
suggestion	that	deliberate	fraud	would	not	constitute	a	breach	of	utmost	good	faith	–	is,	as	
the	Law	Commission	subsequently	noted,119	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	overarching	nature	
																																																						
109	Ibid	[57]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
110	Ibid	[62],	[66]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
111	Ibid	[110]	per	Lord	Scott:	describing	the	issue	as	“more	debateable”.	
112	Ibid	[66]	per	Lord	Hobhouse,	[110]	per	Lord	Scott.	
113	Ibid	[75]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
114	Ibid	[75]	subsequently	applied	in	Suez	Fortune	Investments	Ltd	v	Talbot	Underwriting	Ltd	(The	Brilliante	Virtuoso)	
[2015]	EWHC	42	(Comm),	[2015]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	388.	
115	Law	Com	201	(n101)	[6.30]	“the	rules	of	court	procedure,	which	set	out	disclosure	requirements	and	appropriate	
sanctions	for	non-compliance.”	
116	The	Aegeon	(n9).	
117	Ibid	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
118	Ibid	[44]	per	Mance	LJ.	
119	Law	Com	201	(n101)	[6.44].	
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of	 insurance	 contracts.	 Nevertheless,	 Mance	 LJ	 later	 reiterated	 his	 position	 in	 Axa	 v	
Gottlieb,120	arguing	that	“there	is	no	basis	or	reason	for	giving	the	common	law	rule	relating	
to	fraudulent	claims	a	retrospective	effect	on	prior,	separate	claims	which	have	already	been	
settled	under	the	same	policy	before	any	fraud	occurs.”121	
It	 was	 this	 tension	 –	 and	 the	 complex	 jurisprudence	 resulting	 from	 judicial	 attempts	 to	
reconcile	s.17	and	the	forfeiture	rule122	–	that	provided	the	backdrop	to	the	Law	Commission’s	
consultation	 on	 fraudulent	 claims.	 The	 Commission’s	 proposal	 –	 to	 limit	 the	 remedy	 to	
forfeiture123	 –	 was	 supported	 by	 several	 policy	 considerations.	 Firstly,	 the	 Commission	
emphasised	the	importance	of	finality	in	English	law.	It	would	be	“unprincipled…[and]…wrong	
that	a	valid	claim	made	under	a	valid	policy	can	be	undermined	by	subsequent	events”124	and,	
in	addition,	would	risk	bringing	the	industry	into	disrepute.125	Avoidance	was	also	regarded	
as	 impractical.	 This	 was	 because	 most	 assureds	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 satisfy	 a	 judgment	
perhaps	 some	 years	 after	 valid	 claims	 had	 been	 paid	 and	 the	 indemnity	 spent.126	 Legal	
certainty	would	be	undermined	if,	in	general,	underwriters	were	unable	to	enforce	judgments	
in	these	circumstances.	Thomas	has	suggested	that	in	combination,	these	policy	arguments	
are	“capable	of	supporting	the	exclusion	of	fraudulent	claims	from	the	ambit	of	the	principle	
of	post-contract	good	faith.”127	With	respect,	the	judicial	approach	is	slightly	more	nuanced	
than	Thomas	has	suggested;	fraud	does	engage	good	faith	in	the	post-contractual	phase	but	
the	remedy	will	be	limited	to	forfeiture	of	the	entire	claim.	
The	Insurance	Act	2015	enacts	the	recommendations	contained	in	the	Law	Commission’s	final	
report.128	The	remedy	for	the	submission	of	a	fraudulent	claim	is	limited	to	forfeiture129	and,	
subject	to	the	underwriter’s	satisfaction	of	a	notice	requirement,	prospective	termination	of	
the	policy.130	This	entitles	the	underwriter	to	recover	interim	payments131	made	in	respect	of	
																																																						
120	Gottlieb	(n8).	
121	Ibid	[23]	per	Mance	LJ.	
122	Law	Com	201	(n101)	[6.15]	“convoluted	reasoning	and	uncertainty”.	
123	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[19.4].	
124	Law	Com	201	(n101)	[7.10].	
125	Ibid	[7.10]	citing	the	view	of	Roy	Rodger	(broker).	
126	Ibid	[7.13].	
127	Thomas	(n79)	515.	
128	Law	Com	353	(n5)	344	(recommendations	30-33).	
129	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a).	
130	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(c).	
131	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(b).	
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claims	now	discovered	to	be	fraudulent	but	leaves	prior,	valid	claims	untouched.	The	absence	
of	avoidance	ab	initio	in	this	context	places	a	significant	limit	on	the	extent	to	which	insurance	
claims	 fraud	 unravels	 all.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 considers	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 in	
isolation.	It	seeks	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	‘fraud	unravels	all’	provides	an	accurate	
explanation	of	judicial	intervention	in	this	context.	
	
	
V. The	Forfeiture	Rule	
	
There	 is	 no	 longer	 any	 doubt	 that	 the	 submission	 of	 a	 fraudulent	 claim	 will	 result	 in	
forfeiture.132	 The	 assured	 will	 lose	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 claim	 to	 which	 the	 fraud	 relates,	
including	any	genuine	portion	of	loss.	The	discussion	now	assesses	the	extent	to	which	‘fraud	
unravels	all’	accurately	portrays	the	forfeiture	rule.	Section	A	first	considers	the	juridical	basis	
of	the	rule.	This	task	is	simplified	following	the	2015	Act	and	reveals	a	correlation	between	
forfeiture	and	the	general	law	of	illegality,	embodied	by	the	maxim	ex	turpi	causa.	This	task	
also	enables	us	to	appreciate	the	importance	of	policy	in	the	development	of	the	forfeiture	
rule.	Accordingly,	section	B	examines	the	policy	rationales	used	to	justify	forfeiture.	The	most	
notable	of	 these	 is	 fraud	deterrence	which	has	been	used	by	 the	 courts	 to	 legitimise	 the	
severity	of	 forfeiture.	Section	C	then	considers	the	range	of	 fraudulent	conduct	which	will	
attract	the	remedy	of	forfeiture.	Until	recently,	it	would	have	been	correct	to	suggest	that	the	
courts	had	conceived	of	actionable	fraud	in	broad	terms.	This	permitted	the	courts	to	adopt	
an	interventionist	approach	which	was	in	keeping	with	the	expansiveness	of	the	maxim,	ex	
turpi	 causa.	A	 recent	 Supreme	Court	decision	has	narrowed	 the	 common	 law	meaning	of	
fraud	 and	 thus	 reduces	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 forfeiture	 will	 be	 imposed.133	 The	
traditional	impression	of	an	active	judiciary	is,	however,	reinforced	by	the	minimal	evidential	
(D)	and	temporal	constraints	(E)	applicable	to	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.		
	
	
																																																						
132	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a).	
133	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59).	
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A. The	juridical	basis	of	forfeiture	
Following	the	enactment	of	the	2015	Act,	the	submission	of	a	fraudulent	claim	will	result	in	
forfeiture134	and	require	the	assured	to	repay	any	interim	sums	paid	in	respect	of	the	tainted	
claim.135	As	discussed	above,	the	co-existence	of	the	statutory	remedy	of	avoidance136	and	
the	 forfeiture	 rule	 had	 stymied	 judicial	 attempts	 to	 present	 a	 consistent	 account	 of	 the	
juridical	 basis	 of	 the	 rule.	 137	 Accordingly,	 by	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 Law	Commission	
consultation	in	2006,	case	law	indicated	three	distinct	bases	for	forfeiture:138	an	aspect	of	the	
assured’s	post-contractual	duty	of	utmost	good	faith,139	by	analogy	to	ex	turpi	causa140	or	an	
implied	term	that	the	assured	should	refrain	from	fraud	in	the	claims	process.141	The	attempts	
to	reconcile	forfeiture	with	the	s.17	were	examined	in	the	previous	section.		
Given	that	the	forfeiture	rule	is	now	enshrined	in	statute,	the	search	for	the	juridical	basis	of	
the	rule	becomes	a	largely	academic	exercise.	Indeed,	the	Insurance	Act	not	only	removes	the	
underwriter’s	liability	for	the	claim142	but	also	entitles	the	underwriter	to	treat	the	contract	
as	terminated	with	prospective	effect.143	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	assured	may	equally	
forfeit	his	claim	as	a	 result	of	an	express	 term	 in	 the	policy.144	 In	 these	circumstances	the	
courts	 would	 simply	 give	 effect	 to	 the	 parties’	 agreement.145	 Indeed,	 this	 doctrinal	
explanation146	would	explain	forfeiture	 in	policies	which	 incorporate	the	 International	Hull	
Clauses	(01/11/03).147	Express	terms	tend	to	be	common	in	non-marine	policies148	but	less	so	
																																																						
134	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a).	
135	Insurance	Act	s.12(1)(b);	Gottlieb	(n8)	[32]	per	Mance	LJ.	
136	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.17.	
137	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[20.37]:	“uneasy	juxtaposition	of	section	17	and	the	common	law.”	
138	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[4.18].	
139	For	example,	Orakpo	(n91)	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	
140	For	example,	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
141	For	example,	Orakpo	(n91)	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	
142	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a).	
143	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(c).	
144	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[4.3];	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	3.	
145	Feinman	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	3.	
146	Ibid	3.	
147	International	Hull	Clauses	(01/11/03)	cl.	45.3.	No	such	clause	exists	in	Institute	Time	Clauses	–	Hulls	(01/10/83).	
148	N	Legh-Jones,	J	Birds	and	D	Owen	QC	(eds.),	MacGillivray	on	Insurance	Law	(11th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2012),	
[19-055].		
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in	marine	policies.149	This	may	well	explain	why	recent	judicial	discussion	on	the	extent	of	the	
rule	and	meaning	of	fraud	has	occurred	largely	in	the	marine	context.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	partial	codification	of	forfeiture,	the	juridical	basis	of	the	rule	remains	
an	important	consideration	for	this	project.	Indeed,	freed	from	the	baggage	of	s.17,	the	basis	
for	judicial	intervention	becomes	more	readily	apparent.	It	is	from	this	perspective	that	one	
can	appreciate	the	significance	of	public	policy	considerations	–	unsurprising	given	the	moral	
opprobrium	that	fraud	inspires150	–	in	the	development	of	the	rule.	A	critical	starting	point,	
therefore,	is	the	judgment	of	Lord	Hobhouse	in	The	Star	Sea	where	he	equated	the	forfeiture	
rule	with	the	general	law	of	illegality,		
	
This	result	is	not	dependent	upon	the	inclusion	in	the	contract	of	a	term	having	that	
effect	or	the	type	of	insurance;	it	is	the	consequence	of	a	rule	of	law.	Just	as	the	law	
will	not	allow	an	insured	to	commit	a	crime	and	then	use	it	as	a	basis	for	recovering	
an	indemnity	(Beresford	v	Royal	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1937]	2	KB	197),	so	it	will	not	allow	
an	insured	who	has	made	a	fraudulent	claim	to	recover.151	
	
This	is	entirely	consistent	with	logic	of	ex	turpi	causa;	the	notion	that	fraud	unravels	all	and	
an	indication	of	the	judicial	reluctance	to	engage	with	dishonest	claimants.152		
	
Subsequently,	however,	Mance	LJ	argued	that	general	principles	of	illegality	could	not	explain	
the	totality	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	In	Gottlieb,	Mance	LJ	stated,		
	
The	law	of	illegality…does	not	in	my	view,	however,	provide	a	complete	analogy	to	or	
explanation	of	the	common	law	rule	relating	to	fraudulent	claims.	It	applies	the	rule	
																																																						
149	R	Clift,	‘Fraud:	Does	the	punishment	fit	the	crime?’	International	Marine	Claims	Conference	(24	October	2007)	
available	 at:	 http://www.marineclaimsconference.com/2007/docs/07RhysCliftHandout.pdf	 (accessed	
12/12/2016)	9.	
150	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[72]	per	Lord	Hobhouse:	“fraud	has	a	fundamental	impact	upon	the	parties’	relationships	and	
raises	serious	public	policy	considerations.”	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[1-21]	“fraud	is	often	viewed	as	
morally	repugnant,	especially	in	the	context	of	insurance	law,	which	is	built	upon	the	foundations	of	utmost	good	
faith.”	See	also	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	4	who	refers	to	the	“moral	purpose”	of	forfeiture.		
151	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
152	J	Davey	and	K	Richards,	‘Deterrence,	human	rights	and	illegality:	The	forfeiture	rule	in	insurance	contract	law’	
[2015]	LMCLQ	315,	318.	See	also	Clarke,	Twenty-first	Century	(n30)	207.	
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that	 a	 person	 cannot	 benefit	 from	 his	 own	 wrong.	 It	 does	 not	 explain	 either	 the	
forfeiture	of	the	genuine	part	of	an	insurance	claim	-	that	is	explained	by	the	different	
considerations	of	policy	which	appear	in	the	concluding	sentences	of	paragraph	62	of	
Lord	Hobhouse’s	speech	in	The	Star	Sea	-	or	the	recovery	of	sums	paid	in	respect	of	a	
genuine	loss	after	a	fraud	but	before	its	discovery.153	
	
The	“different	considerations	of	policy”154	to	which	Mance	LJ	referred	in	this	judgment	relate	
to	fraud	deterrence.	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section,	considerations	of	policy	–	
most	notably	deterrence	–	have	been	critical	in	setting	the	limits,	and	justifying	the	effect,	of	
the	 forfeiture	rule.	 In	Gottlieb,	Mance	LJ	advocated	that	 forfeiture	should	be	explained	as	
“special	common	law	rule”155	given	that	ex	turpi	causa	could	not	explain	the	totality	of	the	
rule.	 	A	 further	 reference	 to	 this	 characterisation	was	made	 in	his	dissenting	 judgment	 in	
Versloot156	although,	for	the	reason	discussed	above,	the	juridical	basis	of	forfeiture	is	now	
largely	confined	to	academic	discussion.	
	
The	 juridical	basis	of	 forfeiture	 is	a	useful	starting	point	 to	determine	the	extent	 to	which	
‘fraud	unravels	all’	explains	judicial	intervention	in	cases	of	fraud.	There	is	no	doubt	that	fraud	
does	unravel	all	within	the	confines	of	the	tainted	claim.	Indeed,	insurance	claims	fraud	has	
effects	which	exceed	the	ordinary	invocation	of	ex	turpi	causa;	the	forfeiture	rule	is	not	bound	
by	the	arbitrary	timing	of	interim	payments	and,	by	virtue	of	the	Insurance	Act,	can	bring	the	
relationship	to	an	end.157	Viewed	in	this	light,	the	consequences	of	forfeiture	are	far-reaching	
and	 demonstrate	 the	 willingness	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 intervene	 in	 cases	 of	 fraud.	 These	
consequences,	 as	 will	 now	 be	 discussed,	 are	 attributable	 to	 policy	 considerations	
underpinning	the	rule.	
	
	
B. The	policy	rationales	of	forfeiture	
	
																																																						
153	Gottlieb	(n8)	[29]	per	Mance	LJ.	
154	Ibid	[29]	per	Mance	LJ.	
155	Ibid	[31]	per	Mance	LJ.	
156	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[119]	per	Lord	Mance.	
157	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(c).	
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The	judicial	approach	to	fraudulent	insurance	claims	lends	credence	to	the	notion	that	fraud	
unravels	all.	The	courts	have	clearly	accepted	the	scale	of	the	insurance	fraud	problem	and,	
moreover,	considered	legal	sanctions	a	critical	part	of	combatting	the	problem.	Accordingly,	
the	judicial	narrative	involves	two	distinct	threads	(i)	the	need	to	protect	the	underwriter	and	
(ii)	the	importance	of	deterrence	by	way	of	legal	sanctions.		Considerations	of	transaction	cost	
provide	a	further	rationale	for	the	forfeiture	rule	(iii).			
	
	
i. Protecting	the	underwriter	
The	risk	of	fraud	during	claims	stems	primarily	from	information	asymmetries	present	in	the	
insurance	relationship.	In	particular,	the	assured	will	typically	have	more	information	about	
the	 cause	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 loss	 than	 the	 underwriter,	 which	 creates	 incentives	 for	
misrepresentation	for	private	gain.158	The	underwriter	requires	this	information	to	make	an	
accurate	 assessment	 of	 the	 claim.	 The	 presence	 of	 these	 information	 asymmetries	 has	
traditionally	been	used	to	justify	rules	protecting	the	underwriter,		
	
…the	policy	was	effected	through	an	agent,	who	could	not	be	supposed	to	be	skilled	
in	the	value	of	the	stock	in	all	sorts	of	businesses,	or	to	know	within	a	hundred	or	two	
the	value	of	stock	in	a	business	different	from	his	own.159	
	
Similar	ideas	are	evident	in	more	recent	case	law.	In	Galloway	v	Guardian,	Lord	Woolf	MR	
held	 that	 “in	 the	making	 of	 the	 claim	 the	 facts	 are	 normally	 wholly	 within	 the	 insured’s	
knowledge.	 The	 insurers	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 insured	 exercising	 good	 faith	 in	 order	 to	
evaluate	the	claim.”160	The	Court	of	Appeal	judgment	in	Versloot	raised	similar	concerns,	
	
The	importance	of	honesty	in	the	claiming	process	is	manifest.	Most	insurance	claims	
get	nowhere	near	litigation	because	insurers	rely	on	their	 insured…But	insurers	are	
entitled	to	protection	from	either	type	of	fraud...161	
																																																						
158	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	3.	
159	Britton	(n4)	910	per	Willes	J.	
160	Galloway	(n8)	214	per	Lord	Woolf	MR.	
161	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	[2014]	EWCA	Civ	1349,	[2015]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	115,	
[113]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)).	
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Lord	Sumption	endorsed	this	idea	in	the	Supreme	Court,	holding	that	the	fraudulent	claims	
rule	 “reflects...the	 law’s	 traditional	 concern	 with	 the	 informational	 asymmetry	 of	 the	
contractual	 relationship,	and	 the	consequent	vulnerability	of	 insurers.”162	 In	his	dissenting	
judgment,	Lord	Mance	referred	to	the	“significant	protective	effects”	163	of	the	forfeiture	rule	
which	 he	 asserted	were	 “entirely	 consistent	with	 the	 underlying	 philosophy	of	 insurance,	
mutual	trust.”164	The	judicial	characterisation	of	the	insurance	relationship	is	one	in	which	the	
underwriter	is	vulnerable	and	merits	protection.	The	second	thread	of	the	judicial	narrative	
follows	 from	 this	 characterisation;	 the	 importance	 of	 deterring	 fraud	 through	 harsh	 legal	
sanctions.		
	
ii. 	Fraud	deterrence	
The	characterisation	of	the	underwriter	as	in	need	of	protection	suggests	that	he	is	powerless	
to	counter	fraud.	The	corollary	of	this	is	that	the	courts	have	portrayed	legal	sanctions	as	an	
important	means	of	overcoming	this	vulnerability.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	forfeiture	rule	
is	 typically	 framed	 in	 instrumental	 terms;	 the	deterrence	of	 fraud.	The	 judicial	 account	of	
deterrence	relies	on	severe	legal	sanctions165	to	discourage	assureds	from	taking	advantage	
of	 the	 opportunities	 for	 gain	 within	 the	 claims	 process.166	 The	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 the	
forfeiture	rule	is	explicit	in	the	case	law.	A	representative	example	of	these	follows:	
	
In	Galloway	v	Guardian,	Millett	LJ	commented	on	the	prevalence	and	immorality	of	insurance	
fraud,	
	
The	making	of	dishonest	insurance	claims	has	become	all	too	common.	There	seems	
to	be	a	widespread	belief	that	insurance	companies	are	fair	game,	and	that	defrauding	
them	is	not	morally	reprehensible.	The	rule	which	we	are	asked	to	enforce	today	may	
																																																						
162	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
163	Ibid	[127]	per	Lord	Mance.	
164	Ibid	[127]	per	Lord	Mance.	
165	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[139]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ;	Gottlieb	(n8)	[31]	per	Mance	LJ.	
166	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	3.	This	is	the	‘economic’	rationale	in	Feinman’s	categorisation.	
66	
	
appear	to	some	to	be	harsh,	but	it	is	in	my	opinion	a	necessary	and	salutary	rule	which	
deserves	to	be	better	known	by	the	public.167	
	
Lord	Hobhouse	made	clear	that	the	forfeiture	rule	was	intended	to	influence	the	assured’s	
behaviour	and	discourage	the	submission	of	fraudulent	claims,		
	
Just	as	the	law	will	not	allow	an	insured	to	commit	a	crime	and	then	use	it	as	a	basis	
for	recovering	an	indemnity,	so	it	will	not	allow	an	insured	who	has	made	a	fraudulent	
claim	to	recover.	The	logic	is	simple.	The	fraudulent	insured	must	not	be	allowed	to	
think:	 if	 the	 fraud	 is	 successful,	 then	 I	 will	 gain;	 if	 it	 is	 unsuccessful,	 I	 will	 lose	
nothing.168	
	
In	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 judgment	 in	 Versloot,	 Christopher	 Clarke	 LJ	 equated	 effective	
deterrence	with	sanction	severity,	
	
It	 applies	even	 if	 there	 is	no	 clause	 in	 the	policy	 incorporating	 it	 and	 is	designedly	
draconian.	It	functions	as	a	deterrent	to	the	deception	of	insurers	who…will	have	no,	
or	very	little,	knowledge	of	the	incident	which	is	said	to	give	rise	to	the	claim.	Part	of	
the	rationale	is	that	if	lying	to	the	insurers	did	not	attract	that	sanction,	the	dishonest	
insured	would	enjoy	a	one-way	bet.169	
	
In	 Baker’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 insurance	 contract,	 he	 asserts	 that	 underwriters	 use	
different	 narratives	 about	 insurance	 at	 the	 sales	 and	 claims	 stages.170	 The	 narrative	 that	
follows	a	loss	is	designed	to	limit	the	underwriter’s	exposure	to	subsequent	claims.171	This	
focus	 on	 dishonesty	 and	 deterrence	 in	 the	 English	 case	 law	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 Baker’s	
																																																						
167	Galloway	(n8)	214	per	Millett	LJ.	
168	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[62]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
169	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[75]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
170	T	Baker,	‘Constructing	the	insurance	relationship:	Sales	stories,	claims	stories,	and	insurance	contract	damages’	
(1993-1994)	72	Tex	L	Rev	1395.	
171	Ibid	1405.	
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‘immoral	insured’	narrative.172	On	this	basis	it	is	easy	to	justify	judicial	intervention	to	counter	
“the	depravity	of	those	who	threaten	the	public	interest.”173	
	
The	judicial	view	of	deterrence	is	that	it	depends	on	harsh	legal	sanctions.	Indeed,	the	cases	
are	replete	with	references	to	the	‘draconian’	and	‘severe’	nature	of	the	forfeiture	rule.174	
Millett	LJ’s	reference	in	Galloway	to	public	knowledge	of	forfeiture	appears	to	suggest	that	
decision-making	about	fraud,	as	conceptualised	by	the	courts,	involves	the	assured	weighing	
up	the	potential	penalty	 in	the	decision	to	offend.175	Harsh	sanctions,	on	this	analysis,	are	
required	 to	 outweigh	 the	 potential	 financial	 benefits	 of	 submitting	 a	 fraudulent	 claim.	
Characterised	in	this	manner,	his	Lordship’s	desire	to	improve	public	knowledge	as	a	means	
of	 ensuring	 fraud	 deterrence	 can	 be	 readily	 understood.	 Academic	 commentary	 typically	
characterises	fraud	deterrence	in	a	similar	way.	Bennett,	for	example,	has	argued	in	favour	of	
stringent	sanctions	–	including	avoidance	–	to	counter	fraud,	
	 	
…it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 underplay	 the	 policing	 function	 of	 the	 doctrine…if	 the	
consequence	of	 such	deliberate	non-disclosure	were	merely	 loss	of	 the	 fraudulent	
claim,	 the	 law	would	provide	no	 incentive	 to	honesty	and	almost	encourage	 fraud	
instead	of	deterring	it.176	
	
Legal	 sanctions	 are	 central	 to	 the	 judicial	 account	 of	 fraud	 deterrence.	 This	 absolves	 the	
underwriters’	responsibility	which	is	consistent	with	the	narrative	of	the	vulnerable	insurer.	
It	 further	 carries	 with	 it	 the	 suggestion	 that,	 absent	 forfeiture,	 insureds	 would	 routinely	
submit	fraudulent	claims.	This	overlooks	the	fact	that	the	express	requirement	of	good	faith	
might	 have	 any	 impact	 on	 behaviour.	 Perhaps	most	 interestingly,	 the	 characterisation	 of	
forfeiture	as	a	deterrent	accords	the	civil	law	an	atypical	instrumental	purpose.	The	ordinary	
role	of	the	civil	law	is	not	to	police	the	parties’	relationship	but	to	resolve	disputes	and	award	
compensation	for	loss.177			
																																																						
172	Ibid	1411.	
173	Ibid	1412.	
174	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[139]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ;	Gottlieb	(n8)	[31]	per	Mance	LJ.	
175	For	a	critique	of	this	model	of	decision	making,	see	Chapter	Three	text	to	fn	71	et	seq.	
176	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	doctrine’	(n105)	210.	
177	Galloway	(n8)	214	per	Millett	LJ.	The	logic	of	the	deterrence	rationale	will	be	considered	in	depth	in	Chapter	
Three.	
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Deterrence	 must	 also	 be	 appreciated	 from	 a	 broader	 systemic	 perspective178	 since	 the	
particular	insured-insurer	relationship	is	but	one	of	a	number	of	such	relationships	in	which	
the	underwriter	engages.	Just	as	risks	are	spread	throughout	the	pool	at	inception,	so	too	are	
the	costs	of	fraud	borne	by	policyholders	in	higher	premiums.179	This	makes	fraud	deterrence	
all	 the	more	 important.	Not	 only	will	 a	 deterrent	 sanction	prevent	 the	 individual	 assured	
profiting	from	wrongdoing,	but	it	will	also	safeguard	the	interests	of	honest	assureds.180	This	
has	been	recognised	more	generally	by	Abraham,	“insurers	distribute	risk,	and	legal	rules	that	
protect	insurers	therefore	redound	to	the	benefit	of	the	community	of	insureds.”181	If,	as	the	
courts	 presume,	 deterrence	 is	 dependent	 on	 harsh	 sanctions,	 this	 broader	 consideration	
cements	the	need	for	a	severe	response	to	fraud	willingly	employed	by	the	courts.	
	
	
iii. The	transaction	cost	rationale		
The	judicial	account	of	insurance	fraud	suggests	that	legal	sanctions	are	required	to	protect	
underwriters	and	deter	would-be	fraudsters.	However,	issues	related	to	transaction	cost	also	
bear	examination	in	this	context.	A	good	deal	of	the	information	on	which	the	underwriter	
relies	 to	 make	 decisions	 about	 the	 claim	 will	 emanate	 from	 his	 assured.	 	 Simply,	 if	 the	
underwriter	was	forced	to	confirm	the	validity	of	every	statement	made	to	him,	the	claims	
process	would	be	far	lengthier	and	more	expensive	as	a	result.182	These	costs	would	no	doubt	
be	passed	onto	policyholders	in	increased	premiums.		
	
A	 justification	 premised	 on	 considerations	 of	 transaction	 cost	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 the	
insurance	setting.	Similar	arguments	were	used	in	Brotherton	to	explain	the	pre-contractual	
disclosure	duties	of	the	assured.183	If	the	assured	was	not	required	to	disclose	allegations	of	
misconduct,	even	in	circumstances	where	the	assured	knew	them	to	be	false	and	were	in	fact	
																																																						
178	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	4.	
179	Versloot	(Supreme	Court	hearing)	(n3)	2h	16	per	Lord	Sumption,	Feinman,	‘Agency	and	opportunism’	(n1)	4.	
180	Baker,	‘Constructing	the	insurance	relationship’	(n170)	1410,	1412-1413;	Chapman	v	Pole	(1870)	22	LT	306,	307	
per	Cockburn	CJ.	
181	Abraham,	Distributing	Risk	(n19)	35.	
182	D	Harris,	D	Campbell	and	R	Halson,	Remedies	in	Contract	and	Tort,	(2nd	ed.	Butterworths	Tolley,	2001),	555.	
183	Brotherton	v	Aseguradora	Colseguros	SA	[2003]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	746.	
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later	disproved,	the	underwriter	would	be	put	“to	the	trouble,	expense	and…risk	of	expensive	
litigation…in	circumstances	when	insurers	would	never	have	been	exposed	to	any	of	this,	had	
the	insured	performed	its	prima	facie	duty	to	make	timely	disclosure.”184	
	
This	logic	was	repeated	by	Lord	Hughes	in	Versloot,		
	
Typically,	insurers	market	their	policies	in	part	by	advertising	what	they	assert	to	be	
their	prompt	and	uncomplicated	response	to	claims.	If	such	is	to	be	the	response	to	
claims,	 insurers	must	 take	 the	 claiming	 insured	 to	 a	 considerable	 extent	 on	 trust.	
Furthermore,	 if	 claims	 have	 to	 be	 investigated	 in	 detail	 and	 routinely	 verified	 by	
insurers,	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 systems	 necessary	 to	 do	 this	 will	 fall	 on	 policyholders	
generally.185	
	
Policy	considerations	have	been	critical	in	the	development	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	The	most	
significant	of	these	–	fraud	deterrence	–	has	been	explained	by	the	courts	as	dependent	on	
severe	 legal	sanctions	and	this	 in	turn	has	been	used	to	 justify	the	harsh	consequences	of	
forfeiture.	 This	 provides	 philosophical	 support	 for	 the	 notion	 that	 insurance	 claims	 fraud	
should	unravel	all.	The	focus	now	turns	to	the	common	law	meaning	of	fraud	as	this	 is	an	
important	 perspective	 from	which	 to	 assess	 the	 utility	 of	 ex	 turpi	 causa	 in	 the	 insurance	
context.	
	
	
C. The	conception	of	fraud	
The	definition	of	 insurance	fraud	 is	an	 important	consideration	 in	tracing	the	scope	of	the	
fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.	The	more	broadly	fraud	is	defined,	the	greater	scope	for	courts	
to	prevent	the	assured	receiving	the	indemnity.	This	has	been	a	matter	for	the	courts.186	The	
classic	definition	of	civil	fraud	is	traced	to	the	decision	in	Derry	v	Peek.187	In	that	case,	Lord	
Herschell	determined	that	a	statement	would	be	fraudulent	when	it	was	“made	(1)	knowingly,	
																																																						
184	Ibid	[31]	per	Mance	LJ.	
185	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[55]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
186	This	remains	the	case	following	the	enactment	of	Insurance	Act	2015,	see	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[1.51].	
187	Derry	v	Peek	(1889)	14	App	Cas	337.	
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or	 (2)	without	belief	 in	 its	 truth,	or	 (3)	 recklessly,	 careless	whether	 it	be	 true	or	 false.”188	
Malcolm	Clarke	has	suggested	that	fraud	comprises	three	distinct	elements;	the	fraud	must	
be	substantial,	wilful	and	material.189	
	
The	notion	of	substantiality	requires	an	objective	consideration	of	the	size	of	the	fraud.	This	
is	“not	a	high	threshold”190	and	effectively	enables	the	courts	to	exclude	frauds	which	are	de	
minimis191	from	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.	As	was	noted	at	first	instance	in	Versloot,	
a	fraudulent	exaggeration	of	£2000	in	the	context	of	a	claim	worth	£3	million	will	be	regarded	
as	substantial	for	the	purposes	of	forfeiture.192	
	
The	 second	 requirement	 –	 that	 the	 fraud	 is	 wilful	 and	 deliberate	 –	 is	 embodied	 by	 the	
definition	given	in	Derry.	The	focus	here	is	on	the	mindset	of	the	assured.	Clarke	has	noted	
that	“in	some	degree	the	falsity	must	have	been	known	to	and,	by	inference	intended	by	the	
claimant.”193	This	excludes,	therefore,	both	negligence194	and	the	‘moral	fraud’	of	Redgrave	v	
Hurd.195	 This	 significantly	 narrows	 the	 range	 of	 conduct	 that	 the	 courts	 will	 regard	 as	
fraudulent.		
	
The	test	established	 in	Derry	has	been	accepted	almost	without	question	 in	the	 insurance	
context.	 An	 alternative	 test,	 however,	 was	 proposed	 and	 ultimately	 adopted	 in	 Aviva	 v	
Brown.196	Counsel	for	the	assured	contended	that	the	“combined	test”197	first	enunciated	in	
Twinsectra	v	Yardley198	which	contained	an	objective	and	subjective	element	was	applicable.	
																																																						
188	Ibid	374	per	Lord	Herschell.	
189	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	27-2B.	
190	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI-Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	Ag	(The	DC	Merwestone)	[2013]	EWHC	1666	(Comm),	
[2013]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	582,	[157]	per	Popplewell	J	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	(First	Instance)).	
191	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-2B1];	Legh-Jones,	Birds	and	Owen,	MacGillivray	on	Insurance	Law	(n148)	[19-061].	
In	Lek	v	Mathews	[1927]	Ll	L	Rep	141,	145	per	Viscount	Sumner	the	false	claims	clause	was	interpreted	to	include	
“anything	not	so	insubstantial	as	to	make	the	maxim	de	minimis	applicable.”	
192	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[157]	per	Popplewell	J.	
193	Clarke,	looseleaf	(n26)	27-2B2.	
194	Beacon	Insurance	Company	Ltd	v	Maharaj	Bookstore	Ltd	[2014]	UKPC	21,	[26]:	“error	was	a	genuine	one	and	
that	Mr	Maharaj	had	not	intended	to	deceive	anyone”,	[36]:	“the	boundary	between	an	incompetent	mistake	and	
a	lie	may	be	a	matter	of	impression”	per	Lord	Hodge.	
195	Redgrave	v	Hurd	(1881)	20	Ch	D	1,	see	earlier	discussion	in	Chapter	One.	
196	Aviva	Insurance	Ltd	v	Brown	[2012]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	211,	[101]	but	see	also	[61]	where	Eder	J	describes	Derry	
(n187)	as	providing	the	“classic	definition	of	fraud”	
197	Twinsectra	Ltd	v	Yardley [2002]	2	AC	164,	172	per	Lord	Hutton.	
198	Ibid	172	per	Lord	Hutton.	
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This	meant	that	dishonesty	would	only	be	established	where	i)	the	defendant’s	conduct	was	
dishonest	by	the	standards	of	reasonable	men	and	ii)	the	defendant	knew	his	conduct	was	
dishonest	on	this	basis.199	This	has	not	been	well	received	in	subsequent	commentary	or	case	
law.	 Arnould	 has	 explained	 the	 result	 in	 Aviva	 as	 “heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 test	 of	
dishonesty”200	adopted	without	expressing	a	firm	view	on	the	merits	of	the	combined	test.	At	
first	instance	in	Versloot,	Popplewell	J	restored	Derry	v	Peek	as	the	appropriate	test	in	cases	
of	 fraud	 stating	 that	 “conscious	 dishonesty	 is	 not	 a	 separate	 element	 of	 the	 test.”201	
Moreover,	Popplewell	J	made	clear	that	the	Derry	standard	did	not	constitute	a	lower	burden	
for	the	underwriter	and	reiterated	the	difficulty	of	proving	fraud.202			
	
The	final,	and	perhaps	most	complex,	element	of	the	common	law	definition	is	materiality.	
This	complexity	is	partly	explained	by	the	fact	materiality	“’in	the	ordinary	sense’	has	no	role	
to	play”203	here.	This	is	because	materiality	usually	embodies	a	causal	connection	requiring	
the	court	to	determine	whether	the	falsity	impacted	the	representee’s	conduct.	Indeed,	the	
tort	of	deceit	requires	that	the	representee	was	influenced	by	the	lie	in	deciding	to	enter	the	
contract.204	By	contrast,	when	the	insurer	alleges	fraud,	he	does	so	precisely	because	he	has	
not	been	induced	by	the	lie	to	make	payment.205	
	
This	has	complicated	the	courts’	approach	to	materiality	and	two	distinct	characterisations	of	
this	element	of	the	test	are	identifiable	in	the	case	law.	The	first	school	of	thought	effectively	
marginalised	 the	materiality	 requirement.	 In	Royal	Boskalis	 v	Mountain,	 Rix	 J	 argued	 that	
there	was	“no	additional	test	of	materiality	or,	to	put	the	same	point	perhaps	in	another	way,	
the	test	of	materiality	is	built	into	the	concept	of	a	fraudulent	claim.”206	This	was	a	very	limited	
requirement	which,	as	Rix	 J	 contended,	 responded	 to	 the	“disciplinary	element	of	marine	
																																																						
199	Aviva	v	Brown	(n196)	224	per	Eder	J.	
200	J	Gilman	(ed.),	Arnould’s	Law	of	Marine	Insurance	and	Average	(18th	ed.	Sweet	and	Maxwell,	2013),	[18-92].	
201	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[154]	per	Popplewell	J.	
202	Ibid	[155]	per	Popplewell	J.	
203	Arnould	(18th	ed.)	(n200)	[18-62].	
204	Hayward	v	Zurich	Insurance	Co.	[2016]	UKSC	48,	[47]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
205	As	was	noted	in	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[36]	per	Mance	LJ.	
206	Royal	Boskalis	Westminster	BV	v	Mountain	[1997]	1	LRLR	523,	599	per	Rix	J.	
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insurance.”207	This	conception	has	been	subsequently	endorsed	by	Bennett208	and	by	Mance	
LJ	in	the	following	terms,	
	
And	need	the	fraud	have	any	effect	on	insurers’	conduct?	Speaking	here	of	a	claim	for	
a	 loss	 known	 to	 be	non-existent	 or	 exaggerated,	 the	 answers	 seem	 clear.	Nothing	
further	is	necessary.	The	application	of	the	rule	flows	from	the	fact	that	a	fraudulent	
claim	of	 this	 nature	 has	 been	made.	Whether	 insurers	 are	misled	 or	 not	 is	 in	 this	
context	beside	the	point.209	
	
Understood	in	this	way,	materiality	represented	a	very	minor	constraint	on	the	courts’	ability	
to	intervene	in	cases	of	fraud	and	would	be	easily	satisfied	by	the	underwriter.	
	
An	 alternative	 formulation	 of	materiality	 has	 been	 suggested	 by	Malcolm	 Clarke.	 He	 has	
argued	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 decisive	 influence	 test	 such	 that	 fraud	 would	 be	 material	 when	 it	
affected	the	underwriter’s	readiness	to	pay.210	This	idea	encompassed	“either	the	amount	to	
be	paid	or	the	person	to	whom	it	is	to	be	paid	or	whether	to	pay	anyone	any	amount	at	all.”211	
This	test	would	be	easily	satisfied	where	the	claim	was	either	wholly	fabricated	or	involved	
an	exaggeration.	The	breadth	of	this	formulation212	is	apparent	in	Wisenthal	v	World	Auxiliary	
Insurance	Corporation.213	In	that	case,	Roche	J	determined	that	materiality	would	be	satisfied	
if	the	“deceit	had	been	used	to	secure	easier	or	quicker	payment	of	the	money	than	would	
have	been	obtained	if	the	truth	had	been	told.”214		
	
																																																						
207	Ibid	598	per	Rix	J	citing	Pan	Atlantic	Insurance	Co	Ltd	v	Pine	Top	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1995]	1	AC	501,	511	per	Lord	
Mustill.	
208	Bennett,	The	Law	of	Marine	Insurance	(n80),	[22.91]:	“no	qualification	is	needed	or	acknowledged	with	respect	
to	fraudulent	claims	stricto	sensu,	or	alternatively	is	built	into	the	concept	of	such	a	fraudulent	claim.”		
209	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[36]	per	Mance	LJ.	
210	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-2B4].	
211	Ibid	[27-2B4].		
212	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[3.13].	
213	Wisenthal	v	World	Auxiliary	Insurance	Corporation	(1930)	38	Ll	L	Rep	54.	
214	Ibid	62	per	Roche	J.	
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Whether	the	‘no	additional	requirement’	or	‘decisive	impact’	conception	of	materiality	were	
preferred,	it	was	unlikely	to	constitute	a	significant	hurdle	for	the	underwriter.	As	the	Law	
Commission	noted,	it	would	be	a	very	“rare	case”215	that	a	lie	would	not	be	material.		
	
The	earlier	reference	to	the	complexity	of	materiality	also	reflects	the	fact	that	the	applicable	
test	was	recently	altered	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	Versloot.216	At	this	stage,	it	suffices	to	say	
that	the	new	test	focuses	solely	on	whether	the	lie	relates	to	the	underwriter’s	liability	under	
the	policy	and	will	be	assessed	retrospectively.217	This	now	means	that	lies	like	those	told	in	
Wisenthal	–	to	“secure	easier	or	quicker	payment	of	the	money”218	–	will	not	be	regarded	as	
material.	A	comprehensive	discussion	of	the	new	materiality	threshold	will	be	undertaken	in	
due	course.219	
	
Although	the	courts,	and	indeed	the	Insurance	Act	2015,	proceed	on	the	basis	that	forfeiture	
is	 the	 only	 civil	 sanction	 for	 fraud,	 the	 common	 law	 definition	 of	 insurance	 fraud	 can	 be	
satisfied	 by	 several	 behaviours.	 It	 is	 appropriate,	 therefore,	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 spectrum	 of	
insurance	fraud.220	Three	behaviours	are	traditionally	identified	in	the	case	law:	(i)	the	wholly	
fraudulent	 claim,	 (ii)	 the	 exaggerated	 claim	 and	 (iii)	 the	 genuine	 claim	 supplemented	 by	
fraudulent	 means	 or	 devices.	 A	 fourth	 category	 of	 fraudulent	 claim	 –	 the	 assured’s	
suppression	of	a	defence	–	will	also	be	considered	(iv)	following	the	recent	Supreme	Court	
decision	 in	 Versloot.221	 The	 following	 discussion	 considers	 these	 behaviours	 in	 detail	 to	
determine	the	precise	scope	of	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.	
	
	
i. The	wholly	fraudulent	claim	
A	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claim	 exists	 when	 the	 assured	 fabricates	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 loss	 or	
deliberately	causes	the	loss	himself.	This	is	the	most	serious	type	of	fraudulent	claim222	and	
																																																						
215	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[3.15].	
216	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[30],	[36]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[92]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
217	Ibid	[30],	[36]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[92]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
218	Wisenthal	(n213)	62	per	Roche	J.	
219	See	later,	text	to	fn	319	et	seq.	
220	Richards	(n34)	18.	
221	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59).	
222	Liverpool	Victoria	Insurance	Co	Ltd	v	Bashir	[2012]	EWHC	895	(Admin),	[9]	per	Sir	John	Thomas.	
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will	generally	require	the	assured	to	have	planned	his	offending	in	advance.	The	paradigm	
marine	example	of	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim	is	the	scuttle;	the	deliberate	sinking	of	a	vessel	
to	 claim	 the	 indemnity.	 Todd	 has	 suggested	 that	 scuttling	 is	 “probably	 quite	 common”223	
although	it	will	be	difficult	to	prove	even	when	there	is	ample	suspicion	about	the	real	cause	
of	 the	 loss.224	 This	 is	 because	barratry	 –	 the	destruction	of	 the	 vessel	 by	 the	 crew	 to	 the	
prejudice	 of	 the	 owner225	 –	 is	 a	 covered	 peril.226	 The	 courts	 will	 demand	 considerable	
evidence	 of	 the	 assured’s	 complicity	 in	 the	 casting	 away	 of	 the	 vessel	 to	 substantiate	 an	
allegation	of	scuttling.227	
	
The	 application	 of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 to	 the	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claim	 involves	 a	 difficult	
analysis.	In	the	first	place	this	is	because	forfeiture	deprives	the	assured	of	a	cause	of	action	
which	arose	on	the	occurrence	of	the	loss.228	This	does	not	make	sense	where	the	loss	has	
been	 caused	 deliberately	 by	 the	 assured	 or	 the	 claim	 is	made	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 loss	
whatsoever.	 In	 the	 former	 case,	 the	 wilful	 misconduct	 defence	 establishes	 that	 the	
underwriter	cannot	be	liable	for	loss	deliberately	occasioned	by	the	assured.229	Where	the	
claim	is	made	in	the	absence	of	any	loss,	the	assured	could	not	recover	simply	because	he	
would	be	unable	to	discharge	the	burden	of	proving	the	loss	was	covered	by	the	policy.230	
This	makes	it	conceptually	difficult	to	speak	of	forfeiture	in	the	context	of	wholly	fraudulent	
claims	because	there	never	was	a	valid	claim	for	the	assured	to	forfeit.		
	
Leaving	 this	 conceptual	 difficulty	 aside,	 the	 application	 of	 forfeiture	 in	 relation	 to	wholly	
fraudulent	claims	is	also	problematic	because	the	rule	is	the	only	civil	sanction	for	insurance	
fraud.	Applying	forfeiture	to	this	type	of	claim	is	the	equivalent	of	permitting	a	thief	to	return	
																																																						
223	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n29)	[6.032].	
224	Cases	in	which	scuttling	has	been	proved	include:	P	Samuel	&	Co	v	Dumas	(1924)	18	Ll	L	Rep	211;	National	
Justice	Compania	v	Prudential	Assurance	Co	(The	Ikarian	Reefer)	[1995]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	455;	The	Gold	Sky	(n46)	
[1972]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	187.	
225	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	Sched.	1	(11).	
226	International	Hulls	Clauses	2003	cl.2.2.5.	
227	 In	Elfie	 A	 Issaias	 v	Marine	 Insurance	 Co	 Ltd	 (1923)	 15	 Ll	 L	 Rep	 186,	 the	 assured	 proved	 that	 the	 loss	was	
barratrous;	the	underwriter	was	unable	to	prove	that	this	had	been	done	with	the	privity	of	the	assured.	The	Court	
of	Appeal	found	for	the	plaintiff	assured.	
228	Chandris	v	Argo	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1963]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep	65,	74	per	Megaw	J;	The	Fanti	(n25)	35-36	per	Lord	Goff;	
Rose,	Marine	Insurance	(n26)	[26.1].	
229	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.55(2)(a).	
230	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[2.7].	
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stolen	 property	without	 imposing	 any	 further	 sanction.	 This	 is,	 simply	 put,	 an	 ineffective	
sanction	because	there	was	not,	at	any	stage,	a	valid	claim	and	therefore	nothing	to	lose.	The	
Law	Commission	recognised	the	absence	of	a	penalty	in	the	initial	phase	of	consultation.	It	
was	noted	that	“the	penalty	may	be	arbitrary.	An	insured	who	presents	an	entirely	fictitious	
claim	loses	nothing	(except	a	claim	which	never	existed).”231	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	
absence	 of	 a	 sanction	 in	 these	 circumstances	 cannot	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 judicial	
explanation	of	deterrence,	namely	that	it	is	dependent	on	severe	legal	sanctions.232		
	
	
ii.	 The	exaggerated	claim	
The	second	category	of	fraudulent	behaviour	is	the	exaggerated	claim.	Such	a	claim	occurs	
when	the	assured	takes	advantage	of	genuine	loss	to	make	a	larger	claim	by,	for	example,	
inflating	the	value	of	lost	items	or	claiming	items	that	were	never	in	fact	owned.	There	is	no	
doubt	that	this	behaviour	satisfies	the	common	law	requirement	of	wilfulness.	The	case	of	
Galloway	v	Guardian233	is	useful	here.	Galloway	involved	a	domestic	burglary	as	a	result	of	
which	the	assured	suffered	insured	losses	of	£16,000.	The	assured	then	falsely	asserted	that	
he	 had	 also	 lost	 a	 computer	 worth	 a	 further	 £2,000	 during	 the	 burglary.	 It	 is	 in	 these	
circumstances	that	the	forfeiture	rule	has	the	greatest	“bite”;234	Mr	Galloway	lost	the	entirety	
of	his	claim,	including	the	much	larger	genuine	portion.			
	
Exaggeration	 is	 thought	 to	be	 the	most	 common	 type	of	 insurance	 fraud.235	 Staughton	 LJ	
commented,	 rather	 depressingly,	 on	 the	 prevalence	 of	 such	 fraud	 in	 Orakpo	 v	 Barclays	
Insurance	stating	that	“if	one	examined	a	sample	of	insurance	claims	on	household	contents,	
I	doubt	 if	one	would	 find	many	which	 stated	 the	 loss	with	absolute	 truth.”236	There	 is	no	
reason	to	suggest	that	this	portrayal	is	limited	to	domestic	contents	insurance.	
	
																																																						
231	Ibid	[7.30].	
232	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	174	et	seq.	
233	Galloway	(n8).	
234	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[33]	per	Mance	LJ.	
235	 MORI,	 ‘UK	 Commercial	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Study	 2005’,	 available	 at:	
http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/ABI_Publications_UK_Commercial_Insurance_Fraud_Study_2005_c6d.asp
x	(accessed	22	May	2012),	7.		
236	Orakpo	(n91)	450	per	Staughton	LJ.	
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The	 common	 law	 requirement	 of	 substantiality	 has	 been	 particularly	 problematic	 in	 the	
context	 of	 exaggerated	 claims.	 This	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	 courts’	 inability	 to	 express	 the	
appropriate	means	of	measuring	whether	a	claim	is	substantially	fraudulent	in	a	uniform	and	
consistent	manner.237	In	Galloway,	the	question	of	substantiality	was	answered	in	absolute	
terms;	an	exaggeration	of	£2,000	was	not	de	minimis	and	counted	as	fraud.238	To	assess	the	
exaggeration	by	reference	to	the	value	of	the	total	claim	would,	as	Millett	LJ	recognised,	lead	
to	 the	 absurd	 conclusion	 that	 the	 greater	 the	 claim,	 the	 greater	 the	 fraud	 that	 could	 be	
practiced	 without	 fear	 of	 consequences.239	 Later	 case	 law	 has	 simultaneously	 evaluated	
exaggeration	in	both	absolute	and	proportional	terms,240	meaning	that	a	small	exaggeration	
of	a	small	claim	could	very	well	count	as	fraud.241	Nevertheless,	it	seems	safe	to	say	that	the	
approach	of	the	first	instance	court	in	Tonkin,	an	assessment	of	exaggeration	in	relation	to	
the	overall	claim,242	 is	 incorrect	on	the	basis	that	it	falls	foul	of	Millett	LJ’s	concerns	about	
absurdity.243		
	
Several	 cases	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	 twentieth	 century	appeared	 to	 indicate	a	degree	of	
tolerance	to	exaggeration.	In	certain	circumstances,	the	courts	would	refrain	from	a	finding	
of	 fraud	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 claims	 process,	 particularly	 when	 it	 involved	 commercial	
assureds,	often	resembled	a	negotiation.244	The	case	of	Diggens	v	Sun	Alliance245	suggests	
																																																						
237	G	Swaby,	‘The	price	of	a	lie:	Discretionary	flexibility	in	insurance	fraud’	[213]	JBL	77,	83.	
238	Galloway	 (n8)	214	per	Lord	Woolf	MR.	See	also	Direct	Line	Insurance	v	Khan	 [2001]	EWCA	Civ	1794,	[2002]	
Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	364.	
239	Galloway	(n8)	214	per	Millett	LJ.	
240	Micro	Design	Group	Ltd	v	Norwich	Union	Insurance	Ltd	[2005]	EWHC	3093	(TCC),	[2006]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	235.	
241	R	Merkin,	 ‘Reforming	insurance	law:	 Is	there	a	case	for	reverse	transportation?’	(Report	for	the	English	and	
Scottish	 Law	 Commissions,	 2006)	 available	 at:	 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/ICL_Merkin_report.pdf	(accessed	24/08/2016),	[6.9];	Swaby	(n237)	82	-	83.	
242	Tonkin	v	UK	Insurance	[2006]	EWCA	1120	(TCC),	[2007]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	283	[178]	–	[179],	[189].	This	case	involved	
a	domestic	claim	exaggerated	by	£2000	which	constituted	0.3%	of	the	total	claim.	The	judge,	HHJ	Peter	Coulson	
QC,	determined	at	[178]	that	it	“would	be	absurd	if	an	entirely	insubstantial	element	of	a	large	claim…could	taint	
the	entirety	of	that	claim.”	
243	For	example,	J	Lowry,	P	Rawlings	and	R	Merkin,	Insurance	Law	Doctrines	and	Principles	(3rd	ed.	Hart	Publishing,	
2011),	312;	Arnould	(18th	ed.)	(n200)	[18-75];	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	doctrine’	(n105)	209:	“One	half	of	one	per	
cent.	might	be	regarded	as	de	minimis	in	the	abstract,	but	on	a	claim	of	£1,000,000	that	would	amount	to	the	sum	
of	£5,000.	Relative	insignificance	is	no	reason	to	condone,	or	overlook,	fraud.”	
244	Orakpo	(n91)	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ;	Nsubuga	v	Commercial	Union	Assurance	[1998]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	682,	686	per	
Thomas	J.	The	negotiation	analysis	appears	to	have	been	accepted	by	the	Law	Commission	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	
[3.64]:	 “This	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 be	 precise	 about	 the	 exact	 boundary	 between	 fraud	 and,	 for	 example,	
exaggeration	as	part	of	the	negotiation	process.”	
245	Diggens	v	Sun	Alliance	[1994]	CLC	1146.	
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some	merit	in	the	judicial	conception	of	commercial	claims	as	negotiation.	In	the	judgment,	
Evans	LJ	referred	to	the	following	note	in	the	insurer’s	file,		
	
Put	the	balance	of	our	offer	 ‘on	the	table’	and	give	the	policy-holder	the	option	of	
taking	this	and	backing	off,	or	alternatively	keeping	the	policy-holder	over	the	barrel	
to	see	if	he	[is]	willing	to	go	the	route	of	arbitration/litigation.246	
	
This	suggests	that	the	process	is	much	more	adversarial	and	that	insurers	themselves	expect	
a	degree	of	give	and	take	before	they	would	regard	such	conduct	as	fraud.	However,	it	is	only	
possible	to	regard	the	claims	process	as	a	negotiation	where	“nothing	is	misrepresented	or	
concealed,	and	the	loss	adjuster	is	in	as	good	a	position	to	form	a	view	of	the	validity	or	value	
of	 the	 claim	 as	 the	 insured.”247	 The	 degree	 of	 permitted	 exaggeration	 is	 also	 subject	 to	
constraint;	in	particular,	there	must	be	“some	basis	for	the	figure,	or	at	least	that	the	basis	
for	the	figure	is	given.”248	These	factors	overcome	the	information	imbalance	which	typically	
characterises	 the	 claims	 process	 and	 means	 that	 the	 underwriter	 is	 no	 longer	 wholly	
dependent	on	information	provided	by	his	assured.249	
	
The	weight	of	 academic	 commentary	 suggests	difficulties	with	 the	 characterisation	of	 the	
commercial	claims	process	as	a	negotiation.250	The	editors	of	Arnould	have	suggested	that	the	
ability	of	the	underwriter	to	accurately	assess	the	loss	should	not	make	any	difference	to	a	
finding	of	fraud.251	It	is	also	difficult	to	accept	the	negotiation	analysis	in	light	of	the	extended	
																																																						
246	Ibid	1165	per	Evans	LJ.	
247	Orakpo	(n91)	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	
248	J	Gilman	and	R	Merkin,	(eds.),	Arnould’s	Law	of	Marine	Insurance	and	Average	(17th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2008),	
[18.76];	Transthene	Packing	Co	Ltd	v	Royal	Insurance	(UK)	Ltd	[1996]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	LR	32,	44	per	HHJ	Kershaw	QC	
holding	that	the	claim	for	the	full	replacement	cost	of	a	machine	which	was	seriously	defective	before	the	loss	
would	constitute	fraud.	See	also	Danepoint	v	Allied	Underwriting	Insurance	[2005]	EWHC	2318	(TCC),	[2005]	All	ER	
(D)	237	where	an	exaggerated	claim	for	repair	costs	was	not	regarded	as	material	because	the	final	payment	was	
subject	 to	 authorisation	 by	 a	 loss	 adjuster,	 [70]	 per	 Judge	 Peter	 Coulson	 QC	 the	 exaggeration	 “would…have	
ultimately	made	no	difference.	[because	the	loss	adjuster]	would	not	authorise	any	payments	beyond	those	that	
he	felt,	on	inspection,	were	justified.”	
249	D	Foxton,	‘The	post-contractual	duty	of	good	faith	in	marine	insurance	policies:	The	search	for	elusive	principles’	
in	DR	Thomas,	Marine	Insurance:	The	Law	in	Transition	(Informa	Law,	2006),	[4.77].	
250	 But	 see	 Soyer,	Marine	 Insurance	 Fraud	 (n40)	 [1-24],	 [1-26]	 for	 a	 view	 recognising	 the	 judicial	 tolerance	 to	
exaggeration	as	“realistic”.	
251	Arnould	(17th	ed.)	(n248)	[18.72].	
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scope	of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule.252	 As	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 the	 rule	was	
extended	in	The	Aegeon	to	include	claims	for	wholly	genuine	loss	where	the	assured	had	lied	
about	the	cause	of	the	loss	or	used	forged	evidence	to	make	his	case.253	It	therefore	seems	
unduly	lenient	to	overlook	exaggeration	given	that	the	forfeiture	rule	would	operate	against	
the	claimant	who	told	a	 lie	merely	to	speed	up	the	claims	process.	The	case	 law	does	not	
reflect	 this	 critique.	Notably,	 the	 decisions	 in	Danepoint254	 and	Tonkin,255	heard	 after	 the	
extension	of	the	rule	continued	to	apply	the	negotiation	analysis.	A	final	difficulty	with	the	
negotiation	 analysis	 relates	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 judicial	 condonation	 of	 exaggeration	 directly	
contradicts	the	purpose	of	the	forfeiture	rule;	fraud	deterrence.		
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	 report	 of	 exaggeration	 in	 the	marine	 context.	 Soyer	 has	 suggested	
several	explanations	for	this.256	Firstly,	he	has	attributed	it	to	the	existence	of	deductibles,	
such	as	that	found	in	the	International	Hull	Clauses	2003.257	This	is	not	particularly	convincing.	
Marine	policies	are	far	from	unique	in	requiring	assureds	to	pay	an	excess	during	the	claims	
process.	Similar	terms	exist	 in	both	commercial	and	domestic	policies.	Moreover,	the	logic	
justifying	this	feature	of	the	contract	–	as	a	device	to	mitigate	moral	hazard258	–	is	not	peculiar	
to	the	marine	context.	
	
Soyer’s	other	explanations	are	more	convincing.	He	has	argued	that	the	size	of	marine	claims	
tend	to	justify	investigation	and	the	employment	of	a	loss	adjuster.259	This	was	also	the	view	
																																																						
252	J	Davey,	‘Unpicking	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction:	Sympathy	for	the	devil?’	[2006]	LMCLQ	223,	231	citing	
The	Aegeon	(n9)	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	See	also	Foxton	(n251)	[4.77].	
253	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
254	Danepoint	(n248)	[52],	[56]	per	HHJ	Coulson	QC:	“It	seems	to	me	that	mere	exaggeration	of	an	insurance	claim	
will	not	of	itself	be	fraud.	On	the	other	hand,	exaggeration	which	is	wilful,	or	which	is	allied	to	misrepresentation	
or	concealment	will,	in	all	probability,	be	fraudulent.	In	addition,	I	consider	that	exaggeration	is	more	likely	and	
more	excusable	where	the	value	of	the	particular	claim	or	head	of	loss	in	question	is	unclear	or	a	matter	of	opinion.”	
255	Tonkin	(n242)	[189]	per	HHJ	Coulson	QC.	The	court	held	that	the	claim	in	this	case	was	not	fraudulent	but	an	
honest	and	inadvertent	mistake.	If	it	had	been	fraudulent,	“The	alleged	fraud	appears	to	be	worth	no	more	than	
£2,000.	That	 is,	on	any	view,	not	more	than	about	0.3	per	cent	of	the	entirety	of	the	claimants’	claim	in	these	
proceedings.	I	do	not	consider	that	that	is	"substantial"	in	accordance	with	the	authorities.”	The	decision	ignores	
the	lesson	of	Galloway	(n8)	214	per	Millett	LJ	which	cautioned	against	an	arithmetical	assessment	of	fraud.	
256	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[3-46].	
257	Ibid	[3-46];	International	Hull	Clauses	2003	(01/11/2003)	cl.15.	See	also,	Institute	Time	Clauses	Hulls	(1/10/83)	
cl.12.	
258	M	 Pauly,	 ‘The	 economics	 of	moral	 hazard:	 Comment’	 (1968)	 58(3)(1)	 Am	 Ec	 Rev	 531,	 535—536;	 T	 Baker,	
Insurance	Law	and	Policy	Cases	Materials	and	Problems	(Aspen	Publishers	2003),	16;	C	Heimer,	Reactive	Risk	and	
Rational	Action	(University	of	California	Press,	1985),	47.	
259	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[3-46].	
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expressed	by	 three	members	of	 the	Supreme	Court	during	argument	 in	Versloot.260	 Soyer	
goes	on	to	explain	why	these	efforts	reduce	exaggerated	claims	in	the	marine	context;	“the	
availability	 of	 such	 experts	would	 usually	 have	 a	 deterrent	 effect	 because	 their	 presence	
would	 make	 such	 a	 deceit	 more	 risky	 and	 difficult	 to	 perpetrate.”261	 While	 there	 is	 an	
argument	that	 investigation	reduces	the	likelihood	of	fraud,262	Soyer’s	argument	would	be	
more	compelling	if	it	depended	on	evidence,	rather	than	mere	assertion.	
	
Soyer’s	final	contention	concerns	the	arrangements	of	the	shipping	industry.	Marine	assureds	
are	 generally	 required	 to	 keep	 accurate	 records	 of	 the	 equipment	 used	 on	 board.263	 This	
would	seem	to	make	it	virtually	impossible	for	the	assured	to	assert	the	loss	of	equipment	he	
had	never	owned,	as	was	the	case	in	Galloway.	Soyer	also	makes	the	argument	that,	in	the	
case	of	a	repaired	vessel,	a	suspicious	underwriter	could	seek	corroboration	in	the	supposed	
repair	yard’s	records.264	While	this	rationale	is	more	convincing,	it	is	difficult	to	suppose	that	
shipping	 is	 the	 only	 such	 highly	 regulated	 industry.	 If	 exaggeration	 is	 more	 common	 in	
comparable	 industries,	 it	 would	 cast	 doubt	 on	 this	 explanation	 for	 an	 absence	 of	 similar	
marine	claims.		
	
The	case	of	Glencore	v	Alpina	Insurance265	provides	a	useful	illustration	of	what	exaggeration	
might	look	like	in	the	marine	context.	Glencore	was	one	of	several	companies	which	stored	
oil	at	a	floating	facility	owned	and	operated	by	Metro	Group.	The	oil	was	insured	under	an	
open	cover	and	 included	periods	of	 storage	 in	 the	 facility	 in	Fujairah.	When	Metro	Group	
collapsed	 in	1998,	 it	was	discovered	 that	 there	was	 far	 less	oil	 in	 the	storage	 facility	 than	
anticipated.	 This	 shortfall	 was	 attributed	 to	 withdrawals	 made	 by	 Metro	 for	 its	 own	
(dishonest)	purposes.266	For	a	short	period	following	Metro’s	collapse,	Glencore	took	over	
operations	 at	 the	 facility.	 	 Glencore	 then	 submitted	 a	 claim	 to	 its	 underwriter	 for	 the	
difference	between	the	amount	of	oil	they	had	deposited	and	the	amount	remaining	after	
																																																						
260	Versloot	(Supreme	Court	hearing)	(n3)	1h	34-35	per	Lord	Mance,	2h	15	per	Lord	Hughes	and	2h	16	per	Lord	
Sumption.	
261	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[3-46].	
262	See	later,	Chapter	Three	on	modern	deterrence	theory	and	the	importance	of	certainty	of	sanctions.	
263	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[3-46].	
264	Ibid	[3-46].	
265	Glencore	Ltd	v	Alpina	Insurance	[2003]	EWHC	2792	(Comm),	[2004]	1	All	ER	(Comm)	766.	
266	Ibid	[25].	
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the	collapse,	less	the	authorised	withdrawals.	Prior	to	the	first	instance	hearing,	the	insurer	
gave	notice	of	its	intention	to	run	several	defences,	including	the	assertion	that	the	claim	had	
been	fraudulently	exaggerated	to	the	knowledge	of	the	claims	manager.267	This	was	because	
some	of	the	alleged	shortfall	related	to	oil	which	had	been	withdrawn	during	the	period	that	
Glencore	was	running	the	facility.268	Losses	occasioned	during	this	period	could	not	fairly	be	
attributed	 to	Metro.	 The	 underwriters	 did	 not	 pursue	 a	 defence	 of	 fraud	 at	 trial.269	 It	 is	
certainly	correct	that	exaggeration	is	litigated	less	often	in	the	marine	context.	It	is	certainly	
not	inconceivable,	however,	that	a	marine	assured	might	inflate	his	claim	as	illustrated	by	the	
facts	of	Glencore.	
	
	
iii. Fraudulent	devices	and	collateral	lies	
The	third	category	of	 fraudulent	claim	was	previously	referred	to	as	the	fraudulent	device	
claim.	This	claim	existed	when	the	assured	suffered	a	loss	wholly	within	the	terms	of	the	policy	
but	bolstered	his	 claim	with	 fraudulent	evidence.270	 This	would	 include	 forged	 receipts	 to	
substantiate	the	value	of	lost	items,	fabricated	witness	testimony	or	a	misleading	account	of	
the	loss.	The	rule	was	extended	to	include	device	claims	in	2006271	and	this	has	prompted	
significant	 judicial	 and	 academic	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 severity	 of	 forfeiture	 in	 these	
circumstances.	The	focus	of	this	discussion	has	been	the	appropriate	materiality	threshold	for	
device	 claims	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 substantial	 nature	 of	 the	
wrongdoing.	The	recent	decision	in	Versloot	changes	how	the	law	approaches	these	claims	as	
well	as	imposing	a	name	change;	the	fraudulent	device	is	now	referred	to	as	the	collateral	
lie.272		
	
The	 starting	 point	 for	 discussion	 is	 the	 judgment	 in	 The	 Aegeon.273	 The	 assured	 had	
undertaken	that	hot	works	would	not	commence	until	he	had	received	authorisation	from	
																																																						
267	Ibid)	[27]	-	[29].	
268	Ibid	[29].	
269	Ibid	[32].	
270	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[30]	per	Mance	LJ,	“A	fraudulent	device	is	used	if	the	insured	believes	that	he	has	suffered	the	
loss	claimed,	but	seeks	to	improve	or	embellish	the	facts	surrounding	the	claim,	by	some	lie.”	
271	Ibid	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
272	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[1]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
273	The	Aegeon	(n9).	
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the	classification	society.	In	fact,	the	works	began	before	permission	had	been	obtained	and	
the	assured	misrepresented	the	precise	start	date	during	litigation.	The	question	for	the	Court	
of	Appeal	was	whether	such	a	lie,	told	to	strengthen	an	otherwise	valid	claim,	was	sufficient	
to	attract	the	sanction	of	forfeiture.	Mance	LJ	began	by	noting	the	absence	of	authority	in	this	
area274	and	went	on	to	conduct	a	review	of	the	relevant	case	law.	He	concluded	obiter	that	
the	 jurisdiction	should	be	extended	to	 include	device	claims	with	the	addition	of	a	 limited	
materiality	requirement.	As	such,	the	forfeiture	rule	would	apply	to		
	
any	lie,	directly	related	to	the	claim	to	which	the	fraudulent	device	relates,	which	is	
intended	to	improve	the	insured's	prospects	of	obtaining	a	settlement	or	winning	the	
case,	and	which	would,	if	believed,	tend,	objectively,	prior	to	any	final	determination	
at	trial	of	the	parties'	rights,	to	yield	a	not	insignificant	improvement	in	the	insured's	
prospects—whether	 they	 be	 prospects	 of	 obtaining	 a	 settlement,	 or	 a	 better	
settlement,	or	of	winning	at	trial.275	
	
Materiality	was	to	be	determined	at	the	time	the	lie	was	told.	This	reflected	the	fact	that	lies	
were	generally	employed	for	a	purpose	-	“because	[the	assured]	believes	that	it	is	necessary	
or	expedient	to	do	so.	He	uses	such	devices,	precisely	because	he	cannot	be	sure	that	his	
claim	 is	otherwise	good”276	–	and	to	 take	account	of	 the	 impact	 the	 lie	could	have	had,	 if	
believed.	On	this	basis,	the	judicial	enquiry	was	to	consider	whether	the	lie,	if	believed,	would	
have	 placed	 the	 insured	 in	 a	 better	 position	 during	 the	 claims	 process	 or	 affected	 the	
underwriter’s	handling	of	the	claim.	By	way	of	illustration,	a	lie	would	be	material	if	it	caused	
the	underwriter	to	settle	earlier,	more	favourably	or	defend	the	claim	on	different	grounds.277	
In	 largely	endorsing	 this	 version	of	materiality	 in	Versloot,	 Christopher	Clarke	 LJ	held	 that	
dishonesty	would	be	material	if	the	underwriter	was	“put	off	relevant	inquiries	or…driven	to	
irrelevant	 ones	 and	 he	 loses	 the	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	 the	 claim	 after	 an	 honest	
presentation	 of	 the	 facts.”278	 This	 was	 a	 low	 threshold	which	 caught	many	 untruths	 told	
																																																						
274	Ibid	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
275	Ibid	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
276	Ibid	[20]	per	Mance	LJ.	
277	Ibid	[37]	per	Mance	LJ.	
278	Versloot	 (Court	of	Appeal)	 (n161)	 [132]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	At	 [165]	Christopher	Clarke	LJ	advocated	
framing	 the	materiality	 test	 in	 positive	 terms:	 “For	my	 part,	 however,	 I	 am	 not	 quite	 sure	 why	 the	 negative	
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during	the	claims	process.279	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	this	threshold	would	not	
be	satisfied	by	lies	that	could	not	sensibly	have	affected	the	insured’s	prospects	–	such	as	lies	
told	to	a	third	party280	or	to	avoid	personal	embarrassment.281	In	practice,	this	conception	of	
materiality	 did	 very	 little	 to	 prevent	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 operating	 in	 device	 cases	 and	
significantly	extended	the	scope	of	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.	
	
This	conception	of	materiality	echoed	the	test	employed	in	the	pre-contractual	context.	 In	
Pan	Atlantic,	the	House	of	Lords	held	that	an	underwriter	would	only	be	entitled	to	avoid	for	
misrepresentation	or	non-disclosure	where	it	had	exerted	an	influence	on	the	underwriter’s	
decision-making	 process.282	 This	 would	 be	 satisfied	 where	 the	misrepresentation	 or	 non-
disclosure	had	“no	more	than	an	effect	on	the	mind	of	the	insurer	in	weighing	up	the	risk.”283	
The	‘mere	influence’	test	is	to	be	distinguished	from	the	‘decisive	impact’	test	with	the	latter	
being	satisfied	if	the	non-disclosure	caused	the	underwriter	to	decline	the	risk	or	charge	a	
higher	premium.284	 This	 correlation	between	 the	pre-	 and	post-contractual	 positions	with	
respect	to	materiality	has	been	modified	by	the	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Versloot.285	
	
Despite	 some	 initial	 uncertainty,286	 due	 in	 part	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 materiality	
requirement,287	 subsequent	 case	 law,	 including	a	Privy	Council	 judgment,288	 endorsed	 the	
																																																						
formulation	 was	 adopted,	 and	 I	 would	 prefer	 the	 requirement	 to	 demand	 a	 significant	 improvement	 in	 the	
insured's	prospects.”	
279	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[160],	[176]	per	Popplewell	J.	
280	As	was	the	case	in	The	Mercandian	Continent	(n97).	
281	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[125]	per	Lord	Mance.	
282	Pan	Atlantic	(n207)	531	per	Lord	Mustill;	confirmed	in	Insurance	Act	2015	s.7(3).	
283	Pan	Atlantic	(n207)	517	per	Lord	Goff.	
284	Ibid	531	per	Lord	Mustill.	
285	See	later,	text	to	fn	326	et	seq.	
286	Interpart	Commerciao	e	Gestao	SA	v	Lexington	Insurance	Co	[2004]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	690;	Marc	Rich	Agriculture	
Trading	SA	v	Fortis	Corporate	Insurance	NV	[2005]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	396;	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-2B4].	
287	Interpart	(n286)	[43]	per	HHJ	Chambers	QC,	“The	question	in	the	present	case	still	concerns	the	degree	of	nexus	
that	there	has	to	be	between	the	fraudulent	conduct	and	promotion	of	the	claim	against	insurers.	That	question	
lies	 within	 an	 area	 where	 the	 law	 remains	 uncertain.”	 A	 Scales	 (Insurance	 Fraud	 Symposium,	 University	 of	
Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016),	1	describes	Mance	LJ’s	test	as	“a	masterpiece	in	subjunctive	construction.”	
288	Stemson	v	AMP	General	Insurance	(NZ)	Ltd	[2006]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	852.	It	is	difficult	to	assess	how	much	weight	
to	accord	to	this	endorsement	of	the	rule.	On	the	facts,	the	fraudulent	device	point	was	unnecessary	as	the	insurer	
was	able	to	defend	the	claim	on	the	basis	that	the	assured	had	set	fire	to	his	house	himself,	see	[25]-[26]	per	Lord	
Hope.	
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approach	adopted	in	The	Aegeon.289	Mance	LJ’s	judgment	on	this	point	was	“strictly	speaking	
obiter”290	 but	 subsequent	 courts	 did	 not	 question	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 decision.291	 It	
appeared	at	this	stage	that	the	contours	of	the	forfeiture	rule	were	relatively	settled.	This	
feeling	was	to	some	extent	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	the	Law	Commission	did	not	suggest	a	
statutory	definition	for	 fraud	nor	explicitly	condemn	the	direction	 in	which	the	courts	had	
developed	the	law.292	
	
The	application	of	the	forfeiture	rule	to	all	types	of	insurance	fraud	was	counterintuitive.293	It	
was	noted	above	that	forfeiture	is	not	an	effective	sanction	for	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim294	
given	the	absence	of	any	insured	loss	for	which	the	underwriter	would	be	liable.	By	contrast,	
forfeiture	is	penal	when	it	operates	to	deprive	an	assured	of	a	claim	bolstered	by	a	fraudulent	
device.	The	lopsided	effect	of	the	rule	has	now	been	reversed	by	the	Supreme	Court.295	
	
The	2016	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Versloot	Dredging	v	HDI	Gerling296	fundamentally	altered	
the	legal	approach	to	claims	bolstered	by	a	collateral	lie.	The	case	concerned	a	vessel	which	
had	got	 into	difficulty	on	a	 voyage	between	 Lithuania	and	Spain.	 The	engine	 room	began	
taking	 on	 water	 and	 the	 vessel	 was	 towed	 to	 safety.	 Repairs	 totalling	 €3.2	 million	 were	
required.	 The	 underwriter	 instructed	 its	 solicitors	 to	 investigate.	 During	 this	 process	 the	
solicitors	 sought	an	account	of	 the	 loss	 from	 the	 shipowners.	One	of	 the	 ship’s	managers	
asserted	that	the	crew	had	failed	to	respond	to	a	bilge	alarm	which	was	known	to	give	false	
positives	in	heavy	weather.	This	assertion	was	contained	in	a	letter	under	a	heading	marked	
‘facts’	 and	accompanied	with	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	master	 corroborated	 this	 version	of	
events.	This	was	incorrect;	the	master	was	on	holiday	at	the	time	of	the	statement	and	only	
subsequently	confirmed	that	he	was	prepared	to	support	this	narrative.	
																																																						
289	Eagle	Star	Insurance	Co	Ltd.	V	Games	Video	Co	SA	(The	Game	Boy)	[2004]	EWHC	15	(Comm),	[2004]	1	Lloyd’s	
Rep.	238;	Joseph	Fielding	Properties	(Blackpool)	Ltd	v	Aviva	Insurance	Ltd	[2010]	EWHC	2192	(QB),	[2011]	Lloyd’s	
Rep.	IR	238.	
290	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	181	per	Popplewell	J.	
291	See	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[20]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[85]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
292	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[23.17].	
293	See	Davey	and	Richards	(n152).	
294	As	noted	earlier,	see	text	to	fn	228	et	seq.	
295	For	a	comprehensive	critique	of	this	consequence	of	the	law	prior	to	the	decision	in	Versloot,	see	Davey	and	
Richards	(n152).	
296	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59).	
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The	lie	was	borne	out	of	frustration	on	the	assured’s	part.297	The	repair	yard	would	not	release	
the	vessel	until	the	repairs	had	been	paid	for	and	the	assured	was	unable	to	do	so	without	
indemnification	from	his	underwriter.	The	assured	had	received	advice	that	the	Inchmaree	
clause	might	afford	the	underwriter	a	defence	and	he	was	keen	to	assert	that	the	loss	was	
caused	 by	 crew	 failure,	 a	 covered	 peril	 subject	 to	 his	 satisfaction	 of	 the	 due	 diligence	
proviso,298	 to	 divert	 attention	 away	 from	 (unfounded)	 suspicions	 about	 the	 state	 of	 the	
vessel.299	
	
At	first	instance	the	underwriters	sought	to	defend	the	claim	on	several	substantive	grounds,	
none	of	which	were	operative.	The	loss	was	caused	by	an	ingress	of	water	through	an	open	
valve.	This	was	a	covered	peril,	namely	a	loss	by	perils	of	the	seas.300	It	made	no	difference	
that	 the	 valve	 had	 been	 left	 open	 accidentally	 since	 negligence	 can	 supply	 the	 requisite	
fortuity	for	a	loss	by	perils	of	the	seas.301	Accordingly,	“the	owners	had	a	valid	claim	for	some	
€3.241m	whether	or	not	the	crew	had	failed	to	act	on	a	bilge	alarm	activation.”302	Popplewell	
J	upheld	the	fraudulent	device	defence	“with	regret.”303	He	felt	bound	to	follow	The	Aegeon	
notwithstanding	his	serious	misgivings	about	the	disproportionate	and	draconian	nature	of	
forfeiture	in	this	case.304	The	Court	of	Appeal	refused	the	subsequent	appeal	in	terms	largely	
similar	to	Mance	LJ’s	judgment	in	The	Aegeon,305		but	suggested	that	the	materiality	threshold	
should	be	increased	and	expressed	in	positive	terms,		
	
(a)	 the	 fraudulent	 device	must	 be	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 claim;	 (b)	 the	 fraudulent	
device	must	have	been	intended	by	the	insured	to	promote	his	prospect	of	success;	
and	 (c)	 the	 fraudulent	 device	 must	 have	 tended	 to	 yield	 a	 not	 insignificant	
improvement	in	the	insured's	prospects	of	success	prior	to	any	final	determination	of	
the	 parties’	 rights…For	 my	 part,	 however,	 I	 am	 not	 quite	 sure	 why	 the	 negative	
																																																						
297	Ibid	[3]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
298	International	Hulls	Clauses	2003	cl.2.2.3	
299	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[3]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
300	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[40]	per	Popplewell	J.	
301	Baxendale	v	Fane	(The	Lapwing)	(1940)	P	112,	121	per	Hudson	J.	
302	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[4]	per	Lord	Sumption	
303	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[225]	per	Popplewell	J.	
304	Ibid	[146]	per	Popplewell	J.	
305	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[106]	et	seq.	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
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formulation	was	adopted,	and	I	would	prefer	the	requirement	to	demand	a	significant	
improvement	in	the	insured's	prospects.306	
	
The	Court	of	Appeal	also	heard	argument	on	whether	the	operation	of	forfeiture	in	device	
cases	constituted	a	breach	of	the	assured’s	rights	under	the	European	Convention	of	Human	
Rights.	Article	1,	protocol	1	 (A1P1)	guarantees	 individuals	 the	peaceful	enjoyment	of	 their	
possessions.	 Previous	 case	 law	 had	 indicated	 that	 ‘possessions’	 extended	 to	 contractual	
rights.307	This	would	encompass	the	right	to	indemnity	which	accrues	to	the	assured	on	the	
occurrence	 of	 loss.	 A1P1	 is	 a	 qualified	 right;	 states	 can	 interfere	 with	 an	 individual’s	
enjoyment	provided	intervention	seeks	a	legitimate	aim	and	is	proportionate	in	nature.	The	
Court	 of	 Appeal	 dismissed	 the	 assured’s	 argument	 swiftly;	 the	 deterrence	 of	 fraud	 did	
constitute	a	legitimate	aim	and	forfeiture	was	a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	that	aim.308	
The	court	opted	to	look	at	the	effect	forfeiture	in	the	round309	and	not	by	reference	to	the	
individual	case,	as	earlier	cases	applying	A1P1	had	done.310	
	
On	appeal	to	the	Supreme	Court,	a	majority	of	4:1	held	that	the	newly	designated	collateral	
lie	did	not	attract	the	remedy	of	forfeiture.	This	was	a	lie	“which	turns	out	when	the	facts	are	
found	 to	have	no	 relevance	 to	 the	 insured’s	 right	 to	 recover.”311	 This	 is	 a	 comprehensive	
reversal	of	the	earlier	position.	The	leading	judgment	was	given	by	Lord	Sumption.	He	noted	
that	 the	 policy	 of	 deterrence	was	 not	 an	 appropriate	 explanation	 of	 sanctions	where	 the	
assured	sought	no	more	than	his	actual	entitlement	under	 the	contract.312	Lord	Sumption	
started	from	the	position	that	the	forfeiture	rule	was	designed	to	protect	the	underwriter	
from	information	asymmetries.313	In	the	case	of	wholly	fraudulent	or	exaggerated	claims,	the	
rule	protects	 the	underwriter	 from	making	payments	which	would	exceed	his	 contractual	
liability.	The	same	is	not	true	where	the	assured	only	seeks	his	true	loss	as	will	be	the	case	
where	a	collateral	lie	is	told.	If	forfeiture	operated	in	these	circumstances,	it	would	protect	
																																																						
306	Ibid	[165]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
307	Wilson	v	First	County	Trust	Ltd	(No	2)	[2003]	UKHL	40;	[2004]	AC	816,	[39].	
308	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[154]-[164].	
309	Ibid	[143]	relying	on	James	v	UK	(1986)	8	EHRR	123,	[36].	
310	See,	for	example,	Axa	General	Insurance	Ltd	v	The	Lord	Advocate	[2011]	UKSC	46;	[2012]	1	AC	868,	[128];	Barnes	
v	The	Eastenders	Group	[2014]	UKSC	26;	[2014]	Lloyd’s	Rep	FC	461;	[2015]	AC	1,	[94].	
311	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[1]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
312	Ibid	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
313	Ibid	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
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the	 underwriter	 from	 having	 the	 claims	 process	 diverted	 or	 from	making	 payment	 at	 an	
earlier	stage.	It	is	clear	that	forfeiture	is	not	designed	to	provide	such	security	to	underwriters;	
“the	underwriter	loses	nothing	if	he	meets	a	liability	that	he	had	anyway.”314	Even	if	the	rule	
was	 intended	 to	 serve	 this	purpose,	 Lord	Sumption	 contended	 that	 forfeiture	would	be	a	
disproportionate	 response	 to	 a	 collateral	 lie.315	 By	 way	 of	 analogy,	 Beh	 and	 Stempel’s	
discussion	of	remedies	for	the	assured’s	breach	of	claims	notification	provisions	is	useful.316	
If	late	notice	has	not	prejudiced	the	underwriter,	the	denial	of	coverage	will	only	give	“the	
insurer	an	undeserved	windfall	and	make[]	the	insurance	policy	fail	its	intended	purpose.”317	
The	same	logic	surely	applies	in	the	case	of	collateral	lies;	to	deny	the	indemnity	on	the	basis	
of	 a	 lie	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 underwriter’s	 ultimate	 liability	would	 undermine	 the	 purpose	 of	
insurance.	Having	approached	the	matter	in	this	way,	none	of	their	Lordships	devoted	any	
real	time	to	the	explicit	proportionality	analysis	raised	skilfully	in	argument;	the	application	
of	A1P1	 to	 fraudulent	device	 claims.318	 In	any	event,	 a	determination	 that	proportionality	
should	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis	would	in	all	likelihood	have	constituted	a	higher	
threshold	than	a	retrospective	assessment	based	on	the	underwriter’s	ultimate	liability.		
	
The	decision	to	alter	the	materiality	threshold	in	Versloot	fundamentally	changes	the	scope	
of	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.	In	The	Aegeon,	Mance	LJ	concluded	that	the	lie	should	
be	assessed	by	reference	to	the	time	it	was	told	and	to	the	effect	it	had	on	the	underwriter’s	
behaviour.319	By	contrast,	the	Versloot	test	is	retrospective	in	nature,	and	considers	whether	
the	lie	bore	any	relevance	to	the	underwriter’s	ultimate	liability.320	If	the	court	answers	this	
in	the	negative,	the	lie	will	be	considered	‘collateral’	and	the	assured	will	escape	the	sanction	
of	 forfeiture.	This	narrows	the	 fraudulent	claims	 jurisdiction	–	by	excluding	 from	 its	ambit	
collateral	lie	claims	–	and	clarifies	the	appropriate	standard	of	materiality.	This	should	free	
																																																						
314	Ibid	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
315		Ibid	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
316	Beh	and	Stempel	(n30)	124.	
317	Ibid	124.	
318	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[37]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[103]	per	Lord	Hughes,	[132]	per	Lord	Mance.	See	the	
eloquent	arguments	made	by	Victoria	Wakefield	for	the	assured	in	Versloot	hearing	(n3)	from	2h	31	and	Versloot	
Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	(The	DC	Merwestone)	(Hearing	on	16/03/16,	afternoon	session)	
until	 1h	 04	 available	 at	 https://www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-2014-0252/160316-pm.html	 (accessed	
27/09/2016).	These	arguments	follow	the	acceptance	of	similar	human	rights	considerations	in	the	personal	injury	
context,	see	Summers	v	Fairclough	Homes	Ltd	[2012]	UKSC	26,	[2012]	4	All	ER	317,	[46]	–	[47]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
319	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[37]	per	Mance	LJ.	
320	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[35]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
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future	 courts	 from	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 ‘no	 additional	 requirement’	 and	 ‘decisive	
influence’	standard,	described	earlier	in	this	section.321	
	
There	are	 two	notable	consequences	 flowing	 from	the	new	test	of	materiality.	Firstly,	 the	
focus	on	financial	entitlement	means	that	the	test	can	be	applied	to	all	types	of	fraudulent	
claim.322	 It	 should	 follow	 that	 wholly	 fraudulent	 and	 exaggerated	 claims	 will	 always	 be	
regarded	as	material	and	thus	forfeit.	This	is	because	the	assured	will	always	be	seeking	to	
recover	more	than	his	contractual	entitlement.	This	may	well	make	it	more	difficult	for	courts	
to	excuse	exaggeration	by	reference	to	the	negotiation	analysis.323	The	new	test	renders	the	
purpose	of	the	lie	irrelevant.	Going	forward,	a	lie	which	“affect[s]	his	handling	of	the	claim,	or	
the	speed	which	he	pays	it,	or	the	inquiries	which	he	calls	for”324	will	not	be	material	since	
they	“can	make	no	difference	to	his	liability	to	pay.”325		
	
Secondly,	the	test	distinguishes	the	standard	of	materiality	applicable	at	the	claims	stage	from	
that	 employed	 in	 respect	 of	 non-disclosure	 and	 misrepresentation	 at	 inception.	 A	 pre-
contractual	lie	or	non-disclosure	prevents	the	underwriter	from	assessing	the	entirety	of	the	
risk.326	Without	an	appreciation	of	the	whole	risk,	this	may	cause	the	underwriter	to	accept	
or	price	risks	differently	than	he	otherwise	would	have.327	As	such,	the	pre-contractual	test	
of	materiality	 considers	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 lie	 on	 the	 underwriter’s	 behaviour	 and	 awards	
remedies	 –	 including	 avoidance	ab	 initio	 –	 accordingly.328	 The	 position	 is	 different	 at	 the	
claims	 stage	 because	 the	 underwriter	 is	 not	 in	 the	 same	 position	 of	 choice	 as	 he	was	 at	
inception.329	 If	 the	 loss	was	 caused	by	a	 covered	peril,	 the	 insurer	 is	prima	 facie	 liable	 to	
indemnify	 the	 assured	 from	 the	 time	 that	 the	 loss	 occurred.330	 The	 appropriate	 test	 of	
materiality	 should	not	 consider	whether	 the	 lie	 affected	 the	underwriter’s	behaviour,	 but	
																																																						
321	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	206	et	seq.	
322	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[36]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
323	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	244	et	seq.	
324	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[91]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
325	Ibid	[91]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
326	Ibid	[91]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
327	Ibid	[91]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
328	Insurance	Act	2015	s.3,	sched	1.	
329	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[91]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
330	The	Fanti	(n25)	35,	per	Lord	Goff:	“I	accept	that,	at	common	law,	a	contract	of	indemnity	gives	rise	to	an	action	
for	 unliquidated	damages,	 arising	 from	 the	 failure	of	 the	 indemnifier	 to	prevent	 the	 indemnified	person	 from	
suffering	damage,	for	example,	by	having	to	pay	a	third	party.”;	Rose,	Marine	Insurance	(n26)	[26.1].	
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whether	it	was	relevant	to	his	ultimate	liability.	This	was	the	approach	taken	by	the	Supreme	
Court	in	Versloot.		
	
A	strong	dissent	was	provided	by	Lord	Mance.	He	largely	restated	the	position	he	adopted	in	
The	Aegeon,	subject	to	the	heightened	materiality	threshold	as	recommended	by	the	Court	
of	Appeal.331	Lord	Mance	took	particular	issue	with	the	materiality	test	constructed	by	the	
majority	 of	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 opining	 that	 assureds	 tells	 lies	 for	 a	 specific	 purpose	 and	
reiterating	the	potential	impact	of	such	lies	on	claims	handling.332	In	particular,	his	concern	
was	 that	 the	 retrospective	 nature	 of	 the	 test	 cast	 the	 claims	 process	 in	 the	wrong	 light,	
arguing	 that	 “litigation	 is	 neither	 the	 aim	 nor	 the	 norm.”333	 Lord	Mance	 also	 took	 a	 firm	
position	 that	 deterrence	 was	 equally	 applicable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 device	 claims334	 and,	
moreover,	that	the	statutory	basis	of	forfeiture	represented	parliamentary	approval	of	this	
point.335		This,	with	respect,	overlooks	the	fact	that	the	Insurance	Act,	as	recommended	by	
the	Law	Commission,	leaves	the	meaning	of	‘fraudulent	claim’	to	the	courts.336	
	
The	 result	 in	Versloot	 returns	 the	 law	 to	 the	 position	 adopted	 by	 academics	 prior	 to	 the	
decision	 in	 The	 Aegeon.337	 In	 writings	 prior	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 fraudulent	 claims	
jurisdiction,	Clarke	had	suggested	that	the	use	of	fraudulent	evidence	to	strengthen	a	valid	
claim	was	“dishonest	but	not	substantial:	he	is	not	seeking	to	get	from	the	insurer	money	to	
which	he	knows	that	he	is	not	entitled.”338	It	also	mirrors	the	position	taken	by	the	Financial	
Ombudsman	in	consumer	cases.	The	presentation	of	forged	evidence	did	not	automatically	
result	in	forfeiture;	the	Ombudsman	sought	to	determine	whether	the	evidence	was	“solely	
to	substantiate	transactions	that	really	took	place,	or	did	the	customers	intend	to	obtain	more	
than	they	were	entitled	to?”339	This	is	a	logical	distinction	to	draw	since	the	alternative	could	
																																																						
331	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[113]	citing	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[165]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
332	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59)	[130]	per	Lord	Mance.	
333	Ibid	[111]	per	Lord	Mance.	
334	Ibid	[124]-[125]	per	Lord	Mance.	
335	Ibid	[124]	per	Lord	Mance.	
336	Law	Com	353	(n5)	[23.17].	
337	The	Aegeon	(n9).	
338	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	(n18),	171.	
339	Cited	in	Lowry,	Rawlings	and	Merkin	(n243)	309.	
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provide	the	unscrupulous	underwriter	with	an	incentive	to	continually	question	the	insured	
in	the	hope	of	catching	him	in	a	lie.340	
	
The	 foregoing	 discussion	 has	 traced	 the	 courts’	 difficulty	 in	 establishing	 an	 appropriate	
materiality	 threshold	 for	 device	 claims.	 Considerations	 of	 substantiality	 have	 also	 proved	
problematic	in	this	context,341	as	illustrated	by	Aviva	v	Brown.342	The	assured	claimed	for	the	
cost	of	remedial	works	and	alternative	accommodation	following	serious	subsidence	at	his	
home.	 Mr	 Brown	 took	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	 search	 for	 temporary	 accommodation	 and	
suggested	several	properties	to	his	insurer.	Two	of	the	representations	made	in	connection	
with	this	process	bear	particular	scrutiny.343	Firstly,	the	assured	told	his	insurer	that	he	had	
identified	a	suitable	property	and	that	it	was	available	for	rent.	This	was	false;	the	property	
was	his	childhood	home	which	he	now	owned.	Ultimately,	however,	the	assured	and	his	wife	
decided	the	property	was	unsuitable.	Eder	J	held	that	this	statement	was	“a	substantial	and	
material	part	of…his	claim	for	alternative	accommodation.”344	By	contrast,	his	statement	that	
the	 landlord	of	the	eventual	temporary	accommodation	was	chasing	him	for	rent	was	not	
treated	as	substantial.345	This	was	also	false	given	that	Mr	Brown	was	himself	the	landlord	of	
the	property	in	question.	It	is	difficult	to	find	any	justification	for	treating	these	statements	
differently	and	certainly	Eder	J	does	not	provide	a	rationale	for	his	decision.	It	seems	rather	
odd	that	if	Mr	Brown	had	only	made	the	second	false,	but	not	fraudulent	statement,	he	would	
have	been	entitled	to	recover.		
	
Bugra	and	Merkin	have	expressed	doubts	as	to	the	substantiality	of	the	first	statement	since	
it	could	not	have	affected	the	insurer’s	handling	of	the	claim.346	These	doubts,	as	well	as	the	
result	 in	Brown,	demonstrate	the	difficulty	of	applying	the	substantiality	test	 in	relation	to	
qualitative	 statements,	 as	 distinct	 from	 financial	 exaggeration.	 These	 difficulties	may	well	
explain	why	 the	courts	have	preferred	 to	 focus	on	materiality	 to	determine	whether	such	
																																																						
340	Longobardi	v	Chubb	Ins	Co	560	A	2d	68,	83	(NJ,	1989)	cited	in	Clarke	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-2B4];	J	Hjalmarsson,	
‘Exit	“fraudulent	means	and	devices”’	[2016]	(July)	STL	(published	online,	25	July	2016).	
341	A	Bugra	and	R	Merkin,	'’Fraud'	and	fraudulent	claims’	(2012)	125	J	Brit	Ins	Law	Association	3,5.	
342	Aviva	(n196).	
343	Aviva	made	21	separate	allegations	of	fraud	–	only	2	were	proved	at	trial.		
344	Aviva	(n196)	[96]	Eder	J.	
345	Ibid	[82]	[118]	per	Eder	J.	
346	Bugra	and	Merkin	(n341)	6.	
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conduct	should	count	as	fraud.347	In	any	event,	the	Supreme	Court’s	approach	to	materiality	
in	Versloot	may	well	resolve	the	problems	posed	by	substantiality	in	this	context.	
	
iv. Suppression	of	a	defence	
The	 final	 category	 of	 fraudulent	 claim	 involves	 the	 assured’s	 deliberate	 suppression	 of	
information	which,	if	disclosed,	would	afford	the	underwriter	a	defence	under	the	policy.	A	
useful	illustration	is	provided	by	Savash	v	CIS	General	Insurance.348	The	assured	claimed	on	
his	 buildings	 and	 contents	 insurance	 following	 an	 alleged	 burglary	 at	 his	 home.	 The	
underwriter	 successfully	 relied	 on	 an	 express	 clause	 which	 disclaimed	 liability	 in	
circumstances	where	the	property	was	unoccupied,	defined	as	“insufficiently	furnished	for	
full	habitation,	or	not	lived	in	by	the	Family,	or	any	other	person	with	the	Family's	permission,	
for	 more	 than	 60	 consecutive	 days.”349	 Evidence	 gathered	 by	 police	 in	 the	 immediate	
aftermath	of	 the	burglary	 lent	credence	to	the	underwriter’s	suggestion	that	the	property	
was	 unoccupied.350	 In	 presenting	 the	 claim,	 however,	 the	 assured	 sought	 to	 give	 the	
impression	that	the	property	had	been	occupied	at	the	relevant	time	via	the	production	of	
photographic	evidence	and	an	explanation	of	his	personal	circumstances.		Akenhead	J	held	
that	the	underwriter	was	not	liable	for	the	claim	as	the	property	had	been	unoccupied	and	
because	the	claim	had	been	made	fraudulently.351	
	
Writing	prior	 to	 the	decision	 in	Savash,	 Bennett	had	argued	 that	 knowledge	of	 a	defence	
would	trigger	the	assured’s	post-contractual	duty	of	good	faith	and	would,	therefore,	require	
																																																						
347	Versloot	(First	Instance)	(n190)	[223]	(indicates	an	overlap	between	substantiality	and	materiality);	Law	Com	
353	(n5)	[22.24]	“We	think	there	is	an	argument	that	the	“fraudulent	device”	employed	in	that	case	[Versloot]	
does	not	satisfy	the	common	law	requirements	for	fraud	of	substantiality	and	materiality.”		
348	Savash	v	CIS	General	Insurance	[2014]	EWHC	375	(TCC),	[2014]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	471.	
349	Ibid	[2]	per	Akenhead	J.	
350	Ibid	[5]	per	Akenhead	J:	“She	was	surprised	at	the	extent	of	the	damage	which	had	occurred	and	in	relation	to	
some	of	the	things	said	to	have	been	stolen	in	the	incident	(which	included	a	large	amount	of	heavy	furniture).	She	
was	also	surprised	that	no	one	had	seen	any	vehicle	parked	outside	the	front	given	the	size,	volume	and	weight	of	
items	said	to	have	been	stolen,	it	being	her	view	that	it	would	have	taken	at	least	two	people	to	carry	some	of	the	
items	out	and	frequent	trips	would	need	to	have	been	made	to	and	from	the	house.	Her	colleague	went	into	the	
loft	and	told	her	that	the	pipes	had	been	cut	(from	which	the	escaping	water	emanated).	Her	colleague	did	some	
house-to-house	enquiries:	the	owner	of	No	28	had	been	in	between	13.00	and	15.00	and	had	not	seen	anything,	
the	owner	of	No	32	had	seen	nothing	 suspicious	but	had	been	out	between	12.30	and	13.30,	but	 later	heard	
banging	from	No	30	which	she	thought	might	be	home	improvements,	and	the	owners	of	Nos	21	and	36	who	were	
in	the	whole	time	did	not	see	anything.”	
351	Ibid	[60]	per	Akenhead	J.	
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disclosure.352	The	removal	of	avoidance	as	the	remedy	for	breach	of	s.17	Marine	Insurance	
Act353	means	it	is	no	longer	problematic	to	align	the	prohibition	of	fraudulent	claims	and	the	
duty	 of	 good	 faith.	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	 query	 relating	 to	 the	 expansiveness	 of	 the	 duty	
suggested	in	Bennett’s	comments.	This	is	because	his	comments	also	precede	the	House	of	
Lords’	judgment	in	The	Star	Sea	 in	which	the	assured’s	post-contractual	duty	of	good	faith	
was	limited	to	honesty.354	It	could	well	be	that	to	require	the	assured	to	voluntarily	disclose	
information	amounting	to	a	defence	would	exceed	this	duty	and	resemble	the	wide-ranging	
disclosure	duties	 imposed	at	 inception.	 	Mance	LJ	 subsequently	endorsed	 the	view	 in	The	
Aegeon	that	suppression	of	a	defence	would	result	in	the	loss	of	the	claim.355	It	would	appear	
to	 be	 legitimate	 to	 include	 the	 suppression	 of	 a	 defence	 within	 the	 fraudulent	 claims	
jurisdiction	on	the	basis	that	underwriters	will	 typically	 investigate	not	only	the	scope	and	
quantum	 of	 liability	 following	 a	 loss,	 but	 also	whether	 the	 facts	 enable	 them	 to	 assert	 a	
defence	to	payment.356	Mance	LJ	then	commented	on	the	decision	in	The	Star	Sea,	noting	
that	“none	of	the	speeches	 in	the	House	of	Lords	contain	any	positive	suggestion	that	the	
common	law	rule	or	section	17	cannot	apply	to	a	known	defence.”357	Mance	LJ	did	not	appear	
to	 identify	 any	 tension	 between	 the	 post-contractual	 duty	 of	 honesty	 and	 information	
pertaining	to	a	defence	known	to	the	assured.	
	
The	assured’s	suppression	of	a	defence	has	not	yet	generated	significant	academic	comment	
as	 a	 distinct	 category	 of	 fraudulent	 claim.	 Clarke,	 for	 example,	 includes	 it	 as	 a	 type	 of	
fraudulent	claim	but	provides	no	further	detail	on	the	matter.358	It	is	likely,	however,	that	this	
type	of	conduct	will	gain	new	prominence	following	the	decision	in	Versloot.359	This	is	because	
the	 suppression	 of	 a	 defence	 would	 presumably	 meet	 the	 new	 standard	 of	 materiality	
																																																						
352	Bennett,	‘Mapping	the	doctrine’	(n105)	210.	
353	Insurance	Act	2015	s.14(1)(3).	
354	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[102],	[111]	per	Lord	Scott.	
355	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[18]	per	Mance	LJ.	
356	Gan	Insurance	Co	Ltd	v	Tai	Ping	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[2002]	EWCA	Civ	248,	[2002]	CLC	870,	[37]	per	Mance	LJ.	
357	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[18]	per	Mance	LJ.	
358	Clarke,	(looseleaf)	(n26)	[27-2B4]:	notes	the	existence	of	this	type	of	conduct	as	fraudulent	but	provides	no	
further	discussion.	
359	Hjalmarsson,	‘Exit	“fraudulent	means	and	devices”’	(n340).	
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because	it	affects	the	underwriter’s	ultimate	liability.	The	issue	will	need	to	be	considered	at	
length	by	an	appropriately	senior	court.360	
	
The	decision	in	Versloot	limits	the	circumstances	in	which	fraud	will	unravel	all	in	the	context	
of	insurance	claims.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	the	common	law	definition	of	fraud	
is	settled.		For	one	thing,	subsequent	courts	will	need	to	ascertain	the	precise	limits	of	the	
‘collateral	 lie’361	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 the	materiality	 threshold.	 The	 courts	 also	 retain	 the	
freedom	to	develop	the	meaning	of	fraudulent	claim	in	future	cases.	Notwithstanding	this	
recent	 development,	 procedural	 matters	 –	 most	 notably,	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 (D)	 and	
temporal	limits	of	forfeiture	(E)	–	do	not	unduly	constrain	the	courts’	ability	to	intervene	in	
fraud	cases.	
	
D. The	standard	of	proof	
The	standard	of	proof	is	an	important	consideration	in	assessing	the	scope	of	the	fraudulent	
claims	 jurisdiction.	 The	 higher	 the	 burden,	 the	 more	 difficult	 it	 will	 be	 to	 explain	 the	
jurisdiction	by	reference	to	the	maxim,	fraud	unravels	all.		
	
As	a	civil	matter,	the	ordinary	burden	of	proof	–	the	balance	of	probabilities	–	should	apply	in	
insurance	fraud	cases.	This	would	simply	require	the	underwriter	to	demonstrate	that	fraud	
was	more	 likely	 than	not.362	Given	 the	concealed	nature	of	 fraud,	 the	underwriter	will	be	
permitted	to	rely	on	“circumstantial	evidence	and	inference	to	demonstrate	[the	assured’s]	
knowledge	and	intent”363	to	satisfy	this	burden.	
	
A	closer	examination	of	 the	case	 law,	however,	gives	 the	 impression	that	an	 intermediate	
standard	–	somewhere	between	the	ordinary	civil	standard	and	the	more	onerous	criminal	
																																																						
360	See	the	discussion	in	The	Mercandian	Continent	(n97)	[28]	per	Longmore	LJ:	“the	conduct	of	the	assured	which	
is	relied	on	by	underwriters	must	be	causally	relevant	to	underwriters’	ultimate	liability,	or	at	least,	to	some	defence	
of	 the	 underwriters	 before	 it	 can	 be	 permitted	 to	 avoid	 the	 policy.	 This	 is,	 I	 think,	 the	 same	 concept	 as	 that	
underwriters	must	be	seriously	prejudiced	by	the	fraud	complained	of	before	the	policy	can	be	avoided.”	
361	Hjalmarsson,	‘Exit	“fraudulent	means	and	devices”’	(n340).	
362	Arnould	(18th	ed.)	(n200)	[18-101].	
363	P	MacDonald	Eggers	and	P	Foss,	Good	Faith	and	Insurance	Contracts	 (LLP,	1998),	[11.11];	Arnould	 (18th	ed.)	
(n200)	[18-102].		Stemson	(n288)	[7],	[9]	per	Lord	Hope	in	which	the	Privy	Council	noted	the	first	instance	court’s	
reliance	on	circumstantial	evidence	and	inferences	it	had	drawn	relating	to	the	credibility	of	witnesses.	
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standard	 –	 applies	 in	 the	 fraud	 context.	 In	 Hornal	 v	 Neuberger,	 a	 case	 on	 fraudulent	
misrepresentation,	the	Court	of	Appeal	characterised	the	burden	as	follows,	
	
The	more	serious	the	allegation	the	higher	the	degree	of	probability	that	is	required:	
but	it	need	not,	in	a	civil	case,	reach	the	very	high	standard	required	by	the	criminal	
law.364	
	
More	 recently,	 in	Re	H	 (Minors),	 Lord	Nicholls	 repeated	 this	 idea	 in	 the	context	of	a	child	
protection	case,	
	
The	balance	of	probability	standard	means	that	a	court	is	satisfied	an	event	occurred	
if	the	court	considers	that,	on	the	evidence,	the	occurrence	of	the	event	was	more	
likely	than	not.	When	assessing	the	probabilities	the	court	will	have	in	mind	as	a	factor,	
to	whatever	extent	 is	appropriate	 in	 the	particular	case,	 that	 the	more	serious	 the	
allegation	the	less	likely	it	is	that	the	event	occurred	and,	hence,	the	stronger	should	
be	the	evidence	before	the	court	concludes	that	the	allegation	is	established	on	the	
balance	 of	 probability.	 Fraud	 is	 usually	 less	 likely	 than	 negligence…Built	 into	 the	
preponderance	of	probability	standard	is	a	generous	degree	of	flexibility	in	respect	of	
the	seriousness	of	the	allegation.365	
	
The	existence	of	an	intermediate	standard	of	proof	would	present	a	greater	challenge	to	the	
underwriter	 than	would	be	posed	by	 the	ordinary	civil	 standard.366	More	recent	case	 law,	
however,	has	suggested	that	Re	H	 increases	the	evidential	burden	facing	underwriters	but	
does	not	displace	 the	ordinary	 civil	 standard	of	proof.367	 This	means,	 in	practice,	 that	 the	
courts	demand	cogent	evidence	in	cases	involving	serious	allegations	and	will	examine	that	
																																																						
364	Hornal	v	Neuberger	Products	Ltd	[1957]	1	QB	247,	258	per	Denning	LJ.	
365	 Re	 H	 (Minors)	 [1996]	 AC	 563,	 586-587.	 This	 standard	 is	 endorsed	 by	 a	 range	 of	 cases	 and	 academic	
commentators,	see	Clarke,	looseleaf	(n26)	[27-2A1];	Arnould	(18th	ed.)	(n200)	[18-101].	Recent	cases	endorsing	the	
Re	H	approach	include	Beachview	Aviation	Ltd	v	Axa	Insurance	Ltd	[2015]	NIQB	106,	[32]	per	Stephens	J;	Mandalia	
v	Beaufort	Dedicated	No.2	Ltd	[2014]	EWHC	4039	(QB),	[75]	per	Gerard	McDermott	QC.	
366	J	Hjalmarsson,	‘The	standard	of	proof	in	civil	cases:	An	insurance	fraud	perspective’	(2013)	17	E&P	47,	50.	
367	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	v	Rehman	[2003]	1	AC	153,	[55]	per	Lord	Hoffmann	(confd.	In	Re	
B);	R	(N)	v	Mental	Health	Review	Tribunal	(Northern	Region)	[2006]	QB	468,	[62]	per	Richards	LJ	(endorsed	in	Re	D	
[2008]	UKHL	33;	1	WLR	1499,	[27]	per	Lord	Carswell).	
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evidence	“in	a	more	critical	fashion.”368	This	is	typically	justified	by	reference	to	the	adverse	
consequences	that	a	finding	of	fraud	will	have	for	the	individual.369		
	
Importantly,	 the	 Law	 Commission	 did	 not	 regard	 Re	 H	 or	 Hornal	 as	 establishing	 an	
intermediate	standard	of	proof	for	insurance	cases.	They	derived	support	from	Re	B	in	which	
Lord	Hoffmann	held	that	there	was	“only	one	civil	standard	of	proof	and	that	is	proof	that	the	
fact	 in	 issue	 more	 probably	 occurred	 that	 not.”370	 The	 Law	 Commission	 clarified	 that	
“although	the	courts	may	start	thinking	that	an	innocent	explanation	is	more	likely	than	fraud,	
this	does	not	affect	the	legal	standard	of	proof.”371	The	suggestion	that	fraud	was	less	likely	
than	negligence	was	“simply	something	to	be	taken	into	account,	where	relevant,	in	deciding	
where	the	truth	lies.”372	There	is,	however,	no	empirical	basis	for	the	courts	to	conclude	that	
fraud	is	 less	likely	than	negligence.373	Without	such	data,	 it	 is	right	to	question	the	alleged	
frequency	of	these	offences	as	the	basis	for	an	increased	evidential	burden	on	underwriters.		
	
Even	if	the	cases	had	created	an	intermediate	standard	of	proof,	there	are	strong	arguments	
that	 the	ordinary	 civil	 standard	–	 the	balance	of	probabilities	 –	 should	 apply	 in	 insurance	
cases.374	Hjalmarsson	has	argued	 that	 the	child	protection	and	matrimonial	 cases	deserve	
special	protection	due	to	the	human	rights	issues	that	arise	in	those	contexts.375	Indeed,	the	
later	child	protection	cases	can	be	viewed	as	only	applying	to	cases	which	arise	under	the	
Children	Act.376	More	importantly	for	this	project,	an	intermediate	standard	of	proof	limits	
the	extent	to	which	the	forfeiture	rule	can	serve	its	deterrent	purpose.	As	Hjalmarsson	has	
argued,		
	
																																																						
368	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[1-18].	
369	Britton	(n4)	910	per	Willes	J;	Hornal	(n364)	266-267	per	Morris	LJ;	Beachview	Aviation	(n365)	[32]	per	Stephens	
J;	M	Clarke,	‘Lies,	damned	lies,	and	insurance	claims:	The	elements	and	effects	of	fraud’	[2000]	NZ	L	Rev	233,	237.	
370	Re	B	(Children)	(Sexual	abuse:	Standard	of	proof)	[2009]	1	AC	11,	[13]	per	Lord	Hoffmann.	
371	Law	Commission	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[3.54].	
372	Re	B	(n370)	[70]	per	Lady	Hale.	
373	E	McBride,	‘Is	the	civil	‘higher	standard	of	proof’	a	coherent	concept?’	(2009)	8	Law,	Probability	and	Risk	323,	
334.	
374	Hjalmarsson,	‘The	standard	of	proof’	(n366)	61,	73.	
375	Ibid	63,	71.	
376	Re	B	(n370)	[69]	cited	by	Hjalmarsson,	‘The	standard	of	proof’	(n366)	62.	
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A	 common	 argument	 is	 that	 a	 heightened	 standard	 of	 proof	 should	 be	 employed	
where	the	consequences	of	the	case	are	very	serious,	particularly	in	fraud	cases…In	
insurance	cases,	in	particular,	there	is	a	clear	opposing	social	or	policy	interest	which	
is	just	as	valid	as	the	protection	of	an	individual	person	and	his	or	her	reputation.	The	
opposing	interest	is	the	legitimate	social	need	to	limit	the	number	and	combined	size	
of	 fraudulent	 insurance	 claims	 and	 to	 prevent	 guilty	 individuals	 getting	 away	with	
fraud.377	
	
The	 preferable	 view,	 as	 endorsed	 by	 the	 Law	 Commission,378	 is	 that	 the	 balance	 of	
probabilities	standard	should	apply	in	insurance	fraud	cases.	It	is	notable	that	issues	of	proof	
were	not	included	in	the	final	proposals	for	reform	which	suggests	that	matters	are	relatively	
settled.379	 If	correct,	 this	means	that	procedural	 issues	do	not	unduly	 increase	the	burden	
facing	the	underwriter.	This	is	also	reflected	in	the	number	of	cases	in	which	fraud	has	been	
successfully	established.	Even	in	cases	where	the	underwriter	has	failed	to	prove	fraud,	this	
is	more	usually	attributed	to	an	absence	of	“direct	evidence”380	than	the	constraints	of	the	
evidential	burden.	The	discussion	now	turns	to	the	temporal	limits	of	forfeiture	and	considers	
whether	these	hinder	the	unravelling	effect	of	fraud.	
	
E. The	temporal	limit	
The	courts	approached	the	tension	between	the	forfeiture	rule	and	the	statutory	remedy	of	
avoidance	 by	 consistently	 limiting	 the	 remedy	 for	 fraudulent	 claims	 to	 forfeiture.381	 In	 so	
doing,	the	House	of	Lords	in	The	Star	Sea	imposed	a	temporal	limit	on	the	post-contractual	
duty	of	good	faith,		
	
Once	the	parties	are	in	litigation	it	is	the	procedural	rules	which	govern	the	extent	of	
the	disclosure	which	should	be	given	in	the	litigation,	not	section	17382	
																																																						
377	Hjalmarsson,	‘The	standard	of	proof’	(n366)	70-71.	
378	Law	Com	Issues	Paper	7	(n14)	[3.52]-[3.54].	
379	But	see	the	call	for	a	re-examination	of	the	relevant	standard	of	proof:	Hjalmarsson,	‘Standard	of	proof’	(n366)	
72-73.	
380	Yeganeh	v	Zurich	Plc.	[2011]	EWCA	Civ	398,	[2011]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	540,	[14]	per	Ward	LJ.	
381	This	was	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,	see	Part	IV.	
382	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[77]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	See	the	more	recent	discussion	of	the	moment	at	which	the	parties’	
relationship	is	crystallised	in	the	context	of	a	writ	agreement	issued	under	a	notice	of	abandonment	in	Atlasnavios-
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This	dictum	was	later	endorsed	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	The	Aegeon.470		Mance	LJ	considered	
that	it	would	be	“inappropriate	to	introduce	a	distinction	between	the	duration	of	the	impact	
of	 the	 fraudulent	 claims	 rule…and	 of	 the	 s.17	 duty.”471	 The	 same	 policy	 argument	 –	 the	
altered	character	of	 the	parties’	 relationship	during	 litigation	–	dictated	that	 the	 threat	of	
forfeiture	should	cease	on	the	commencement	of	litigation.472	
	
The	 Civil	 Procedure	 Rules	 (CPR)	 govern	 the	 situation	 in	 which	 a	 claimant	 lies	 during	
litigation.473	When	faced	with	a	dishonest	litigant,	the	Court	may	either	dismiss	the	claim	for	
abuse	of	process474	or	adjudicate	the	issue	in	the	normal	way,	provided	the	dishonesty	has	
not	made	this	impossible.475	Strike	out	enables	the	court	to	“protect	[the]	legitimacy	of…[its]	
own	processes”476	and	is,	therefore,	the	procedural	equivalent	of	ex	turpi	causa.477	The	major	
difference,	however,	is	that	strike	out	is	to	be	used	proportionately	in	line	with	the	overriding	
principle	of	the	CPR.478	Proportionality	in	this	context	requires	the	court	to	use	their	discretion	
reasonably,	such	that	the	judicial	response	represents	the	minimum	necessary	to	protect	the	
judicial	 process	 from	 abuse.479	 By	 contrast,	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 does	 not	
depend	on	an	explicit	consideration	of	proportionality.	In	essence,	therefore,	this	means	that	
the	assured	who	lies	in	the	period	before	litigation	risks	a	far	greater	penalty	–	the	forfeiture	
of	his	entire	claim	–	than	if	he	lies	during	the	trial.480	This	is	counterintuitive;	lies	told	during	
																																																						
Navegação	LDA	v	Navigators	Insurance	Co	Ltd	(The	B	Atlantic)	(No	2)	[2014]	EWHC	4133	(Comm),	[2015]	1	Lloyd’s	
Rep.	IR	151,	[343]	per	Flaux	J.	
470	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[52]	per	Mance	LJ.	
471	Ibid	[53]	per	Mance	LJ.	
472	Ibid	[52]	per	Mance	LJ;	See	also	Thomas	‘Fraudulent	insurance	claims’	(n79)	488.	
473	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n161)	[78]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
474	Civil	Procedure	Rules	r.3.4.(2)(b);	confirmed	in	Zahoor	v	Masood	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	650,	[2010]	1	WLR	746,	[71]	
per	Mummery	LJ.	
475	A	Zuckerman,	‘Must	a	fraudulent	litigant	be	allowed	to	think:	if	the	fraud	is	successful,	I	will	gain	much;	if	it	is	
not,	I	will	still	recover	my	legitimate	claim?’	(2011)	30(1)	CJQ	1,	2.	
476	A	Zuckerman,	‘Court	protection	from	abuse	of	process	–	the	means	are	there	but	not	the	will’	(2012)	31(4)	CJQ	
377,	378.	
477	Ibid	378.	
478	Civil	Procedure	Rules	r.1.1;	Bugra	and	Merkin	(n341)	8.	
479	Zuckerman,	‘Court	protection’	(n389)	380.	
480	This	risk	is	not	replicated	in	other	areas	of	the	civil	law.	See	Zuckerman,	‘Must	a	fraudulent	litigant’	(n388)	5:	
recognising	the	difficulty	of	responding	to	fraud	with	substantive	law	as	it	would	“encourage	a	diversity	of	solutions	
to	a	common	problem,	create	waste	and	confusion.	Further,	it	would	bring	the	law	into	disrepute	if	the	outcome	
of	deceit	were	different	depending	on	the	right	invoked.”	See	later	discussion	of	the	tort	context	in	Chapter	Three,	
text	to	fn	312	et	seq.	
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litigation	are	designed	with	a	more	reprehensible	purpose	–	to	mislead	both	the	underwriter	
and	the	court	–	whereas	the	lie	told	earlier	intends	only	to	deceive	the	insurer.	Park	J	hinted	
at	this	inconsistency	in	The	Aegeon,		
	
Suppose	that	at	the	trial	his	 lies	are	exposed,	but	the	 judge	takes	the	view	that	he	
would	have	won	anyway	without	them.	Does	he	lose	the	case	because	he	lied?	The	
answer	is:	no.	If	his	case	is	a	good	one	anyway,	he	wins.	It	is	deplorable	that	he	lied	
but	he	is	not	deprived	of	his	victory	in	consequence.481	
	
Lies	told	before	and	during	litigation	will	be	treated	differently	by	the	courts.	In	the	former	
situation,	fraud	deterrence	preoccupies	the	courts	and	is	used	to	justify	the	potentially	harsh	
consequences	of	forfeiture.	By	contrast,	the	issue	of	the	claim	form	triggers	the	operation	of	
the	CPR	meaning	that	considerations	of	proportionality	will	colour	the	court’s	assessment	of	
the	 appropriate	 remedy.	 This	 more	 punitive	 response	 to	 pre-litigation	 dishonesty	
demonstrates	the	utility	of	‘fraud	unravels	all’	to	explain	the	effect	of	insurance	claims	fraud.	
	
	
VI. Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 has	 examined	 the	 civil	 response	 to	 insurance	 claims	 fraud	 from	 a	 doctrinal	
perspective	and	identified	the	policy	factors	which	have	been	critical	in	shaping	this	response.	
The	earlier	tension	between	the	forfeiture	rule	and	the	statutory	remedy	of	avoidance482	has	
now	been	resolved	by	the	Insurance	Act	2015.	The	2015	Act	confirms	that	forfeiture	is	the	
appropriate	response	to	insurance	claims	fraud.483	Viewed	in	isolation,	therefore,	the	notion	
that	‘fraud	unravels	all’	is	a	useful	explanation	of	the	operation	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	This	is	
because	the	rule	acts	to	retrospectively	bar	the	assured’s	right	to	succeed	in	a	claim.		
	
Writing	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 decision	 in	 Versloot,	 Soyer	 suggested	 that	 the	
development	 of	 forfeiture	 was	 characterised	 by	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 need	 to	 penalise	
dishonest	 assureds	 and	 concerns	 about	 treating	 all	 frauds	 alike.484	 This	 is	 essentially	 the	
																																																						
481	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[58]	per	Park	J.	
482	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.17.	
483	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12(1)(a).	
484	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n40)	[1.24]-[1.26].	
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suggestion	that	proportionality	had	been	a	critical	factor	in	judicial	decision	making.	While	
this	tension	was	certainly	evident	in	the	attempt	to	marginalise	avoidance	in	the	fraudulent	
claims	context,485	there	is	no	evidence	that	it	played	any	part	in	the	judicial	approach	to	the	
forfeiture	rule.	Indeed,	prior	to	Versloot,	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction	had	been	widened	
to	include	device	claims486	and	the	courts	had	paid	no	attention	to	the	nuances	of	fraudulent	
claims	which	a	truly	proportionate	enquiry	would	demand.	
	
The	absence	of	an	explicit	proportionality	enquiry	within	the	confines	of	the	forfeiture	rule	is	
due	to	the	overriding	 importance	of	 fraud	deterrence.	The	courts	have	accepted	both	the	
scale	 of	 the	 fraud	 problem	 and	 the	 role	 of	 legal	 sanctions	 in	 combatting	 fraud.	 As	
conceptualised	by	the	courts,	deterrence	is	dependent	on	harsh	sanctions.	Indeed,	this	is	no	
doubt	the	result	when	forfeiture	is	imposed	in	respect	of	an	exaggerated	claim	and,	formerly	
in	 relation	 to	 claims	 bolstered	 by	 fraudulent	 devices.	 A	 further	 narrative	 in	 the	 case	 law	
concerns	 the	vulnerability	of	underwriters	 to	 fraud.	This	 solidifies	both	 the	 importance	of	
deterrence	and	legal	sanctions	–	as	distinct	from	industry	initiatives	–	to	respond	to	the	fraud	
problem.	
	
The	 fraudulent	 claims	 jurisdiction	 is	 no	 doubt	more	 settled	 following	 the	 passage	 of	 the	
Insurance	Act	and	the	decision	in	Versloot.487	Further	developments	are	still	likely,	however,	
not	least	because	the	precise	contours	of	the	collateral	lie	and	the	new	materiality	test	will	
need	 further	 consideration.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 emphasised	 that	 lying	 during	
litigation	was	not	without	risk.488	Any	lie,	whether	collateral	or	otherwise,	would	entitle	the	
court	 to	make	use	of	 procedural	 sanctions	during	 litigation.489	 It	 remains	 to	be	 seen	how	
subsequent	 courts	 will	 make	 use	 of	 these	 tools.	 It	 will	 also	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	
underwriters	contend	with	suspicious	claims	given	that	the	new	statutory	regime	makes	it	far	
more	difficult	for	underwriters	to	raise	a	technical	defence	as	a	proxy	for	fraud.490	
	
																																																						
485	The	Star	Sea	(n7)	[51]	per	Lord	Hobhouse.	
486	The	Aegeon	(n9)	[45]	per	Mance	LJ.	
487	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n59).	
488	Ibid	[98]	per	Lord	Hughes,	[108]	per	Lord	Toulson.	
489	Ibid	[36]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[98]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
490	Macaura	v	Northern	Assurance	Co	Ltd	[1925]	AC	619.	
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This	chapter	has	addressed	the	limits	of	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction	and	considered	the	
policy	arguments	that	have	influenced	the	development	of	the	rule.	The	following	chapter	
focusses	on	the	third	research	question	by	submitting	these	policy	considerations	to	critique.	
It	will	contend,	primarily,	that	the	judicial	conception	of	deterrence	depends	on	an	outdated	
model	of	decision	making	and	this	means	that	forfeiture	is	an	ineffective	deterrent.	Research	
in	related	disciplines	suggests	that	legal	sanctions	are	a	minor	factor	in	decisions	about	crime	
and	 this	 weakens	 the	 centrality	 of	 forfeiture	 in	 the	 insurance	 law	model.	 The	 remaining	
discussion	challenges	the	characterisation	of	the	underwriter	as	vulnerable.	Furthermore,	the	
absence	 of	 proportionality	 in	 the	 insurance	 framework	 is	 compared	 to	 other	 fraud-prone	
systems	which	 have	 adopted	 nuanced	 remedial	 frameworks.	 The	 suggestion	 is	 that	while	
deterrence	is	a	laudable	and	important	policy	objective,	there	is	no	reason	for	it	to	override	
everything	 else	 and	 thereby	 prevent	 the	 establishment	 of	 proportionate	 sanctions	 for	
insurance	fraud.
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Chapter	Three	
Insurance:	A	Critique	of	the	Judicial	Response	to	Fraud	
	
	
The	notion	that	‘fraud	unravels	all’	makes	sense	in	the	insurance	context.	The	courts	have	
fashioned	an	expansive	jurisdiction	to	deal	with	fraud.	This	is	a	result	of	their	characterisation	
of	 the	 insurance	 relationship	 as	 distinctive	 in	 which	 the	 insurer	 merits	 protection	 from	
fraudulent	assureds.	The	courts	view	themselves	as	deterring	fraud	through	the	imposition	
of	harsh	penalties.	
	
There	 is	 something	 superficially	 attractive	 about	 these	 propositions	 and	 the	 idea	 that	
individuals	modify	their	behaviour	in	response	to	the	threat	of	legal	punishment.	A	closer	look	
suggests	 the	 consequentialist	 effects	 of	 forfeiture	 are	 not	 guaranteed	 nor	 is	 the	
characterisation	of	the	insurer-insured	relationship	a	given.	This	chapter	addresses	the	third	
research	question	in	the	insurance	context	and	considers	the	extent	to	which	the	suggested	
policy	justifications	are	valid.	The	importance	of	sanctions	to	counter	insurance	fraud	is	not	
contested	but	it	 is	far	from	clear	that	the	policy	reasons	said	to	justify	harsh	sanctions	are	
sufficiently	compelling.			
	
For	ease	of	exposition,	the	arguments	challenging	these	propositions	are	summarised	here:	
	
A. The	assumption	that	the	forfeiture	rule	deters	is	premised	on	an	outdated	model	of	
decision	making.	Modern	research	casts	doubt	on	the	centrality	of	legal	sanctions	in	
deterrence.	
B. The	forfeiture	rule	is	not	an	effective	legal	sanction	for	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim.	
C. Underwriters’	 vulnerability	 and	 consequent	 need	 for	 protection	 from	 fraud	 is	 no	
longer	as	compelling	given	technological	and	investigative	developments.	
D. Fraud	deterrence	and	proportionality	can	be	reconciled	within	a	remedial	framework.	
The	Australian	approach	to	 insurance	fraud	and	the	English	response	to	fraudulent	
personal	injury	claims	and	in	the	criminal	law	reflect	a	more	balanced	approach.	This	
casts	doubt	on	the	supposed	necessity	of	harsh	sanctions.	
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I. The	Deterrence	Critique	
The	notion	that	civil	law	rules	play,	or	have	the	potential	to	play,	a	significant	role	in	deterring	
socially	harmful	conduct	is	likely	to	be	counterintuitive	to	those	inculcated	in	the	traditional	
distinction	 between	 the	 criminal	 and	 civil	 spheres.	 And	 yet,	 this	 is	 exactly	 the	 rationale	
underpinning	the	draconian	consequences	of	forfeiture	in	insurance	contract	law.	Notions	of	
deterrence	 have	 traditionally	 been	 used	 to	 justify	 fraud	 rules	 in	 the	 insurance	 context	
notwithstanding	 the	 absence	 of	 empirical	 evidence.1	Without	 such	 evidence,	 it	 becomes	
virtually	 impossible	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 law	 has	 met	 its	 aim	 or	 assess	 the	
appropriateness	of	the	chosen	approach.2	And	yet,	simple	assumptions	about	the	deterrent	
effect	 of	 legal	 sanctions	 have	 not	 troubled	 the	 insurance	 courts.	 This	 approach	 mirrors	
Shand’s	 comment	 that	 “once,	 moreover,	 the	 courts	 are	 prepared	 to	 talk	 in	 terms	 of	
deterrence,	they	do	so	irrespective	of	any	reality	the	deterrent	may	have.”3			
	
The	judicial	account	of	deterrence	is	fairly	simplistic;	harsh	sanctions	deter.	This	is	not	unique	
to	the	insurance	context.	In	Smith	v	Citibank,	a	case	on	fraudulent	misrepresentation,	Lord	
Steyn	held	that,		
	
a	policy	of	imposing	more	stringent	remedies	on	an	intentional	wrongdoer	serves…a	
deterrent	purpose	in	discouraging	fraud…And	in	the	battle	against	fraud	civil	remedies	
can	play	a	useful	and	beneficial	role.4	
	
This	would	seem	to	mirror	the	equally	simplistic	assertions	of	a	rational	choice	conception	of	
crime.	This	section	will	argue	that	the	reality	of	deterrence	is	far	more	complex.	Put	simply,	
the	law	cannot	have	such	a	decisive	influence	on	individuals’	decisions	largely	because	they	
are	unaware	of	the	law	and	in	any	event,	are	influenced	by	different	factors.		
																																																						
1	This	point	is	also	made	by	P	Rawlings	and	J	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud:	The	“convoluted	and	confused”	state	of	the	
law’	 [2016]	LQR	96,	115:	 “there	 is	no	empirical	data	 to	 show	that	 the	 fraudulent	claim	rule	does	deter,	and	a	
growing	 literature	 throws	 serious	doubts	on	 the	effectiveness	of	non-criminal	 (and	even	criminal)	 sanctions	 in	
deterring	behaviour.”	
2	J	Smits,	The	Mind	and	Method	of	the	Legal	Academic	(Edward	Elgar,	2012),	67.	
3	J	Shand,	‘Unblinkering	the	unruly	horse:	Public	policy	in	the	law	of	contract’	(1972)	30	Cambridge	LJ	144,	155.	
4	Smith	New	Court	Securities	Ltd	v	Citibank	NA	[1997]	AC	254,	279-280	per	Lord	Steyn.	
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Modern	frameworks	of	decision	making	about	crime	undermine	the	traditional	deterrence	
model	 in	several	ways.	Firstly,	the	decision-making	process	is	affected	by	a	broad	range	of	
considerations,	 of	 which	 the	 threat	 of	 legal	 sanctions	 is	 one	 (relatively	 minor)	 factor.	
Secondly,	humans	lack	the	ability	to	conduct	a	wholly	rational	analysis	and	instead	rely	on	
techniques	 to	 simplify	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 These	 cognitive	 shortcuts	 commonly	
skew	 the	 decision	 in	 favour	 of	 offending.	 Lastly,	 the	 objective	 realities	 of	 detection	 and	
punishment	are	irrelevant;	instead	the	individual’s	perception	of	these	costs	is	decisive.		
	
The	discussion	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	the	discussion	will	address	the	major	arguments	of	
rational	choice	theory	and	the	assumptions	on	which	it	relies	(A).	The	argument	made	here	
uses	analysis	rooted	in	the	criminal	law	to	evaluate	sanctions	in	the	private	sphere.	Economic	
analysis	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 the	 criminal	 law	 and	 so	 it	 is	 important	 to	 justify	 the	 use	 of	 this	
framework	(B).	The	discussion	will	then	turn	to	the	modern	research	which	has	undermined	
rational	choice	theory	(C).		The	major	argument	is	that	if	the	insurance	courts’	insistence	on	
harsh	sanctions	depends	on	an	outdated	model	of	decision	making,	the	forfeiture	rule	is	likely	
to	be	ineffective	in	practice.	
	
A. Economic	analysis	of	crime:	Rational	choice	theory	
An	economic	analysis	of	law	seeks	to	answer	two	questions;	firstly,	what	are	the	effects	of	
law	on	behaviour,	and	secondly,	are	those	effects	desirable?5	It	answers	those	questions	by	
applying	 tools	 of	 economic	 theory	 to	 legal	 issues.6	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 first	 question,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 understand	 the	 assumed	 characteristics	 of	 the	 actor	 whose	 behaviour	 is	
analysed.	Gary	Becker’s	sketch	of	the	actor	is	as	follows,			
[A]ll	human	behavior	can	be	viewed	as	involving	participants	who	[1]	maximize	their	
utility	[2]	from	a	stable	set	of	preferences	and	[3]	accumulate	an	optimal	amount	of	
information	and	other	inputs	in	a	variety	of	markets.7		
																																																						
5	 L	 Kaplow	 and	 S	 Shavell,	 ‘Economic	 analysis	 of	 law’	 (1999)	 available	 at:	
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/251.pdf	(accessed	01/08/16),	3.	
6	Ibid	3.	
7	G	Becker,	An	Economic	Approach	to	Human	Behavior	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	1976)	14.	
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This	 characterisation	 assumes	 rationality,	 namely	 that	 actors	 consistently	make	 decisions	
which	maximise	their	expected	utility	or	self-interest.8	Through	this	process	of	maximising,	
the	actor	ranks	alternatives	and	chooses	the	course	of	action	that	most	increases	his	utility.9		
	
The	actor	is	also	presumed	to	be	immune	from	the	manner	in	which	choices	are	presented.10	
This	means	 that	 the	 actor	will	 always	 respond	 to	 the	 consequences	of	 a	 course	of	 action	
whether	they	are	characterised	in	terms	of	a	loss	or	a	gain.11	When	the	actor	is	faced	with	
alternate	courses	of	action,	he	 is	presumed	 to	have	 sufficient	ability	 to	gather	and	assess	
information	to	determine	which	alternative	conforms	to	his	preferences.	The	actor	adopts	a	
cost-benefit	analysis	to	make	this	decision.	On	this	basis,	law	is	regarded	as	a	set	of	incentives	
(benefits)	 and	 sanctions	 (costs)	 which	 shapes	 behaviour.	 The	 second	 question	 for	 law	 &	
economics	scholars	is	answered	by	reference	to	considerations	of	welfare	economics;	does	
the	consequent	behaviour	accord	with	ideas	of	economic	efficiency	and	equity.12	
	
It	is	possible	to	trace	this	type	of	analysis	to	Jeremy	Bentham’s	eighteenth	century	work	on	
criminal	law	and	deterrence.13	The	modern	version	of	the	analysis,	primarily	associated	with	
the	 Chicago	 School	 of	 the	 1950s,	 was	 initially	 applied	 to	 the	 law	 of	 competition	 and	
monopolies.14	 The	analysis	 gradually	 became	more	expansive	 and	was	used	 to	 assess	 the	
efficiency	of	almost	every	area	of	law.15			
	
																																																						
8	R	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	of	Law	(5th	ed.	Aspen	Law,	1998),	4.	
9	R	Cooter	and	T	Ulen,	Law	&	Economics	(3rd	ed,	Addison-Wesley,	2000),	11.	
10	M	Eisenberg,	‘Behavioral	economics	and	contract	law’	in	E	Zamir	and	D	Teichman	(eds.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	
of	Behavioral	Economics	and	the	Law	(OUP,	2014)	446,	447.	
11	Eisenberg	(n10)	447	citing	A	Tversky	and	D	Kahneman,	‘The	framing	of	decisions	and	the	psychology	of	choice’	
(1981)	211(4481)	Science	453,	457.	
12	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	‘Economic	analysis’	(n5)	3.	
13	JH	Burns,	HLA	Hart	and	F	Rosen	(eds),	The	Collected	Works	of	Jeremy	Bentham	An	Introduction	to	the	Principles	
of	Morals	and	Legislation	(Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	2005);	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	‘Economic	analysis’	(n5)	3.	
14	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	Economic	analysis’	(n5)	3;	E	Posner	‘Values	and	consequences:	An	introduction	to	economic	
analysis	of	law’	in	E	Posner,	Chicago	Lectures	in	Law	and	Economics	(Foundation	Press,	2000),	189.	
15	 Posner,	 ‘Values	 and	 consequences’	 (n14)	 189-190;	 Papers	 which	 are	 attributed	 with	 expanding	 the	 law	 &	
economics	analysis	included	R	Coase,	‘The	problem	of	social	cost’	(1960)	3	J	of	L	and	Econ	1	and	G	Calabresi,	‘Some	
thoughts	on	risk	distribution	and	the	law	of	torts’	(1961)	70	Yale	LJ	499.	
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The	publication	of	Becker’s	seminal	paper,	‘Crime	and	punishment:	An	economic	approach’,	
in	1968	extended	this	analysis	to	the	criminal	law.16	He	contended	that	the	decision	to	commit	
crime	 was	 the	 same	 as	 any	 other	 decision	 to	 which	 the	 same	 analytical	 framework	 was	
applicable.17	This	was	an	assertion	of	considerable	magnitude	given	the	prevailing	theories	
about	crime.	The	positive	school	of	criminology	had	dominated	the	crime	discourse	since	the	
early	1900s	which	held	that	crime	was	a	product	of	economic,	social	and	biological	factors.18	
This	resulted	in	policies	which	sought	to	incapacitate	harmful	offenders19	and	to	correct	the	
inequalities	that	caused	crime.20		
	
Becker	restored	the	view	that	the	decision	to	commit	crime	depended	on	weighing	“the	costs	
of	apprehension	and	conviction”21	against	the	benefits	of	commission.	This	was	a	return	to	
the	utilitarian	ideas	of	classical	criminology	which	had	dominated	discussions	of	crime	and	
criminal	justice	from	the	renaissance	until	the	early	twentieth	century.	The	classical	school,	
particularly	 Jeremy	 Bentham	 and	 Cesare	 Beccaria,	 conceptualised	 crime	 as	 “a	 rational	
calculation	of	the	risk	of	a	pain	versus	potential	pleasure	derived	from	an	act”.22	Understood	
in	this	way,	the	appropriate	purpose	of	punishment	was	deterrence.23		
	
The	major	 premise	 of	 law	&	 economics	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 ideas	 of	 deterrence	 is	 the	 law	 of	
demand.24	 This	 suggests	 that	 if	 the	 price	 of	 any	 good	 increases,	 there	 will	 be	 reduced	
																																																						
16	G	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment	An	economic	approach’	(1968)	76	J	of	Pol	Econ	169,	170	intending	that	the	
framework	was	applicable	to	the	entire	range	of	criminal	offences,	including	white	collar	crimes	and	more	trivial	
offences	such	as	parking	violations.	
17	Ibid	170,	201;	N	Mazar	and	D	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life	and	its	policy	implications’	(2006)	25(1)	J	of	Pub	
Pol	&	Mark.	117,	118.	
18	A	comprehensive	account	of	the	positive	school	of	criminology	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	work.	The	following	
provide	a	representative	sample	of	the	causes	of	crime.	R	Merton,	‘Social	structure	and	anomie’	(1938)	3(5)	Am.	
Soc.	Rev.	672,	672,	678;	A	Quetelet,	 ‘Of	 the	development	of	 the	propensity	 to	crime’	originally	published	 in	A	
Quetelet,	 A	 Treatise	 on	Man	 (Chambers,	 1842)	 and	 reprinted	 in	 E	McLaughlin,	 J	Muncie	 and	G	Hughes	 (eds),	
Criminological	Perspectives	(2nd	ed.	SAGE	Publications,	2003),		41;	E	Ferri,	‘Causes	of	criminal	behaviour’	originally	
published	in	E	Ferri,	The	Positive	School	of	Criminology;	Three	Lectures	by	Enrico	Ferri	(Charles	H	Kerr	&	Co.,	1908)	
and	partially	reprinted	in	E	McLaughlin,	J	Muncie	and	G	Hughes	(n18)	54.	
19	J	Lilly,	F	Cullen	and	R	Ball,	Criminological	Theory	Context	and	Consequences	(5th	ed.	SAGE	Publications,	2011),	34.	
20	Ibid	83.	
21	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	205.	
22	R	Akers,	Criminological	Theories	Introduction,	Evaluation	and	Application	(3rd	edn,	Roxbury	Publishing	Company	
2000),	16.	
23	Burns,	Hart	and	Rosen	(n13)	34,	158;	R	Bellamy	(ed)	and	R	Davies	(tr),	Beccaria:	‘On	Crimes	and	Punishments’	
and	Other	Writings	(Cambridge	University	Press,	1995)	31.	
24	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	4.	
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consumer	demand	 for	 that	 good	 in	proportion	 to	 the	 size	of	 the	 initial	 increase.	 This	will	
prompt	the	rational,	self-interested	actor	to	investigate	alternatives	which	he	preferred	less	
when	the	good	was	at	its	previous,	lower	price.25	This	hypothesis	is	equally	applicable	to	the	
commission	of	crime,	as	Richard	Posner	has	argued,		
	
people	 act	 as	 rational	maximizers	 of	 their	 satisfactions	 in	making	 such	 nonmarket	
decisions	 as	whether	 to…commit	 or	 refrain	 from	 committing	 crimes…Rules	 of	 law	
operate	to	impose	prices	on…these	nonmarket	activities,	thereby	altering	the	amount	
or	 character	 of	 the	 activity…The	 first	 two	 premises	 lead	 to	 such	 predictions	 as	
that…increasing	the	severity	as	well	as	certainty	of	criminal	punishment	will	reduce	
the	crime	rate.26	
	
The	theory	of	the	criminal	sanction	propounded	by	the	law	&	economics	movement	rests	on	
deterrence	on	the	basis	that	“the	state	reduces	the	demand	for	crime	by	setting	a	“price”	for	
it	 in	 the	 form	of	an	expected	cost	of	having	 to	pay	a	 fine	or	go	 to	prison.”27	 The	 rational	
criminal	is	assumed	to	conduct	a	cost-benefit	analysis	in	which	he	weighs	the	expected	costs	
against	the	benefits.	A	person	refrains	from	crime	when	the	costs	outweigh	the	benefits.28	In	
this	equation,	the	costs	of	crime	are	traditionally	regarded	as	the	certainty	and	severity	of	
punishment.	More	peripheral	costs,	which	are	not	a	major	part	of	the	conventional	analysis,	
include	the	criminal’s	opportunity	costs	and	the	expenses	required	to	commit	the	offence.29	
The	criminal	weighs	these	costs	against	the	expected	benefits	of	punishment	which,	in	the	
case	of	fraud,	are	largely	financial.	
	
This	idea	leads	to	very	simple	policy	prescriptions:	increasing	the	costs	of	crime	will	result	in	
fewer	offences.30	This	is	no	doubt	intuitively	attractive.	A	question	remains,	however,	how	
should	policymakers	increase	the	costs	of	crime?	The	answer	for	law	&	economics	scholars	
was	rooted	in	the	idea	that	these	costs	were	interchangeable	and	in	notions	of	efficiency.		
																																																						
25	Ibid	5.	
26	R	Posner,	‘The	law	and	economics	movement’	(1987)	77	(2)	American	Economic	Review	1,	5.	
27	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	250.	
28	Ibid	242.	
29	Ibid	242.	
30	G	Stigler,	‘The	optimum	enforcement	of	laws’	in	G	Becker	and	W	Landes	(eds.),	Essays	in	the	Economics	of	Crime	
and	Punishment	(NBER,	1974),	56.	
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A	traditional	economic	analysis	of	law	views	the	certainty	and	severity	of	legal	sanctions	as	
representing	a	cumulative	cost	to	the	offender.31	For	example,	a	fine	of	$10,000	with	a	0.1	
chance	of	detection	has	the	same	expected	cost	to	the	offender	as	a	fine	of	$1million	where	
the	chance	of	detection	is	0.001.32	In	both	cases	the	rational	offender	calculates	the	expected	
cost	of	crime	as	$1000.33	Where	the	cumulative	cost	of	these	variables	exceeds	the	benefits	
of	offending,	the	model	predicts	that	the	individual	refrains	from	crime.	This	suggests	that	
the	 role	 played	 by	 each	 variable	matters	 little	 for	 deterrence	 as	 long	 as	 the	 combination	
reaches	a	given	cost	value	in	the	mind	of	the	offender.	This	notion	of	interchangeability	has	
been	recently	confirmed	by	Kaplow	and	Shavell.34	The	major	lesson	of	this	analysis	is	that	a	
severe	sanction	which	is	unlikely	to	be	imposed	can	have	an	identical	deterrent	effect	as	a	
more	trivial	sanction	where	the	offender	is	very	likely	to	be	apprehended	and	convicted.35	
	
This	presents	a	choice	to	policymakers;	which	combination	of	sanctions	should	be	chosen	to	
reduce	crime?	The	answer	to	this	question	depended	on	efficiency;36	policymakers	should	
determine	 the	most	 efficient	 combination	 of	 certainty	 and	 severity	 for	 each	 offence	 and	
operationalise	sanctions	on	that	basis.	The	most	efficient	combination	would	typically	be	high	
severity/low	certainty	sanctions.	This	is	because	increasing	the	likelihood	of	detection	is	not	
costless,	but	 requires	 significant	 state	 investment	 in	 the	machinery	of	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system.37	Becker	and	Posner	argued,	on	the	basis	of	 theoretical	models,	 that	 this	was	 the	
appropriate	combination	in	relation	to	prison	sentences	and	fines.38		
	
																																																						
31	Ibid	56;	A	Harel,	‘Behavioral	analysis	of	criminal	law:	A	survey’	in	E	Zamir	and	D	Teichman,	The	Oxford	Handbook	
of	Behavioral	Economics	and	The	Law	(OUP,	Oxford	2014),	575.		
32	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	244.	
33	Ibid	244.	
34	L	Kaplow	and	S	Shavell,	Fairness	Versus	Welfare	(Harvard	University	Press,	2002),	362	Where	an	offence	has	a	
low	probability	of	detection,	it	may	be	“desirable	to	employ	higher	punishments	than	those	called	for	under	the	
proportionality	principle.”	
35	A	Harel,	‘Economic	analysis	of	criminal	law:	A	survey’	in	A	Harel	and	K	Hylton	(eds.),	Research	Handbook	on	the	
Economics	of	Criminal	Law	(Edward	Elgar,	2012),	575.	
36	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	183-184;	R	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory	of	the	criminal	law’	(1985)	85	
Colum	L	Rev	1193,	1206.	
37	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1207.	
38	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	184;	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1206,	1213;	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	
‘Economic	analysis’	(n5)	[6.2.2].	
108	
	
This	single	metric	could	result	in	very	harsh	policy	recommendations.	Efficiency	could	dictate,	
for	example,	that	trivial	offences	which	were	difficult	or	expensive	to	detect	were	punished	
very	severely.39	Some	of	Becker’s	contemporaries	had	noted	these	potential	consequences	
of	his	analysis	and	sought	to	develop	arguments	to	counter	his	insistence	on	severity.40	This	
is	not	to	say,	however,	that	Becker	was	wholly	immune	from	broader	considerations.	In	his	
1968	paper	he	had	suggested	that	if	deterrence	was	society’s	only	concern,	offences	could	be	
reduced	 “at	 will”	 by	 rendering	 detection	 virtually	 certain	 and	 ensuring	 that	 punishment	
exceeded	the	offender’s	gain.41	While	this	would	not	meet	his	efficiency	criterion,	Becker	had	
a	 further	 issue	 with	 prescriptions	 made	 on	 this	 basis:	 it	 “ignore[d]	 the	 social	 costs	 of	
increases”	in	certainty	and	severity.42		Social	costs	were	the	product	of	the	cost	of	punishment	
to	the	offender	and	the	impact	that	this	punishment	had	on	society.43	Note	that	this	impact	
could	 be	 negative,	 as	 when	 society	 is	 forced	 to	 invest	 resources	 in	 prisons,	 or	 could	 be	
positive,	 as	when	 the	 sanction	 is	 a	 fine	which	 the	offender	pays	 to	 society.44	Accordingly,	
Becker	suggested	that	fines	should	be	used	in	preference	to	imprisonment	as	these	would	
generally	result	in	lower	social	costs.45	Imprisonment	should	be	used	to	sanction	offenders	
unable	to	pay	a	fine.46	This	analysis	is	not	without	criticism	–	it	assumes	that	the	collection	of	
fines	is	costless47	and	aggregates	the	offender’s	cost	into	the	overall	determination	of	social	
cost48	–	but	it	is	important	to	address	the	totality	of	prescriptions	that	Becker	made.	
	
Rational	choice	theory	provides	a	superficially	attractive	model	of	criminal	decision	making.	
If	crime	is	the	result	of	a	rational	balancing	of	costs	and	benefits,	the	key	to	crime	reduction	
lies	in	increasing	the	costs	of	offending.49	Moreover,	these	costs	can	be	increased	in	a	manner	
which	is	economically	efficient	for	society	without	compromising	on	deterrence.		
																																																						
39	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	183-184;	see	also	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	Fairness	Versus	Welfare	(n34)	362.	
40	Harel,	‘Economic	analysis’	(n35)	576:	“horrified	even	the	most	orthodox	advocates	of	law	and	economics	who	
tried	 hard	 to	 provide	 counterarguments”;	 K	 Dau-Schmidt,	 ‘An	 economic	 analysis	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 as	 a	
preference-shaping	policy’	(1990)	1	Duke	LJ	1,	21.	
41	Becker,	‘Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	180.	
42	Ibid	181.	
43	Ibid	180.	
44	Ibid	180.	
45	Ibid	193.	
46	Ibid	193.	
47	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1206-1207;	A	Harel,	‘Economic	analysis’	(n35)	15.	
48	Dau-Schmidt	(n40)	11-12.	
49	Becker,	’Crime	and	punishment’	(n16)	177.	
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There	 is	 a	 certain	 symmetry	 between	 rational	 choice	 theory	 and	 the	 approach	 of	 the	
insurance	courts.	The	 judges	have	consistently	argued	that	harsh	penalties	deter	and	that	
communication	of	these	penalties	will	reduce	fraud.	True,	the	insurance	courts	do	not	speak	
explicitly	in	economic	terms,	but	this	does	not	preclude	the	explanatory	power	of	economic	
theory.50	While	intuitively	attractive,	these	models	are	far	too	simplistic.	They	fail	to	recognise	
the	complex	realities	of	decision	making	and	the	importance	of	social	context	for	the	potential	
offender.	Accordingly,	sanctions	premised	on	rational	choice	theory,	including	the	insurance	
forfeiture	rule,	are	likely	to	be	ineffective	in	deterring	offenders.	It	will	be	argued	that	modern	
deterrence	theory	better	reflects	these	complexities	and	can	be	used	to	underpin	sanctions	
which	are	more	likely	to	deter.			
	
B. The	applicability	of	the	framework	
The	forgoing	discussion	has	centred	on	the	economic	approach	to	criminal	law.	However,	the	
focus	of	discussion	here	–	the	forfeiture	rule	–	 is	a	civil	 law	sanction.	Given	that	economic	
analysis	is	not	unique	to	the	criminal	law,	the	applicability	of	the	criminal	framework	within	
this	thesis	merits	explanation.51	An	explanation	is	all	the	more	necessary	given	the	similarity	
between	the	insurance	approach	and	the	economic	analysis	of	intentional	torts	which	also	
equates	 deterrence	with	 harsh	 sanctions.52	 The	 relative	 size	 and	maturity	 of	 the	 criminal	
literature	means,	however,	that	it	provides	a	more	comprehensive	basis	for	comparison	and	
is	preferred	in	this	project.	
	
The	 critical	 difference	 between	 the	 criminal	 and	 civil	 settings	 is	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
punishment	or	sanction,	respectively.	The	criminal	law	imposes	punishments	“for	doing	what	
is	forbidden”53	and	is	designed	to	“dissuade	the	actor	from	engaging	in	[the]	activity	at	all.”54	
This	is	because	conduct	punishable	by	the	criminal	law	lacks	any	social	utility	whatsoever.55	
																																																						
50	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1230	where	a	similar	point	is	made	in	relation	to	the	criminal	law.	
51	I	am	grateful	to	Dr	Johanna	Hjalmarsson	for	encouraging	me	to	think	about	the	suitability	of	this	framework	in	
greater	depth	and	to	Professor	Rick	Swedloff	for	assisting	me	in	reaching	the	final	conclusion	on	this	point.	
52	R	Cooter,	‘Economic	analysis	of	punitive	damages’	[1982]	56	S	Cal	L	Rev	79,	89-90.	
53	R	Cooter,	‘Prices	and	sanctions’	(1984)	84	Colum	L	Rev	1523,	1524.	
54	J	Coffee,	‘Paradigms	lost.	The	blurring	of	the	criminal	and	civil	law	models’	(1991-1992)	101	Yale	LJ	1875,	1876.	
55	Ibid	1876.	
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The	 level	 of	 punishment	 is	 typically	 affected	 by	 two	 variables;	 the	 harm	 caused	 and	 the	
offender’s	state	of	mind.56			
	
By	contrast,	the	civil	 law,	generally	concerns	conduct	which	creates	social	utility	but,	 in	so	
doing,	imposes	externalities	on	others.	Many	examples	are	cited	in	the	literature57	but	the	
most	useful	for	our	purposes	is	a	contract	which	is	breached	by	one	party.	As	a	socially	useful	
activity,	the	practice	of	contracting	is	to	be	encouraged,	but	the	law	must	make	provision	for	
the	possibility	that	one	party	fails	to	perform	as	agreed.	The	task	for	the	courts,	therefore,	is	
to	develop	appropriate	sanctions	in	these	circumstances.	One	option	would	be	to	punish	the	
contract	breaker	but	this	could	also	have	the	unwelcome	effect	of	making	contracting	less	
desirable.	A	more	appropriate	response	is	to	‘price’	the	behaviour	so	that	the	sanction	equals	
the	 harm	 caused.58	 This	 forces	 the	 actor	 to	 internalise	 any	 externalities	 he	 imposes	 on	
others,59	which	 in	 the	 context	 of	 breach	 of	 contract,	 requires	 the	 breaching	 party	 to	 pay	
compensatory	 damages	 to	 his	 counterpart.60	 This	 is	 an	 appropriate	 response	 since	 the	
majority	of	contract	breaches	are	not	opportunistic	but	either	involuntary,	as	would	be	the	
case	where	frustration	operates,	or	voluntary	but	characterised	as	efficient.61	This	enables	
the	individual	to	determine	whether	to	engage	in	the	particular	conduct62	and	to	undertake	
an	efficient	level	of	precautions.63		
	
There	is	an	occasional	reference	in	the	economic	literature	on	contract	law	to	large	damages	
awards	which	 are	 designed	 to	 deter	 inefficient,	 opportunistic	 breaches.64	 This	 is	 how	we	
would	 characterise	 the	 submission	 of	 a	 fraudulent	 insurance	 claim.	 These	 references,	
however,	are	not	sufficiently	developed	to	enable	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	forfeiture	
rule.		
																																																						
56	Cooter,	‘Prices	and	sanctions’	(n53)	1552.	
57	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1206	(the	example	of	driving	which	causes	an	accident);	Coffee	(n54)	1884	
(the	example	of	a	manufacturer	who	causes	environmental	pollution).	
58	Cooter,	‘Prices	and	sanctions’	(n53)	1554.	
59	Coffee	(n54)	1876;	Cooter,	‘Prices	and	sanctions’	(n53)	1525.	
60	Robinson	v	Harman	154	ER	363	(1848),	365	per	Parke	B.	But	see	H	Collins,	Regulating	Contracts	(OUP,	1999)	121	
where	he	argues	that	“we	should	be	cautious	in	assuming	that	it	is	the	legal	sanction	or	a	payment	equivalent	to	
the	measure	of	legal	damages	that	supplies	this	incentive	towards	performance	of	undertakings.”	
61	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	131.	
62	Cooter,	‘Prices	and	sanctions’	(n53)	1552.	
63	Cooter	and	Ulen	(n9)	290.	
64	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	130-131,	142.	
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Where	the	civil	law	‘pricing’	method	works	well,	the	non-breaching	party	will	be	indifferent	
to	performance	or	breach	plus	damages.65		This	is	because	a	damages	award	calculated	by	
reference	 to	 expectation	 interest	 will	 mean	 that	 the	 non-breaching	 party	 is	 in	 the	 same	
position	as	 though	the	contract	was	 fully	performed.66	The	critical	point	 is	 that	 the	 ‘price’	
equals	the	harm	caused.67	To	impose	prices	which	exceeded	the	harm	would	discourage	the	
actor	from	engaging	in	socially	beneficial	activities,	namely	contracting.68		
	
Insurance	fraud	does	not	produce	any	social	utility.	 In	fact,	as	a	deliberate	attempt	by	the	
assured	to	extract	more	than	his	entitlement	at	the	expense	of	the	underwriter	and	the	pool	
of	 policyholders,	 fraud	 creates	 disutility.	 This	 disutility	 increases	 premiums	 for	 honest	
policyholders	and	 forces	 the	underwriter	 to	expend	unnecessary	 costs	 in	determining	 the	
validity	of	the	claim.69	This	resembles	the	type	of	conduct	proscribed	by	the	criminal	law	and,	
therefore,	 by	 analogy,	 the	 appropriate	 legal	 response	 is	 to	 outlaw	 fraud.	 A	 framework	
premised	on	‘prices’	would	give	the	impression	that	fraud	was	a	legitimate	activity	provided	
the	assured	was	willing	to	pay	the	relevant	price.	This	is	clearly	not	the	message	that	the	legal	
system	is	attempting	to	send,	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	insurance	fraud	is	also	punishable	
as	 a	 crime.70	 Accordingly,	 the	 economic	 analysis	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 and	 its	 associated	
literature	is	a	suitable	framework	in	which	to	discuss	the	forfeiture	rule.		
	
C. An	alternative	account	of	legal	sanctions:	Modern	deterrence	theory	
Modern	 deterrence	 theory	 is	 the	 result	 of	 research	 undertaken	 to	 test	 the	 assertions	 of	
rational	 choice	 theory71	 and	 developments	 in	 decision	 theory	 from	 the	 behavioural	 and	
																																																						
65	Ibid	133;	E	Zamir	and	B	Medina,	Law,	Economics,	and	Morality	(OUP,	2010)	294.	
66	Robinson	(n60)	365	per	Parke	B.	A	similar	analysis	is	employed	to	explain	damages	awards	in	tort	law,	see	Cooter	
and	Ulen	(n9)	345-346.	
67	 Cooter,	 ‘Prices	 and	 sanctions’	 (n53)	 1554.	 This	 supposes	 that	 monetary	 damages	 are	 capable	 of	 fully	
compensating	the	accident	victim	or	non-breaching	party	in	a	contract,	for	this	point	in	relation	to	tort	see	Cooter	
and	Ulen	(n9)	345.	
68	M	Bedi,	‘Contract	breaches	and	the	criminal/civil	divide:	An	inter-common	law	analysis’	(2011-2012)	28	Ga	St	U	
L	Rev	559,	583-584,	588-589.	This	is	the	fear	of	‘over-deterrence’,	see	generally	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	
1206.	
69	Cooter	and	Ulen	(n9)	276	make	this	point	in	discussing	why	fraudulent	misrepresentation	during	negotiations	
will	render	a	contract	void.	
70	Fraud	Act	2006	s.2;	see	later	discussion	in	part	V	(ii).	
71	R	Paternoster,	‘How	much	do	we	really	know	about	criminal	deterrence?’	(2010)	100(3)	J	of	Crim	L	&	Criminol.	
765,	779.	
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cognitive	sciences.	It	presents	a	much	more	complex	framework	for	understanding	decisions	
about	crime	than	the	law	&	economics	approach.	The	framework	adopts	a	more	realistic	actor	
who	 is	 distinguishable	 from	 his	 rational	 forbear.	 The	 decision-making	 process	 too	 is	
fundamentally	 different;	 the	 actor	 takes	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 factors	 into	 account	 when	
choosing	between	alternatives	and	 the	process	 itself	 is	 far	 from	 the	methodical	 approach	
suggested	by	law	&	economics.		
	
Before	 considering	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 modern	 theory	 diverges	 from	 the	 rational	 choice	
account	 of	 crime	 and	 deterrence,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 provide	 a	 sketch	 of	 the	 actor	 in	 the	
behavioural	analysis.	The	model	of	man	used	in	behavioural	economics	differs	considerably	
from	the	rational	actor.	The	actor’s	preferences	are	not	constant;	decisions	do	not	always	
reflect	self-interest	but	demonstrate	concern	for	others.72	Empirical	evidence	demonstrates	
that	the	actor	values	fairness	both	in	how	he	is	treated	and	how	he	treats	others.73	There	is	
considerable	evidence	of	altruistic	and	reciprocal	behaviour	in	one-time	interactions	between	
anonymous	 parties,74	 the	 paradigm	 case	 in	 which	 one	 would	 expect	 ‘rational’,	 selfish	
behaviour.75	 Perceptions	 of	 unfairness	 can	 also	 cause	 behaviours	 more	 spiteful	 than	 the	
traditional	framework	would	predict.76	In	economic	exchange,	behaviour	is	not	driven	solely	
by	 financial	 concerns	but	 in	 some	circumstances	considerations	of	 “comfort,	or	power,	or	
pleasure”77	 may	 dominate	 decision	 making.	 Decision	 making,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 simply	 a	
balance	of	the	relative	economic	costs	and	benefits.		
	
Modern	theory	recognises	that	preferences	are	not	solely	shaped	by	exogenous	factors78	but	
also	develop	 through	 social	 interaction.79	 The	 actor’s	 existence	within	 a	particular	 society	
explains	a	good	deal	of	his	behaviour.	The	actor,	 for	example,	 is	characterised	as	having	a	
																																																						
72	C	Jolls,	C	Sunstein	and	R	Thaler,	‘A	behavioral	approach	to	law	and	economics’	[1998]	50	Stan	LR	1471,	1479.	
73	Ibid	1479.	
74	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	(n17)	119	citing	U	Gneezy,	‘Deception:	The	role	of	consequences’	
(2005)	 95(1)	 Am	 Ec	 Rev	 384;	 J	 Andreoni	 and	 J	Miller,	 ‘Analyzing	 choice	with	 revealed	 preference:	 Is	 altruism	
rational?’	in	C	Plott	and	V	Smith	(eds.),	Handbook	of	Experimental	Economics	Vol	1	(Elsevier	Science,	2008);	J	Abeler,	
D	Nosenzo	 and	 C	 Raymond,	 ‘Preferences	 for	 truth-telling’	 (IZA	Discussion	 Paper	No.	 10188,	 September	 2016)	
available	at:	http://ftp.iza.org/dp10188.pdf	(accessed	15/09/2016),	7,	38.	
75	E	Posner,	‘Law,	economics,	and	inefficient	norms’	[1996]	144	U	Penn	L	Rev	1697,	1714.	
76	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1479.	
77	J	Kidwell,	‘A	caveat’	(1985)	Wis	L	Rev	615,	617.	
78	This	is	a	major	premise	of	rational	choice,	see	Dau-Schmidt	(n40)	5;	Cooter	and	Ulen	(n9)	18.	
79	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	(n17)	119;	Kidwell	(n77)	617.	
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“desire	 to	achieve	a	positive	 image	of	 self	by	winning	acceptance	or	 status	 in	 the	eyes	of	
others.”80	He	achieves	this	social	approbation	by	behaving	in	accordance	with	the	norms	of	
his	 society.	 Behaving	 in	 accordance	 with	 these	 codes	 of	 conduct	 also	 benefits	 the	 actor	
intrinsically.	Evidence	of	this	comes	from	the	field	of	neuroscience	which	demonstrates	that	
the	brain	responds	in	the	same	way	to	behaviour	which	accords	with	social	norms	as	it	does	
to	stimuli	which	offer	the	actor	external	rewards.81	This	suggests	the	existence	of	an	internal	
mechanism	to	control	behaviour.	This	internal	mechanism	sanctions	misconduct,	behaviour	
which	contravenes	this	set	of	values,	and	rewards	compatible	behaviour.82	Put	simply,	we	feel	
good	when	we	behave	 in	ways	we	consider	good	even	 if	 this	means	we	sacrifice	external	
benefits	 associated	with	 a	 different	 course	 of	 action.83	 The	 recognition	 that	 behaviour	 is	
shaped	by	a	combination	of	internal	and	external	influences	undermines	the	predictive	ability	
of	a	model	based	solely	on	external	considerations.		
	
The	actor	 in	 this	modern	 framework	 also	differs	 from	his	 rational	 forbear	 in	his	 ability	 to	
gather	and	assess	relevant	information.	The	complexity	of	decision	making	means	that	the	
actor	 is	 no	 longer	 regarded	 as	 a	 super	 computer.84	 Instead,	 the	 actor	 employs	 mental	
shortcuts	to	assist	with	decision	making.85	These	shortcuts	are	prone	to	mislead	and	divert	
the	 actor	 from	 ‘rational’	 decisions.	 This	 again	 should	 lead	 us	 to	 question	 the	 predictive	
accuracy	of	the	rational	choice	framework.	The	complexities	of	the	actor	in	the	behavioural	
model	render	him	much	more	akin	to	actual	humans	than	homo	economicus.	The	following	
discussion	of	behaviour	and	decision	making	should	be	viewed	in	this	light.		
	
																																																						
80	 H	 Grasmick	 and	 D	 Green,	 ‘Legal	 punishment,	 social	 disapproval	 and	 internalization	 as	 inhibitors	 of	 illegal	
behavior’	(1980)	71	J	of	Crim	L	and	Criminol	325,	328	citing	D	Wrong,	‘The	oversocialized	conception	of	man	in	
modern	sociology’	(1961)	26	Am	Soc	Rev	183,	185;	Abeler,	Nosenzo	and	Raymond	(n74)	19.	
81	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	(n17)	119	citing	J	Rilling	et	al.,	‘A	neural	basis	for	social	cooperation’	
(2002)	35(2)	Neuron	395;	D	de	Quervain	et	al.,	‘The	neural	basis	of	altruistic	punishment’	(2004)	305	(5688)	Science	
1254.			
82	N	Mazar,	O	Amir	and	D	Ariely,	‘The	dishonesty	of	honest	people:	A	theory	of	self-concept	maintenance’	(2008)	
45(6)	J	of	Mark.	R	633,	633.	
83	Ibid	634.	
84	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1477.	
85	Ibid	1477.	
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i. Certainty	and	severity	not	interchangeable	
A	major	premise	of	the	rational	choice	conception	of	crime	was	the	idea	that	the	legal	costs,	
sanction	certainty	and	severity,	were	interchangeable.	The	contribution	of	each	cost	did	not	
matter	provided	that	the	overall	cost	value	exceeded	the	benefits	of	crime.	Much	of	the	early	
work	following	Becker’s	paper	set	about	subjecting	these	assertions	to	empirical	testing.	A	
variety	 of	 methods	 established	 that	 certainty	 of	 detection	 was	 a	 far	 greater	 indicator	 of	
deterrence	than	sanction	severity.86	This	resurrected	the	view	previously	held	by	renaissance	
theorists,	Bentham	and	Beccaria.87	The	relationship	between	certainty	and	severity	was	also	
subjected	to	critique.	The	modern	research	undermined	the	idea	of	a	cumulative	relationship	
in	 which	 the	 variables	 were	 interchangeable	 and	 instead	 posited	 a	model	 in	 which	 both	
variables	must	represent	a	real	cost.	If	either	cost	is	perceived	to	be	negligible,	the	threat	of	
legal	sanctions	will	not	inhibit	crime.88	
	
The	 empirical	 evidence	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 “issues	 are	 more	 complex	 than	 standard	
deterrence	analysis	assumes.”89	A	notable	absence	from	standard	theory	is	the	time	at	which	
punishment	 is	 levied	 in	relation	to	the	offence;90	 the	celerity	of	punishment.	Beccaria	had	
insisted	 that	 speed	was	a	vital	 component	of	deterrence	on	 the	basis	 the	offender	would	
associate	swift	punishment	with	the	offence	in	question.91	Modern	theorists	have	recognised	
the	 importance	 of	 speed92	 which	 further	 demonstrates	 the	 simplistic	 account	 offered	 by	
rational	choice.	In	the	insurance	context,	punishments	are	unlikely	to	be	administered	swiftly.	
The	underwriter’s	assessment	of	a	claim	as	fraudulent	will	occur	after	the	claims	process	and	
																																																						
86	E	Blais	and	J	Bacher,	 'Situational	deterrence	and	claim	padding:	Results	from	a	randomized	field	experiment'	
(2007)	3	J	Exp	Criminol	337,	338;	S	Klepper	and	D	Nagin,	'The	deterrent	effect	of	perceived	certainty	and	severity	
of	punishment	revisited'	(1989)	27	Criminology	721,	741.	Much	of	this	work	focussed	on	the	death	penalty,	see:		A	
von	Hirsch	et	al,	Criminal	Deterrence	and	Sentence	Severity	An	Analysis	of	Recent	Research	(Hart	Publishing	1999),	
11;	H	Grasmick	and	R	Bursik,	'Conscience,	significant	others	and	rational	choice:	Extending	the	deterrence	model'	
(1990)	24	L	&	Soc	Rev	837,	837.	The	research	into	the	death	penalty	demonstrated	no	clear	difference	in	the	rate	
of	 capital	 offences	 between	 states	 which	 prescribed	 the	 death	 penalty	 and	 those	 which	 prescribed	 life	
imprisonment.	
87	Burns,	Hart	and	Rosen	(n13)	31.	
88	Grasmick	and	Green	(n86)	327.	
89	P	Robinson	and	J	Darley,	‘Does	criminal	law	deter?	A	behavioral	science	investigation’	(2004)	24(2)	Oxford	J	of	
Leg	Stud	173,	182,	186.	
90	T	Loughran,	R	Paternoster	and	D	Weiss,	‘Hyperbolic	time	discounting,	offender	time	preferences	and	deterrence’	
(2012)	28	J	Quant	Criminol	607,	611,	624.	
91	Bellamy	and	Davies	(n23)	49.	
92	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	193;	a	preliminary	study	on	the	impact	of	celerity	and	hyperbolic	discounting	was	
conducted	by	Loughran,	Paternoster	and	Weiss	(n90).	
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some	form	of	investigation.	The	process	may	be	further	delayed	by	a	trial.	The	loss	of	a	claim	
is	therefore	likely	to	occur	a	considerable	time	after	the	fraud	was	committed.	As	a	result,	the	
assured	may	not	necessarily	associate	the	sanction	with	the	offence.	
	
The	 empirical	 evidence	 undermines	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 sanction	 severity.	 As	 such,	 it	
follows	that	sanctions	premised	on	this	framework,	such	as	the	insurance	forfeiture	rule,	will	
be	 relatively	 ineffective	 in	 deterrence	 terms.	 	 The	 construction	 of	 adequate	 deterrents,	
therefore,	 depends	 on	 other	 factors,	 including	 ones	 which	 trigger	 the	 actor’s	 internal	
behaviour	mechanism.	This	is	the	focus	of	the	following	discussion.	
	
ii. Informal	sanction	threats	and	perception	
Rational	man	 takes	 account	 of	 the	 objective	 legal	 costs	 of	 punishment	 in	 his	 decision	 to	
offend.	The	actor	in	the	modern	framework,	by	contrast,	considers	a	broader	range	of	costs	
and	thinks	about	those	costs	in	different	ways.		
	
We	 consider	 first	 the	 additional	 variables	 that	 affect	 the	 decision	 to	 offend.	 These	 are	
generally	 referred	 to	as	social	or	 informal	 sanctions	because	 they	are	not	 imposed	by	 the	
state.93	Social	sanctions	include	feelings	of	shame	and	embarrassment	levied	on	the	individual	
by	himself	as	a	result	of	behaving	in	a	way	which	contravenes	his	moral	code.94	Sanctions	are	
also	 imposed	by	 the	offender’s	community	–	he	may	 feel	 shame	or	be	shunned	socially	–	
because	his	behaviour	breaks	agreed	codes	of	conduct.	If	wrongdoing	affects	the	individual’s	
commercial	 reputation,	 market	 costs	 will	 also	 be	 suffered,	 such	 as	 a	 fall	 in	 demand	 for	
products	 or	 a	 reduction	 in	 parties	 willing	 to	 trade	 with	 the	 fraudulent	 individual.95	 It	 is	
important	to	distinguish	a	separate	category	of	sanctions	which	follow	a	formal	sanction	but	
are	not	imposed	by	the	state.96	These	would	include,	the	difficulty	of	obtaining	professional	
employment97	and	future	insurance	cover	as	a	result	of	a	civil	finding	of	fraud.	
																																																						
93	Paternoster	(n71)	781.	
94	Mazar,	Amir	and	Ariely,	‘The	dishonesty	of	honest	people’	(n82)	633-634.	
95	A	Ogus,	Costs	and	Cautionary	Tales	(Hart	Publishing,	2006),	130.	
96	The	author	is	grateful	to	Professor	Rick	Swedloff	for	highlighting	this	distinction	in	discussions	at	the	Insurance	
Fraud	Symposium	(University	of	Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016).	
97	J	Waldfogel,	‘The	effect	of	criminal	conviction	on	income	and	the	trust	“reposed	in	the	workmen”’	(1994)	J	Hum	
Resour	62,	63,	66,	72.	
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Informal	 sanction	 threats	 exercise	 a	 stronger	 deterrent	 effect	 than	 traditional	 legal	
sanctions.98	The	modern	 framework	 recognises	 that	 the	precise	 impact	of	 social	 sanctions	
varies	 by	 offender	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 his	 social	 circle	 is	 engaged	 in	
criminality.	 If	 his	 acquaintances	 themselves	 engage	 in	 deviant	 behaviour,	 the	 weight	 of	
informal	 sanctions	will	 be	 considerably	 lower	 than	 those	 social	 sanctions	 levied	by	 a	 law-
abiding	group.99	The	significance	of	social	sanctions	confirm	the	modern	characterisation	of	
decision	makers	 as	 rooted	 in	 their	 community.	 Not	 only	 is	 the	 informal	 sanction	 a	more	
effective	 deterrent	 than	 the	 legal	 sanction,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 far	 cheaper	 to	 administer.100	 In	
rational	choice	theorists’	drive	for	efficiency,	the	utility	of	stigma	and	other	informal	sanctions	
appears	to	have	been	overlooked.	
	
The	importance	of	informal	sanctions	is	not	to	say	that	legal	penalties	are	irrelevant.	Formal	
sanctions	 imposed	 by	 the	 state	 will	 typically	 provide	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 imposition	 of	
informal	sanctions.101	The	legal	penalty	signals	to	the	wider	community	that	the	individual	
has	 contravened	 accepted	 standards	 of	 behaviour.102	 There	 are,	 of	 course,	 some	
circumstances	in	which	social	sanctions	will	be	levied	irrespective	of	formal	sanctions.	Most	
notably,	the	individual’s	own	feelings	of	guilt	are	triggered	by	behaviour	which	challenges	his	
perception	of	himself	as	morally	good.	Formal	sanctions	will	also	be	less	relevant	in	markets	
where	the	individual’s	misconduct	is	visible	to,	and	can	be	sanctioned	independently	by,	other	
market	participants.		
	
Formal	sanctions	imposed	by	the	state	also	have	an	important	moralising	effect.103	The	fact	
that	a	particular	act	is	prohibited	and	sanctioned	by	the	legal	system	validates	social	norms	
about	 the	particular	offence.	 This	 can	 serve	 to	 strengthen	 society’s	 feelings	about	 certain	
types	of	behaviour.	Alignment	between	social	values	and	the	law	renders	the	law	credible	in	
																																																						
98	Klepper	and	Nagin	(n86)	721;	D	Kahan	‘Social	influence,	social	meaning,	and	deterrence’	(1997)	83(2)	Va	L	Rev	
349,	354,	357.	
99	Grasmick	and	Green	(n86)	329.	
100	Dau-Schmidt	(n40)	30.	
101	Klepper	and	Nagin	(n86)	741;	Ogus	(n95)	130.	
102	Collins	(n60)	124.	
103	R	Paternoster	and	S	Simpson,	 'Sanction	 threats	and	appeals	 to	morality:	Testing	a	 rational	choice	model	of	
corporate	crime'	(1996)	30	L	&	Soc	Rev	549,	577;	Kidwell	(n77)	618.	
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the	eyes	of	the	populace.104	The	evidence	suggests	a	higher	rate	of	compliance	with	‘credible’	
laws	than	those	laws	which	diverge	from	widespread	social	attitudes,105	particularly	where	
these	sanctions	are	imposed	by	a	lawmaker	regarded	as	legitimate.106		
	
There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 there	 is	 a	 complex	 interrelationship	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	
sanctions.107	 The	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 social	 sanctions	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 exercise	 a	
stronger	deterrent	effect	but	any	model	must	account	for	both	types	of	sanction.	The	general	
premise	 of	modern	 theory	 continues	 to	 rely	 on	 a	 cost-benefit	 analysis;	 the	 actor	 will	 be	
deterred	 from	 crime	 when	 the	 combination	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	 costs	 outweighs	 the	
benefits.	Mazar	and	Ariely	present	a	more	complex	model	of	this	interaction	and	suggest	that	
it	exists	as	a	step	function.108	It	suggests	that	when	the	actor	engages	in	low-level	or	negligible	
dishonesty,	the	internal	mechanisms	of	control	are	not	activated.109	Decisions	depend	solely	
on	 a	 consideration	 of	 external	 costs	 and	 benefits.	 When	 the	 dishonesty	 contemplated	
activates	the	internal	mechanism,	the	actor’s	reward	system	exerts	considerable	dissuasive	
force	 against	 misconduct.110	 The	 actor	 forgoes	 the	 opportunity	 for	 dishonesty	 but	 this	
decision	 is	unconnected	 from	 the	external	 sources	of	 reward	and	punishment.111	 In	 cases	
where	the	external	benefits	of	dishonesty	are	particularly	 large,	Mazar	and	Ariely	contend	
that	the	internal	mechanism	no	longer	plays	a	role;	it	is	overridden	by	the	promise	of	these	
material	benefits.112	Decisions	again	are	made	solely	by	reference	to	external	 factors.	This	
latter	aspect	of	the	model	has	not	been	well	tested;	if	correct,	however,	it	would	suggest	a	
residual	 role	 for	 the	 rational	 cost-benefit	 analysis.113	 This	 highlights	 the	 nuances	 of	 the	
relationship	between	informal	and	formal	sanction	threats	and	that	this	may	vary	according	
																																																						
104	D	Kahan,	‘Between	economics	and	sociology:	The	new	path	of	deterrence’	(1996-1997)	95	Mich	L	Rev	2477,	
2481;	T	Tyler,	Why	People	Obey	The	Law	(Yale	University	Press,	1990)	64;	Zamir	and	Medina	(n65)	77.	
105	Kahan,	‘Between	economics	and	sociology’	(n104)	2481;	P	Robinson,	‘The	criminal-civil	distinction	and	the	utility	
of	desert’	(1996)	76	Boston	Uni.	L	Rev.	201,	213;	Zamir	and	Medina	(n65)	77-78.	
106	Tyler	(n104)	64-65.	
107	Grasmick	and	Green	(n80)	334.	See	also	P	Cane,	‘The	anatomy	of	private	law	theory:	A	25th	anniversary	essay’	
(2005)	25(2)	OJLS	203,	217	“Private	law	is	not	only	a	system	of	norms	but	also	a	set	of	social	practices	around	these	
norms	and	institutions.	More	theoretical	work	needs	to	be	done	on	the	interaction	of	these	elements.”	
108	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	(n17)	120.		
109	Ibid	120.	
110	Ibid	120.	
111	Ibid	120.	
112	Ibid	120.	
113	See	later	discussion,	text	to	fn	222	et	seq.	But	see	Abeler,	Nosenzo	and	Raymond	(n74)	8	who	suggest	that	
increases	in	incentives	have	little	impact	on	behaviour.	
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to	the	nature	of	the	dishonesty.	It	is	not	the	goal	of	this	project	to	sketch	the	precise	contours	
of	this	relationship	but	to	suggest	that	accounts	of	deterrence	which	exclude	a	whole	category	
of	sanction	threats	are	necessarily	incomplete.	It	also	suggests	that	sanctions	must	be	tailored	
to	the	degree	of	dishonesty	and	to	the	way	in	which	decisions	are	made.	
	
The	rational	actor	is	presumed	to	balance	the	objective	likelihood	of	detection	and	the	actual	
punishment	rate	in	his	decision	to	offend.	The	empirical	evidence	suggests	a	much	different	
view.	Firstly,	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	potential	offenders	know	or	obtain	such	information	as	
part	of	 their	decision-making	process.114	This	 is	what	Robinson	and	Darley	have	called	the	
“legal	 knowledge	 hurdle”.115	 Knowledge	 of	 legal	 penalties	 is	 low	 even	 among	 groups	 for	
whom	accurate	statistics	would	seem	to	be	useful;	those	involved	in	a	life	of	crime.116	This	
does	not	mean	that	society	is	totally	ignorant	of	legal	rules117	nor	that	the	overarching	threat	
of	the	law	has	no	effect;	of	course	it	must	do	to	some	extent.	The	point	is	that	the	individual	
will	struggle	to	determine	how	the	law	will	deal	with	him.	Issues	to	do	with	burdens	of	proof,	
factors	 influencing	sentencing	and	judicial	discretion	combine	to	obscure	the	actual	threat	
value	of	the	law.118			
	
If	we	look	at	the	specific	insurance	fraud	statistics,	these	ideas	would	seem	to	hold.	Data	from	
2010	suggests	that	policyholders	are	generally	aware	of	the	severity	of	the	fraud	rule,	and	in	
some	 cases	 identified	 consequences	 more	 severe	 than	 forfeiture,119	 but	 more	 than	 half	
considered	 that	 fraud	was	 ‘unlikely’	 or	 ‘very	unlikely’	 to	be	detected.120	 This	 goes	against	
industry-wide	messages	to	counter	the	perception	that	offenders	are	unlikely	to	be	caught121	
and	reduces	the	impact	of	punishment	in	the	decision	process.	
																																																						
114	T	Brooks,	Punishment	(Routledge	Cavendish,	Oxford	2012),	47;	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	
(n17)	120.	
115	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	175.	
116	Ibid	176.	
117	Ibid	177.	
118	Ibid	177.	
119	 ABI,	 Research	 Brief:	 Deterring	 Opportunistic	 General	 Insurance	 Fraud	 (2010)	 available	 at:	
http://www.betterregulation.com/external/Research%20Brief%20Deterring%20opportunistic%20general%20ins
urance%20fraud.pdf	(accessed	30/07/16)	5:	almost	70%	of	participants	thought	the	whole	claim	would	be	denied,	
64%	considered	that	the	policy	would	be	avoided	and	55%	thought	the	individual	would	go	to	court.	
120	Ibid	6:	51%	thought	it	was	‘unlikely’	or	‘very	unlikely’	that	insurance	frauds	would	be	detected.	
121	ABI,	‘Insurers	will	do	whatever	it	takes	to	protect	honest	customers	against	insurance	fraud’	(18/01/16)	available	
at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-updates/2016/01/Insurers-will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-protect-honest-
customers-against-insurance-fraud	(accessed	13/08/16).	
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On	the	basis	that	potential	offenders	do	not	know	the	actual	likelihood	of	being	caught	and	
punished,	 it	 follows	 that	decisions	can	only	be	made	on	 the	basis	of	perception.122	This	 is	
critical.	The	development	of	perception	is	strongly	tied	to	the	actor’s	experience	of	the	system	
and	those	of	his	acquaintances.123	As	such,	a	prior	offence	which	went	undetected	or	was	
treated	 leniently	 will	 cause	 the	 offender	 to	 perceive	 a	 lower	 likelihood	 of	 detection	 and	
sanction	 severity	 than	 the	 reality.	 The	 same	 logic	 is	 applicable	 to	 the	 severity	of	 informal	
sanctions.	Punishment	will	be	perceived	as	a	lesser	threat	by	those	offenders	for	whom	crime	
“may	lead	to	very	little	if	any	loss	of	status	and	respect	in	the	communities	within	which	they	
function.”124	Decisions	about	crime,	like	many	other	decisions,	are	not	made	in	a	vacuum;125	
there	is	a	“strong	correlation	between	a	person’s	obedience	and	her	perceptions	of	others’	
behaviour	and	attitude	 toward	 the	 law.”126	This	 suggests	 that	attempts	 to	 shape	society’s	
perceptions	about	punishment	 should	be	 just	as	 important	 to	policymakers	and	courts	as	
changing	the	law.	It	is	not	enough	to	enact	harsher	penalties	without	working	to	communicate	
that	those	sanctions	exist	and	will	apply	to	particular	groups.	Indeed,	as	Kahan	has	argued,	it	
is	 “obvious	 that	 a	 policy	 that	 attends	 only	 to	 price	 and	 not	 to	 social	 influence	 may	 be	
ineffective	in	reducing	crime.”127	
	
iii. Limits	on	rationality	and	the	use	of	heuristics	and	biases	
A	 rational	 choice	 model	 of	 crime	 conceptualises	 man	 as	 able	 to	 access	 and	 accurately	
compute	 all	 the	 information	 needed	 to	 make	 an	 optimal	 decision.	 This	 is	 implicit	 in	 the	
assumption	 that	 the	 actor	 knows	 the	 objective	 likelihood	 of	 detection	 and	 punishment.	
Developments	 in	 cognitive	 psychology	 and	 behavioural	 science	 during	 the	 1970s	
demonstrated	the	simplicity	of	 this	assumption.128	Humans	do	not	have	perfect	memories	
nor	infinite	cognitive	capacity.129	
	
																																																						
122	Paternoster	(n71)	780;	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	184.	
123	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	177,	178.	
124	Ibid	192.	See	also,	Kahan	‘Social	influence’	(n98)	357.	
125	Kahan,	‘Social	influence’	(n98)	354;	Kahan,	‘Between	economics	and	sociology’	(n104)	2486.	
126	Kahan,	‘Social	influence’	(n98)	354.	
127	Ibid	361.	
128	D	Teichman,	‘The	optimism	bias	of	the	behavioral	analysis	of	crime	control’	(2011)	U	Ill.	L	Rev	1697,	1698.	
129	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1477.	
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The	complexity	of	many	decisions	will	mean	that	it	is	impossible	for	decision	makers	to	weigh	
all	possible	alternatives.130	As	such,	there	are	bounds	to	human	rationality;	 individuals	will	
tend	to	demonstrate	a	consistent	preference	for	particular	outcomes131	but	their	decisions	
will	not	always	coincide	with	the	predictions	of	rational	choice	theory.	There	is,	for	example,	
empirical	 evidence	 of	 ‘satisficing’132	 where	 an	 individual	 makes	 decisions	 which	 meet	 “a	
specified	 aspiration	 level”	 133	 but	 does	 not	 fully	maximise	 his	 utility.	 The	 decision	 is	 good	
enough,	but	not	the	best	it	could	be.	In	the	real	world,	satisficing	is	common;	individuals	could	
not	shop	around	for	the	best	deal	ad	infinitum,	considerations	of	time	and	need	overriding	
those	of	 optimality.	Of	 course,	 this	 behaviour	 could	be	described	 as	 rational;	 it	would	be	
inefficient,	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	 impossible,	 to	 ‘waste’	 time	 amassing	 and	 considering	 all	
possible	alternatives.134	
	
This	bounded	rationality	is	overcome	by	the	use	of	mental	shortcuts,	known	as	heuristics,	and	
biases,	which	simplify	the	decision-making	process.	As	such,	the	use	of	heuristics	is	rational,	
provided	that	the	heuristics	are	themselves	rational.135	The	focus	in	this	discussion	is	on	those	
biases	which	 are	most	 relevant	 to	 decision	making	 about	 crime;	 the	 availability	 heuristic,	
hyperbolic	discounting	and	the	optimism	bias.	
	
The	rational	choice	model	relies	on	potential	offenders	having	access	to	information	about	
the	objective	likelihood	of	detection	and	the	likely	punishment.	This	is	unrealistic	particularly	
when	one	considers	the	variables	affecting	detection	and	judicial	discretion	in	sentencing.136	
The	problems	of	bounded	rationality	are	particularly	acute	when	decision	makers	need	to	
assess	the	probability	of	a	given	outcome,	137	such	as	the	likelihood	of	punishment.	Evidence	
suggests	 that	 the	 availability	 heuristic	 is	 adopted	 in	 these	 circumstances.	 Availability	 is	 a	
																																																						
130	 R	 Korobkin	 and	 T	 Ulen,	 ‘Law	 and	 behavioral	 science:	 Removing	 the	 rationality	 assumption	 from	 law	 and	
economics’	[2000]	88(4)	Cal	L	Rev.	1051,	1077.	
131	H	Simon,	'Altruism	and	economics'	(1993)	83	The	Am	Econ	Rev	156,	156.	
132	The	idea	of	satisficing	is	first	identified	by	H	Simon,	‘Rational	choice	and	the	structure	of	the	environment’	(1956)	
63(2)	Psych.	Rev	129,	129.		
133	Korobkin	and	Ulen	(n130)	1075.	
134	Ibid	1076;	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	19	suggests	however	that	decisions	made	on	the	basis	of	incomplete	
information	are	 rational	and	 in	 line	with	a	 rational	choice	 theory	of	 law	when	the	costs	of	acquiring	complete	
information	would	exceed	the	likely	benefits	stemming	from	a	wholly	informed	decision.	
135	Eisenberg	(n10)	446.	
136	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	177.	
137	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1480.	
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measure	of	the	likelihood	of	a	given	event	calculated	by	reference	to	the	ease	with	which	the	
actor	can	call	to	mind	similar	examples.138	This	will	depend	on	the	personal	experience	of	the	
potential	offender	and	his	immediate	community	as	well	as	relevant	media	coverage.139	The	
actor	asked	to	judge	the	probability	of	event	for	whom	“retrieval	is	easy	and	fluent”140	will	
assume	a	high	likelihood	of	the	given	event.	In	general	terms,	the	availability	heuristic	is	prone	
to	error	since	“actors	are…systematically	insensitive	to	sample	size	and	therefore	erroneously	
take	 small	 samples	 as	 representative.”141	 In	 relation	 to	 crime,	 the	 prior	 experience	 of	
committing	 similar	 offences	 without	 being	 detected	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 the	 individual	 to	
underestimate	the	 likelihood	of	apprehension.	 It	 follows	that	the	availability	heuristic	may	
cause	 individuals	 to	 make	 decisions	 which	 the	 rational	 choice	 framework	 would	 not	
predict.142	
	
A	second	way	in	which	recent	research	has	undermined	rational	choice	theory	is	related	to	
how	decision	makers	balance	the	costs	and	benefits	of	a	given	decision.	The	traditional	cost-
benefit	 analysis	 presumes	 that	 individuals	 give	 equal	 weight	 to	 each	 factor.143	 The	
behavioural	research	demonstrates	that	this	is	not	the	case.144	Instead,	the	more	immediate	
the	 event,	 the	more	 heavily	 it	 is	 weighed	 in	 the	 decision	 to	 act	 in	 a	 particular	 way.	 The	
likelihood	 of	 future	 events	 is	 heavily	 discounted.145	 This	 is	 the	 heuristic	 of	 hyperbolic	
discounting.	Its	existence	explains	why	individuals	make	decisions	which	conflict	with	their	
long-term	goals146	such	as	the	employee’s	inability	to	save	for	retirement	or	the	dieter	who	
succumbs	to	a	tempting	dessert.	
																																																						
138	A	Tversky	and	D	Kahneman,	'Availability:	A	heuristic	for	judging	frequency	and	probability'	(1973)	5	Cognitive	
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which	the	relevant	mental	operation	of	retrieval,	construction,	or	association	can	be	carried	out.”	
139	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	177-178.	There	is	a	considerable	overlap	here	with	issues	of	perception,	discussed	
above.	
140	D	Kahneman,	Thinking,	Fast	and	Slow	(Penguin,	2012)	129.	
141	Eisenberg	(n10)	447.	
142	Korobkin	and	Ulen	(n130)	1069,	1075;	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1477.	
143	See	Zamir	and	Medina	(n65)	86	who	suggest	that	certain	factors	necessarily	have	‘lexical	priority’	over	others	
but	that	these	different	weightings	are	ignored	by	a	conventional	cost-benefit	analysis.	
144	T	Ulen	and	R	McAdams,	‘Behavioral	criminal	law	and	economics’	(2008)	University	of	Chicago	Public	Law	and	
Legal	Theory	Working	Paper	No.	244,	23;	Robinson	and	Darley	(n89)	194.	
145	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(n72)	1539.	
146	Ibid	1479.	
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This	heuristic	is	particularly	relevant	to	decisions	about	crime.	In	the	typical	case,	benefits	are	
likely	 to	be	enjoyed	 immediately	after	commission147	with	any	punishment	 to	be	suffered	
later	 on.148	 In	 the	 cost-benefit	 analysis,	 therefore,	 the	 immediate	 benefits	 of	 crime	 are	
accorded	much	more	importance	than	the	possible	costs.	The	lag	between	commission	and	
costs	is	particularly	acute	in	relation	to	offences	of	fraud	which	are	characterised	by	lengthy	
investigations.149	Hyperbolic	discounting	 is	 likely	to	affect	many	decisions	about	crime	and	
will	 be	 particularly	 emphasised	 in	 circumstances	 where	 the	 offence	 is	 committed	 due	 to	
emotional150	or	financial	pressure.	This	would	account	for	some	of	the	cases	of	exaggeration	
in	the	insurance	context.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	celerity	of	punishment	is	an	important	
factor	in	modern	deterrence	theory.	
	
The	 optimism	 bias	 is	 also	 relevant	 to	 questions	 of	 deterrence.	 The	 human	 propensity	 to	
optimism151	means	that	decision	makers	are	 likely	to	assume	that	negative	consequences,	
such	as	having	one’s	crime	detected	and	sanctioned	severely,	are	more	likely	to	happen	to	
someone	else.152	This	allows	the	decision	maker	 to	 further	discount	 the	potential	costs	of	
crime.	If	the	decision	maker	discounts	the	formal	costs	of	crime	in	this	way,	it	may	also	have	
a	knock-on	effect	for	his	perception	of	social	sanctions	given	that	these	are	to	a	large	extent	
dependent	on	the	imposition	of	sanctions	by	the	state.	At	the	same	time,	the	optimism	bias	
may	cause	individuals	to	overestimate	the	benefits	of	crime.	For	those	individuals	not	suitably	
deterred	by	the	threat	of	sanctions,	the	combined	effect	of	the	optimism	bias	is	likely	to	tip	
the	decision	in	favour	of	offending.	
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As	McAdams	and	Ulen	have	argued,	it	is	also	important	to	account	for	the	beneficial	ways	in	
which	 behavioural	 biases	 interact	 with	 decision	 making.153	 The	 optimism	 bias	 is	 a	 prime	
candidate	for	such	treatment.	The	optimistic	offender	who	underestimates	the	likelihood	of	
detection	is	likely	to	take	fewer	precautions	in	committing	his	crime,	154	as	from	an	economic	
standpoint,	these	precautions	would	represent	wasted	costs.	This,	they	argue,	“would	bolster	
the	 true	probability	 of	 detection,	which	partially	 offsets	 the	dilution	of	 deterrence	excess	
optimism	causes.”155	It	is	easy	to	envisage	fewer	precautions	in	the	context	of	street	crime	
but	less	so	in	relation	to	commercial	fraud.	This	further	indicates	the	complexity	of	decision	
making	and	the	need	for	further	empirical	work	on	the	influence	of	these	biases.156		
	
Modern	 deterrence	 theory	 represents	 a	 significant	 departure	 from	 the	 traditional	
understanding	of	deterrence	and	rational	choice	 theory.	 It	 recognises	 that	 the	decision	 to	
offend	 is	 taken	 by	 boundedly	 rational,	 optimistic	 actors	who	use	 rules	 of	 thumb,	 such	 as	
availability	and	hyperbolic	discounting,	to	simplify	the	process.	Under	this	analysis,	there	is	a	
much	 broader	 range	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	which	 form	 part	 of	 the	 decision.	 In	 particular,	
decision	makers	 accord	 greater	weight	 to	 social	 sanctions	 levied	 by	 themselves	 and	 their	
social	circle	than	the	threat	of	legal	sanctions.	The	law	serves	to	provide	a	foundation	for	the	
imposition	of	informal	sanctions	and	legitimises	moral	views	about	certain	behaviours.		
	
The	combined	impact	of	these	factors	has	been	usefully	highlighted	by	Robinson	and	Darley,	
	
Potential	offenders	commonly	do	not	know	the	 legal	 rules	…Even	 if	 they	know	the	
rules,	the	cost-benefit	analysis	potential	offenders	perceive	…	commonly	leads	to	…	
violation	 rather	 than	 compliance,	 either	 because	 the	 perceived	 likelihood	 of	
punishment	is	so	small,	or	because	it	is	so	distant	as	to	be	highly	discounted	…	And,	
even	 if	 they	 know	 the	 legal	 rules	 and	 perceive	 a	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 that	 urges	
compliance,	potential	offenders	commonly	cannot	or	will	not	bring	such	knowledge	
to	bear	[because	of]	a	variety	of	social,	situational	or	chemical	influences.	Even	if	no	
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one	of	these	three	hurdles	is	fatal	to	the	law’s	behavioural	influence,	their	cumulative	
effect	typically	is.157	
	
The	 argument	made	here	 is	 that	 this	 empirical	 research	 should	 change	 the	nature	of	 the	
debate	for	academics,	policymakers	and	the	judiciary.	Policies	which	rely	on	the	severity	of	
sanctions	 –	 such	 as	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 –	 are	 out	 of	 step	 with	 modern	 thinking	 about	
deterrence	and,	therefore,	are	likely	to	be	ineffective	in	preventing	crime.	The	Supreme	Court	
was	recently	invited	to	reconsider	the	scope	of	the	forfeiture	rule	in	light	of	the	lessons	from	
modern	deterrence	theory.	Accordingly,	the	discussion	now	considers	the	judicial	response	
to	the	evidence	and	provides	some	illustrations	of	deterrents	aligned	with	modern	theory.		
	
D. Modern	deterrence	theory	and	the	Supreme	Court	
In	 the	course	of	argument	 in	Versloot,	 counsel	 for	 the	assured	 referred	 their	 Lordships	 to	
modern	deterrence	theory,	in	the	form	of	an	article	co-written	by	the	author	and	Professor	
James	 Davey.158	 	 During	 the	 hearing	 itself,	 Lord	 Mance	 noted	 that	 set	 against	 empirical	
evidence	were	“theories	of	judicial	activity	[which]	invite	us	to	operate	on	the	basis	of	rational	
choice	theory	which	assume	that	people	behave	logically	and	that	we	have	knowledge	of	the	
law.”159	This	statement	from	Lord	Mance	encapsulates	the	entire	debate	contained	 in	this	
section.	
	
The	arguments	received	little	attention	in	the	final	judgment.	The	comments	are	worth	citing	
in	full.	Firstly,	the	comments	made	by	Lord	Toulson	which	indicate	tacit	acceptance	of	the	
importance	of	internal	moral	codes	in	preventing	wrongdoing,		
I	 am	 not	 a	 psychologist,	 but	 I	 am	 sceptical	 about	 the	 idea	 that	 knowledge	 of	 this	
judgment	will	incentivise	people	with	valid	insurance	claims	to	lie	in	support	of	their	
claims.	Those	who	are	honest	will	not	do	so	because	it	would	not	be	in	their	nature,	
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while	some	who	are	dishonest	may	do	so	if	they	think	that	they	will	get	away	with	it,	
despite	 the	 risk	 of	 it	 having	 a	 boomerang	 effect	 on	 whether	 the	 court	 believes	
anything	that	they	say.160		
More	 generally,	 however,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	was	 sceptical	 of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 on	
deterrence	and	did	not	use	modern	theory	to	ground	the	new	approach	to	collateral	lies	told	
in	 support	 of	 an	 insurance	 claim.	 Lord	 Sumption,	 in	 giving	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 majority,	
commented	
There	was,	 it	was	 said,	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 the	 common	 law	 rule	was	an	
effective	deterrent	to	fraud,	and	no	reason	to	think	that	the	problem	was	peculiar	to	
claims	on	insurers	as	opposed	to,	say,	claims	in	tort	for	personal	injuries,	the	cost	of	
which	 also	 falls	 ultimately	 on	 insurers	 and	 policy-holders	without	 there	 being	 any	
equivalent	 common	 law	 rule.	 Informational	 asymmetry	 is	 not	 a	 peculiarity	 of	
insurance,	and	in	modern	conditions	may	not	even	be	as	true	of	insurance	as	it	once	
was.	These	points	have	some	force.	But	I	doubt	whether	they	are	relevant.	Courts	are	
rarely	in	a	position	to	assess	empirically	the	wider	behavioural	consequences	of	legal	
rules.	The	formation	of	 legal	policy	 in	this	as	 in	other	areas	depends	mainly	on	the	
vindication	of	collective	moral	values	and	on	judicial	instincts	about	the	motivation	of	
rational	beings,	not	on	the	scientific	anthropology	of	fraud	or	underwriting.161		
During	 argument	 in	 Versloot,	 Lord	 Mance	 had	 commented	 that	 scepticism	 about	 the	
deterrent	 effect	 of	 the	 rule	 was	 “understandable.”162	 However,	 he	 too	 dismissed	 the	
empirical	arguments	in	the	following	terms,		
We	were	referred	to	academic	criticism	of	theories	of	deterrence	in	this	context,	but,	
as	Lord	Sumption	observes,	many	legal	rules	are	framed	on	a	basis	which	assumes	that	
they	are	capable	of	having	and	shaping	legal,	social	or	economic	behaviour,	and	here	
is	a	classic	example	of	Parliament	endorsing	this	approach.163		
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This	 retrenches	 the	 rational	 choice	analysis.	 It	 is	unsurprising	 that	 the	Supreme	Court	–	a	
judiciary	inculcated	in	a	rational	choice	approach	to	law-making	–	responded	in	this	way	to	
empirical	and	behavioural	evidence.	It	would	have	required	the	Supreme	Court	to	look	at	the	
bigger	picture,	which	as	Lord	Sumption	noted,	courts	are	generally	unable	to	do.164	Writing	
extra-judicially,	however,	Lord	Mance	has	been	receptive	to	modern	evidence	about	decision	
making	and	recognised	that	it	forces	a	reassessment	of	judicial	assumptions	in	the	context	of	
illegality.		
The	brocard	[of	ex	turpi	causa]	…	is	of	course	an	invitation	to	fast-thinking	of	the	type	
that	the	Nobel	prize-winner	Daniel	Kahnemann	has	in	his	book	Thinking	Fast	and	Slow	
so	tellingly	-	and,	for	decision-makers	like	myself,	alarmingly	-	described.	It	suggests	
easy	answers,	but	is	entirely	fallacious	in	so	doing.165	
He	continued,		 	 	 	
I	 doubt	whether	 it	 is	 realistic	 to	 try	 to	 justify	 it	 on	 a	 deterrent	 basis…But	 I	 doubt	
whether	 it	 really	can	have	here.	Have	persons	engaging	 in	 illegal	 transactions	ever	
heard	of	ex	turpi	causa?	Would	it	deter	them?	Gamblers	might	even	relish	the	chances	
of	uncovenanted	benefit	which	it	offers.166	
Lord	Mance’s	acceptance	of	these	arguments	in	the	context	of	an	academic	article	makes	his	
dismissal	of	them	in	the	Supreme	Court	disappointing.	Of	course,	this	may	well	be	explained	
by	the	different	nature	of	a	 journal	article	and	a	judicial	speech.	The	typical	 journal	article	
takes	 as	 its	 focus	 “an	 ideal	 situation	 rather	 than	an	actual	 situation”,167	 as	noted	by	 Lord	
Sumption	 during	 the	 hearing	 in	Versloot.	 This	 gives	 the	 author	much	 greater	 freedom	 to	
examine	the	topic	without	feeling	constrained	by	practical	considerations,	even	if	that	author	
is	ordinarily	a	Supreme	Court	judge.	In	relation	to	this	specific	case,	Lord	Mance’s	comments	
also	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 influenced	 by	 Parliament’s	 acceptance	 of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 as	
deterrent	in	the	Insurance	Act.168	To	be	clear,	however,	modern	deterrence	theory	does	not	
																																																						
164	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	bid	[10]	per	Lord	Sumption.		
165	(Lord)	J	Mance,	‘Ex	turpi	causa—When	Latin	avoids	liability’	(2014)	18	Edin	L	Rev	175,	176.	
166	Ibid	182-183.	
167	Versloot	(Supreme	Court	hearing)	(n159)	2h	26	per	Lord	Sumption.		
168	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12;	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[124]	per	Lord	Mance.		
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entirely	 relegate	 legal	 sanctions	 but	 instead	 views	 them	 as	 part	 of	 the	 decision-making	
process	about	dishonesty.	It	would	not	be	incompatible,	therefore,	to	simultaneously	endorse	
the	forfeiture	rule	as	deterrent	and	modern	deterrence	theory.		
	
Notwithstanding	 the	 effective	 rejection	 of	 these	 ideas	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 the	 role	 of	
behavioural	 science	 in	 deterrence	 has	 been	 recognised	 extra-judicially.	 The	 following	
discussion	charts	some	of	these	recent	developments	and	considers	what	deterrents	aligned	
with	the	lessons	of	modern	deterrence	theory	might	look	like.	
	
E. Aligning	deterrents	with	modern	deterrence	theory	
A	small	body	of	empirical	work	relating	to	the	insurance	claims	process	confirms	the	potential	
of	 deterrents	 aligned	 with	 modern	 theory	 and	 provides	 inspiration	 for	 this	 part	 of	 the	
discussion.	 In	 addition,	 a	 recent	 meta-analysis	 of	 72	 studies	 drawn	 from	 economics,	
psychology	and	sociology	attributed	honest	behaviour	to	the	personal	costs	associated	with	
lying	and	concerns	about	reputation.169	This	provides	further	support	for	social	sanctions	and	
mechanisms	which	seek	to	trigger	these	‘costs’	in	the	development	of	deterrents.170		
	
The	 claim	 form	 is	 a	 critical	 tool	 in	 fraud	 deterrence	 as	 this	 is	 the	moment	 at	 which	 the	
opportunity	for	fraud	arises.	A	Canadian	study	on	exaggerated	claims	trialled	the	impact	of	
incorporating	social	norms	into	the	claims	process	across	four	insurance	companies.171	In	half	
of	the	claims,	the	policyholder	received	a	letter	in	addition	to	the	standard	claim	form.	The	
letter	reminded	recipients	of	the	penalties	for	fraud	and	continued,	
	
[a]nd	we	know,	as	a	recent	poll	has	revealed,	that	a	very	large	majority	of	people	feel	
that	boosting	 insurance	claims	 is	morally	wrong…we	very	well	 know	that	 the	 large	
majority	 of	 insurance	 holders	 share	 our	 beliefs.	 And	 this	 is	 why	 we	 take	 this	
opportunity	 to	 ask	 for	 your	help	 and	 your	 cooperation	 in	 completing	 carefully	 the	
enclosed	forms.172	
	
																																																						
169	Abeler,	Nosenzo	and	Raymond	(n74)	38-39.	
170	Ibid	38-39.	
171	Blais	and	Bacher	(n86).	
172	Ibid	350.	
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On	average,	policyholders	in	receipt	of	the	experimental	letter	submitted	claims	worth	$300	
less	 than	 claimants	 who	 were	 subject	 to	 the	 company’s	 standard	 procedure.173	 This	
intervention	can	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	overcome	some	of	the	biases	that	result	in	the	
decision	to	commit	fraud.	Firstly,	 the	reminder	of	 legal	penalties	 is	perhaps	an	attempt	to	
overcome	the	effect	of	hyperbolic	discounting	by	bringing	sanctions	into	the	forefront	of	the	
decision	maker’s	mind.	In	addition,	the	appeal	to	morality	can	be	explained	as	an	attempt	to	
make	salient	the	individual’s	own	set	of	values	to	trigger	the	internal	behaviour	mechanism	
at	the	relevant	time.		
	
The	placement	of	the	honesty	declaration	on	claim	forms	is	also	critical.	Assureds	are	typically	
required	to	sign	at	the	bottom	of	the	claim	form	to	confirm	that	the	information	provided	is	
true	 to	 the	best	of	 their	knowledge.	This	declaration	may	also	 require	 the	policyholder	 to	
acknowledge	the	possible	sanctions	of	insurance	fraud.	Research	by	Shu	et	al.	suggests	that	
this	declaration	comes	too	late;	by	the	time	the	assured	signs	the	form,	the	exaggeration	has	
already	occurred.174	The	researchers	tested	the	impact	of	moving	the	declaration	to	the	top	
of	 the	 form	 in	both	 laboratory	and	 real-world	 settings.	 The	 real-world	 settings	 included	a	
policy	review	form	used	by	an	American	insurance	company.175	The	assured	was	required	to	
state	their	current	mileage	which	was	to	be	compared	for	the	purposes	of	the	experiment	to	
their	actual	mileage.	This	presented	an	opportunity	for	dishonesty;	it	was	in	the	participants’	
self-interest	 to	 understate	 mileage	 to	 attract	 a	 lower	 premium.	 Policyholders	 who	 had	
declared	 their	 honesty	 in	 advance	 of	 their	 mileage	 recorded	 higher	 figures	 which	 was	
associated	with	 lower	 dishonesty.176	 This	mirrored	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 other	 experiments	
undertaken	by	Shu	et	al.177	The	effect	of	relocating	the	honesty	declaration	was	equated	to	
the	 process	 of	 swearing	 an	 oath	 in	 court.178	 In	 Ariely’s	 parlance,	 the	 honesty	 declaration	
primes	the	assured	with	his	own	morality	as	the	opportunity	for	dishonesty	is	presented.179		
																																																						
173	Ibid	344,	347.	
174	L	Shu	et	al,	‘Signing	at	the	beginning	makes	ethics	salient	and	decreases	dishonest	self-reports	in	comparison	to	
signing	at	the	end.’	(2012)	109(38)	PNAS	15197,	15198.		
175	Ibid	15198.	
176	Ibid	15198.	
177	Ibid	15197-15198.	
178	Ibid	15197.	
179	 Ibid	 15198.	 See	 also	N	Mazar,	O	Amir	 and	D	Ariely,	 ‘(Dis)Honesty:	 A	 combination	 of	 internal	 and	 external	
rewards’	 (Working	 Paper,	 Sloan	 School	 of	 Management	 (MIT))	 cited	 in	 D	 Ariely,	 The	 (Honest)	 Truth	 About	
Dishonesty	(Harper,	2012),	50-51.	
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These	suggestions	for	the	redesign	of	the	claim	form	focus	prevention	efforts	at	the	moment	
that	the	opportunity	for	fraud	is	presented.	They	are	likely	to	be	cost-effective180	not	least	
because	insurers	will	already	need	to	make	other	changes	to	their	documentation	following	
the	2015	Act.		
	
The	industry	has	also	been	taking	steps	to	counter	fraud	outside	of	the	courts.	These	efforts	
can	be	analysed	from	the	perspective	of	modern	deterrence	theory,	even	if	this	was	not	the	
basis	for	intervention	by	insurers.	The	Insurance	Fraud	Enforcement	Department	(IFED)	was	
established	 in	 2012	 and	 is	 funded	 by	 insurers.181	 It	 centralised	 police	 investigation	 into	
insurance	 fraud	 within	 the	 City	 of	 London	 Police.	 Previous	 difficulty	 in	 detecting	 fraud	
stemmed	from	a	lack	of	expertise	in	financial	crime182	and	the	central	unit	overcomes	this	
difficulty.	IFED	has	had	considerable	success	since	its	inception	having	seized	or	confiscated	
£1.3million	from	fraudsters	and	achieving	200	convictions	totalling	more	than	100	years	in	
prison	sentences.183		
	
Continued	effort	and	investment	should,	in	time,	increase	the	detection	of	insurance	fraud.	
An	increase	in	the	objective	likelihood	of	detection	is	not,	as	previously	discussed,	a	significant	
indicator	of	compliance	with	the	law.	What	is	important	about	this,	however,	is	the	potential	
for	greater	investigation	and	prosecution	to	affect	perception	of	detection	and	social	norms	
about	 the	 immorality	 of	 insurance	 fraud.	 The	 greater	 the	 social	 costs	 associated	 with	
opportunistic	fraud,	the	less	likely	it	is	that	an	assured	will	take	advantage	of	the	incentives	
to	fraud	during	the	claims	process.	
	
The	reality	of	 insurance	fraud	has	also	been	publicised	through	the	work	of	 IFED.	A	BBC	1	
daytime	television	show,	 ‘Claimed	and	Shamed’,	 is	now	in	 its	sixth	series	and	follows	 IFED	
investigators	 as	 they	 uncover	 and	 prosecute	 insurance	 fraud.184	 The	 Insurance	 Fraud	
																																																						
180	Shu	et	al	(n174)	15198.	
181	IFED,	‘About	IFED’	available	at:	https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-
crime/ifed/Pages/About-IFED.aspx	(accessed	12/09/2017).	
182	R	Emerson,	‘Insurance	claims	fraud:	Problems	and	remedies’	(1991-1992)	46	U	Miami	L	Rev	907,	950.	
183	IFED,	‘IFED	News’	(22/01/16)	available	at:	https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-
economic-crime/ifed/ifed-news/Pages/Insurance-Fraud-Enforcement-Department-announce-new-head.aspx	
(accessed	31/07/16).	
184	BBC,	‘Claimed	and	Shamed’	available	at:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b071hmq0	(accessed	01/08/16).	
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Taskforce,	discussed	further	below,185	has	credited	the	programme	with	“raising	the	profile	
of	insurance	fraud	and	acting	as	a	deterrent.”186	From	the	perspective	of	modern	deterrence	
theory,	media	coverage	should	increase	the	ease	with	which	decision	makers	can	call	to	mind	
instances	 of	 detection	 and	 punishment.	 This	 taps	 into	 the	 availability	 heuristic	 by	 which	
individuals	would	 tend	 to	 underestimate	 the	 likelihood	of	 detection.	 Research	by	 the	ABI	
demonstrates	that	many	policyholders	do	not	consider	insurance	fraud	a	crime	or	otherwise	
consider	 it	 victimless.187	 The	 television	 programme	 may	 help	 to	 overcome	 these	
misconceptions	 by	 equating	 fraud	 with	 traditional	 street	 crimes	 and	 providing	 concrete	
examples	of	detection	and	punishment.	
Following	the	conclusion	of	the	Law	Commission	consultation	into	insurance	contract	law,	the	
government	established	the	Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce	(IFT).188	The	IFT	was	charged	with		
investigat[ing]	the	causes	of	fraudulent	behaviour	and	recommend[ing]	solutions	to	
reduce	the	level	of	insurance	fraud	in	order	to	ultimately	lower	costs	and	protect	the	
interests	of	honest	consumers.189		
The	Taskforce	was	receptive	to	the	role	that	behavioural	economics	could	play	in	combatting	
insurance	fraud.	One	of	their	key	recommendations	was	for	the	ABI	to	commission	research	
into	the	use	of	behavioural	economics	and	adopt	useful	conclusions	as	best	practice	within	
the	 industry.190	 The	 IFT	 also	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 structural	 mechanisms	 to	
overcome	incentives	to	fraud,	
…good	research	has	been	published	about	consumers	and	behavioural	economics	and	
considers	 it	would	be	worthwhile	for	 insurers	to	review	their	documentation,	sales	
and	claims	processes	with	consumer	behaviour	in	mind.191	
																																																						
185	See	later,	text	to	fn	188.	
186	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce,	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Taskforce	 Final	 Report	 (2016)	 available	 at:		
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insurance-fraud-taskforce-final-report	 (accessed	 13/09/2016),	
[4.12]	
187	S	Viaene	and	G	Dedene,	‘Insurance	fraud:	Issues	and	challenges’	(2004)	29(2)	The	Geneva	Papers	on	Risk	and	
Insurance,	321.		
188	Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce,	Final	Report	(n186)	[3.47].		
189	Ibid	75.	
190	Ibid	8-9,	53-54,	57.	
191	Ibid	[5.17].	
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This	is	promising	largely	because	it	demonstrates	a	willingness	to	look	beyond	law	as	a	means	
of	combatting	insurance	fraud.	Notwithstanding	the	rejection	of	modern	deterrence	theory	
by	the	courts,	the	recommendation	that	insights	drawn	from	behavioural	science	should	be	
established	as	best	practice	for	the	insurance	industry	is	a	welcome	move.		
	
The	major	critique	of	the	insurance	forfeiture	rule	is	that	it	is	premised	on	outdated	models	
of	decision-making	which	focus	attention	on	the	severity	of	legal	punishment.	Modern	theory,	
by	contrast,	accords	legal	sanctions	a	more	modest	role	in	deterrence	and	instead	emphasises	
the	 preventive	 power	 of	 social	 sanctions.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 chapter	 develops	 further	
critiques	of	the	judicial	response	to	insurance	claims	fraud.	The	first	of	these	highlights	the	
absence	of	an	effective	legal	sanction	for	the	most	serious	fraud;	the	wholly	fabricated	claim.	
	
	
II. The	Absence	of	an	Effective	Legal	Remedy	for	Wholly	Fraudulent	Claims		
The	forfeiture	rule	was	designed	to	deter	the	exaggerated	claim,192	and,	in	this	sense,	one	can	
readily	appreciate	the	model	of	deterrence	which	inspired	the	nineteenth-century	judges.	A	
rule	which	operates	 to	deprive	 the	 assured	of	 genuine	 loss	 (in	 addition	 to	 the	 fraudulent	
portion),	 however,	 works	much	 less	 well	 in	 relation	 to	 wholly	 fraudulent	 and	 fraudulent	
device	claims.	Indeed,	the	argument	made	in	this	section	is	that	forfeiture	is	an	ineffective	
deterrent	to	the	most	serious	fraud;	the	wholly	fabricated	claim.193	Applying	forfeiture	to	this	
type	of	claim	is	akin	to	allowing	the	thief	to	return	stolen	goods	to	the	store	without	receiving	
any	 additional	 sanction.	 The	 rule	 has	 minimal	 impact	 on	 the	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claimant	
because	there	is	not,	and	never	was,	any	genuine	claim	to	be	forfeited.194	
	
The	 Law	 Commission	 was	 aware	 of	 this,	 noting	 in	 its	 2012	 consultation	 paper	 that	 the	
forfeiture	rule	had	“little	practical	effect”195	 in	relation	to	wholly	 fraudulent	claims.196	The	
Commission	further	stated,	however,	that	ordinary	common	law	remedies	–	most	notably,	an	
																																																						
192	Britton	v	Royal	Insurance	Co	(186)	4	F&F	905,	909	per	Willes	J.	
193	See	earlier,	Chapter	Two.	
194	P	MacDonald	Eggers,	‘Utmost	good	faith	and	the	presentation	and	handling	of	claims’	in	B	Soyer	(ed.),	Reforming	
Marine	and	Commercial	Insurance	Law	(Informa,	2008),	245.	
195	Law	Commission,	‘Insurance	Contract	Law:	Post	Contract	Duties	and	Other	Issues’	(Law	Com	CP	201)	[7.29],	
[8.20].	
196	Ibid	[7.29],	[8.20].	
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action	 in	 the	 tort	 of	 deceit197	 –	 were	 available	 to	 underwriters.	 Two	 cases	 in	 which	 the	
underwriter	 sought	 remedies	 in	addition	 to	 forfeiture	merit	discussion	at	 this	 stage.	 First,	
London	Assurance	v	Clare198	in	which	the	underwriter	claimed	damages	for	the	investigation	
of	an	alleged	arson	in	addition	to	recovering	the	indemnity	from	the	assured.	The	argument	
was	made	that	the	assured	was	under	an	implied	duty	to	put	forward	honest	claims	and	fraud,	
therefore,	entitled	the	underwriter	to	damages	for	breach	of	contract.199		Goddard	J	held	that	
such	damages	“were	far	too	remote”200	and	cited	the	fact	that	all	claims	would	need	to	be	
investigated	to	determine	liability	and	quantum.	It	is	difficult	to	find	subsequent	mention	of	
damages	 until	 the	 2012	 case	 of	 Parker	 v	 NFU	 Mutual	 Insurance	 Society.201	 It	 “was	 not	
disputed”202	 that	 the	 underwriter	 was	 entitled	 to	 damages	 and	 interest	 for	 the	 costs	 of	
investigating	an	alleged	arson	but	there	was	not	any	discussion	of	the	basis	of	the	cause	of	
action	nor	the	method	of	assessment.	Parker	has	been	subsequently	cited	in	case	law203	and	
by	the	Law	Commission204	although	in	neither	circumstance	has	the	availability	of	damages	
been	mentioned.		
	
Despite	 the	 recent	 discussion	 of	 damages	 in	 Parker,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 underwriters	 do	 not	
routinely	seek	additional	remedies.205	To	some	extent,	this	is	understandable	since	a	claim	in	
deceit	would	require	the	underwriter	to	satisfy	an	additional	procedural	hurdle,	namely	that	
it	had	been	influenced	by	the	misrepresentation.206	Cognisant	of	this	remedial	gap,	the	Law	
Commission	initially	advocated	the	creation	of	a	statutory	right	to	damages	to	meet	the	costs	
of	 investigating	 fraudulent	 claims.207	 This	 remedy	 was	 designed	 as	 a	 deterrent	 to	 wholly	
																																																						
197	Law	Commission,	Insurance	Contract	Law:	Business	Disclosure;	Warranties;	Insurers’	Remedies	for	Fraudulent	
Claims;	and	Late	Payment	(Law	Com	No	353,	2014),	[22.30};	Insurance	Corporation	of	the	Channel	Islands	v	McHugh	
[1997]	1	LRLR	94,	135	per	Mance	J:	“would	not	in	itself	appear	in	legal	theory	to	preclude	the	making	of	a	claim	–	
if	the	facts	otherwise	justified	it	–	based	on	any	positive	deceitful	misrepresentation.”	
198	London	Assurance	v	Clare	[1937]	57	Ll	L	Rep	254.	
199	Ibid	270	per	Goddard	J.	
200	Ibid	270	per	Goddard	J.	
201	Parker	v	NFU	Mutual	Insurance	Society	[2012]	EWHC	2156	(Comm),	[2013]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	253.	
202	Ibid	[205]	per	Teare	J.	
203	Bates	v	Aviva	[2013]	EWHC	1687	(Comm),	[2013]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	492.	
204	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[22.43]	discussion	of	Parker	(n201)	in	the	context	of	fraudulent	co-insureds.	
205	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[22.30].	
206	Hayward	v	Zurich	Insurance	Co.	[2016]	UKSC	48,	[67],	[71]	per	Lord	Toulson.		
207	Law	Com	201	(n195)	[8.19].	
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fraudulent	 claims	 and	would	 have	 capped	 damages	 at	 costs	which	were	 foreseeable	 and	
reasonable	in	the	circumstances.208	
	
By	the	time	of	the	final	report,	the	Law	Commission	had	abandoned	this	proposal,	stating	that	
“we	 do	 not	 consider	 that	 the	 recoverability	 of	 investigation	 costs	 will	 significantly	
disincentivise	 policyholder	 fraud.”209	 This	 was	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 insurers	 did	 not	
commonly	bring	actions	in	deceit	nor	attempt	to	include	express	terms	reserving	their	right	
to	 damages,210	 though	 this	 may	 well	 be	 due	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 actions	 in	 deceit.211	 A	
statutory	cause	of	action	would	have	considerably	simplified	matters	for	underwriters.	The	
Commission	also	 suggested	 the	difficulty	of	 recovering	 investigative	costs	 from	 fraudulent	
policyholders212	though	this	is	not	particularly	convincing	in	relation	to	commercial	assureds.		
	
Uniting	 both	 the	 Commission’s	 initial	 preference	 for	 a	 financial	 penalty	 and	 its	 eventual	
rejection	is	assertion,	and	not	evidence,	about	deterrence.	This	is	a	classic	example	of	Bell’s	
account	of	(judicial)	policymaking	which	takes	place,	
	
on	the	basis	of	unsupported	assertions	of	social	fact	and	projection	of	future	benefits	
or	disasters	which	would	follow	the	adoption	of	a	new	rule,	which	rest	on	the	judges’	
appreciation	of	human	nature.213	
	
To	 some	extent,	 judicial	 reliance	on	 such	material	 can	be	 excused	 since	 the	 court	will	 be	
limited	by	 the	material	 before	 it.214	 This	 explanation	does	not	 assist	 the	 Law	Commission	
which	could	have	trialled	the	potential	impact	of	costs	during	consultation.215	This	leads	the	
																																																						
208	Ibid	[8.20].	
209	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[22.30].	
210	Ibid	[22.30].	
211	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	206.	
212	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[22.30].	
213	J	Bell,	Policy	Arguments	in	Judicial	Decisions	(Clarendon	Press,	1983)	67.	
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‘Empirical	legal	research	and	policy-making’	in	P	Cane	and	H	Kritzer	(eds.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Empirical	Legal	
Research	(OUP,	2010),	1012.	
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author	to	speculate	that	the	real	reason	for	abandonment	was	really	an	“apparent	 lack	of	
demand,”216	 particularly	 given	 that	 Goriely	 has	 recently	 characterised	 the	 Commission	 as	
developing	“piecemeal	solutions	for	demonstrated	problems	where	there	was	consensus	for	
reform.”217	 If	 this	 explanation	 is	 correct,	 this	 should	 cause	 us	 to	 question	 whether	
underwriters	 remain	 as	 vulnerable	 to	 fraud	 –	 and	 therefore	 as	 necessitous	 of	 judicial	
protection	–	as	 they	were	when	the	 forfeiture	 rule	emerged.	This	will	be	discussed	 in	 the	
following	section.218	The	abandonment	of	proposals	could	also	be	due	to	concern	that	the	
provisions	would	not	satisfy	the	non-controversial	procedure	for	Law	Commission	bills.219		
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 Law	Commission’s	 final	 report	 to	
suggest	 that	 underwriters	 cannot	 still	make	 use	 of	 common	 law	 remedies	 in	 fraud	 cases	
following	the	enactment	of	the	2015	Act.220	By	only	enshrining	the	forfeiture	rule	in	statute,	
however,	the	Act	gives	the	impression	that	this	is	the	sole	civil	sanction	for	fraud.	The	position	
taken	in	this	thesis	is	that	the	failure	to	enact	a	statutory	remedy	for	the	most	serious	frauds	
is	problematic	both	in	conceptual	and	practical	terms.	
	
To	appreciate	the	conceptual	difficulty,	it	is	important	to	return	to	the	judicial	understanding	
of	deterrence,	namely	that	it	is	contingent	on	harsh	legal	sanctions.221	It	is	wholly	inconsistent	
that	this	same	logic	has	not	been	used	to	develop	a	suitable	sanction	for	wholly	fraudulent	
claims.	Indeed,	the	absence	of	a	statutory	response	is	also	disappointing	in	light	of	Mazar	and	
Ariely’s	work	on	decision	making	around	dishonesty.	This	research,	discussed	earlier	in	this	
chapter,222	demonstrated	that	a	traditional	cost-benefit	analysis	has	some	traction	in	cases	
where	 the	 external	 benefits	 of	 dishonesty	 are	 particularly	 large.223	 The	wholly	 fraudulent	
claim	–	the	scuttle	 in	the	marine	context	–	 falls	neatly	within	this	description	because	the	
successful	assured	stands	to	make	considerable	financial	gain.	In	such	cases,	the	existence	of	
																																																						
216	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[22.31].	
217	T	Goriely,	 ‘Good	faith:	The	residual	 impact	of	s.17	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906’	(Good	Faith	 in	Contract	Law,	
Exeter	University,	July	2017).	
218	See	later,	Part	III.	
219	A	Horne	and	R	Kelly,	‘The	Law	Commission	and	Law	Commission	Bill	Procedures’	(27	March	2015)	available	at:	
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07156/SN07156.pdf	(accessed	13/09/2017).	
220	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[20.6],	[22.30].	
221	See	earlier,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	174	et	seq.	
222	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	113	et	seq.	
223	Mazar	and	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life’	(n17)	120.	
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material	benefits	overrides	internal	mechanisms	for	behaviour	control.	Mazar	and	Ariely	have	
argued,	therefore,	that	decisions	 in	these	circumstances	more	typically	reflect	the	rational	
choice	model,224	although	presumably	this	would	have	to	be	modified	to	take	account	of	the	
cognitive	limitations	of	the	decision	maker.225	Accordingly,	effective	legal	deterrence	would	
require	 the	 construction	 of	 sufficiently	 certain	 and	 severe	 sanctions	 which	 exceeded	 the	
benefits	 of	 offending.	 The	 fact	 that	 forfeiture	 “provides	 no	 deterrent	 against	 complete	
fabrication”226	is	problematic	on	this	basis.	Had	the	Law	Commission’s	proposal	to	create	a	
statutory	basis	for	recovering	investigation	costs	been	taken	forward,	it	would	have	been	a	
much	better	fit	with	the	model	suggested	by	Mazar	and	Ariely’s	research.	As	designed	by	the	
Law	Commission,	the	damages	would	have	compensated	the	underwriter	and	so	cannot	be	
characterised	 as	 a	 punitive	 response	 to	 the	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claim.	 However,	 the	
introduction	of	damages	would	have	provided	a	tangible	external	sanction	for	the	fraudulent	
assured.	This	would	have	gone	some	way	to	addressing	the	absence	of	an	effective	sanction	
for	the	most	serious	frauds.	
	
The	Law	Commission’s	abandonment	of	this	proposal	is	also	difficult	to	reconcile	with	other	
areas	 of	 the	 civil	 justice	 system	 where	 financial	 penalties	 are	 considered	 a	 deterrent	 to	
dishonesty.	Recent	civil	 justice	 reforms,	designed	to	“control	costs	and	promote	access	 to	
justice,”227	introduced	Qualified	One-way	Costs	Shifting	(QOCS).228	This	protects	litigants	from	
adverse	costs	orders	by	providing	that	any	order	cannot	exceed	the	amount	the	claimant	has	
been	 awarded	 in	 damages.229	 This	means	 that	 if	 the	 claimant	 is	 unsuccessful,	 he	will	 not	
become	 liable	 in	damages	to	the	defendant.	This	protection	 from	costs	 is	not	absolute;	 in	
particular,	 a	 full	 costs	 order	 can	 be	 made	 where	 the	 claimant	 has	 been	 fundamentally	
																																																						
224	Ibid	120.	
225	Such	as	those	discussed	above,	text	to	fn	128	et	seq.	
226	Law	Com	201	(n195)	[7.29]	(n195).	
227	R	 Jackson,	Review	of	Civil	 Litigation	Costs:	 Final	Report	 (December	2009)	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	as	 ‘Jackson	
Report’),	[i].	
228	Ibid	ch.19.	Civil	Procedure	Rules	r.44.13	limits	QOCS	to	(1)(a)	personal	injury	cases,	(b)	claims	under	the	Fatal	
Accidents	Act	1976,	and	(c)	claims	which	arise	out	of	death	or	personal	 injury	and	survive	for	the	benefit	of	an	
estate	by	virtue	of	section	1(1)	of	the	Law	Reform	(Miscellaneous	Provisions)	Act	1934.	See	commentary	of	this	in	
P	Rawlings	and	J	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(2017)	80(3)	MLR	525,	534-536.	
229	Civil	Procedure	Rules	r.44.14.	
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dishonest.230	 This	 is	 designed	 to	 deter	 frivolous	 and	 fraudulent	 claims.231	 This	 is	 a	
fundamentally	different	approach	to	that	taken	by	the	Law	Commission.	Of	course,	neither	
approach	 has	 been	 justified	 empirically	 but	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 opposing	 views	 about	 the	
deterrent	effect	of	monetary	sanctions	have	been	adopted	in	similar	areas	of	 law	within	a	
short	space	of	time.	
	
It	is	disappointing	that	the	Law	Commission	did	not	make	use	of	the	opportunity	to	consider	
a	 remedy	 for	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claims	 in	more	 depth.	 It	means	 that	 the	 criticism	 of	 the	
forfeiture	rule	as	counterintuitive	remains	unresolved.	Goriely’s	suggestion	that	there	was	
insufficient	demand	for	reform232	causes	us	to	reflect	on	the	judicial	narrative	surrounding	
insurance	fraud:	the	vulnerable	underwriter	and	deceitful	assured.	 It	contends,	 in	the	first	
place,	that	modern	underwriters	are	not	as	susceptible	to	fraud	as	their	eighteenth-century	
counterparts	and	further,	that	this	prompts	reconsideration	of	the	centrality	of	deterrence	as	
a	policy	consideration.	
	
	
III. The	Vulnerability	of	Modern	Underwriters?	
One	of	the	traditional	hallmarks	of	the	insurance	relationship	is	the	existence	of	information	
asymmetries	between	assured	and	underwriter.	These	asymmetries	are	particularly	critical	
pre-contractually	and	at	the	claims	stage.	This	 is	because	the	key	underwriting	decisions	–	
whether	 to	 accept	 the	 risk	 and	 on	 what	 terms	 –	 depend	 on	 access	 to	 information.	 This	
information	 is	generally	held	by	 the	prospective	assured.	As	Lord	Mansfield	made	clear	 in	
Carter	v	Boehm,	the	law	developed	obligations	of	disclosure	so	that	the	insurer	could	assess	
the	risk	properly,	
	
The	 special	 facts,	 upon	which	 the	 contingent	 chance	 is	 to	 be	 computed,	 lie	most	
commonly	 in	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 insured	 only;	 the	 underwriter	 trusts	 to	 his	
																																																						
230	Civil	Procedure	Rules	r.44.16.	
231	 Jackson	 Report	 (n227)	 ch.19	 [4.5],	 [4.8];	 M	 Porter-Bryant,	 ‘Fundamental	 dishonesty’	 available	 at:	
http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploadedFiles/FundamentalDisMPB.pdf	(accessed	30/07/16)	1.	See	also,	A	
Higgins,	‘A	defence	of	qualified	one	way	costs	shifting’	[2013]	Civ	J	Q	198,	203:	“These	are	sensible	limitations	on	
one	way	cost	shifting,	and	will	go	a	long	way	to	preventing	any	increase	in	hopeless	or	fraudulent	claims.”	
232	Goriely	(n217).	
137	
	
representation,	 and	 proceeds	 upon	 confidence	 that	 he	 does	 not	 keep	 back	 any	
circumstance	in	his	knowledge…The	keeping	back	such	circumstance	is	a	fraud,	and	
therefore	the	policy	is	void.	Although	the	suppression	should	happen	through	mistake,	
without	any	fraudulent	intention;	yet	still	the	under-writer	is	deceived,	and	the	policy	
is	 void;	 because	 the	 risque	 run	 is	 really	 different	 from	 the	 risque	 understood	 and	
intended	to	be	run,	at	the	time	of	the	agreement.233		
This	was	 indisputable	 at	 the	 time	 the	Marine	 Insurance	 Act	was	 drafted.234	 Underwriters	
would	have	found	it	very	difficult	to	assess	the	accuracy	of	pre-contractual	representations	
without	information-forcing	obligations	imposed	on	assureds.	The	development	of	rules	to	
protect	the	underwriter	at	that	stage	was	wholly	reasonable.235	
	
Information	asymmetries	in	the	claims	stage	also	warranted	rules	to	protect	the	underwriter	
following	a	loss.	In	Britton,	Willes	J	commented	that	the	assured	had	lied	to	“put	the	office	
off	its	guard,	and	in	the	result	to	recover	more	than	he	is	entitled	to”.236	He	continued,	“it	is	
of	 the	 utmost	 moment	 that	 insurances	 should	 be	 enforced	 fairly	 and	 protected	 from	
fraud.”237	The	contemporary	state	of	scientific	and	investigative	methods238	would	have	made	
it	problematic	for	the	underwriter	to	obtain	independent	information	about	the	loss	and,	in	
any	 event,	 the	 marine	 context	 of	 the	 loss	 would	 have	 made	 information	 asymmetries	
particularly	acute.239		
These	rules,	in	Lord	Mansfield’s	words,	designed	“to	prevent	fraud	and	to	encourage	good	
faith”240,	were	secured	with	harsh	sanctions.	The	1906	Act	prescribed	avoidance	ab	initio	as	
the	remedy	for	non-disclosure241	and	the	prevalent	use	of	basis	clauses	transformed	all	pre-
																																																						
233	Carter	v	Boehm	(1766)	97	Eng	Rep	1162,	1164	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
234	J	Lowry,	P	Rawlings	and	R	Merkin,	Insurance	Law	Doctrines	and	Principles	(3rd	ed.	Hart	2011)	84:	“Duties…	have	
their	origins	in	a	time	when	there	was	a	clear	lack	of	symmetry	in	the	information	available	to	the	insured	and	to	
the	insurer.”	
235	M	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	of	Insurance	(Clarendon	Law,	1997),	83;	Law	Com	353	(n197),	[5.2].	
236	Britton	(n192)	909	per	Willes	J.	
237	Ibid	911	per	Willes	J.	
238	R	Clift,	‘Fraud:	Does	the	punishment	fit	the	crime?’,	International	Marine	Claims	Conference	(24	October	2007),	
11.	
239	B	Conway,	Maritime	Fraud,	(LLP,	1990)	19,	73;	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[55]	per	Lord	Hughes:	insured	
loss	“may	occur	anywhere	in	the	world	and	with	or	without	witnesses.”	
240	Carter	(n233)	1165	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
241	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.18.	
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contractual	 statements	 into	 warranties,	 breach	 of	 which	 automatically	 discharged	 the	
underwriter’s	 liability.242	 At	 the	 claims	 stage,	 the	 1906	Act	 contained	 provisions	 on	wilful	
misconduct243	 and	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 had	 been	 in	 use	 for	 50	 years	 by	 the	 time	 of	
codification.244		
	
Similar	arguments,	connected	to	ideas	of	good	faith,	are	evident	in	modern	case	law,	
	
I	do	not	see	why	the	duty	of	good	faith	on	the	part	of	the	assured	should	expire	when	
the	contact	has	been	made.	The	reasons	for	requiring	good	faith	continue	to	exist.	Just	
as	the	nature	of	the	risk	will	usually	be	within	the	peculiar	knowledge	of	the	insured,	
so	will	the	circumstances	of	the	casualty:	it	will	rarely	be	within	the	knowledge	of	the	
insurance	company.	I	think	that	the	insurance	company	should	be	able	to	trust	the	
assured	to	put	forward	a	claim	in	good	faith.245	
	
In	Versloot,	Lord	Hughes	commented,	
	
At	the	later	stage	when	the	claim	is	made,	the	policyholder	will	also	typically	know	a	
good	deal	more	about	the	facts	which	give	rise	to	the	claim	than	the	insurers	possibly	
can…Insured	loss	is	generally	adventitious.246	
	
Despite	these	recent	references	to	ideas	of	protection,	modern	case	law	has	restricted	the	
scope	of	the	post-contractual	duty	of	good	faith.	The	assured	is	not	required	to	disclose	all	
material	 matters	 during	 claims	 but	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 lesser	 duty	 to	 refrain	 from	
misrepresentations.247	MacDonald	Eggers	and	Foss	have	 suggested	 that	 this	 is	 the	correct	
approach	due	to	the	adversarial	nature	of	the	claims	process.248	It	is	also	doubtful	whether	
arguments	 relating	 to	 protection	 are	 today	 as	 persuasive	 as	 they	were	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
																																																						
242	M	Clarke,	Law	of	Insurance	Contracts	(4th	ed.	Service	Issue	35	1	April	2016),	[20-2A1]	(hereafter	referred	to	as	
Clarke	(looseleaf)),	but	now	see	Insurance	Act	2015	s.9(2).	
243	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906	s.55.	
244	Britton	(n192).	
245	Orakpo	v	Barclays	Insurance	Services	[1999]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	LR	443,	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	
246	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[55]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
247	Manifest	Shipping	Co	Ltd	v	Uni-Polaris	Co	Ltd	(The	Star	Sea)	[2003]	1	AC	469,	[102],	[111]	per	Lord	Scott.	See	
earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	104	et	seq.	
248	P	MacDonald	Eggers	and	P	Foss,	Good	Faith	and	Insurance	Contracts	(LLP,	1998),	[11.173],	[11.175].	
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century.	 The	 insurer	 is	 no	 longer	 an	 individual	waiting	 for	 news	 in	 a	 coffee	 house,249	 but	
commonly	 a	 large	 and	 sophisticated	 organisation	 which	 attracts	 custom	 because	 of	 its	
expertise	in	risk	and	claims	settlement.250	In	a	modern	age	of	information	technology,251	not	
only	have	“the	means	of	collating,	collecting,	and	recalling	information…improved	greatly”,252	
but	 insurers	 have	 dedicated	 anti-fraud	 teams	 comprised	 of	 forensic	 investigators,	 loss	
adjusters	and	other	specialists.253	These	are	all	 tools	 to	which	 the	early	 twentieth	century	
underwriter	did	not	have	access.	 It	 is	now	distinctly	possible	 that	 insurers	 could	despatch	
investigators	to	the	scene	of	a	casualty	in	real	time	to	determine	whether	the	loss	is	covered	
and	to	assess	the	credibility	of	the	assured’s	account.254		Indeed,	Soyer	has	suggested	that	the	
size	of	marine	claims	would	tend	to	justify	the	expense	of	specialist	investigation.255	Provided	
the	insurer	has	“has	equal	access	to	witnesses,	technical	reports	and	the	like”,256	he	should	
be	well	placed	to	investigate	the	loss	without	relying	on	his	assured.	This	same	logic	enabled	
the	Court	of	Appeal	in	Orakpo	to	determine	that	exaggeration	was	not	necessarily	fraudulent	
but	a	bargaining	position	taken	by	the	assured.257		
	
It	is	doubtful,	therefore,	that	the	modern	underwriter	requires	the	same	protection	as	their	
earlier	counterparts.		Indeed,	the	notion	of	underwriter	protection	was	an	important	theme	
in	the	Versloot	 litigation.	The	Supreme	Court	rejected	the	suggestion	that	the	underwriter	
should	be	protected	from	lies	which	would	cause	it	to	be	“put	off	relevant	inquiries	or…driven	
																																																						
249	J	Herschaft,	‘Not	your	average	coffee	shop:	Lloyd’s	of	London	–	A	twenty-first-century	primer	on	the	history,	
structure,	and	future	of	the	backbone	of	marine	insurance’	[2004-2005]	29(2)	Tul.	Mar.	LJ	169,	171	by	virtue	of	
Lloyd’s	network	of	correspondents	located	in	ports	across	the	globe.	
250	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[55]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
251	See	J	Feinman,	Delay	Deny	Defend	(Penguin,	2010),	121	where	he	compares	the	modern	and	eighteenth	century	
underwriter;	“Lloyd,	anticipating	Starbuck’s	provision	of	free	Wi-Fi	by	more	than	two	centuries,	made	available	
paper,	pens,	and	shipping	news	to	his	customers.”		
252	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	(n235),	89.	See	also	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[5.3].	
253	 Similar	 arguments	 have	 been	made	 in	 the	 US	 context,	 see	 E	 Anderson,	 R	 Tuttle	 and	 S	 Crego,	 ‘Draconian	
forfeitures	of	insurance:	Commonplace,	indefensible,	and	unnecessary’	(1996)	65(3)	Ford	LR	825,	842:	“The	notion	
that	 insurance	 companies	 need	 special	 assistance	 with	 respect	 to	 claims	 investigation	 is	 specious.	 Insurance	
companies	tout	their	special	expertise	in	claims	handling	and	loss	investigation.	Nearly	every	insurance	company	
has	a	special	unit	to	ferret	out	false	claims	and	the	insurance	industry	has	a	plethora	of	industry-wide	organizations	
to	combat	insurance	fraud.”	
254	Cf.	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[55]	per	Lord	Hughes:	“Only	sometimes	will	thorough	investigation	of	the	
circumstances	of	the	claimed	loss	be	a	realistic	option	for	insurers.”		
255	B	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(Informa	Law,	2014)	[3-46].	
256	Davey	and	Richards	(n158)	318.	
257	Orakpo	(n245)	451	per	Hoffmann	LJ.	
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to	irrelevant	ones.”258	This	was	simply	because	“wasted	effort	of	this	kind	is	no	part	of	the	
mischief	against	which	the	fraudulent	claims	rule	is	directed,	and	even	if	it	were	the	avoidance	
of	the	claim	would	be	a	wholly	disproportionate	response.”259	This	can	be	readily	understood;	
after	all,	the	underwriter	will	need	to	investigate	for	the	purposes	of	determining	validity	and	
quantum,	whether	or	not	the	claim	subsequently	turns	out	to	be	fraudulent.260	Accordingly,	
the	discussion	of	underwriter	protection	in	Versloot	was	more	nuanced;	deterrent	sanctions	
remain	important	because	of	the	information	asymmetries	inherent	in	the	claims	process261	
but	there	are	limits	to	the	protection	the	law	is	willing	to	offer.	As	Lord	Sumption	noted,	
	
It	is	therefore	right	to	ask	in	a	case	of	collateral	lies	uttered	in	support	of	a	valid	claim,	
against	what	should	the	underwriter	be	protected	by	the	application	of	the	fraudulent	
claims	rule?	It	would,	as	it	seems	to	me,	serve	only	to	protect	him	from	the	obligation	
to	pay,	or	to	pay	earlier,	an	indemnity	for	which	he	has	been	liable	in	law	ever	since	
the	loss	was	suffered.262		
	
The	decision	 in	Versloot	 limited	the	protection	available	to	underwriters	during	the	claims	
process;	 the	 law	 will	 only	 offer	 protection	 against	 (presumably)	 non-collateral	 lies,263	
exaggerations	and	wholly	fraudulent	claims.	This	is	an	important	limit	on	the	forfeiture	rule	
and	 provides	 some	 support	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 ideas	 of	 protection	 are	 no	 longer	 so	
compelling	in	the	modern	era.	
	
Fraud	deterrence	is	not	only	relevant	at	claims	but	also	at	the	underwriting	stage;	as	they	say,	
‘prevention	is	better	than	cure’.	In	recent	years,	the	industry	has	made	concerted	efforts	to	
facilitate	information	sharing	between	underwriters	through	the	creation	of	databases,	such	
																																																						
258	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI-Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	(The	DC	Merwestone)	 [2014]	EWCA	Civ	1349;	
[2015]	 1	 Lloyd’s	 Rep	 32,	 [132]	 per	 Christopher	 Clarke	 LJ	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	Versloot	 (Court	 of	 Appeal));	
Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
259	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
260	 Law	Commission	353	 (n197)	 [22.29]:	 “Some	argued	 that	 investigation	of	 claims	 should	be	 considered	an	
inherent	cost	of	the	insurer’s	business.”;	Versloot	(Supreme	Court	hearing)	(n159)	2h	02	per	Richard	Lord	QC	
available	 at:	 https://www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-2014-0252/160316-am.html	 (accessed	 31/07/16);	
MacDonald	Eggers	and	Foss	(n248),	[11.173];	Clare	(n198)	270	per	Goddard	J.	
261	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[114]	per	Lord	Mance.	
262	Ibid	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
263	The	precise	definition	and	application	of	the	‘collateral	lie’	remains	a	matter	for	future	litigation.	
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as	the	Claims	and	Underwriting	Exchange	(CUE)264	and	the	Insurance	Fraud	Register.265	This	
enables	underwriters	to	decline	cover,	or	else	charge	a	very	high	premium,	to	those	with	a	
history	of	fraud.	Clarke	has	poetically	referred	to	the	forfeiture	rule	as	operating	“once	the	
horse	has	bolted.”266		The	use	of	databases	means	that	“more	attention	is	now	being	paid	to	
information	 at	 an	 earlier	 stage,	 in	 particular	 information	 about	 the	 ‘stable’.	 The	 key	 to	
underwriting	profitability,	whether	it	be	private	or	commercial,	is	often	the	moral	and	other	
standards	of	the	insured.”267	The	existence	of	these	databases	is	the	means	by	which	Lord	
Hughes’	 prediction	 that	 fraudulent	 assureds	will	 struggle	 to	 obtain	 cover	 in	 the	 future268	
becomes	 a	 reality.	 Fraud	 prevention	 does	 not	 just	 rely	 on	 underwriters	 identifying	 fraud-
prone	assureds	at	the	outset,	but	also	in	educating	assureds	as	to	the	appropriate	behaviour	
during	claims.269			
	
It	is	interesting	that	the	judicial	discussions	of	insurance	fraud	have	continued	to	focus	on	the	
horse;	 the	courts	do	not	accord	any	role	to	 insurers	 to	prevent	 fraud	pre-contractually.	 In	
some	ways,	this	is	not	surprising;	the	courts	can	only	respond	to	the	case	before	them	and	
have	no	authority	to	direct	the	actions	of	insurance	companies,	or	the	industry	more	broadly.	
However,	in	other	areas	of	the	law,	the	courts	have	not	hesitated	to	allocate	pre-contractual	
responsibility	for	fraud	prevention	to	the	parties.	In	the	context	of	documentary	credits,	to	
be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 later,270	 the	 courts	 have	 assumed	 that	 traders	 take	 sufficient	
preventative	measures	before	contracting.271	This	divergence	is	particularly	interesting	if	we	
consider	 that	 entities	 within	 the	 insurance	 industry,	 such	 as	 the	 ABI,	 Lloyd’s	 and	 the	
International	Group	of	Protection	&	Indemnity	Clubs	,	will	typically	be	in	a	better	position	and	
have	greater	resources	to	take	these	steps	in	comparison	to	the	buyer	in	an	international	sale.	
This	serves	to	cement	the	characterisation	of	insurers	as	needing	judicial	protection	which,	
for	the	reasons	outlined	above,	is	less	convincing	in	the	modern	era.	
																																																						
264	M	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	of	Insurance	Law	in	the	Twenty-first	Century	(OUP,	2005)	212.	
265	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Bureau,	 ‘About	 the	 IFR’	 available	 at:	 http://www.theifr.org.uk/en/about/	 	 (accessed	
29/07/2016).	
266	Clarke,	Policies	and	Perceptions	(n235)	179.	
267	Ibid	179.	
268	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[98]	per	Lord	Hughes.	
269	 W	 Lesch	 and	 J	 Brinkmann,	 ‘Consumer	 insurance	 fraud/abuse	 as	 co-creation	 and	 co-responsibility:	 A	 new	
paradigm’	(2011)	103(1)	J	of	Bus	Ethics	17,	18.	
270	See	later,	Chapter	Four.	
271	For	example,	Sanders	v	Maclean	(1883)	11	QBD	327,	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	See	later	discussion,	Chapter	Four.	
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Interestingly,	 the	 Law	Commission	 recognised	 the	modernisation	 of	 underwriters	 and	 the	
changing	nature	of	the	insurance	industry	in	respect	of	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	duty	of	
disclosure.	The	Commission	noted	that,		
	
The	 1906	 Act	 codifies	 principles	 developed	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 and	 nineteenth	
centuries,	when	communications	were	slow	and	access	to	information	was	difficult.	It	
was	drafted	on	the	principle	that	the	proposer	knows	everything	about	the	risk	and	
the	underwriter	knows	nothing.	It	therefore	sought	to	protect	insurers. 272 
	
Under	the	1906	Act,	the	underwriter	was	entitled	to	the	remedy	of	avoidance	ab	initio	if	the	
assured	failed	to	make	a	full	disclosure.	The	Law	Commission	considered	that	this	went	too	
far,	
	
[it]	over-protects	the	insurer	against	the	loss	it	might	have	suffered	had	the	claim	been	
paid,	and	provides	no	incentive	for	insurers	to	ask	appropriate	questions.	Even	where	
avoidance	 is	not	actually	 invoked,	 the	 threat	of	 it	puts	 the	 insurer	 in	a	very	strong	
position	to	negotiate	a	low	settlement.273	
	
The	 Insurance	Act	 2015	 reflects	 the	 contemporary	 insurance	market	with	 respect	 to	 pre-
contractual	 duties	 of	 disclosure.	 The	 underwriter	 is	 given	 a	 more	 proactive	 role	 during	
negotiations	and	the	new	remedies	correspond	to	the	impact	of	breach.274	It	is	notable	then	
that	these	same	ideas	were	not	deemed	relevant	in	the	context	of	fraudulent	claims.	Indeed,	
the	Law	Commission	preferred	to	characterise	the	forfeiture	rule	as	“appropriate”.275	
	
There	is	no	doubt	that	technological	and	investigative	developments	have	reduced	insurers’	
vulnerability	to	fraud	at	both	the	underwriting	and	claims	stages.	While	it	is	not	suggested	
that	 rules	 against	 fraud	 are	 unnecessary,	 these	 developments	 undermine	 the	 continued	
																																																						
272	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[5.2].	
273	Ibid	[5.42].	
274	Insurance	Act	2015	sched	1,	part	1,	ss.2,	4,	5.		
275	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[20.6].	
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characterisation	of	the	insurer	as	vulnerable	and	in	need	of	judicial	protection.	The	argument	
developed	in	this	section	–	that	we	should	re-examine	this	rationale	of	forfeiture	–	is	further	
supported	by	the	more	nuanced	discussion	of	underwriter	protection	in	Versloot.	Proceeding	
on	the	basis	that	the	requirement	for	protection	 is	no	 longer	as	compelling	today,	we	can	
assess	the	overriding	significance	of	deterrence	in	the	construction	of	fraud	remedies.	To	this	
end,	the	final	argument	in	this	chapter	examines	the	approach	to	insurance	fraud	in	Australia	
and	related	areas	of	English	law	to	suggest	that	it	is	possible	to	develop	a	remedial	framework	
which	balances	the	deterrence	of	fraud	and	proportionality.	
	
	
IV. A	Proportionate	Approach	to	Deterrence	
The	 insurance	 courts	 have	 traditionally	 focussed	 on	 deterrence	 in	 the	 construction	 of	
remedies	 for	 fraud.	The	 recent	decision	 in	Versloot,	 by	 contrast,	highlighted	 the	opposing	
consideration	of	proportionality.276	There	is	 insufficient	space	in	this	thesis	to	consider	the	
philosophical	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 proportionate	 sanctions	 or	 to	 make	 explicit	
recommendations	for	a	proportionate	framework	in	English	law.277	Accordingly,	this	part	of	
the	chapter	attempts	a	more	manageable	task;	namely,	to	identify	approaches	in	comparable	
jurisdictions	 and	 areas	 of	 law	 where	 considerations	 of	 proportionality	 have	 enabled	 the	
construction	of	a	nuanced	response	to	fraud	without	compromising	fraud	deterrence.	
	
It	is	important	to	preface	this	discussion	by	addressing	the	suggestion	that	considerations	of	
proportionality	are	not	appropriate	in	the	construction	of	rules	against	fraud.	In	the	economic	
literature,	for	example,	Posner	has	argued	that	issues	of	fairness	should	be	irrelevant	in	the	
criminal	law.278	He	has	argued	that	participation	in	“the	criminal	justice	system	is	voluntary:	
you	keep	out	of	it	by	not	committing	crimes.”279	Christopher	Clarke	LJ’s	argument	in	Versloot	
about	the	scope	of	the	forfeiture	rule	has	echoes	of	this	rationale.	He	noted	that	“the	rule	is	
																																																						
276	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[36]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
277	Readers	are	directed	to	the	following	for	a	consideration	of	this	area:	J	Andenaes,	‘The	morality	of	deterrence’	
(1970)	37(4)	U	Chicago	L	Rev	649;	K	Carlsmith,	J	Darley	and	P	Robinson,	‘Why	do	we	punish?	Deterrence	and	just	
deserts	as	motives	 for	punishment’	 (2002)	83(2)	 J	of	Personality	&	Social	Psychology	284;	P	Robinson,	 ‘Hybrid	
principles	for	the	distribution	of	criminal	sanctions	(1987-1988)	82	Nw	U	L	Rev	19;	L	Weinreb,	‘Desert,	punishment,	
and	criminal	responsibility’	(1986)	49	Law	&	Contemp.	Problems	47;	F	Zimring,	‘Principles	of	sentencing,	plain	and	
fancy’	(1988)	82(1)	Nw	U	L	Rev	73.			
278	See	also	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	Fairness	Versus	Welfare	(n34)	352.	
279	Posner,	‘An	economic	theory’	(n36)	1213.	
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only	 applicable	 in	 the	 case	 of	 fraud,	 from	which	 no	 insured	 should	 have	 any	 difficulty	 in	
abstaining.”280	There	is,	however,	evidence	of	these	values	beginning	to	permeate	other	areas	
of	private	law.	The	Supreme	Court	has	recognised	proportionality	as	relevant	to	the	law	on	
contractual	penalties281	and	a	similar	argument	has	been	made	in	the	American	context.282	
The	similarity	between	forfeiture	and	penalty	clauses	is	that	they	are	not	ordinary	contractual	
terms,	but	 rather	contain	a	disciplinary	element.	 	As	such,	 these	clauses	“implicate	values	
other	than	economic	efficiency	and	the	parties’	autonomy”283	and	justify	consideration	of	the	
broader	public	interest.	As	such,	the	call	for	proportionality	in	insurance	fraud	is	timely	and	
would	also	correspond	with	the	introduction	of	like	remedies	elsewhere	in	insurance	contract	
law.284	
	
In	 the	 context	 of	 legal	 sanctions,	 proportionality	 implies	 some	 relationship	 between	
wrongdoing	 and	 punishment.285	 It	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 speak	 of	 proportionality	 in	 abstract	
terms286	and	we	must,	therefore,	consider	whether	a	given	punishment	corresponds	to	the	
crime	 in	any	 real	 sense.287	As	 Lacey	and	Picard	have	 suggested,	 the	practical	 reflection	of	
proportionality	can	only	depend	on	“fair	and	appropriate	penalties	which	are	meaningful	to,	
and	regarded	as	legitimate	by,	the	populace	in	whose	name	they	are	imposed.”288	This	appeal	
for	proportionality	thus	depends	on	two	factors;	i)	an	acceptance	by	the	courts	or	legislature	
that	 some	 relationship	 between	 fraud	 and	 sanction	 is	 appropriate	 and	 ii)	 a	 substantive	
discussion	about	what	this	would	mean	in	practice.	This	is	evidently	no	easy	task.289	In	this	
regard,	 the	 English	 insurance	 courts	 could	 draw	 inspiration	 from	more	nuanced	 statutory	
responses	 to	 fraud,	 namely	 the	 Australian	 approach	 to	 insurance	 fraud	 and	 the	 English	
attitude	towards	personal	injury	fraud	(A).	The	English	criminal	response	to	insurance	fraud	
																																																						
280	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n258)	[155]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ.	
281	Cavendish	Square	Holdings	BV	v	Talal	El	Makdessi;	Parking	Eye	Limited	v	Beavis	[2015]	UKSC	67,	[32]	per	Lord	
Neuberger	and	Lord	Sumption.	
282	S	Shiffrin,	‘Remedial	clauses:	The	overprivatization	of	private	law’	(2015-2016)	67	Hastings	LJ	407,	423.	
283	Ibid	413.	
284	Insurance	Act	2015	sched.	1.	
285	N	Lacey,	‘The	metaphor	of	proportionality’	[2016]	43(1)	J	Law	&	Soc	27,	30.	
286	Ibid	28,	41.	
287	N	Lacey	and	H	Picard,	‘The	chimera	of	proportionality:	Institutionalising	limits	on	punishment	in	contemporary	
social	and	political	systems’	(2015)	78	MLR	216,	219.	
288	Ibid	219.	
289	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	Fairness	Versus	Welfare	(n34)	306-308	where	the	authors	note	that	there	is	“no	natural	
metric	for	translating	the	wrong	into	punishment”	and	that	questions	of	proportionality	receive	different	answers	
between	societies	and	over	time.		
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provides	a	further	model	for	reconciling	deterrence	and	proportionality	(B).	A	final	argument,	
in	Part	C,	suggests	that	nuanced	sanctions	are	also	required	for	economic	reasons.		
	
A. Balancing	deterrence	and	proportionality	in	statute:	The	Australian	Insurance	
Contracts	Act	1984	and	the	English	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	
	
The	first	examples	of	a	proportionate	approach	to	fraud	are	statutory	in	nature;	involving	a	
default	 remedy	 enshrined	 in	 legislation	 coupled	with	 a	 judicial	 discretion	 to	mitigate	 the	
harshness	of	the	remedy	in	appropriate	cases.	The	discussion	commences	by	considering	the	
Australian	response	to	insurance	fraud.	
	
i. The	Australian	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	
The	Australian	Insurance	Contracts	Act	(ICA)	1984	establishes	a	proportionate	framework	to	
deal	with	fraudulent	claims	in	all	lines,	excluding	marine.290	Forfeiture	remains	the	primary	
sanction	for	fraud291	but	the	Act	provides	the	following	judicial	discretion;	
	
In	any	proceedings	 in	 relation	 to	 such	a	 claim,	 the	court	may,	 if	only	a	minimal	or	
insignificant	part	of	the	claim	is	made	fraudulently	and	non-payment	of	the	remainder	
of	the	claim	would	be	harsh	and	unfair,	order	the	 insurer	to	pay,	 in	relation	to	the	
claim,	such	amount	(if	any)	as	is	just	and	equitable	in	the	circumstances.292	
	
This	requires	courts	to	balance	fraud	deterrence,	explicitly	listed	as	a	relevant	policy	factor	in	
s.56,293	and	the	impact	of	forfeiture	for	the	assured.	The	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission	
(ALRC)	recognised	the	importance	of	deterrence	but	determined	that	it	did	not	require	the	
“insured	to	suffer	loss	far	in	excess	of	the	damage	his	fraud	has	caused	to	the	insurer.”294	The	
legislation	was	explicitly	designed	to	“strike	a	fair	balance	between	the	interests	of	the	insurer	
and	the	insured.”295	
																																																						
290	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	s.9(1)(d).	
291	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	s.56(1).	
292	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	s.56(2).	
293	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	s.56(3).	
294	Assistant	Treasurer	 (Australia),	 ‘Insurance	Contracts	Bill	1984	Explanatory	Memorandum’	 (13161/84,	1983	 -	
1984),	[187]	(hereafter	referred	to	as	‘Insurance	Contracts	Bill’).	
295	Ibid	[187].	
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If	the	Australian	experience	is	to	provide	a	meaningful	example	for	English	law,	we	need	to	
consider	how	this	discretion	operates	in	practice.	The	meaning	of	‘minimal	or	insignificant’	
was	not	immediately	obvious	to	those	drafting	the	legislation	nor	the	courts	called	upon	to	
apply	 it.	 The	 ALRC	 contended	 in	 consultation	 that	 the	 discretion	 envisaged	 a	 $200	
exaggeration	in	a	claim	worth	$3000.296	By	the	time	that	the	Bill	reached	the	legislature,	the	
Explanatory	 Memorandum	 had	 “downplayed”297	 the	 extent	 of	 permissible	 exaggeration,	
suggesting	instead	that	an	exaggeration	of	$50	in	a	$100,000	claim	would	be	allowed.298	The	
case	law	demonstrates	that	the	judicial	approach	has	also	become	less	lenient	over	time.	The	
first	reported	case	to	exercise	the	discretion	was	Entwells	v	National	&	General	Insurance.299	
There	the	court	recognised	an	exaggeration	of	$27,000	as	‘relatively	small’	in	the	context	of	
a	claim	worth	$520,000.300	This	decision	has	not	been	well	received	by	commentators.301	The	
Queensland	Court	 of	Appeal	 took	 a	much	 firmer	 approach	 in	Ricciardi	 v	 Sunway	Metcorp	
Insurance,	recognising	that	an	exaggeration	of	$10,000	could	never	be	regarded	as	‘minimal	
or	 insignificant’,	 no	matter	 the	 size	 of	 the	 claim.302	 This	 approach	 is	 to	 be	preferred	 as	 it	
reflects	the	necessary	balance	between	deterrence	and	the	interests	of	the	assured.	
The	statutory	discretion	is	not	as	well-suited	to	dealing	with	fraudulent	devices	or	collateral	
lies.	This	is	because	s.56	explicitly	refers	to	fraud	affecting	a	minor	part	of	the	claim	rather	
than	falsity	which	goes	to	the	root	of	the	entire	claim.303	The	issue	did	not	arise	for	decision	
																																																						
296	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission,	Insurance	Contracts	(ALRC	20,	1982),	[243].	
297	M	Kirby,	‘Australian	insurance	contract	law:	Out	of	the	chaos	–	A	modern,	just	and	proportionate	reforming	
statute’,	Speech	at	Australian	Insurance	Law	Association	National	Conference	2010	(28	October	2010)	available	at:	
http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeches/2000s/2010_Speeches/2499-SPEECH-HUGH-
ROWELL-LECTURE-OCTOBER-2010.pdf	(accessed	24/08/2016),	(fn	44	in	original).	
298	Insurance	Contracts	Bill	(n294)	[187].	
299	Entwells	Pty	Ltd	v	National	and	General	Insurance	Co	Ltd	(1991)	6	WAR	68.	
300	Ibid.	
301	G	Swaby,	‘The	price	of	a	lie:	Discretionary	flexibility	in	insurance	fraud’	[213]	JBL	77,	98;	R	Merkin,	‘Reforming	
insurance	law:	Is	there	a	case	for	reverse	transportation?’	(Report	for	the	English	and	Scottish	Law	Commissions,	
2006)	 available	 at:	 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ICL_Merkin_report.pdf	 (accessed	
24/08/2016),	[6.11].	
302	Ricciardi	v	Suncorp	Metway	Insurance	[2001]	QCA	190,	[36]	–	[37]	per	Chesterman	J.	
303	Tiep	Thi	Tho	v	Australian	Associated	Motor	Insurers	Ltd	[2001]	VSCA	48,	[25]	per	Buchanan	J.	The	decision	in	this	
case	diverged	from	the	position	which	had	existed	at	common	law	prior	to	the	1984	Act.	In	GRE	Insurance	v	Ormsby	
(1982)	29	SASR	498,	the	assured	suffered	a	burglary	and	increased	the	damage	to	the	door	through	which	the	
thieves	had	gained	access.	At	502-503	per	Mitchell	J,	the	court	held	that	the	assured	was	entitled	to	recover	on	the	
basis	that	a	valid	claim	would	not	be	regarded	as	fraudulent	even	if	“it	were	proved	that	there	was	an	attempt	to	
support	the	valid	claim	by	evidence	which	was	intentionally	false.”	
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under	the	1984	Act	until	the	case	of	Tho	v	Australian	Associated	Motor	Insurers304	in	2001.	In	
Tho,	the	assured’s	son	had	taken	the	insured	car	without	consent	and	crashed	it.	The	assured,	
unaware	that	the	policy	covered	these	circumstances,	concocted	a	story	that	the	vehicle	had	
been	stolen	and	subsequently	damaged	by	the	thief.	Without	the	lie,	the	underwriter	would	
have	been	liable	for	the	loss	and	the	question	for	the	court,	therefore,	was	whether	this	falsity	
was	within	the	statutory	discretion.	The	court	held	that	the	meaning	of	fraud	“encompasses	
a	lie	which	could	not	prejudice	the	insurer	even	if	it	were	believed	as	well	as	a	lie	which	does	
not	prejudice	the	insurer	because	the	insurer	is	not	deceived.”305	The	assured’s	attempt	to	
bring	the	lie	within	the	discretion	in	s.56	was	rejected	by	the	court	in	the	following	terms,	
“where,	 as	 here,	 the	 fraud	 relates	 to	 the	 entire	 sum	 or	 benefit	 claimed,	 the	 division	
contemplated	by	the	subsection	cannot	be	achieved.”306	The	assured	forfeited	the	entirety	of	
her	claim.		
Although	the	statutory	discretion	will	not	operate	in	the	case	of	a	collateral	lie,	it	does	appear	
to	be	working	well	in	relation	to	exaggerated	claims.	Recent	amendments	to	the	1984	Act	did	
not	make	any	changes	to	the	framework	for	fraud307	and	Michael	Kirby	has	remarked	that,		
	
most	Australian	lawyers,	expert	in	this	field,	would	not	now	want	to	go	back	to	the	old	
absolute	law.	And	the	Australian	insurance	industry	appears	to	be	of	the	same	view,	
taking	into	account	the	actual	operation	of	the	proportionate	operation	of	the	ICA	in	
practice.308	
	
The	 Australian	 approach	 to	 insurance	 fraud	 differs	 from	 the	 English	 model	 in	 both	 its	
treatment	 of	 exaggerated	 and	 collateral	 lie	 claims.	 The	 more	 balanced	 approach	 to	
exaggeration	could	serve	as	useful	guidance	should	the	English	courts	wish	to	develop	a	more	
																																																						
304	Tho	(n303).	
305	Ibid	286	per	Buchanan	JA.	This	definition	was	recently	confirmed	in	Sgro	v	Australian	Associated	Motor	Insurers	
[2015]	NSWCA	262,	[46]	per	Beazley	P.	
306	Tho	(n303)	287	per	Buchanan	J.	
307	Insurance	Contracts	Amendment	Act	2013.	See	generally,	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission,	Review	of	the	
Marine	Insurance	Act	1909	(ALRC	91,	2001)	available	at	http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/marine-insurance-act-
1909	(accessed	27/09/2017).	
308	 The	Hon	M	Kirby,	 ‘Insurance	 contract	 law	 reform—30	years	on’	 (2014)	 26	 ILJ	 1,	 17.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	
concerns	 of	 “serious	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 difficulties	with	 this	 provision”	 expressed	 in	 JA	 Tarr,	 ‘Dishonest	
insurance	claims’	(1988)	1	Ins	LJ	42,	52	are	overrated.	
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nuanced	response	to	claims	fraud	in	the	future.309	This	would,	as	Gerald	Swaby	has	opined,	
meet	the	“need	for	the	courts	to	have	some	equitable	discretion	in	borderline	cases.”310	In	
searching	 for	 analogues	 for	 the	 future	 development	 of	 English	 insurance	 law,	we	 are	 not	
limited	to	comparable	jurisdictions.	Indeed,	the	prevalence	of	personal	injury	claims	fraud311	
means	that	we	can	legitimately	consider	how	the	English	courts	have	responded	to	fraud	in	
this	context.		
	
	
ii. The	English	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	
Fraudulent	personal	injury	claims	arise	for	similar	reasons	as	opportunistic	insurance	fraud;	
information	asymmetries	which	exist	between	victim	and	defendant312	and	additionally,	the	
subjective	nature	of	pain	and	suffering.313	Interestingly,	however,	a	more	nuanced	remedial	
response	 to	personal	 injury	claims	 fraud	has	been	developed	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 rigidity	of	
forfeiture	 in	 first-party	 insurance	 claims.	 In	 addition	 to	 providing	 a	 further	 example	 of	 a	
proportionate	 approach	 to	 deterrence,	 the	 argument	 made	 here	 is	 that	 there	 is	 not	 a	
compelling	reason	to	treat	these	two	areas	as	distinct.		
	
The	law	applicable	to	personal	injury	fraud	is	contained	in	the	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	
2015	(CJCA).	The	default	remedy	for	the	“fundamentally	dishonest”314	litigant	is	the	dismissal	
of	 the	entire	claim,	 including	any	genuine	part.315	This	 is	 the	procedural	equivalent	of	 the	
forfeiture	rule.	However,	the	Act	also	creates	a	judicial	discretion	exercisable	in	cases	where	
																																																						
309	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[23.7]	noting	the	existence	of	the	statutory	discretion	 in	Australia	but	choosing	not	to	
recommend	it	on	the	basis	that	it	could	signal	a	lenient	attitude	to	fraud.		
310	Swaby	(n301)	78.	
311	Fairclough	Homes	v	Summers	[2012]	UKSC	26,	[32]	per	Lord	Clarke;	Ul-haq	v	Shah	[2010]	1	WLR	616,	[51]	per	
Toulson	LJ;	A	Zuckerman,	‘Must	a	fraudulent	litigant	be	allowed	to	think:	if	the	fraud	is	successful,	I	will	gain	much;	
if	it	is	not,	I	will	still	recover	my	legitimate	claim?’	(2011)	30(1)	CJQ	1,	1.	
312	W	Norris	QC,	‘Look	out:	I’ve	got	a	power…but	I	am	not	going	to	use	it’	(2012)	3	JPI	Law	169,	171.	
313	R	Ericson	and	A	Doyle,	‘The	moral	risks	of	private	justice:	The	case	of	insurance	fraud’	in	R	Ericson	and	A	Doyle,	
Risk	and	Morality	(University	of	Toronto	Press,	2003),	336.	
314	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(2).	The	meaning	of	‘fundamentally	dishonest’	is	a	matter	for	the	courts.	
In	an	unreported	case,	Hanif	v	Patel	[2016]	(County	Court	(Manchester)	11	May	2016),	HHJ	Main	QC	dismissed	the	
claim	 in	 its	 entirety,	 satisfied	 that	 the	 claimant	had	been	 fundamentally	 dishonest.	 	 As	 the	 judgment	was	not	
reported	it	is	impossible	to	know	how	the	judge	defined	this	standard.	In	future,	it	is	likely	that	courts	will	have	
regard	to	the	related	litigation	concerning	‘Qualified	One-way	Costs	Shifting’	(QOCS),	see	earlier	discussion,	where	
courts	begun	to	define	this	notion	under	the	Civil	Procedure	Rules.	See	generally,	B	Dixon,	‘Fundamental	dishonesty	
and	the	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015’	(2015)	2	J	P	I	Law	108.	
315	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(2)(3).	
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the	claimant	would	suffer	“substantial	injustice	if	the	claim	was	dismissed.”316	This	preserves	
the	 possibility	 that	 the	 fraudulent	 claimant	 will	 receive	 a	 measure	 of	 damages,	
notwithstanding	his	fraudulent	exaggeration.	Importantly,	and	contrary	to	forfeiture,317	the	
framework	 established	 by	 the	 CJCA	 covers	 the	 entirety	 of	 proceedings;	 the	 prospect	 of	
dismissal	does	not	cease	when	the	writ	is	issued.318	
The	trigger	for	legislation	was	the	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Summers	v	Fairclough	Homes.319	
Following	an	accident	at	work,	Summers	claimed	£880,000	in	damages	but	it	later	transpired	
that	he	had	exaggerated	the	extent	of	his	injuries	to	a	very	considerable	extent.320	When	the	
fraud	was	discovered,	 the	underwriter	applied	 to	have	the	claim	struck	out.	The	Supreme	
Court	held	that	while	strike	out	was	possible,	it	would	only	be	suitable	in	“very	exceptional	
circumstances”321	 and	 when	 it	 constituted	 a	 “just	 and	 proportionate”322	 response	 to	 the	
fraud.	 The	 Court	 did	 not	 provide	 any	 concrete	 examples	 in	 which	 strike	 out	 would	 be	
proportionate.323	 Lord	 Clarke	 speculated,	 however,	 that	 dismissal	 might	 be	 appropriate	
where	 the	 litigant	had	engaged	 in	 “a	massive	attempt	 to	deceive	 the	court”324	where	 the	
actual	loss	was	“very	small”.325	Summers’	sizeable	exaggeration	–	some	90%	of	the	total	claim	
–	did	not	meet	this	test326	and	he	was	awarded	damages	of	£88,000,	to	reflect	the	gravity	of	
his	actual	injuries.327	Indeed,	it	is	notable	that	the	Supreme	Court	did	not	regard	deterrence	
as	 solely	 dependent	 on	 harsh	 legal	 sanctions	 and	 highlighted	 a	 multitude	 of	 procedural	
																																																						
316	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(2).	
317	See	earlier,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	381	et	seq.	
318	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(1).	
319	Summers	(n311).	
320	Ibid	[3].	This	was	a	considerable	exaggeration;	the	damages	claim	was	in	the	region	of	£838,000,	his	actual	loss	
was	later	assessed	to	be	in	the	region	of	£88,000.	
321	Ibid	[33]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
322	Ibid	[61]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
323	Ibid	[49]	per	Lord	Clarke.	Strike	out	has	since	been	employed	in	several	cases	Fari	v	Homes	for	Haringey	(County	
Court	(Central	London)	9	October	2012);	Scullion	v	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	(County	Court	(Exeter)	24	May	2013)	
and	Plana	v	First	Capital	East	(County	Court	(London)	15	August	2013).	
324	Summers	(n311)	[49]	per	Lord	Clarke	
325	Ibid	[49]	per	Lord	Clarke	
326	But	see	Norris,	‘Look	out’	(n312)	176:	arguing	that	it	is	“difficult	to	imagine	a	more	clear	cut	case”	that	would	fit	
Lord	Clarke’s	hypothetical	situation	in	which	strike	out	would	be	appropriate.	
327	Summers	(n311)	[63]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
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weapons	 which	 could	 contribute	 to	 deterrence,328	 including	 adverse	 costs	 orders,329	 a	
reduction	in	interest	or	proceedings	in	contempt.330		
Although	the	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	makes	dismissal	more	likely	in	comparison	to	
the	position	post-Summers,331	 the	 legislation	clearly	 continues	 the	balance	between	 fraud	
deterrence	and	the	impact	on	the	individual.		This	balance	is	initially	evident	in	the	judicial	
discretion	contained	in	s.57(2)	which	entitles	the	court	to	award	damages	even	though	the	
claimant	has	behaved	 fraudulently.	 In	 addition,	 the	overriding	 character	of	 the	 legislation	
does	not	appear	to	be	penal;	the	Act	requires	criminal	courts	to	have	regard	to	the	fact	of	
dismissal	 when	 dealing	 with	 related	 proceedings	 in	 contempt	 or	 dishonesty.332	 This	 was	
explicitly	 incorporated	 to	 ensure	 that	 punishments	 were	 proportionate.333	 This	 is	 a	
commendable	 attempt	 to	 prevent	 double	 punishment	 and	 reflects	 the	 ideas	 of	 balance	
inherent	in	the	legislation.	Notably,	a	similar	caution	against	double	punishment	has	not	been	
sounded	by	the	insurance	courts	nor	in	the	Insurance	Act.		
	
A	further	distinction	between	the	personal	injury	and	insurance	response	to	fraudulent	claims	
is	temporal	 in	nature.	The	threat	of	the	forfeiture	rule	ceases	with	the	 issue	of	the	writ334	
whereas	 the	 remedy	 of	 strike	 out	 is	 directed	 at	 dishonesty	 during	 litigation.335	 This	 is	
interesting.	If	the	personal	injury	claimant	lies	at	trial,	he	is	attempting	to	deceive	both	the	
defendant	and	the	court.	This	is	surely	far	more	serious	than	the	lie	which	only	deceives	the	
underwriter,	 as	will	 be	 the	 case	where	 the	 lie	 is	 told	before	 litigation	begins,	 and	yet	 the	
forfeiture	rule	prescribes	a	much	harsher	remedy	than	the	statutory	response	in	the	CJCA.	
																																																						
328	Ibid	[50]	-	[56],	[61]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
329	Jackson	v	Ministry	of	Defence	[2006]	EWCA	Civ	46,	[16]	per	Tuckey	LJ:	“must	act	as	a	considerable	disincentive	
to	claimants	and	their	advisers	against	making	exaggerated	claims.”	
330	Summers	(n311)	[50]	-	[56],	[61]	per	Lord	Clarke.	Incidentally,	these	are	the	same	tools	which	Lords	Hughes	and	
Toulson	suggested	could	attach	to	fraudulent	claims,	including	collateral	lies,	in	the	first-party	context	in	Versloot	
(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[98]	[99]	per	Lord	Hughes,	[108]	per	Lord	Toulson.	Note	that	proceedings	in	contempt	must	
be	proportionate,	see	Royal	&	Sun	Alliance	Insurance	Co	v	Fahad	[2014]	EWHC	4480	(QB),	[25],	[29]	per	Spencer	J.	
331	Criminal	Law	and	Legal	Policy	Unit	(Ministry	of	Justice),	‘Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	Circular	2015/01’	
(23	 March	 2015)	 available	 at:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/428204/cjc-act-circular.pdf	
(accessed	26/08/16)	[175].	
332	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(7).	
333	Criminal	Law	and	Legal	Policy	Unit	(n331)	[178].	
334	The	Star	Sea	(n247)	[75]	per	Lord	Hobhouse;	Agapitos	v	Agnew	(The	Aegeon)	[2003]	QB	556,	[52]	per	Mance	LJ.	
335	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(9):	“This	section	does	not	apply	to	proceedings	started	by	the	issue	of	
a	claim	form	before	the	day	on	which	this	section	comes	into	force.”	
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This	means	 that	 the	 relative	 severity	 of	 the	 remedies	 is	 counterintuitive	 since	 one	would	
expect	the	litigant	who	threatens	judicial	integrity	to	be	sanctioned	more	severely	that	the	
assured	who	merely	attempts	to	deceive	his	counterpart.		
	
These	different	approaches	to	fraud	should	prompt	us	to	consider	whether	there	are	policy	
considerations	militating	in	favour	of	different	treatment.	The	difference	between	these	areas	
is	typically	explained	by	the	direct	relationship	of	good	faith	in	the	first-party	context.336	While	
there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 a	 requirement	 of	 good	 faith	 is	 not	 imposed	 in	 the	 personal	 injury	
context,	this	explanation	is	less	convincing	when	one	considers	the	practical	consequences	of	
personal	injury	fraud.	As	was	noted	in	Hayward	v	Zurich,	“personal	injury	claims	usually	fall	
to	be	met	by	insurers	and	the	ultimate	cost	is	borne	by	other	policyholders	though	increased	
premiums.”337	 The	 Law	 Commission	 noted	 the	 inconsistency	 created	 by	 the	 different	
approaches	to	fraud	in	their	final	report,	
	
The	 reported	 decisions	 have	 shown	 no	 inclination	 to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 well-
established	forfeiture	rule	and,	although	it	is	arguably	anomalous,	we	do	not	have	a	
mandate	to	recommend	more	substantial	change.338	
	
Instead	 of	 comprehensively	 engaging	 with	 the	 anomaly,	 the	 Law	 Commission	 simply	
reiterated	the	absence	of	good	faith	in	the	personal	injury	context	and	suggested	that	first-
party	insurance	was	particularly	vulnerable	to	fraud.339	With	respect,	moral	hazard	is	a	similar	
threat	 in	 the	 personal	 injury	 context	 and	 it	 is	 disappointing,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 Law	
Commission	chose	to	sidestep	the	issue.	In	the	author’s	view,	the	requirement	of	good	faith	
in	first-party	claims	can	only	partially	explain	the	difference	in	approach.		
	
A	notable	theme	in	the	personal	injury	discussions	is	the	importance	of	holding	the	party	who	
has	caused	damage	to	the	fraudster	to	account.340	In	Summers,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	
																																																						
336	Summers	(n311)	[29]	per	Lord	Clarke;	Ul-haq	(n311)	[37]	per	Toulson	LJ;	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[21.19].	
337	Hayward	(n206)	[51]	per	Lord	Toulson.	
338	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[21.20].	
339	Ibid	[21.21]-[21.22].	
340	Summers	(n311)	[61]	per	Lord	Clarke:	“more	appropriate	to	penalise	such	a	claimant	as	a	contemnor	than	to	
relieve	the	defendant	of	what	the	court	has	held	to	be	a	substantive	liability.”	
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it	was	 “more	appropriate	 to	penalise	 such	a	 claimant	 as	 a	 contemnor	 than	 to	 relieve	 the	
defendant	 of	 what	 the	 court	 has	 held	 to	 be	 a	 substantive	 liability.”341	 By	 contrast,	 the	
insurance	courts	have	wholly	disregarded	the	underwriter’s	substantive	liability.	This	makes	
little	sense	when	we	recall	that	the	underwriter’s	obligation	is	to	hold	his	assured	harmless	
against	covered	perils.	Liability	is	established	as	from	the	date	of	loss342	and	is	not	contingent	
on	the	bringing	of	an	honest	claim.343	
	
It	is	also	likely	that	the	physical	nature	of	loss344	has	contributed	to	the	more	lenient	approach	
in	the	personal	injury	cases,	though	this	is	not	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	judicial	or	legislative	
discussions.	In	any	event,	the	author	doubts	whether	physical	injury	can	adequately	explain	
the	different	approaches	to	fraudulent	claims	 in	these	contexts.	The	notion	of	holding	the	
breaching	party	to	account	is	surprisingly	absent	in	the	insurance	debates	and,	as	was	argued	
above,	the	presence	of	good	faith	is	an	insufficient	explanation	of	the	divergence	between	
personal	injury	and	insurance	law.	The	discretion	in	the	CJCA	encourages	courts	to	balance	
deterrence	and	the	rights	of	the	fraudulent	litigant.	A	similar	balancing	exercise	does	not	take	
place	in	the	pure	insurance	cases,	despite	Soyer’s	contention	to	the	contrary.345	Instead,	the	
myopic	focus	of	the	insurance	courts	on	deterrence	causes	important	public	values,	such	as	
proportionality	and	fairness,	to	be	excluded	from	the	debate.		
	
Both	the	Australian	approach	to	insurance	fraud	and	the	discretion	contained	within	the	CJCA	
enable	the	court	to	respond	proportionately	to	exaggerated	claims.	An	alternative	means	of	
balancing	fraud	deterrence	and	proportionality	is	evident	in	the	English	criminal	law	response	
to	 insurance	 fraud.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 comparison	 because	 the	 approach	 to	 sentencing	
demonstrates	a	means	of	responding	to	a	spectrum	of	wrongdoing.	
	
																																																						
341	Ibid	[61]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
342	Firma	C-Trade	SA	v	Newcastle	Protection	and	Indemnity	Association	(The	Fanti)	[1991]	2	AC	1,	35-36	per	Lord	
Goff.	
343	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[24]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
344	Ibid	[63]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
345	Soyer,	Marine	Insurance	Fraud	(n255)	[1.23]-[1.24].	See	also	Diggens	v	Sun	Alliance	[1994]	CLC	1146,	1165	per	
Evans	LJ	where	 it	 is	noted	that	 the	case	 law	had	not	determined	whether	 the	remedy	should	be	 in	some	way	
proportionate	to	the	fraud.	
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B. Balancing	deterrence	and	proportionality	in	mandatory	guidelines:	English	
criminal	law		
	
Insurance	fraud	is	a	crime	under	the	Fraud	Act	2006.346	A	comparison	with	the	criminal	law	
approach	 to	 fraud	 is	warranted	 for	 two	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 the	Law	Commission	 justified	 the	
atypical	deterrent	function	of	the	forfeiture	rule	by	reference	to	the	historically	low	likelihood	
of	 criminal	 punishment.347	 In	 addition,	 the	 insurance	 law	 narrative	 of	 sanctions	 is	 one	 of	
severity	and	punishment	and,	as	such,	resonates	with	the	premise	of	criminal	law.		
	
Insurance	fraudsters	are	sentenced	in	the	same	way	as	other	offenders	by	the	criminal	courts.		
Sentencing	 is	designed	to	fulfil	a	number	of	 functions	 including	punishment,	rehabilitation	
and	 deterrence348	 and	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 Sentencing	 Council	 Guidelines.349	 A	 court	 must	
determine	 the	 offender’s	 culpability	 and	 the	 harmfulness	 of	 the	 offence	 before	 taking	
account	of	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors.350	Relevant	considerations	include	the	actual	
or	 intended	 financial	harm	and	whether	 the	offence	was	sophisticated	or	opportunistic	 in	
nature.351	Note	that	the	vulnerability	of	the	underwriter,	a	significant	concern	in	the	civil	law	
context,	 is	 irrelevant	 in	 the	 criminal	 setting.	 The	 Guidelines’	 reference	 to	 vulnerability	
contemplates	a	wholly	different	category	of	victims	where	their	age,	financial	circumstances	
or	mental	capacity	render	them	particularly	susceptible	to	deception.352		
	
The	Guidelines	enable	the	court	to	rank	each	offence	on	a	scale	of	severity	and,	unlike	the	
forfeiture	rule,	respond	to	the	entire	spectrum	of	wrongdoing.	The	corresponding	framework	
of	sentences	is	large,	comprising,	at	its	most	lenient,	a	fine	based	on	the	offender’s	income	
and,	at	its	most	severe,	a	custodial	sentence	of	seven	years.353	The	guiding	principle	of	totality	
																																																						
346	Fraud	Act	2006	s.2.	
347	Law	Com	353	(n197)	[19.3].	
348	 Sentencing	 Council,	 ‘Sentencing	 basics’	 available	 at:	 https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-
sentencing/sentencing-basics/	(accessed	22/08/16).	
349	 Sentencing	 Council,	 Fraud,	 Bribery	 and	 Money	 Laundering	 Offences:	 Definitive	 Guideline	 (October	 2014)	
available	 at:	 https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf	 (accessed	
22/08/2016).(Hereafter	referred	to	as	 ‘Sentencing	Guidelines’)	See	also	Lacey	(n285)	32	where	she	argues	that	
proportionality	in	the	criminal	law	is	achieved	through	the	use	of	sentencing	guidelines.	
350	Sentencing	Council,	Fraud,	Bribery	and	Money	Laundering	(n349)	6-7,	10.	
351	Ibid	6-7.	
352	Ibid	7.	
353	Ibid	10.	
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instructs	the	court	to	consider	whether	the	“total	sentence	is	just	and	proportionate	to	the	
overall	offending	behaviour.”354	On	this	basis,	 the	court	sentencing	an	 insurance	fraudster	
would	be	 required	 to	weigh	 the	 circumstances	of	 the	wrongdoing	 and,	 in	particular,	 take	
account	of	the	degree	of	planning	and	 intended	financial	gain.	Accordingly,	 the	assured	 in	
Tonkin,355	who	exaggerated	his	claim	by	0.3%,	would	receive	a	dramatically	different	sentence	
under	the	Fraud	Act	than	the	assured	in	The	Ikarian	Reefer,356	who	deliberately	scuttled	his	
vessel.		
	
The	 criminal	 response	 to	 fraud	 provides	 a	 practical	 example	 of	 how	 considerations	 of	
deterrence	 and	 proportionality	 can	 be	 combined	 within	 a	 single	 framework.	 Notably,	
considerations	 of	 fairness	 are	 not	 thought	 to	 detract	 from	 the	 preventive	 effect	 of	 the	
criminal	law,	as	appears	to	be	the	basis	for	the	insurance	courts’	resistance	to	a	more	nuanced	
approach	 in	 the	civil	 setting.	Moreover,	 the	current	absence	of	proportionality	 in	 the	civil	
context	means	that	forfeiture	will	constitute	a	much	greater	sanction	for	low-level	frauds	than	
the	equivalent	sentence	under	the	Fraud	Act.	This	is	concerning	since	the	civil	courts	do	not	
extend	the	evidential	and	procedural	safeguards	to	the	alleged	fraudster	that	he	would	enjoy	
in	 criminal	 litigation.357	 	 The	 final	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 proportionality	 is	made	 from	 an	
economic	perspective;	a	nuanced	legal	response	is	required	to	reflect	the	differences	in	fraud	
offences.		
	
C. The	economic	argument	in	favour	of	proportionality	
Rational	 choice	 theory	 generally	 understands	 deterrence	 as	 being	 contingent	 on	 harsh	
penalties.	The	first	argument	in	this	chapter	suggested	the	fallacy	of	this	contention	based	on	
modern	decision-making	theory.	Suppose	for	the	moment,	however,	that	deterrence	was	in	
fact	contingent	on	harsh	penalties,	it	would	not	automatically	follow	that	one	sanction	was	
capable	of	deterring	a	 range	of	 criminal	or	 civil	offences.	Fraudulent	 insurance	claims,	 for	
example,	 vary	 considerably	 and	 have	 been	 characterised	 in	 earlier	work	 as	 constituting	 a	
																																																						
354	Ibid	11.	
355	Tonkin	v	UK	Insurance	[2006]	EWCA	1120	(TCC),	[2007]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	283.	
356	National	Justice	Compania	v	Prudential	Assurance	Co	(The	Ikarian	Reefer)	[1995]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	455.	
357	Broome	v	Cassell	 [1972]	AC	1027,	1127-1128	discussed	 in	Clarke,	Twenty-first	Century	 (n264)	276.	See	also,	
Rawlings	and	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law”	(n1)	538.	
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spectrum	 of	 wrongdoing.358	 Although	 the	 Sentencing	 Council	 Guidelines	 make	 these	
differences	relevant	in	criminal	sentencing;	as	it	stands,	the	forfeiture	rule	treats	all	frauds	in	
the	same	way.		
	
An	 economic	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 these	 variations	 between	offences	 are	 important	 and	
should	matter	in	the	construction	of	civil	remedies.	To	make	this	argument,	it	is	necessary	to	
assume	that	the	cost-benefit	analysis	of	rational	choice	theory	is	correct.	Accordingly,	if	the	
costs	of	offending	are	held	constant,	 there	 is	a	clear	 incentive	for	the	actor	to	choose	the	
offence	which	offers	him	the	greatest	benefits.359	As	Stigler	has	argued,	“if	the	thief	has	his	
hand	cut	off	for	taking	five	dollars,	he	had	just	as	well	take	$5,000.”360	But	this	course	of	action	
does	not	just	benefit	the	actor	to	a	greater	extent,	it	has	a	correspondingly	harmful	impact	
on	society.	Stigler	has	expressed	this	as	an	“increasing	marginal	disutility	of	offenses,	so	a	
theft	of	$1000	is	more	than	twice	as	harmful	as	a	theft	of	$500.”361	A	single	penalty	to	deter	
a	range	of	offences	ignores	these	consequences.	The	risk	then	is	that	a	single	penalty	deters	
the	 least	 serious	offences	but	 creates	 additional	 incentives	 for	 the	 actor	 to	 commit	more	
serious	crimes.362	 In	Stigler’s	example,	 the	prospect	of	 losing	a	hand	deters	the	thief	 from	
stealing	a	small	sum	of	money	but	fails	to	deter	him	from	stealing	a	larger	sum.	By	contrast,	
a	range	of	sanctions	which	correspond	to	the	severity	of	different	offences	creates,	on	an	
economic	analysis,	an	adequate	deterrent	for	each	offence.	This	is	known	in	the	economic	
literature	 as	 marginal	 deterrence.363	 As	 Posner	 has	 suggested,	 “if	 it	 were	 not	 for	
considerations	of	marginal	deterrence,	more	serious	crimes	might	not	always	be	punishable	
by	more	severe	penalties	than	less	serious	ones.”364	The	forfeiture	rule	takes	no	account	of	
these	concerns.	The	criminal	framework,	outlined	above,	does	conform	to	the	requirements	
of	marginal	deterrence	and	therefore,	on	this	analysis,	would	be	regarded	as	a	more	effective	
deterrent.	
	
																																																						
358	K	Richards,	 ‘Deterring	 insurance	 fraud:	A	critical	and	criminological	analysis	of	 the	English	and	Scottish	Law	
Commissions’	current	proposals	for	reform’	(2013)	24	ILJ	16,	18-19.	
359	Stigler	(n30)	57.	
360	Ibid	57.	
361	Ibid	58.	
362	See	the	example	of	bike	and	car	theft	suggested	by	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	(n8)	246.	
363	Stigler	(n30)	57.	
364	 Posner,	 ‘An	 economic	 theory’	 (n36)	 1207.	 But	 see	 Posner	 at	 1208	 where	 he	 suggests,	 without	 detailed	
elaboration,	that	marginal	deterrence	is	not	a	particularly	useful	consideration.	
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On	the	assumption	that	rational	choice	theory	holds,	the	forfeiture	rule	creates	an	adequate	
deterrent	 to	exaggeration.	This	echoes	 the	conclusion	reached	by	 the	Law	Commission.365	
However,	once	an	individual	has	decided	to	commit	fraud,	the	marginal	deterrence	analysis	
suggests	that	the	forfeiture	rule	serves	to	incentivise	the	more	serious	frauds,	like	the	scuttle.	
This	should	be	concerning	both	to	the	industry	and	the	general	public	who	absorb	the	cost	of	
these	frauds.	The	argument	then	is	not	just	that	the	forfeiture	rule	is	an	ineffective	deterrent	
to	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim,	as	argued	in	Part	II,366	but	also	that	the	existence	of	a	single	
sanction	actually	incentivises	the	commission	of	these	more	serious	offences.	This	economic	
argument	for	proportionality	exists	alongside	the	evidence	of	remedial	 frameworks	 in	tort	
and	criminal	 law	which	combine	considerations	of	deterrence	and	proportionality.	 It	 is	my	
contention	that	these	arguments	provide	strong	support	for	the	development	of	nuanced	civil	
response	to	fraud	to	replace	the	universal	rule	of	forfeiture.367				
	
	
	
V. Conclusion	
The	scale	of	the	fraudulent	claims	problem	across	all	lines	of	insurance	is	said	to	justify	the	
imposition	 of	 deterrent	 civil	 sanctions.	 Recent	 legislative	 activity	 has	 confirmed	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 deterrence	 as	 a	 policy	 justification	 in	 this	 context.368	 This	 expansive	
approach	to	fraud	has	demonstrated	the	extent	to	which	the	assured’s	fraud	can	and	does	
unravel	all.	The	particular	contours	of	the	fraudulent	claims	rule	are	typically	explained	by	
reference	 to	 underwriters’	 vulnerability	 to	 information	 asymmetries	 and	 ideas	 of	 utmost	
good	faith.	The	chapter	has	argued	that,	although	civil	sanctions	for	fraud	are	necessary,	these	
justifications	are	open	to	critique.		
	
Deterrence	is	generally	not	an	aim	of	the	civil	law,	which	instead	attempts	to	resolve	disputes	
between	private	parties	and	award	compensation	for	harm.	But	even	if	we	can	accept	the	
need	for	deterrence	in	this	context,	it	does	not	mandate	acceptance	of	draconian	sanctions.	
																																																						
365	Law	Com	201	(n195)	[7.28]	-	[7.29].	
366	See	earlier,	Part	II.	
367	There	 is	 insufficient	space	to	consider	a	nuanced	civil	regime	in	more	detail	here	and	the	author	 intends	to	
undertake	such	a	task	in	future	work.	
368	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12;	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n160)	[124]	per	Lord	Mance.	
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The	 fundamental	 argument	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 that	 modern	 theories	 of	 deterrence	 and	
decision	making	undermine	notions	of	sanction	severity	and	instead	prioritise	social	sanctions	
and	cognitive	limitations.	The	forfeiture	rule	is	an	ineffective	deterrent	in	light	of	this	recent	
empirical	 and	 theoretical	 research.	 Instead,	 the	 research	 calls	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	
complexity	 and	 nuance	 of	 decision	 making,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 deterrents	 which	
correspond	 to	 these	 processes.	 While	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 was	 not	 receptive	 to	 these	
arguments	in	Versloot,369	it	was	contended	that	these	interdisciplinary	insights	remain	critical	
to	 the	 fight	 against	 fraud.	 The	 Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce	 recommendations370	 and	 recent	
industry	initiatives	would	tend	to	confirm	this.	
	
The	absence	of	an	effective	sanction	for	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim	is	a	notable	shortcoming	
of	the	civil	response	to	fraud.	If	the	insurance	courts	truly	believe	that	deterrence	is	secured	
by	draconian	penalties,	it	is	difficult	to	understand	why	a	similar	approach	is	not	adopted	to	
counter	all	types	of	fraud	in	the	claims	stage.	Following	the	Law	Commission’s	abandonment	
of	these	issues,	future	development	is	now	a	matter	for	the	courts.	Until	such	time	as	this	
mantle	is	taken	up,	the	lack	of	equivalent	penalties	leaves	the	forfeiture	rule	on	shaky	ground	
and	undermines	the	judicial	conception	of	deterrence.	
	
The	underwriter’s	vulnerability	to	fraud	is	a	common	theme	in	judicial	accounts	of	fraud.	The	
development	 of	 modern	 investigative	 tools	 and	 resources	 which	 enable	 underwriters	 to	
gather	information	independently	suggest	that	these	arguments	are	no	longer	as	compelling	
as	 they	 were	 when	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 emerged	 in	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century.	 These	
developments	tend	to	reduce	the	information	asymmetries	which	create	the	opportunity	for	
dishonesty	in	the	claims	process.	
	
Different	approaches	to	fraudulent	(insurance)	claims	in	other	jurisdictions	and	related	areas	
of	 law	 prompt	 further	 questioning	 of	 the	 English	 civil	 response	 to	 insurance	 fraud.	 In	
particular,	 the	Australian	approach	to	non-marine	 fraud,	 the	English	approach	to	personal	
injury	fraud	and	the	criminal	response	to	insurance	fraud	demonstrate	how	deterrence	can	
																																																						
369	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	158	et	seq.	
370	Insurance	Fraud	Taskforce,	Final	Report	(n186)	8-9,	53-54.	
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be	 reconciled	 within	 a	 more	 nuanced	 remedial	 framework.	 A	 range	 of	 penalties	 which	
correspond	to	the	severity	of	the	offender’s	conduct	responds	to	notions	of	fairness	as	well	
as	 economic	 arguments	 related	 to	marginal	 deterrence.	 It	was	 argued	 that	 the	 first-party	
insurance	 context	was	 not	 sufficiently	 unique	 to	merit	 such	 a	 distinct	 response	 to	 claims	
fraud.		
	
In	 combination,	 these	 critiques	 highlight	 the	weakness	 of	 the	 policy	 justifications	 said	 to	
underpin	the	forfeiture	rule.	It	has	the	capacity	to	operate	in	a	draconian	fashion	on	the	one	
hand,	but	fails	to	provide	any	effective	deterrent	for	the	most	serious	fraudulent	claims.	This	
is	 illogical	and	not	supported	by	evidence.	There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	deterrence	of	 fraud	
remains	 important	but	efforts	 to	deter	should	reflect	empirical	 research	and	the	decision-
making	processes	involved	in	dishonesty.	A	sophisticated	remedial	regime	informed	by	these	
insights	would,	in	the	very	least,	contain	an	effective	penalty	for	wholly	fraudulent	claims	and	
could	adopt	a	more	nuanced	approach	to	exaggerations.	This	is	effectively	a	demand	for	the	
courts	to	balance	fraud	deterrence	with	considerations	of	proportionality.	The	demand	for	
such	proportionality	 is	 timely;	public	 values	are	beginning	 to	permeate	 judicial	debates	 in	
private	 law	and	 recommendations	of	 the	 Insurance	 Fraud	Taskforce	 are	 likely	 to	 result	 in	
some	movement	in	this	direction.			
	
The	 focus	 now	 moves	 from	 insurance	 claims	 fraud	 to	 fraud	 committed	 in	 transactions	
financed	by	documentary	credit.	The	maxim	ex	turpi	causa	has	been	central	 in	the	judicial	
elaboration	of	 the	 fraud	exception	but	 in	practice,	 the	 simplicity	of	 this	phrase	belies	 the	
complexity	of	 the	 fraud	enquiry.	This	 is	because	 the	documentary	credit	 raises	competing	
policy	considerations	–	the	deterrence	of	fraud	and	the	autonomy	of	the	credit	mechanism	–	
and	 the	 courts	 have	 consistently	 prioritised	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 credit.	 The	 resulting	
exception	 is	 narrow	 in	 scope	 which	 demands	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 onerous	 procedural	
requirements.		Accordingly,	while	ex	turpi	causa	may	underpin	the	fraud	exception,	Chapter	
Four	 will	 argue	 that	 fraud	 rarely	 unravels	 all	 in	 the	 context	 of	 transactions	 financed	 by	
documentary	credit.
Chapter	Four	
Documentary	Credits:	A	Doctrinal	Analysis	of	the	Fraud	Exception	
	
I. Introduction	
The	effectiveness	of	international	sales	depends	on	the	availability	of	devices	to	strengthen	
and	secure	economic	exchange.	This	is	because	overseas	transactions	are	risky	and	involve	a	
greater	number	of	risks	than	a	typical	domestic	exchange.1	The	discussion	focuses	on	one	of	
the	most	significant	mechanisms	developed	for	this	purpose;	the	documentary	credit.	The	
credit	overcomes	risks	associated	with	payment	and	defective	performance	by	the	seller	by	
substituting	the	buyer’s	promise	to	pay	for	that	of	a	bank	and	only	releasing	payment	when	
evidence	of	contractual	compliance	is	tendered.	
	
A	major	risk	remains	unresolved	by	the	credit	mechanism,	however,	and	that	is	the	risk	that	
the	seller	will	behave	fraudulently.	This	causes	two	significant	policy	considerations	to	collide;	
the	 need	 to	 facilitate	 international	 trade	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 discouraging	 fraud	 in	
commercial	transactions.2	The	conflict	between	these	policies	 is	particularly	evident	 in	the	
documentary	 credit	 context	 as	 the	 hallmarks	 of	 a	 system	 capable	 of	 identifying	 and	
sanctioning	fraud	–	detailed	investigations	and	significant	expense	–	are	in	stark	contrast	to	
the	 commercial	 demand	 for	 an	 efficient	 method	 of	 payment.3	 This	 balance	 is	 critical	 in	
understanding	the	judicial	approach	to	documentary	credits	and	in	appreciating	how	the	law	
relating	to	fraud	has	developed.		
	
The	precise	balance	that	has	been	drawn	by	the	English	courts	is	the	subject	of	discussion	in	
this	chapter.	It	is	evident	that	the	courts	have	prioritised	the	promotion	of	international	trade	
at	the	expense	of	a	more	robust	anti-fraud	mechanism.	A	rule	against	fraud	does	exist	but	it	
has	been	framed	in	narrow	terms	and	its	use	is	constrained	by	procedural	issues	and	the	rules	
																																																						
1	M	Bridge	(ed.),	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(9th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2015),	[18-001].	
2	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	v	Angelica-Whitewear	[1987]	1	RCS	59,	72	per	Le	Dain	J:	“differences	of	view	or	emphasis	
with	respect	to	these	issues,	reflect	the	tension	between	the	two	principal	policy	considerations:	the	importance	
to	 international	 commerce	 of	 maintaining	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 autonomy	 of	 documentary	 credits	 and	
the…importance	 of	 discouraging	 or	 suppressing	 fraud	 in	 letter	 of	 credit	 transactions”;	 N	 Enonchong,	 The	
Independence	Principle	of	Letters	of	Credit	and	Demand	Guarantees	(OUP,	2011),	[1.03]-[1.04]	
3	P	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(2nd	ed.	Informa,	2010),	[2.022]-[2.023].	
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governing	letters	of	credit.	Nevertheless,	the	phase	‘fraud	unravels	all’	does	appear	routinely	
in	the	case	law;	the	maxim	ex	turpi	causa	forming	a	significant	part	of	the	judicial	reasoning	
in	the	elaboration	of	the	fraud	exception.4	To	simply	state	the	maxim,	however,	is	to	ignore	
these	broader	issues	which	have	dictated	the	precise	boundaries	of	the	exception.		
	
The	chapter	explores	the	first	and	second	research	questions;	firstly,	how	has	the	fraud	rule	
been	constructed	in	the	law	of	documentary	credits	and,	secondly,	what	policy	arguments	
have	 been	 employed	 by	 the	 courts	 to	 justify	 this	 particular	 construction?	 By	 way	 of	
introduction,	the	discussion	commences	with	an	account	of	the	risks	involved	in	international	
trade	and	the	range	of	financing	mechanisms	available	to	parties.	Part	II	then	focuses	on	the	
contractual	 framework	 created	 by	 the	 documentary	 credit	 and	 examines	 the	 underlying	
principles	which	ensure	its	utility	as	a	financing	mechanism.5	Attention	then	turns	to	fraud	in	
Part	 III.	 The	 discussion	 will	 first	 consider	 how	 the	 courts	 have	 conceptualised	 the	 fraud	
problem	and	their	role	in	prevention.	The	focus	will	then	shift	to	the	limited	circumstances	in	
which	the	English	courts	are	willing	to	permit	 fraud	by	the	beneficiary	to	disrupt	payment	
under	a	documentary	credit.		
	
A. The	risks	of	international	trade	
Risks	 in	 international	 trade	 arise	 because	 the	 contracting	 parties	 do	 not	 perform	 their	
obligations	simultaneously,	but	sequentially.6	Unlike	the	position	in	insurance,	both	parties	
to	an	international	contract	of	sale	are	expected	to	perform	substantively	and	performance	
is	not	contingent	on	the	occurrence	of	a	specified	event.	Performance	is	sequential	simply	
because	 the	 great	 distances	 involved	 make	 simultaneous	 performance	 impossible.	 The	
security	 of	 economic	 exchange	 depends	 on	 overcoming	 these	 risks.	 From	 the	 seller’s	
perspective,	 these	 risks	 relate	 primarily	 to	 payment;	 both	 the	 creditworthiness	 and	 the	
insolvency	risk	of	the	buyer	are	at	issue.	In	addition,	there	is	a	risk	that	the	buyer	will	behave	
opportunistically	when	he	receives	the	goods	by	rejecting	them	due	to	minor	discrepancies	
																																																						
4	For	example,	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1982]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	1,	6	per	
Lord	Diplock	(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)).	
5	A	consideration	of	the	doctrinal	account	of	the	mechanism	is	also	warranted	at	this	stage	as	discussion	in	Chapter	
Five	will	discuss	empirical	evidence	which	challenges	the	traditional	account	of	how	the	mechanism	operates,	see	
Chapter	Five,	Part	III.	
6	G	Gundlach,	 ‘Exchange	governance:	 The	 role	of	 legal	 and	nonlegal	 approaches	across	 the	exchange	process’	
(1994)	13(2)	J	Pub	Pol	&	Mark.	246,	247;	R	Posner,	Economic	Analysis	of	Law	(5th	ed.	Aspen	Publishers,	1998),	101.	
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in	quality.	If	the	buyer	refused	to	pay	or	rejected	the	goods,	the	seller	would	have	to	find	a	
replacement	buyer	preferably	located	in	the	same	place	as	the	goods,	arrange	for	his	goods	
to	be	returned	or	to	bring	an	action	for	the	price	against	the	buyer.	Trading	parties	will	seek	
to	avoid	litigation	overseas	for	reasons	of	time,	expense	and	uncertainty	due	to	differences	
in	legal	systems.7	
	
The	risk	for	the	buyer	lies	in	his	limited	ability	to	assess	the	probity	of	the	seller	in	advance.	
His	concern	relates	to	whether	the	quality	and	quantity	of	the	goods	shipped	accords	with	
the	parties’	 contractual	agreement.	 If	 the	 seller	 fails	 to	meet	 these	obligations,	 the	buyer	
faces	the	difficult	prospect	of	bringing	an	action	for	breach	of	contract	against	his	seller.	
	
Exchanges	can	be	strengthened,	and	these	risks	alleviated,	by	the	adoption	of	mechanisms	to	
support	the	transaction.	Several	payment	mechanisms	exist	for	this	purpose.	The	first,	pre-
payment,	 requires	 the	 buyer	 to	 pay	 before	 the	 goods	 are	 shipped.	 This	 reduces	 the	 risks	
associated	with	 insolvency	and	opportunism	and	also	means	that	the	seller	 is	not	without	
working	capital	during	shipment.8	The	reverse	of	this	mechanism,	shipment	on	open	account,	
requires	the	seller	to	ship	the	goods	and	extend	credit	to	his	buyer.9	This	is	the	ideal	solution	
for	 the	buyer	as	 it	enables	him	to	withhold	payment	until	he	has	examined	the	goods	 for	
contractual	conformity.10	The	similarity	between	these	mechanisms	is	that	they	only	assuage	
one	 party’s	 concerns	 about	 the	 transaction.	 A	 mechanism	 that	 simultaneously	 provides	
reassurance	 to	 both	 parties	 will	 often	 be	 required,	 particularly	 where	 the	 parties	 are	
strangers11	and	are	trading	across	borders.		
	
																																																						
7	D	Bischof,	 ‘Letters	of	 credit	 (LCs):	 recognizing	 the	value	of	 simple	 trade	 instruments’	 (12/07/16)	available	at:	
http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2016/Letters-of-credit-(LCs)-recognizing-the-value-of-simple-trade-
instruments/	(accessed	15/08/16).	
8	R	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	payment	transactions’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2494,	2516-2517;	AW	
Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral	assurance	mechanism.	Comments	on	Ronald	Mann’s	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	
payment	transactions’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2554,	2556.	
9	Mann	(n8)	2517;	Katz	(n8)	2556.	
10	Katz	(n8)	2556.	
11	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.003]	“Documentary	credits	remain	well-adapted	to	transactions	where	
unfamiliar	parties	deal	with	each	other	at	a	distance,	where	the	security	of	a	document	of	title	is	required,	and	
where	re-sales	at	sea	are	envisaged.”	
162	
	
The	most	significant	intermediate	financing	mechanism	is	the	letter	of	credit.	It	is	designed	to	
allay	both	parties’	concerns	about	dealing	overseas	by	expanding	the	contractual	network	to	
include	banks	and	reallocates	many	of	the	risks	inherent	in	international	trade.	Payment	is	
arranged,	and	made,	through	an	intermediary	bank	which	has	no	interest	in	the	underlying	
transaction,	in	exchange	for	documentation	which	evidences	that	the	seller	has	performed	in	
accordance	with	the	parties’	agreement.	The	credit	enables	the	seller	to	shift	the	risk	of	non-
payment	 and	 insolvency	 to	 the	 bank	 and	 reduces	 the	 buyer’s	 ability	 to	 reject	 the	 goods	
opportunistically.12	The	seller	retains	the	marginal	risk	that	the	paying	bank	will	fail	before	he	
has	received	payment.	
	
In	a	standard	sale,	 the	risk	that	the	seller	will	 fail	 to	perform	or	perform	inadequately	are	
borne	by	the	buyer.	The	fact	that	payment	is	contingent	on	certain	documentation	should	
reduce	 these	 concerns	 in	 transactions	 financed	 by	 documentary	 credit.	 However,	 risks	
relating	 to	 the	quality	 and	quantity	 of	 contract	 goods	will	 remain	with	 the	buyer	 as	 such	
matters	are	irrelevant	to	the	payment	decision	made	by	the	bank.	In	such	circumstances,	and	
subject	to	the	difficulties	and	expense	of	foreign	litigation,13	the	buyer	will	need	to	bring	an	
action	for	breach	on	the	underlying	contract	to	obtain	relief.		
	
In	 comparison	 to	 other	 intermediate	 financing	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 documentary	
collection,14	the	documentary	credit	is	expensive.	As	an	indication,	the	price	is	usually	fixed	
by	reference	to	a	quarter	of	one	percent	of	the	invoice	price15	though	considerations	of	the	
buyer’s	standing	with	his	bank	are	also	relevant.16	Why	then	are	parties	willing	to	adopt	the	
credit	if	other,	cheaper	mechanisms	are	available	in	the	market?	The	answer	would	seem	to	
lie	in	the	irrevocable	nature	of	credit,	that	is	to	say,	that	the	bank’s	undertaking	to	pay	cannot	
be	revoked	without	the	express	agreement	of	the	seller-beneficiary.17	This	makes	payment	
																																																						
12	This	is	subject	to	the	possibility	of	opportunistic	behaviour	during	waiver,	see	later	text	to	fn	76.	
13	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.045].	
14	In	a	documentary	collection	arrangement,	a	bank	agrees	to	act	as	the	middleman	between	the	parties;	collecting	
payment	from	the	buyer	in	exchange	for	the	documents	presented	by	the	seller.	This	is	a	cheaper	mechanism	since	
the	bank	makes	no	obligation	to	make	payment	to	the	seller	but	instead	acts	simply	as	an	intermediary	between	
the	parties.	A	consideration	of	the	collection	mechanism	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
15	Mann	(n8)	2499;	Katz	(n8)	2559.	
16	Mann	(n8)	2499.	
17	 International	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 ‘The	 Uniform	 Customs	 and	 Practice	 for	 Documentary	 Credits’	 (2007	
Revision,	ICC	Publication	no.	600)	(hereafter	referred	to	as	UCP	600),	art.	3:	“A	credit	is	irrevocable	even	if	there	is	
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virtually	certain	for	the	seller,	subject	to	the	provision	of	correct	documentation,	and	explains	
the	 popularity	 of	 the	mechanism.18	 At	 one	 time	 the	 documentary	 credit	 was	 thought	 to	
account	for	the	majority	of	international	trade	financing,19	and	although	such	widespread	use	
is	no	longer	the	case,20	the	mechanism	has	regained	a	degree	of	popularity	in	recent	years,	
particularly	 in	Asia.21	This	resurgence	has	been	attributed	to	uncertainty	in	global	financial	
markets.22	The	most	recent	data,	provided	by	the	2015	ICC	Global	Trade	and	Finance	Survey,	
suggests	that	credits	fund	40%	of	worldwide	import	and	export	trade.23	This	represents	some	
US$2	trillion	per	year.24		
	
Although	the	credit	solves	many	of	the	parties’	concerns,	it	does	not	remove	all	of	the	risks	
associated	with	international	trade.	A	major	risk,	and	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	is	that	the	seller-
beneficiary	will	commit	fraud	in	the	performance	of	his	contractual	obligations.	Indeed,	two	
particular	aspects	of	the	system	provide	opportunities	for	the	dishonest	seller	to	exploit	his	
buyer;	the	ease	of	forging	documents	due	to	high	quality	reproduction	methods25	and	the	use	
of	containers.26	Containerisation	enables	dishonest	sellers	to	conceal	the	true	quality	of	goods	
from	the	master	and	obtain	clean	shipping	documents.	This	risk	is	usefully	illustrated	by	the	
facts	of	Discount	Records	v	Barclays	where	the	seller	concealed	rubbish	among	a	fraction	of	
the	contract	goods	in	cartons	but	tendered	clean	documents.27	The	risk	of	bank	failure	also	
remains	unmitigated	by	the	decision	to	use	a	documentary	credit,	although	admittedly	this	is	
																																																						
no	 indication	to	that	effect.”	This	constitutes	a	departure	from	the	previous	version	of	the	UCP	in	which	art.	5	
recognised	the	possibility	that	the	credit	could	be	revocable	or	irrevocable	in	nature.	
18	The	low	failure	of	letters	of	credit	would	tend	to	confirm	the	unassailable	nature	of	payment,	see	Bischof	(n7).	
19	 United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Trade	 And	 Development	 (UNCTAD),	 ‘Documentary	 risk	 in	 commodity	 trade’	
(1998),	1:	letters	of	credit	supported	trade	worth	US$100	billion/year	and	accounted	for	60%	of	commodity	sales.	
20	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.003];	J	Ulph,	‘The	UCP	600:	Documentary	credits	in	the	21st	century’	[2007]	
JBL	355,	356;	H	Beale	(ed.)	Chitty	on	Contracts	(32nd	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2015),	[34-446].	
21	Chitty	(32nd	ed.)	(n20)	[34-446].	
22	J	Mora	and	W	Powers,	 ‘Global	perspectives	in	the	decline	of	trade	finance’	 in	JP	Chauffour	and	M	Malouche	
(eds.),	Trade	Finance	during	the	Great	Trade	Collapse	(The	World	Bank,	2011)	128.	
23	 International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 ‘ICC	Global	Trade	and	Finance	Survey	2015’	 (2015),	40-41	available	at:	
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/policy-commissions/banking/	(accessed	26/07/2016).	
24	International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	‘About	ICC	Banking’	available	at:	http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/policy-
commissions/banking/	(accessed	15/08/2016).	
25	EP	Ellinger,	‘Fraud	in	documentary	credit	transactions’	[1981]	JBL	258,	258;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	
[3.022].	
26	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[2.047].	
27	Discount	Records	v	Barclays	Bank	[1975]	1	WLR	315,	317	as	cited	in	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.058].	
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a	small	risk.28	The	risk	of	bank	failure	would	be	borne	by	the	seller	in	the	first	instance	who	
would	then	seek	payment	under	the	contract	of	sale	from	the	buyer.29		
	
B. Independent	guarantees:	Performance	bonds	and	standby	letters	of	credit	
As	 an	 intermediate	method	of	 financing,	 the	 documentary	 credit	will	 typically	 be	 used	 in	
transactions	 where	 parties	 are	 unknown	 to	 each	 other	 and	 where	 the	 absence	 of	 trust	
justifies	the	expense	of	the	credit.30	At	this	stage,	however,	reference	should	be	made	to	two	
other	 mechanisms,	 referred	 to	 broadly	 as	 ‘independent	 guarantees’	 which	 share	
characteristics	with	the	letter	of	credit.	Although	these	mechanisms	serve	different	purposes,	
the	law	relating	to	these	instruments,	and	particularly	its	response	to	fraud,	have	developed	
in	tandem.31	As	such,	a	brief	explanation	is	required.		
	
The	 most	 significant	 of	 these	 independent	 guarantees	 are	 the	 performance	 bond	 (used	
primarily	 in	 the	United	Kingdom)	and	 the	standby	 letter	of	 credit.	The	standby	credit	was	
originally	developed	and	used	primarily	in	the	United	States32	but	today	the	standby	is	being	
used	more	 broadly	 to	 facilitate	 international	 transactions.33	 The	 similarity	 between	 these	
mechanisms	and	the	letter	of	credit	is	the	agreement	of	a	third-party	bank	to	pay	one	of	the	
contractual	parties	in	pre-determined	situations.	The	difference	is	the	intended	purpose	and	
amount	of	this	payment.	The	letter	of	credit	is	the	primary	source	of	payment	for	the	seller34	
and	is	designed	to	furnish	him	with	an	assured	right	of	payment	when	he	presents	conforming	
																																																						
28	I	Carr,	International	Trade	Law	(5th	ed.	Routledge,	2014)	476.	
29	M	Brindle	and	R	Cox,	Law	of	Bank	Payments	 (3rd	ed.	Sweet	and	Maxwell,	2004),	 [8.032];	R	Goode,	 ‘Abstract	
payment	undertakings’	 in	P	Cane	and	J	Stapleton	(eds.),	Essays	 for	Patrick	Atiyah	 (Clarendon	Press,	1991),	212	
(hereafter	referred	to	as	‘Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’);	WJ	Alan	&	Co	Ltd	v	El	Nasr	Export	and	Import	
Co	[1972]	2	QB	189,	212	per	Denning	LJ	who	described	the	credit	as	a	conditional	payment.	Recourse	to	the	buyer	
following	the	failure	of	the	bank	resurrects	the	risks	of	buyer	insolvency	and	opportunism.	
30	Mann	(n8)	2498;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.003].	
31	RD	Harbottle	(Mercantile)	Ltd	v	Nat	West	Bank	Ltd	[1978]	QB	146,	156	per	Kerr	J;	Howe	Richardson	Scale	Co	Ltd	
v	Polimex-Cekop	[1978]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	161,	163	per	Roskill	LJ;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.009].	It	is	not	
unusual	to	see	performance	bond	cases	cited	in	letter	of	credit	disputes,	for	example,	Edward	Owen	Engineering	v	
Barclays	Bank	International	Ltd.	[1978]	QB	159,	a	case	on	performance	bonds,	is	routinely	cited	in	letter	of	credit	
cases	such	as	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4),	Tukan	Timber	v	Barclays	Bank	plc	[1987]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	
171,	Montrod	Ltd	v	Grundkötter	Fleischvertreibs	GmbH	[2002]	1	WLR	1975.	
32	A	Malek	and	D	Quest,	Jack:	Documentary	Credits	(4th	ed.	Tottel	Publishing,	2009)	[12.14].	The	standby	mechanism	
was	developed	to	enable	federal	chartered	banks	in	the	USA	to	circumvent	a	law	which	prohibited	the	issue	of	
guarantees	on	behalf	of	 third	parties.	The	standby	credit	 is	used	widely	 in	domestic	 transactions	 in	the	United	
States.	See	generally,	A	Mugasha,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	and	Bank	Guarantees	(The	Federation	Press,	2003)	
44.	
33	Chitty	(32nd	ed.)	(n20)	[34-486].	
34	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n29)	213.	
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documentation.	The	payment	made	under	a	documentary	credit	is	the	full	invoice	value	of	
the	transaction.	By	contrast,	the	performance	bond	or	standby	credit	is	designed	to	create	a	
financial	 incentive	for	the	seller	to	perform	his	substantive	obligations.35	The	performance	
bond	constitutes	a	secondary	obligation	which	may	never	be	drawn	upon	when	the	contract	
is	performed	without	incident.36	In	the	event	of	the	seller’s	poor	performance,	such	as	short	
delivery	or	the	delivery	of	defective	goods,	the	buyer	is	able	to	call	on	the	bond	and	receives	
the	sum	of	money	stipulated	by	the	parties.37	This	is	typically	5-10%38	of	the	contract	price.	
An	 important	 difference	 is	 the	 trigger	 to	 payment	 under	 these	 mechanisms.	 As	 the	
documentary	credit	 is	 the	substantive	means	of	payment,	 the	bank	requires	documentary	
evidence	 that	 the	 seller	 has	 performed	 his	 contractual	 obligations.	 These	 documents	will	
evidence	 shipment	 of	 the	 requisite	 goods	 in	 the	 manner	 agreed	 by	 the	 parties.39	 The	
performance	bond,	by	contrast,	may	only	require	a	simple	written	assertion	of	the	seller’s	
breach	 of	 contract,	 though	 the	 bond	 may	 specify	 additional,	 but	 minimal,	 documentary	
conditions.		
	
The	comparative	ease	of	seeking	payment	under	a	performance	bond	means	that	this	device	
is	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 fraud.40	Arguably,	 performance	bonds	 could	have	 formed	 the	
basis	of	comparison	within	this	project.	The	letter	of	credit,	however,	has	been	chosen	as	the	
second	 example	 of	 fraud	 rules	 in	 commercial	 law.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 policy	
discussion	and	recent	developments	in	the	law	occur	in	the	context	of	documentary	credits.	
The	law	relating	to	fraud	in	documentary	credits	and	performance	bonds	has	developed	in	
tandem	 and,	 therefore,	 occasional	 reference	 will	 be	 made	 to	 bonds	 throughout	 the	
discussion.	For	now,	the	discussion	focuses	solely	on	the	documentary	credit	and	examines	
the	mechanism	from	a	doctrinal	perspective.		
																																																						
35	P	Ellinger	and	D	Neo,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	Documentary	Letters	of	Credit	(Hart	Publishing,	2010),	308.	
36	Harbottle	(n31)	149	per	Kerr	J,	“These	were	in	effect	to	be	performance	bonds…their	purpose	was	to	provide	
security	to	the	buyer	for	the	fulfilment	by	the	plaintiffs	of	their	obligations	under	the	contracts.”;	Bachmann	Pty	
Ltd	v	BHP	Power	New	Zealand	Ltd	[1999]	1	VR	420,	436-437	per	Brooking	JA.		
37	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	306.	
38	Malek	and	Quest,	 Jack	 (n32)	 [12.48]	 (in	relation	to	performance	bonds);	H	Getz,	 ‘Enjoining	the	 international	
standby	letter	of	credit:	The	Iranian	letter	of	credit	cases’	(1980)	21	Harv	Int.	L	J	189,	193-194	(in	relation	to	standby	
letters	of	credit).	But	see	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[12.15]	where	it	is	said	that	the	standby	credit	is	replacing	
the	documentary	credit	in	some	international	sales.	In	these	cases,	the	standby	credit	would	pay	the	entire	contract	
price.	
39	This	is	discussed	further,	see	later	text	to	fn	99.	
40	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[12.44].	
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II. The	Documentary	Credit	Mechanism:	A	Network	of	Contracts	
An	 agreement	 to	 finance	 a	 contract	 of	 sale	 by	 letter	 of	 credit	 creates	 a	 network	 of	
autonomous	but	interconnected	contracts.	The	object	of	the	contract,	like	any	other	contract	
of	sale,	is	for	the	seller	to	pass	control	and	ownership	of	the	goods	to	the	buyer	in	exchange	
for	 the	 price.	 The	 network	 of	 contracts	 created	under	 the	 credit	 creates	 a	mechanism	 to	
facilitate	this	exchange.	The	diagram	below	provides	a	representation	of	the	network.		
	
Figure	1:	A	typical	letter	of	credit	transaction	
	
The	starting	point	is	the	contract	of	sale	in	which	the	parties	agree	that	the	transaction	will	
be	 financed	 by	 letter	 of	 credit.	 The	 parties	must	 also	 nominate	 the	 banks	 through	which	
payment	 is	 available	 and	 agree	 the	 final	 date	 on	 which	 payment	 can	 be	 sought.	 The	
documentary	conditions	that	the	seller	will	need	to	satisfy	will	also	be	agreed	at	this	stage.	
The	required	documents	usually	include	a	clean	bill	of	lading,	an	insurance	policy	and	quality	
certificates	 issued	by	a	third	party.	A	brief	point	on	terminology.	 In	the	credit	context,	the	
buyer	is	referred	to	as	the	applicant	and	the	seller	as	the	beneficiary.	These	terms	will	be	used	
interchangeably	throughout.		
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The	applicant	approaches	his	bank	to	issue	a	documentary	credit	in	favour	of	the	beneficiary.	
The	 issuing	 bank	 undertakes	 to	 pay	 the	 beneficiary	 when	 the	 necessary	 documents	 are	
presented.	From	a	contractual	perspective,	the	opening	of	the	credit	will	generally	constitute	
a	condition	precedent	to	the	seller’s	duty	to	arrange	shipment.41			
	
The	particular	value	of	 the	credit	 for	 the	seller	 is	his	ability	 to	 seek	payment	 from	a	bank	
located	in	his	own	country.42	This	is	facilitated	by	the	confirming	bank,	an	institution	local	to	
the	 seller,	who	gives	 an	 independent	undertaking	 to	pay	when	 complying	documents	 are	
presented.	A	less	advantageous	arrangement	is	also	possible	where	the	bank	merely	advises	
the	seller-beneficiary	that	the	credit	has	been	opened.	Once	the	opening	of	the	credit	has	
been	 communicated	 to	 the	 beneficiary,	 the	 obligations	 created	 by	 the	 credit	 are	
irrevocable;43	it	will	be	impossible	to	amend	the	terms	of	payment	without	the	beneficiary’s	
assent.	
	
The	bank	must	examine	the	documents	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	terms	of	the	credit	
within	five	banking	days.44	If	the	documents	do	so	comply,	the	confirming	bank	must	make	
payment	 to	 the	 beneficiary.45	 The	 confirming	 bank	 then	 presents	 the	 documents	 to	 the	
issuing	institution.	If	the	issuing	bank	deems	that	the	documents	comply,	it	will	reimburse	the	
confirming	bank	and	then	debit	the	applicant’s	account	in	exchange	for	the	documents.		
	
Where	the	documents	do	not	conform,	the	bank	“may	refuse	to	honour	or	negotiate.”46		The	
factors	which	inform	this	decision	will	depend	upon	whether	the	bank	is	the	confirming	or	
issuing	 institution.	 In	 line	with	the	doctrine	of	autonomy,	discussed	below,	 the	confirming	
bank’s	decision	depends	solely	on	an	examination	of	the	documents.47	By	contrast,	the	issuing	
bank	 may	 approach	 the	 applicant	 for	 permission	 to	 waive	 the	 discrepancies	 in	 the	
																																																						
41	Trans	Trust	SPRL	v	Danubia	Trading	Co	[1952]	2	QB	297,	304	per	Lord	Denning;	Brindle	and	Cox	(n29)	[8-035].	
Recently	confirmed	in	Mena	Energy	DMCC	v	Hascol	Petroleum	Ltd	[2017]	EWHC	262	(Comm);	[2017]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	
607,	[161]	per	Males	J.		
42	Hamzeh	Malas	&	Sons	v	British	Imex	Industries	[1958]	2	QB	127,	129	per	Jenkins	LJ.		
43	UCP	600	art.2.	
44	UCP	600	art.	14(b).	
45	UCP	600	art.8.	The	precise	time	of	payment	will	depend	on	the	type	of	credit	chosen	by	the	parties,	see	UCP	600	
art.2.	
46	UCP	600	art.	16(a).	
47	UCP	600	art.	14(a).	
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documents.48	If	the	bank	decides	to	reject	the	presentation,	it	must	do	so	within	five	banking	
days	and	provide	a	list	of	discrepancies	for	the	beneficiary.49	Provided	that	the	credit	has	not	
yet	expired,	 the	beneficiary	may	 remedy	 the	defects	and	make	a	 further	presentation	 for	
payment.	 Finally,	 where	 the	 bank	 and	 beneficiary	 disagree	 about	 the	 existence	 of	
discrepancies,	the	bank	may	agree	to	make	payment	under	reserve	or	subject	to	a	letter	of	
indemnity	from	the	beneficiary.50		
	
A. The	law	governing	documentary	credits	
At	its	heart,	the	documentary	credit	is	a	device	of	commercial	origin	and,	as	such,	does	not	
readily	conform	to	a	strict	contractual	analysis.51	Notwithstanding	these	analytical	issues,	the	
courts	have	 recognised	 that	 the	credit	 creates	 the	network	of	 contracts,	discussed	above.	
Given	that	the	credit	mechanism	is	used	by	parties	across	jurisdictions,	a	degree	of	uniformity	
in	 how	 these	 contracts	 are	 interpreted	 is	 desirable.	 Beginning	 in	 1933,	 the	 International	
Chamber	of	Commerce	set	about	a	task	which	has	resulted	in	significant	harmonisation	in	the	
use	of	documentary	credits.52	The	Uniform	Customs	and	Practices	for	Documentary	Credits	
(UCP)	is	a	voluntary	set	of	rules	which	gain	the	force	of	law	through	inclusion	in	the	parties’	
contract.53	Almost	all	transactions	financed	by	documentary	credit	expressly	incorporate	the	
UCP.54		
	
The	current	version	of	 the	UCP,	 the	UCP	600,	entered	 into	 force	 in	 July	2007.	The	English	
courts	interpret	the	UCP	purposively55	given	that	it	embodies	“international	practice	and	the	
																																																						
48	UCP	600	art.	16(b).	
49	UCP	600	art.	14(b),	16(c).	
50	 C	 Schmitthoff,	 'Discrepancies	 of	 documents	 in	 letter	 of	 credit	 transactions'	 (1987)	 JBL	 94,	 104-108.	 A	
comprehensive	account	of	these	methods	of	payment	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
51	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n29)	209,	235;	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[1.16];	Angelica-Whitewear	
(n2)	 82	 per	 Le	Dain	 J,	 “…no	 completely	 satisfactory	 rationale	 has	 been	 found	 in	 the	 established	 categories	 of	
contract	theory,	but	the	judicial	recognition	of	its	legal	enforceability	is	now	beyond	dispute.”	
52	UCP	600	art.	1,	“The	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	for	Documentary	Credits,	2007	Revision,	ICC	Publication	no.	
600	("UCP")	are	rules	that	apply	to	any	documentary	credit…when	the	text	of	the	credit	expressly	indicates	that	it	
is	subject	to	these	rules.	They	are	binding	on	all	parties	thereto	unless	expressly	modified	or	excluded	by	the	credit.”	
See	UCP	600	(Foreword):	“The	objective,	since	attained,	was	to	create	a	set	of	contractual	rules	that	would	establish	
uniformity	in	that	practice,	so	that	practitioners	would	not	have	to	cope	with	a	plethora	of	often	conflicting	national	
regulations.”	
53	Ulph	(n20)	355.	
54	F	Lorenzon,	‘International	trade	and	shipping	documents’	in	Y	Baatz	(ed.),	Maritime	Law	(4th	ed.	Informa,	2017)	
116.	
55	Fortis	Bank	SA/NV	v	Indian	Overseas	Bank	[2011]	EWCA	Civ	58,	[2011]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	33,	[29]	per	Thomas	LJ.	
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expectations	 of	 international	 bankers	 and	 international	 traders	 so	 that	 it	 underpins	 the	
operation	of	letters	of	credit	in	international	trade.”56	The	parties	are	free	to	vary	these	terms	
by	agreement.57	
	
The	UCP	does	not,	however,	provide	a	comprehensive	guide	on	matters	relating	to	letters	of	
credit.58	 In	areas	where	 the	UCP	 is	 silent,	 and	 in	 the	absence	of	an	express	 choice	of	 law	
clause,59	the	Rome	Convention	determines	that	the	contract	will	be	governed	by	the	law	of	
the	country	with	which	the	contract	has	the	closest	connection.60	The	most	significant	factors	
for	this	purpose	will	be	the	location	of	the	bank	first	checking	the	documents	for	compliance	
and	the	place	at	which	payment	is	made	to	the	beneficiary.61	This	will	typically	be	the	country	
in	 which	 the	 confirming	 bank	 and	 beneficiary	 are	 based,	 the	 seller-beneficiary’s	 home	
country.62	 The	 residual	 role	 for	 national	 law	 undermines	 the	 significant	 degree	 of	
harmonisation	which	has	been	achieved	in	many	aspects	of	documentary	credit	use.	This	is	
most	 notable	 in	 relation	 to	 the	effect	 of	 fraud	on	 the	 letter	 of	 credit	 transaction,63	 to	be	
discussed	in	Part	III.	
	
The	provisions	of	the	UCP	and	their	purposive	interpretation	by	national	courts	ensures	that	
the	 credit	meets	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 commercial	 community.	 In	 particular,	 traders	 desire	 a	
payment	mechanism	which	 is	 “as	good	as	cash,”64	by	which	 I	mean	a	device	under	which	
payment	is	virtually	unassailable	and	enables	documents	to	be	transferred	between	parties	
without	 onerous	 notice	 requirements.65	 These	 characteristics	 are	 highly	 desirable	 in	 the	
commercial	 world	 and	 particularly	 useful	 in	 transactions	 where	 multiple	 re-sales	 are	
																																																						
56	Ibid	[29]	per	Thomas	LJ.	See	also,	Glencore	International	AG	v	Bank	of	China	[1996]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	135,	148	per	
Sir	Thomas	Bingham	MR:	 In	construing	 the	UCP,	courts	“seek	 to	give	effect	 to	 the	 international	consequences	
underlying	the	UCP.”	
57	UCP	600	art.	1.	
58	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[1.23].	
59	Ibid	[13.47]:	“It	is	unusual	for	a	letter	of	credit	to	specify	a	governing	law,	though	there	is	no	reason	why	it	should	
not	do	so.”	
60	Rome	Convention	on	the	Law	applicable	to	Contractual	Obligations	1980,	art.4.1	
61	Marconi	Communications	International	v	PT	Pan	Indonesia	Bank	[2007]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	72,	[63]	per	Potter	LJ.	
62	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[13.49].	
63	 Carr	 (n28)	 438.	 For	 a	 comparative	 discussion	of	 the	American	 approach	 to	 fraud	 in	 credit	 transactions,	 see	
Chapter	Five,	Part	I.		
64	Power	Curber	v	Bank	of	Kuwait	[1981]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	394,	398	per	Denning	LJ;	Safa	v	Banque	du	Caire	[2000]	2	
Lloyd’s	Rep.	600,	605	per	Waller	LJ.	
65	Chitty	(32nd	ed.)	(n20)	[34-001].	
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envisaged.66	 The	 importance	 of	 a	 commercially	 desirable	 mechanism	 are	 particularly	
apparent	in	the	development	of	the	twin	doctrines	of	autonomy	and	strict	compliance.		
	
	
B. Autonomy	and	strict	compliance	
i. The	principle	of	autonomy	
An	efficient	system	of	 trade	financing	 is	said	to	depend	on	the	autonomous	nature	of	 the	
contracts	created	by	the	letter	of	credit.67	The	principle	itself	is	enshrined	in	the	following	two	
provisions	of	the	UCP,	
	
Article	4a	
A	credit	by	its	nature	is	a	separate	transaction	from	the	sale	or	other	contract	on	which	
it	may	be	based.	Banks	are	in	no	way	concerned	with	or	bound	by	such	contract,	even	
if	 any	 reference	 whatsoever	 to	 it	 is	 included	 in	 the	 credit.	 Consequently,	 the	
undertaking	of	a	bank	to	honour,	to	negotiate	or	to	fulfil	any	other	obligation	under	
the	 credit	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 claims	 or	 defences	 by	 the	 applicant	 resulting	 from	 its	
relationships	with	the	issuing	bank	or	the	beneficiary.	A	beneficiary	can	in	no	case	avail	
itself	of	the	contractual	relationships	existing	between	banks	or	between	the	applicant	
and	the	issuing	bank.68	
	
Article	5	
Banks	deal	with	documents	and	not	with	goods,	services	or	performance	to	which	the	
documents	may	relate.69	
	
Put	simply,	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	treats	as	distinct	each	of	the	contracts	created	by	the	
letter	of	credit.	This	means	that	each	contract	is	to	be	enforced	by	reference	to	its	own	terms	
without	reference	to	other	contracts	in	the	network.70	Autonomy	is	most	visible	in	the	bank’s	
decision	to	make	payment	since	only	considerations	of	documentary	compliance	are	relevant.	
																																																						
66	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[2.040]-[2.041].	
67	Angelica-Whitewear	(n2)	70	per	Le	Dain	J	“international	commercial	utility”.	
68	UCP	600	art.	4(a).	
69	UCP	600	art.	5.	
70	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4-021].	
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The	bank	must	ignore	the	buyer’s	assertions	that	the	seller	has	shipped	poor	quality	goods	or	
breached	the	contract	in	some	other	way.71	The	operation	of	the	credit	contract	is	therefore	
independent	from	the	operation	of	the	underlying	contract	of	sale.	
	
The	effect	of	autonomy	is	to	cast	the	bank’s	role	in	purely	clerical	terms.	This	can	be	justified	
for	 two	 distinct	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 to	 require	 banks	 to	 assess	 the	 commercial	materiality	 of	
discrepancies	would	require	expertise	in	the	particular	transaction.	This	is	unrealistic.72	The	
UCP	confirms	that	a	determination	of	conformity	is	not	to	be	equated	with	evidence	of	the	
genuineness	or	accuracy	of	the	documents.73	A	second	justification	relates	to	the	speed	of	
payment.	 Documentary	 compliance	 can	 be	 gauged	 relatively	 quickly,	 facilitating	 the	
commercial	desire	for	swift	payment.	
	
The	contractual	nature	of	the	documentary	credit	provides	a	further	perspective	from	which	
we	can	appreciate	the	doctrine	of	autonomy.	Goode	has	commented	that	there	is	“no	good	
reason	why	the	issuing	bank	should	be	entitled	to	invoke	the	protection	of	the	sales	contract,	
to	which	 it	 is	 a	 stranger.”74	 This	 reiterates	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 bank	 cannot	 have	 regard	 to	
contractual	disputes	between	buyer	and	seller	in	determining	whether	payment	is	due	under	
the	 credit.	 The	 contractual	 explanation	 of	 autonomy	 remains	 valid	 notwithstanding	 the	
enactment	 of	 the	 Contract	 (Rights	 of	 Third	 Parties)	 Act	 1999	 which	 limits	 third	 party	
enforceability	to	circumstances	where	the	contract	expressly	so	provides	or	confers	a	benefit	
on	a	third	party.75	Given	that	the	bank’s	role	is	to	facilitate	the	transaction,	the	underlying	
contract	of	sale	will	not	confer	a	benefit	on	a	bank	for	the	purposes	of	the	1999	Act.	
	
If	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	was	absolute,	by	which	I	mean	that	in	no	circumstances	could	
payment	 be	 disrupted	 by	 extraneous	 considerations,	 the	 mechanism	 would	 offer	 virtual	
certainty	 and	 security	 of	 payment.	 The	 standard,	 both	 that	 enunciated	by	 the	 courts	 and	
contained	within	the	UCP,	is	not	absolute,	but	rather	recognises	the	risk	of	beneficiary	fraud	
and	the	reality	that	documents	may	not	be	wholly	compliant	in	all	presentations.	
																																																						
71	Turkiye	Is	Bankasi	v	Bank	of	China	[1998]	1	Lloyd's	Rep	250,	253,	255	per	Hirst	LJ.	
72	Equitable	Trust	Co	of	New	York	v	Dawson	Partners	Ltd	(1926)	27	Ll	L	Rep	49,	52	per	Viscount	Cave.	
73	UCP	600	art.	34.	
74	Goode,	'Abstract	payment	undertakings'	(n29)	219.	
75	Contracts	(Rights	of	Third	Parties)	Act	1999	s.1(1)	
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Where	the	presented	documents	contain	discrepancies,	the	UCP	entitles	the	issuing	bank	to	
reject	the	presentation	or	to	seek	a	waiver	from	its	customer,	the	credit	applicant,	to	make	
payment.76	 This	 evidently	 is	 designed	 to	 facilitate	 payment	 in	 the	 real	world	 of	 technical	
discrepancies	and	so	forth.	The	evidence	suggests	that	banks	frequently	take	advantage	of	
this	 entitlement	 in	 practice.77	 The	 re-introduction	 of	 the	 buyer	 into	 the	 payment	 process	
resurrects	the	risk	of	buyer	opportunism	and,	more	importantly,	the	risk	that	factors	other	
than	 documentary	 compliance	 will	 determine	 payment.78	 As	 such,	 although	 waiver	
undoubtedly	enables	payments	to	be	made	in	cases	of	document	discrepancy,	the	process	
itself	undermines	the	doctrine	of	autonomy.		
	
The	creation	of	specific	exceptions	to	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	is	a	matter	for	the	common	
law	and,	there	is	no	doubt	that	the	English	courts	have	been	cautious	in	this	regard.	The	effect	
of	any	exception	to	autonomy	is	to	make	payment	less	certain	since	factors	unrelated	to	the	
credit	contract	itself	may	operate	to	disrupt	or	prevent	payment.	This	has	been	expressed	in	
colourful	language	by	the	courts,	most	notably	in	the	concern	that	exceptions	would	cause	
“thrombosis”	to	occur	in	the	“life	blood	of	commerce.”79	
	
The	resulting	exceptions	to	autonomy	have	been	cast	in	narrow	terms	and	to	the	extent	that	
public	policy	would	demand.	The	most	significant	of	these,	and	the	focus	of	the	project,	is	the	
fraud	exception.	The	conflict	between	the	commercial	utility	of	the	mechanism	and	the	need	
to	prevent	fraud,	identified	in	the	opening	remarks	of	this	chapter,	is	particularly	apparent	in	
the	development	of	the	fraud	exception	to	autonomy.	
	
ii. The	principle	of	strict	compliance		
The	doctrine	of	strict	compliance	refers	to	the	standard	against	which	demands	for	payment	
and	 reimbursement	 are	 judged.	 Presentations	 which	 fail	 to	 attain	 this	 standard,	 due	 to	
																																																						
76	UCP	600	art.	16(b).	
77	Mann	(n8)	2513.	
78	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.015].	
79	 Intraco	 Ltd	 v	 Notis	 Shipping	 Corporation	 of	 Liberia	 (The	 Bhoja	 Trader)	 [1981]	 2	 Lloyd’s	 Rep.	 256,	 257	 per	
Donaldson	LJ.	
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missing	 documents	 or	 documents	 which	 indicate	 the	 wrong	 shipment	 date	 for	 example,	
entitle	the	bank	to	refuse	payment.	The	precise	standard	of	compliance	has	been	formulated	
in	different	terms	under	the	UCP	and	by	case	law	and	so	a	degree	of	precision	is	required.	It	
is	conventional	to	begin	with	a	consideration	of	the	position	at	common	law	and	to	chart	the	
evolving	approach	to	the	question	of	compliance.	The	early	cases	favoured	a	strict	approach	
to	 compliance.	 The	 leading	 exposition	 is	 found	 in	 Equitable	 Trust	 of	 New	 York	 v	 Dawson	
Partners,	
It	is	both	common	ground	and	common	sense	that	in	such	a	transaction	the	accepting	
bank	can	only	claim	indemnity	if	the	conditions	on	which	it	is	authorised	to	accept	are	
in	the	matter	of	the	accompanying	documents	strictly	observed,	there	is	no	room	for	
documents	which	are	almost	the	same,	or	which	will	do	just	as	well.	Business	could	
not	proceed	securely	on	any	other	lines.80	
This	approach	was	endorsed	 in	subsequent	case	 law.81	The	 facts	of	 JH	Rayner	v	Hambro’s	
Bank82	provide	a	useful	illustration	of	strict	compliance	in	practice.	The	exchange	involved	the	
sale	 of	 Coromandel	 groundnuts.	 The	 bill	 of	 lading,	 however,	 listed	 ‘machine-shelled	
groundnut	kernels’	though	it	was	common	ground	that	these	were	identical	to	the	specified	
groundnuts.	 The	 bank	 refused	 to	 pay.	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 held	 that	 the	 rejection	 was	
legitimate	as	the	bank	had	a	limited	contractual	mandate	to	pay	and	as	such	“acts	at	its	peril	
if	it	departs	from	the	precise	terms	of	the	mandate.”83		
More	recent	case	law	has	questioned	the	level	of	stringency	that	documents	must	attain.84	In	
particular,	 the	 courts	 will	 block	 attempts	 by	 banks	 to	 reject	 documents	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
technical	discrepancies.	This	was	made	clear	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	Kredietbank	Antwerp	
v	Midland	Bank:	
The	 requirement	 of	 strict	 compliance	 is	 not	 equivalent	 to	 a	 test	 of	 exact	 literal	
compliance	 in	 all	 circumstances	 and	 as	 regards	 all	 documents,	 to	 some	 extent,	
																																																						
80	Equitable	Trust	(n72)	52	per	Viscount	Cave.	
81	For	example,	Gian	Singh	v	Banque	de	l'Indochine	[1974]	1	WLR	1234,	1240	per	Lord	Diplock	“this	oft-cited	passage	
has	never	been	questioned	or	improved	on.”	
82	JH	Rayner	v	Hambro's	Bank	[1943]	KB	37,	37.	
83	Ibid	37	per	MacKinnon	LJ,	42-43	per	Goddard	LJ.	
84	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[8.31].	
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therefore,	the	banker	must	exercise	his	own	judgment	whether	the	requirement	 is	
satisfied	by	the	documents	presented	to	him.85	
This	suggests	that	the	bank	does	not	occupy	a	purely	administrative	role	but	must	in	certain	
circumstances	exercise	some	discretion.	This	counters	the	impression	of	autonomy	discussed	
in	 the	 preceding	 section.	 In	 Kredietbank,	 the	 credit	 required	 a	 report	 issued	 by	 ‘Griffith	
Inspectorate’.	 The	 beneficiary	 tendered	 a	 document	 issued	 by	 ‘Daniel	 C	Griffith	 (Holland)	
BV…member	 of	 the	 worldwide	 inspectorate’	 which	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 determined	 was	
compliant	 and	 ordered	 payment	 to	 be	 made.86	 The	 authors	 of	 Jack	 have	 criticised	 this	
approach.	They	have	opined	that	the	documents	may	need	to	be	exactly	compliant	for	certain	
parties	in	a	string	sale	who	will	never	physically	receive	the	goods.87	Their	preference	would	
be	for	banks	to	reject	documents	containing	discrepancies	like	those	in	Kredietbank	unless	“it	
is	 unmistakeably	 typographical	 [or]	 the	 document	 could	 not	 reasonably	 be	 referring	 to	 a	
person	or	organisation	different	 from	 the	one	 specified	 in	 the	 credit.”88	 There	 is	 clearly	a	
balance	to	be	struck	here	to	ensure	that	payments	are	not	unreasonably	withheld.	The	reality,	
however,	is	that	this	balance	will	need	to	be	determined	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
The	phrase	‘strict	compliance’	does	not	appear	in	the	UCP;	the	obligation	to	make	payment	
instead	arises	against	a	‘complying	presentation’	judged	against	“the	terms	and	conditions	of	
the	 credit,	 the	 applicable	 provisions	 of	 these	 rules	 and	 international	 standard	 banking	
practice	 (ISBP)”.89	 There	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 qualification	 that	 this	 duty	 is	 carried	 out	 with	
reasonable	 care90	 since	 it	was	 considered	 that	 this	made	 little	 practical	 difference	 to	 the	
process	of	examination.91	
																																																						
85	Kredietbank	Antwerp	v	Midland	Bank	[1999]	CLC	1108,	[12]	per	Evans	LJ.	
86	 Ibid	 [57]	 The	 court	 commented	 further	 that	 “[i]f	 there	 is	 a	 literal	 requirement	 that	 the	 name	 ‘Griffith	
Inspectorate’	shall	appear	in	the	documents,	then	it	does	so,	assuming	only	that	there	is	a	world-wide	Inspectorate	
group	and	that	the	company	bearing	the	name	Daniel	C.	Griffith	(Holland)	is	a	member	of	it.	That	is	an	assumption	
which,	as	the	judge	held,	an	experienced	banker	can	be	expected	to	make”	
87	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[8.37].	
88	Ibid	[8.38].	
89	UCP	600	art.	2.	The	duties	of	 the	 issuing	and	confirming	banks	 to	pay	against	a	complying	presentation	are	
contained	in	art.	7(a)	and	art.	15(a),	and	art.	8(a)	and	art.	15(b),	respectively.	See	also,	ICC,	International	Standard	
Banking	Practice	681	(2007	Revision,	ICC	Publication	no.	681),	a	set	of	best	practices	for	document	examination	
and	a	guide	as	to	how	credits	should	be	operated	on	a	day-to-day	basis.	
90	See,	for	example,	UCP	500	art.	13(a).	
91	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[8.3].	
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The	 ISBP	 confirms	 the	 direction	 of	 travel	 in	 case	 law	 as	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘complying	
presentation’.	It	provides	that	“a	misspelling	or	typing	error	that	does	not	affect	the	meaning	
of	 a	 word	 or	 the	 sentence	 in	 which	 it	 occurs,	 does	 not	make	 a	 document	 discrepant.”92	
Abbreviations	 in	 general	 use	 will	 also	 not	 affect	 a	 determination	 of	 compliance.93	 This	
approach	 to	 questions	 of	 compliance	 is	 appropriate;	 it	 should	 ensure	 that	 the	 presented	
documents	 serve	 their	 commercial	 purposes	 without	 insisting	 on	 an	 unrealistic	 standard	
which	could	unduly	frustrate	transactions.		
The	 process	 of	 document	 examination	 is	 a	 complex	 undertaking	 for	 the	 banks.	 As	 banks	
cannot	look	beyond	the	face	of	the	documents	to	determine	compliance,	it	is	possible	that	
payment	 is	made	against	documents	which	appear	to	conform	but	are	 later	discovered	to	
contain	defects.	This	would	be	the	case	where	documents	had	been	falsified	to	conceal	late	
shipment	or	had	been	authorised	by	a	forged	signature.	The	subsequent	discovery	of	defects	
is	 problematic	 since	 payment	 will	 have	 already	 been	 made	 to	 the	 seller.	 In	 light	 of	 this	
possibility,	the	UCP	establishes	the	rule	of	apparent	compliance	which	guarantees	the	paying	
bank’s	right	to	reimbursement	in	circumstances	where	the	documents	appeared	to	comply	
with	the	terms	of	the	credit	at	the	time	of	payment.94	Without	such	protection,	banks	may	
well	 become	 unwilling	 to	 finance	 international	 transactions	 by	 documentary	 credit	 and,	
therefore,	the	rule	of	apparent	compliance	is	to	be	welcomed.	
A	potential	risk	associated	with	the	principle	of	strict	compliance	is	that	it	could	open	the	door	
to	opportunistic	behaviour	by	the	issuing	bank.	Opportunism	in	this	sense	would	contemplate	
the	identification	of	any	discrepancy	to	refuse	payment,95	particularly	if	this	was	accompanied	
by	pressure	 from	 its	 customer	or	 the	 suspicion	of	 fraud.	Of	 course,	 this	would	not	 be	 an	
illegitimate	response	to	discrepancies	on	an	isolated	reading	of	the	terms	of	the	credit	and	
UCP.	This	is	unlikely	to	be	a	significant	risk	in	practice,	however,	since	banks	have	a	vested	
																																																						
92	ISBP	681	(n89)	[25].	
93	Ibid	[6].	
94	UCP	600	art.	14(a);	Brindle	and	Cox	(n29)	[8-088]-[8.089].	
95	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.019];	See	also	Guaranty	Trust	Co	of	New	York	v	Van	den	Berghs	(1925)	22	
Ll	L	Rep	112,	114	per	Roche	J	that	a	bank	could	reject	documents	on	the	basis	of	minor	discrepancies	if	the	market	
had	fallen.	This	is	of	course	subject	to	the	bank’s	knowledge	and	interest	that	the	market	had	fallen.	This	would	
seem	to	contradict	the	modern	view	that	banks	are	not	to	assess	the	materiality	of	discrepancies	but	simply	to	
determine	whether	documents	comply.	
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interest	in	payments	succeeding	for	reputational	reasons.96	Empirical	research	gives	credence	
to	 this	 assertion.	 The	 evidence	 demonstrates	 that	 payments	 are	 routinely	 made	 against	
discrepant	 presentations	 notwithstanding	 the	 existence	 of	 defects	 which	 would	 justify	
rejection.97	Detailed	discussion	of	this	empirical	work	is	postponed	until	Chapter	Five	but,	for	
now,	 it	 suffices	 to	say	 that	 this	evidence	undermines	 the	possibility	 that	strict	compliance	
might	operate	as	a	proxy	for	suspicions	of	fraud.	
Much	 like	 the	doctrine	of	 autonomy,	 the	principle	of	 strict	 compliance	ensures	 the	 credit	
fulfils	 its	 function	 as	 an	 efficient	method	 of	 trade	 financing.	 Firstly,	 the	 determination	 of	
whether	the	documents	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	credit	is	much	more	straightforward	
than	 a	 process	 which	 demanded	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 materiality	 of	 any	 documentary	
defects.	This	enables	the	bank	to	examine	documents	within	the	five	days	permitted	by	the	
UCP98	which	contributes	to	the	commercial	demand	for	a	swift	payment	mechanism.		
Strict	compliance	should	also	provide	a	degree	of	reassurance	for	the	buyer.	Firstly,	this	 is	
because	 compliant	 documents	 should	 only	 be	 capable	 of	 production	when	 the	 seller	 has	
performed	his	substantive	obligations.99	In	addition,	the	bank’s	ability	to	reject	documents	
containing	minor	discrepancies	should	provide	some	protection	against	fraud100	since	such	
defects	may	indicate	wrongdoing	by	the	credit	beneficiary.101	This	should	minimise	the	risk	
for	the	buyer	of	making	payment	in	advance	of	receiving	the	goods.	
The	 legal	 framework	 which	 has	 developed	 to	 support	 documentary	 credit	 transactions	
reflects	 the	 commercial	 desire	 for	 an	 efficient	 system	 of	 financing	 which	 cannot	 be	
undermined	by	disputes	relating	to	the	underlying	contract	of	sale.	This	makes	sense	in	an	
environment	of	honesty.	A	risk	that	remains	unmitigated	by	the	credit	mechanism	and	a	legal	
framework	 which	 privileges	 autonomy	 is	 the	 risk	 that	 the	 beneficiary	 will	 commit	 fraud.	
																																																						
96	Harbottle	(n31)	151	per	Kerr	J;	Bolivinter	Oil	SA	v	Chase	Manhattan	Bank	[1984]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	251,	257	per	Sir	
John	Donaldson	MR:	the	injunction	undermines	“the	bank’s	greatest	asset…namely	its	reputation	for	financial	and	
contractual	probity.	Furthermore,	if	this	happens	at	all	frequently,	the	value	of	all	irrevocable	letters	of	credit	and	
performance	bonds	and	guarantees	will	be	undermined.”	
97	Mann	(n8)	2502	–	2504.	
98	UCP	600	art.	14(b).	
99	Mann	(n8)	2505;	M	Moses,	‘Letters	of	credit	and	the	insolvent	applicant:	A	recipe	for	bad	faith	dishonor’	(2005-
2006)	57	Ala	L	Rev	31,	47.	
100	D	Horowitz,	Letters	of	Credit	and	Demand	Guarantees:	Defences	to	Payment	(OUP,	2010),	[3.19];	Ellinger,	‘Fraud	
in	 documentary	 credit	 transactions’	 (n25)	 260;	 W	 Chew,	 ‘Strict	 compliance	 in	 letters	 of	 credit:	 The	 bankers	
protection	or	bane?’	(1990)	2	S	Ac	LJ	70,	71.	
101	Horowitz	(n100)	[3.19].	
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Cognisant	 of	 this	 gap,	 the	 English	 courts	 have	 crafted	 a	 fraud	 exception	 to	 autonomy	 to	
respond	to	wrongdoing	by	the	beneficiary.	This	is	the	focus	for	the	remainder	of	the	chapter.	
	
III. The	Fraud	Exception	
The	development	of	the	fraud	exception	causes	the	competing	policy	considerations	of	the	
autonomy	of	 the	credit	mechanism	and	fraud	deterrence	to	collide.102	This	 is	because	the	
demand	for	an	efficient	and	unassailable	payment	mechanism,	facilitated	by	the	doctrine	of	
autonomy,	 is	wholly	 opposed	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 system	designed	 to	 uncover	 and	
sanction	fraud.	
	
The	risk	of	fraud	–	heightened	by	containerisation	and	high-quality	reproduction	methods	–	
means	that	a	wholly	autonomous	mechanism	would	be	problematic.	If	the	credit	applicant	
could	never	adduce	evidence	extraneous	to	the	documents,	this	would	give	the	green	light	to	
the	 fraudulent	 beneficiary	 whose	 wrongdoing	 would	 be	 concealed	 by	 documents	 which	
appeared	to	conform.	It	follows	that	an	exception	to	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	in	cases	of	
fraud	is	required	for	reasons	of	public	policy.	As	an	exception	to	autonomy,	this	enables	the	
claimant	to	look	beyond	the	documents	to	furnish	the	necessary	evidence103	by,	for	example,	
introducing	documentary	evidence	relating	to	the	underlying	contract,	evidence	from	third	
parties	and	evidence	of	the	quality	of	the	goods.	
	
The	impact	of	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	is	not	established	in	the	UCP.	Instead,	the	ICC	have	
taken	the	view	that	fraud	is	a	controversial	issue	which	is	best	left	to	national	courts	to	fashion	
rules	 in	 line	with	 local	 attitudes.104	 In	 balancing	 the	 competing	 policy	 considerations,	 the	
English	courts	have	consistently	emphasised	the	autonomy	of	the	mechanism	over	a	more	
robust	anti-fraud	rule.	The	resulting	exception	is	narrow	in	scope,	requiring	the	claimant	to	
prove	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	as	well	as	several	other	onerous	criteria.	This	means	that	the	
English	courts	will	only	intervene	to	disrupt	payments	under	the	credit	mechanism	in	the	most	
																																																						
102	This	is	the	balancing	exercise	referred	to	in	the	opening	paragraphs	of	this	chapter,	see	text	to	fn	2.	
103	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.2].	
104	ICC	Banking	Commission,	‘Latest	queries	answered	by	the	ICC	Banking	Commission’	(1997)	3(2)	Documentary	
Credits	Insight	6	cited	in	A	Davidson,	‘Fraud,	the	Prime	Exception	to	the	Autonomy	Principle	in	Letters	of	Credit’	
(2003)	8	Intl.	Trade	&	Bus	L	Ann	23,	26.	
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exceptional	 of	 circumstances.	 The	 limited	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 exception	 can	 be	
invoked	in	practice	calls	into	question	the	explanatory	power	of	the	notion	that	fraud	unravels	
all.	 It	 also	 brings	 into	 focus	 other	 documentary	 defects	 unconnected	 to	 the	 beneficiary,	
notably	documents	which	have	been	forged	or	are	nullities,	and	whether	these	can	be	used	
to	delay	payment	under	a	documentary	credit.	
	
The	following	discussion	charts	the	restrictive	approach	to	fraud	in	English	law.	It	commences	
with	a	consideration	of	how	the	courts	have	conceived	of	the	fraud	problem	and	their	role	in	
combatting	fraud	(A).	It	then	discusses	the	circumstances	in	which	the	fraud	exception	can	be	
employed	(B).	Much	like	the	insurance	forfeiture	rule,	the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	
credits	depends	in	part	on	ex	turpi	causa.	A	considered	analysis	of	the	juridical	basis	of	the	
rule	is	undertaken	in	part	C.	The	procedural	aspects	of	the	fraud	exception	–	the	criteria	the	
claimant	will	need	to	satisfy	(D),	the	standard	of	proof	(E)	and	issues	relating	to	the	interim	
injunction	(F)	are	then	considered	in	turn.		
	
	
A. Setting	the	scene:	Judicial	conceptions	of	fraud		
There	are	few	statistics	with	which	to	gauge	the	extent	of	the	fraud	problem	in	documentary	
credits.	An	absence	of	fraud	cases	in	England105	has	contributed	to	this	obscurity	but	this	is	
more	 likely	 due	 to	 the	 chilling	 effect	 of	 the	 judicial	 construction	 of	 fraud,	 than	 an	 actual	
absence	of	 fraud.	As	 such,	 there	 are	 only	 very	 limited	 indications	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 the	
problem.	 One	 such	 indication	 appears	 from	 Langley	 J’s	 judgment	 in	 Banco	 Santander	 v	
Bayfern	in	which	he	commented	that,	“it	was	comforting	to	hear	from	both	experts	that	the	
incidence	of	fraud	in	these	situations	is	very	rare	indeed…whilst	when	it	arises	[is]	no	doubt	
capable	of	involving	very	large	sums.”106	Reference	should	also	be	made	to	the	most	recent	
																																																						
105	M	Bridge,	The	International	Sale	of	Goods	Law	&	Practice	(2nd	ed.	OUP,	2007),	[6.84],	“failure	of	fraud	cases	to	
go	to	trial	gives	rise	to	some	difficulty	in	defining	fraud	and	giving	instructive	examples.”	See	also	E	Symons,	‘Letters	
of	credit:	Fraud,	good	faith	and	the	basis	for	injunctive	relief’	(1979-1980)	54	Tul	L	Rev	338,	344	which	suggests	that	
patterns	of	litigation	mirror	economic	cycles	in	business.	
106	Banco	Santander	SA	v	Bayfern	Ltd	[1999]	CLC	1321,	1332.	In	this	case	the	confirming	bank	had	discounted	the	
letter	of	credit	to	the	beneficiary.	The	beneficiary’s	fraud	was	discovered	after	discounting	but	before	maturity.	
The	question	for	the	court	was	whether	the	risk	of	fraud	should	be	borne	by	the	confirming	bank	or	the	issuing	
bank	(and	applicant)	under	the	UCP	500.	The	risk	was	determined	to	lie	with	the	confirming	bank	because	the	bank	
had	taken	an	assignment	of	the	beneficiary’s	rights.	The	position	has	now	been	changed	under	the	UCP	600	art.	
7(c)	and	art.	12(b).	
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Trade	Finance	Survey	conducted	by	the	 ICC	which	recorded	the	“troublesome	trend[s]”	of	
increasing	allegations	of	 fraud	and	applications	 for	 injunctions.107	Of	course,	 this	does	not	
mean	that	fraud	is	happening	with	any	greater	regularity	than	previously.	
	
An	efficient	system	of	trade	depends	on	the	ability	to	sell	goods	on	the	basis	of	documents	
and	 for	 those	 documents	 to	 transfer	 ownership	 to	 the	 buyer.108	 The	 bill	 of	 lading	 was	
developed	for	this	purpose.	It	was	common	practice	that	bills	of	lading	were	issued	in	three	
sets	 as	 a	 safeguard	 for	 the	 buyer	 against	 lost	 documents.109	 This,	 however,	 creates	 the	
possibility	for	fraud110	as	the	seller	could	theoretically	sell	the	same	cargo	to	multiple	buyers	
and	issue	each	a	bill	of	lading.	Bills	of	lading	continue	to	be	issued	in	three	sets111	even	though	
the	 conditions	 justifying	 this	practice	no	 longer	exist.112	Of	 course,	 the	parties	are	 free	 to	
stipulate	that	the	buyer	should	receive	a	full	set	of	bills	of	lading113	and	this	would	provide	
some	protection	against	fraud.	Modern	developments	also	create	opportunities	for	fraud	in	
a	system	where	the	accuracy	of	documents	is	critical.	The	availability	of	high	quality	methods	
of	reproduction	and	the	use	of	containers114	assist	unscrupulous	traders.	
	
Perhaps	surprisingly,	the	fraud	risk	does	not	appear	to	have	affected	the	popularity	of	the	
mechanism.	Indeed,	neither	does	fraud	appear	to	be	perceived	as	a	major	concern	for	the	
contracting	parties.115	As	Todd	has	argued,		
	
																																																						
107	 ICC,	 ‘Global	 Trade	and	Finance	Survey’	 (n23)	37,	45-46.	 (18.5%	of	 respondents	 reported	an	 increase	 in	 the	
allegations	of	fraud.)	
108	Bridge,	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(9th	ed)	(n1)	[18-007];	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(4th	ed.	Penguin,	
2010)	960.	
109	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[3.037].	
110	Sanders	v	Maclean	 (1883)	11	QBD	327,	342	per	Bowen	LJ,	 “The	possibility	of	 its	 separation	 is	 intentionally	
devised	for	 the	purpose	not	of	 fraud,	but	of	protecting	honest	dealing.	The	separation	may	conceivably	afford	
opportunities	of	fraud,	if	the	holders	chose	to	be	dishonest,	but	on	the	whole	the	commercial	world	is	satisfied	to	
run	the	risk	of	this	contingency	for	the	sake	of	the	compensating	advantages	and	conveniences	which	merchants	
rightly	or	wrongly	have	…	believed	to	be	afforded	by	the	system	of	triplicates	or	quadruplicates.”	See	also	UNCTAD,	
‘Documentary	risk’	(n19)	63:	“the	set	of	documents	provided	with	a	letter	of	credit	is	a	passport	to	fraud.”	
111	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[2.052];	P	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	(4th	ed.	
Informa,	2007),	[3.26]	“one	of	which	being	accomplished,	the	others	stand	void.”	
112	Glyn	Mills	Currie	&	Co	v	East	and	West	India	Dock	Co	(1882)	7	App	Cas	591,	599	per	Earl	Cairns.	
113	D	Backus	and	H	Harfield,	‘Customs	and	letters	of	credit:	The	Dixon,	Irmaos	case’	(1952)	52	Colum	L	Rev	589,	593	
suggesting	that	credits	commonly	require	all	three	bills	to	be	presented.	
114	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n2)	[2.047].	
115	Ibid	[2.050],	[4.127].	
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…maritime	 fraud	 is	 facilitated	 by	 a	 trading	 system,	 deliberately	 developed	 over	
decades	 by	 commercial	 parties,	 where	 security	 against	 fraud	 has	 been	 sacrificed,	
apparently	deliberately,	to	commercial	expediency.	The	courts	also	take	the	view	that	
this	 is	what	 the	 commercial	 parties	want.	 There	 are	 costs	 to	 security,	 in	 terms	 of	
convenience	and	speed	as	well	as	financial,	and	the	parties	are	assumed	not	to	want	
to	pay	those	costs.116	
	
The	courts	then	have	conceptualised	their	role	as	giving	effect	to	the	needs	of	the	commercial	
community.	In	the	documentary	credit	context,	this	is	reflected	in	the	importance	of	swift	and	
certain	 payment	 over	 the	 construction	of	 a	 broader	 fraud	 exception.	More	 generally,	 the	
discussion	in	Sanders	v	Maclean	is	useful	in	this	regard,	
	
The	object	of	mercantile	usages	is	to	prevent	the	risk	of	insolvency,	not	of	fraud;	and	
anyone	 who	 attempts	 to	 follow	 and	 understand	 the	 law	merchant	 will	 soon	 find	
himself	 lost	 if	he	begins	by	assuming	that	merchants	conduct	their	business	on	the	
basis	of	attempting	to	insure	themselves	against	fraudulent	dealing.	The	contrary	is	
the	case.117	
	
More	recently,	Lloyd	LJ	endorsed	this	proposition	 in	The	Future	Express	holding	that	“that	
celebrated	observation	is	as	true	today	as	it	was	a	hundred	years	ago.”118	This	view	that	the	
law	merchant	has	no	instrumental	purpose	in	fraud	deterrence	should	not	be	confused	with	
a	 liberal	attitude	to	wrongdoing	by	traders.119	The	converse	is	true.	 Indeed,	rules	on	fraud	
have	 developed	 to	 protect	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 court	 and	 to	 prevent	 the	 fraudster	 from	
benefitting	 from	 his	 own	wrongdoing.	Where	 these	 rules	 operate	 against	 the	 beneficiary	
directly,	he	will	lose	his	entire	right	to	payment	without	any	consideration	of	proportionality	
or	 contributory	 negligence.120	 In	 addition,	 a	 claim	 in	 the	 tort	 of	 deceit	 will	 enable	 the	
defrauded	party	to	recover	the	entirety	of	its	payment	and	damages	for	all	direct	loss	from	
																																																						
116	Ibid	[2.003].	
117	Sanders	(n110)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
118	The	Future	Express	[1993]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	542,	544.	
119	Todd,	‘Outlawing	dishonest	international	traders’	[2000]	LMCLQ	394,	394.	
120	Standard	Chartered	Bank	v	Pakistan	National	 Shipping	Corp.	 (Nos.	2	and	4)	 [2003]	1	AC	959,	 [16]	per	 Lord	
Hoffmann	drawing	support	at	[14]-[17]	from	Edgington	v	Fitzmaurice	(1888)	29	Ch	Div	459.	
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the	beneficiary.121	 In	direct	 actions	against	 the	beneficiary,	 the	 courts	will	 not	hesitate	 to	
enforce	the	highest	standards	of	commercial	morality.122	
	
Fraud	deterrence	is	viewed	as	a	matter	for	the	parties	to	resolve	pre-contractually.	As	Bowen	
LJ	commented	in	Sanders,			
	
Credit,	not	distrust,	 is	 the	basis	of	 commercial	dealings;	mercantile	genius	 consists	
principally	 in	 knowing	 whom	 to	 trust	 and	 with	 whom	 to	 deal,	 and	 commercial	
intercourse	and	communication	is	no	more	based	on	the	supposition	of	fraud	than	it	
is	on	the	supposition	of	forgery.123	
	
This	 assumption	 that	 traders	 will	 only	 deal	 with	 honest	 counterparts	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	
modern	 case	 law.	 In	HIH	v	Chase	Manhattan,	 Lord	Bingham	commented	 that	 commercial	
parties	will	assume	the	“honesty	and	good	faith	of	the	other;	absent	such	an	assumption	they	
would	not	deal.”124	The	same	sentiments	are	evident	in	a	report	issued	by	the	United	Nations	
Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD).	For	buyers,	suggested	UNCTAD,	“the	best	
protection…is	to	make	adequate	inquiries	to	be	able	to	satisfy	themselves	as	to	the	reliability	
of	the	parties	they	deal	with.”125	The	Report	further	attributed	fraud	in	documentary	credits	
to	insufficient	safeguards	to	ensure	that	the	contractual	goods	had	actually	been	shipped.126	
The	courts	evidently	view	commercial	traders	as	able	to	protect	themselves	and,	moreover,	
consider	that	this	is	appropriate;	the	courts’	role	is	not	to	rewrite	the	contract	ex	post.	
	
The	 suggestion	 that	 fraud	 should	 be	 a	matter	 for	 the	 parties	 does	 have	 some	 force.127	 A	
number	 of	 American	 commentators	 have	 characterised	 credit	 transactions	 as	 involving	
																																																						
121	Doyle	v	Olby	(Ironmongers)	Ltd	[1969]	2	QB	158,	167	per	Lord	Denning	MR.	
122	See,	for	example,	Standard	Chartered	Bank	v	Pakistan	National	Shipping	Corp.	(No.	2)	[2000]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	511,	
[2]	per	Evans	LJ.	
123	Sanders	(n110)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
124	HIH	Casualty	&	General	Insurance	v	Chase	Manhattan	[2003]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	61,	68.	See	also	Yam	Seng	Pte	Ltd	v	
International	 Trade	Corporation	 Ltd	 [2013]	 EWHC	111	 (QB),	 [2013]	 1	 Lloyd’s	Rep.	 526,	 [135]	per	 Leggatt	 J:	 “A	
paradigm	example	of	 a	 general	 norm	which	underlies	 almost	 all	 contractual	 relationships	 is	 an	expectation	of	
honesty.	That	expectation	is	essential	to	commerce,	which	depends	critically	on	trust.”		
125	UNCTAD,	‘Documentary	risk’	(n19)	74.	
126	 Ibid	62.	See	also	Ulph	(n20)	368	which	she	suggests	that	the	UCP	600	contains	a	“subtle	message”	that	the	
requirement	of	a	certificate	from	an	independent	expert	is	the	best	protection	against	fraud.	
127	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[2.051].	
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experienced,	commercial	parties	who	do	not	require	judicial	protection.128	On	this	basis,	the	
court’s	role	 is	simply	to	 interpret	the	contractual	agreement.	 In	Gill	&	Duffus	v	Berger,	 for	
example,	the	contract	term	providing	that	the	expert’s	certificate	would	be	determinative	of	
the	quality	of	 the	goods	was	“freely	negotiated	and	 included	 in	 the	contract	between	the	
parties	in	the	interests	of	speed,	certainty	and	economy.”129	If	the	buyer	is	concerned	that	a	
single	expert’s	certificate	does	not	provide	adequate	safeguards,130	he	should	negotiate	for	
greater	protection.	Moreover,	as	Todd	has	argued,	if	the	contract	does	not	require	delivery	
against	a	full	set	of	bills	of	 lading,131	the	onus	 is	on	the	buyer	to	ensure	his	counterpart	 is	
honest	and	not	for	the	courts	to	remake	the	deal	ex	post.132	
	
Judicial	 pronouncements	 in	 general	 do	 not	 contemplate	 the	 risk	 of	 fraud	 in	 international	
trade.133	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	courts	will	permit	a	fraudster	to	get	away	with	wrongdoing,	
but	rather	evidence	judicial	assumptions	about	the	parties	 involved	in	overseas	trade.	The	
courts	clearly	regard	traders	as	sophisticated	commercial	parties	who	do	not	require	their	
protection,	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	more	 rigorous	 fraud	enquiry.	 In	 any	 event,	 a	more	proactive	
approach	 to	 fraud	 would	 diminish	 the	 speed	 and	 efficiency	 of	 payment.	 The	 following	
discussion	 will	 demonstrate	 the	 prominence	 of	 these	 considerations	 in	 shaping	 the	
availability	of	relief.	It	would	seem	that	in	the	context	of	documentary	credits,	prevention	is	
regarded	as	better	than	cure.	
	
B. Circumstances	in	which	the	fraud	exception	is	relevant	
It	is	conventional	to	begin	any	discussion	of	the	fraud	exception	with	the	American	case	giving	
rise	 to	 the	 rule	on	both	 sides	of	 the	Atlantic,	Sztejn	 v	 Schroder	Banking	Corp.134	 The	 case	
																																																						
128	J	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	Commercial	and	Standby	Credits	(4th	ed.	AS	Pratt	&	Sons,	2007)	[7-80]	“the	
law	 should	 not	 reward	 novice	 or	 unknowledgeable	 parties	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 credit	 device	 fashioned	 by	
experienced	 merchants…Rather	 than	 accommodating	 those	 who	misunderstand	 and	 thus	 destroy	 the	 credit,	
courts	should	enforce	credits	vigorously	and	hasten	the	learning	process.”;	X	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	in	the	Law	of	
Letters	of	Credit:	A	Comparative	Survey	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2002)	77:	“a	commercial	transaction	between	
sophisticated	parties	who	can	and	should	look	after	their	own	interests.”		
129	Gill	&	Duffus	v	Berger	[1984]	AC	382,	388	per	Lord	Diplock.	
130	UNCTAD,	‘Documentary	risk’	(n19)	62.	
131	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[3.038].	
132	Ibid	[2.051].	
133	See,	for	example,	Meyerstein	v	Barber	(1866-67)	LR	2	CP	38,	51	per	Willes	J:	“all	arguments	founded	upon	the	
notion	that	the	Court	is	to	pronounce	a	judgment	in	this	case	which	will	protect	those	who	deal	with	fraudulent	
people,	are	altogether	beside	the	facts	of	this	case,	and	foreign	from	transactions	of	this	nature.”	
134	Sztejn	v	Schroder	Banking	Corp	177	Misc.	719	(NY	Misc	1941).	
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involved	a	contract	for	the	sale	of	bristles	which	was	to	be	financed	by	documentary	credit.		
The	buyer	alleged	that	the	seller	had	sent	boxes	of	rubbish	instead	of	the	contract	goods	and	
sought	an	injunction	against	the	issuing	bank	and	beneficiary.	The	issuing	bank	argued	that	
as	 it	was	only	concerned	with	 the	documents,	a	presentation	which	appeared	to	conform	
should	entitle	it	to	pay	the	beneficiary.		
	
Shientag	J	began	his	judgment	by	emphasising	the	importance	of	the	doctrine	of	autonomy,	
	
It	is	well	established	that	a	letter	of	credit	is	independent	of	the	primary	contract	of	
sale	 between	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	 seller.	 The	 issuing	 bank	 agrees	 to	 pay	 upon	
presentation	of	documents,	not	goods.	This	rule	is	necessary	to	preserve	the	efficiency	
of	the	letter	of	credit	as	an	instrument	for	the	financing	of	trade…It	would	be…most	
unfortunate…if	a	bank	was	obliged	or	even	allowed	to	go	behind	the	documents,	at	
the	request	of	 the	buyer,	and	enter	 into	controversies	between	the	buyer	and	the	
seller	regarding	the	quality	of	the	merchandise	shipped.135	
	
This	confirms	that	ordinary	breaches	of	the	underlying	contract	will	not	be	sufficient	for	the	
courts	to	interfere	with	payment	under	a	documentary	credit.136	He	continued,	however,	that	
the	 autonomy	 principle	 “presupposes	 that	 the	 documents	 accompanying	 the	 draft	 are	
genuine	and	conform	in	terms	to	the	requirements	of	the	 letter	of	credit.”137	Accordingly,	
where	the	seller	has	acted	fraudulently	–	by,	for	example,	intentionally	failing	to	ship	any	of	
the	contract	goods138	–	and	this	is	known	to	the	bank,	the	bank	is	entitled	to	resist	payment.139	
The	 protection	 afforded	 to	 beneficiaries	 by	 the	 doctrine	 of	 autonomy	 “should	 not	 be	
extended	to	protect	the	unscrupulous	seller.”140	
	
																																																						
135	Ibid	721	per	Shientag	J.	
136	Ibid	721-722	per	Shientag	J.	
137	Ibid	721	per	Shientag	J.	
138	Ibid	722	per	Shientag	J.	
139	Ibid	722	per	Shientag	J.	
140	Ibid	722	per	Shientag	J.	
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Although	the	focus	of	the	thesis	is	fraud	committed	by	the	beneficiary,141	the	fraud	exception	
can	be	 employed	within	 several	 of	 the	 contracts	 created	by	 the	documentary	 credit.	 It	 is	
convenient	to	outline	these	fact	patterns	before	considering	the	relevant	criteria	and	issues	
of	proof.		
	
(1) The	beneficiary	brings	a	suit	following	the	bank’s	refusal	to	pay	due	to	fraud.	
The	fraud	exception	is	invoked	by	the	bank	as	a	defence	to	non-payment.		
(2) The	applicant	resists	a	claim	for	reimbursement	from	the	issuing	bank	on	the	
basis	that	the	bank	should	not	have	paid	due	to	fraud.	
(3) The	paying	bank	seeks	to	recover	payment	directly	from	the	beneficiary.	This	
action	occurs	either	as	a	claim	for	damages	in	the	tort	of	deceit142	or	an	action	
in	restitution	to	reclaim	money	paid	under	a	mistake	of	fact.143	
(4) (a)	The	applicant	seeks	an	interlocutory	injunction	against	the	bank	to	prevent	
payment	due	to	fraud.	
(b)	The	applicant	seeks	an	interlocutory	injunction	against	the	beneficiary	to	
prevent	the	presentation	of	documents	on	the	basis	of	fraud.		
	
The	 consequences	 of	 the	 fraud	 exception	 depend	 upon	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 it	 is	
employed.	Used	against	the	beneficiary,	the	exception	will	prevent	him	receiving	payment	
(situation	 1),	 require	 him	 to	 pay	 damages	 to	 the	 bank	 (situation	 3)	 or	 preclude	 the	
presentation	 of	 documents	 (situation	 4b).	 Where	 the	 exception	 is	 employed	 against	 the	
issuing	bank,	 it	will	operate	to	bar	the	bank’s	claim	for	reimbursement	from	the	applicant	
(situation	2)	or	will	prevent	the	bank	from	honouring	the	credit	(situation	4a).	
	
A	 successful	 direct	 action	 against	 the	 fraudulent	 beneficiary	 –	 situations	 3	 and	 4b	 –	 is	
relatively	unlikely.	This	is	because	the	fraudster	may	well	have	disappeared	with	the	proceeds	
of	the	credit144	and/or	the	claimant	will	struggle	to	satisfy	the	procedural	hurdles	to	succeed	
																																																						
141	As	opposed	to	fraud	committed	by	the	applicant,	see	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.20];	X	Gao,	‘The	identity	
of	the	fraudulent	party	under	the	fraud	rule	in	law	of	letters	of	credit’	(2001)	24	UNSWLS	119,	125-128.		
142	Standard	Chartered	Bank	(Nos.	2	and	4)	(n120)	[4]	per	Lord	Hoffmann.	
143	Edward	Owen	(n31)	171	per	Lord	Denning	MR	citing	Bank	Russo-Iran	v.	Gordon	Woodroffe	&	Co.	Ltd.	(3	October	
1972,	QBD)	per	Browne	J	(noted	by	LN	Williams	(1972)	116	Sol	Jo	921).	
144	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[2.004],	[4.041]	
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at	 the	 interim	 stage.	By	 contrast,	 judicial	 intervention	 in	 situation	2	 requires	 the	 court	 to	
allocate	the	loss	between	two	innocent	parties;	the	issuing	bank	and	the	buyer.	Bridge	has	
characterised	the	losses	to	these	parties	as	follows,		
	
The	loss	to	the	buyer	may	be	the	market	loss	that	comes	with	paying	for	July	goods	
when	in	fact	August	goods	were	shipped,	or	it	may	be	the	loss	arising	on	the	receipt	
of	 goods	 that	 bear	 little	 relation	 to	 goods	 of	 the	 contractual	 description.	 The	 loss	
incurred	by	an	issuing	bank,	for	example,	may	be	the	reduced	value	of	its	security	if	it	
is	taking	a	pledge	of	the	documents	as	security	for	an	advance	to	the	buyer.	145	
	
Although	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 fraud	 committed	 by	 the	 credit	 beneficiary,	 the	 varied	
circumstances	in	which	the	exception	may	be	employed	requires	careful	consideration	of	the	
legal	basis	for	judicial	intervention.	It	is	appropriate	to	examine	the	juridical	basis	of	the	fraud	
exception	at	this	stage.		
	
C. The	juridical	basis	of	the	exception	
The	leading	case	on	fraud	in	English	law	is	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada146	
in	 which	 the	 confirming	 bank	 employed	 the	 exception	 to	 refuse	 payment	 to	 the	 credit	
beneficiary	(situation	1).147	The	House	of	Lords	recognised	a	narrow	fraud	exception	in	this	
case	which	was	premised	on	ex	turpi	causa.148	This	proved,	however,	to	be	an	 inadequate	
explanation	 for	 intervention	 in	all	 the	circumstances	 in	which	 the	 fraud	exception	may	be	
relevant.	 Accordingly,	 subsequent	 case	 law	 has	 developed	 a	 supplementary	 basis	 for	
intervention;	the	implied	term	analysis.	The	discussion	in	this	section	tests	these	explanations	
against	each	of	the	situations	1-4	where	the	exception	is	relevant.	The	argument	made	here	
is	that	both	analyses	are	required	to	understand	judicial	intervention	in	cases	of	fraud.	
	
The	juridical	basis	of	the	fraud	exception	does	not,	in	general,	garner	significant	academic	or	
judicial	 attention.	 The	 leading	 academic	 treatment	 of	 documentary	 credits,	 Jack:	
																																																						
145	M	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence	in	international	trade’	in	S	Worthington,	(ed.),	Commercial	
Law	and	Commercial	Practice	(Hart,	2003),	228-229.	
146	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4).	
147	A	comprehensive	discussion	of	the	facts	of	this	case	and	the	criteria	required	to	trigger	the	fraud	exception	are	
postponed	until	Part	D.	
148	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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Documentary	Credits,	confines	its	discussion	of	the	juridical	basis	of	the	exception	to	a	mere	
two	paragraphs.149	The	absence	of	detailed	consideration	in	Goode	on	Commercial	Law150	is	
somewhat	surprising	given	that	Goode	has	devoted	significant	attention	to	other	aspects	of	
the	fraud	exception.151	The	rationale	of	the	exception	is	afforded	a	matter	of	sentences	by	
Ellinger	 and	 Neo	 in	 which	 they	 simply	 reiterate	 the	 position	 advocated	 by	 the	 House	 of	
Lords.152	Enonchong’s	treatment	of	the	exception	is	longer	–	running	to	seven	paragraphs153	
–	but	focuses	substantially	on	the	implied	term	analysis154	with	limited	attention	paid	to	the	
explanation	provided	in	United	City	Merchants.155	Judicial	discussions	of	the	rationale	of	the	
rule	are	also	similarly	lacking.156	Taken	together,	this	lack	of	focus	is	surprising	given	that	the	
juridical	basis	of	the	fraud	exception	is	not	comprehensively	settled.		
	
i. The	ex	turpi	causa	analysis		
In	United	City	Merchants,	Lord	Diplock	explained	the	exception	as	“a	clear	application	of	the	
maxim	ex	turpi	causa	non	oritur	actio	or,	 if	plain	English	 is	to	be	preferred,	fraud	unravels	
all.”157	This	 immediately	presents	a	problem.158	The	usual	 translation	of	ex	 turpi	 causa,	or	
illegality,	is	the	following,	derived	from	the	case	of	Holman	v	Johnson,	
	
No	Court	will	lend	its	aid	to	a	man	who	founds	his	cause	of	action	upon	an	immoral	or	
an	 illegal	 act.	 If,	 from	 the	 plaintiff’s	 own	 stating	 or	 otherwise,	 the	 cause	 of	 action	
appears	to	arise	ex	turpi	causa,	or	the	transgression	of	a	positive	law	of	this	country,	
there	the	Court	says	he	has	no	right	to	be	assisted.159	
																																																						
149	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.13]-[9.14].	
150	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n108)	1101,	a	single	paragraph	is	devoted	to	the	juridical	basis.	
151	For	example,	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n29)	228-234.	
152	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	141.	
153	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.03]-[5.009].	
154	Ibid	[5.06]-[5.09].	The	discussion	of	the	alternative	basis	of	the	exception	does	not	just	run	to	a	greater	number	
of	paragraphs	but	also	a	significantly	higher	word	count.	
155	Ibid	[5.04]-[5.05].	
156	For	example,	the	recent	Privy	Council	decision	in	Alternative	Power	Solution	Ltd	v	Central	Electricity	Board	[2014]	
UKPC	31,	did	not	consider	the	precise	juridical	basis	of	the	exception.	
157	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
158	See,	for	example,	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	253	(fn	5	in	original)	where	the	authors	comment	that	‘fraud	
unravels	all’	is	traditionally	translated	from	the	maxim,	fraus	omnia	corrumpit.	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	
congruence’	(n145)	229	is	also	in	favour	of	this	alternative	translation	although	he	noted	that	“blanket	statements	
of	this	kind,	however,	envelope	better	than	they	explain.”	
159	Holman	v	Johnson	1	Cowp	342	(1775),	343	per	Lord	Mansfield.	
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This	rule	is	designed	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	court	and	to	prevent	the	plaintiff	profiting	
from	his	own	wrongdoing.160	Indeed,	this	is	how	Lord	Diplock	went	on	to	explain	the	fraud	
exception	in	United	City	Merchants	stating,	“the	Courts	will	not	allow	their	process	to	be	used	
by	a	dishonest	person	to	carry	out	a	fraud.”161	Given	that	the	fraud	exception	will	not	always	
involve	 the	 beneficiary	 directly,	 it	 is	 questionable	whether	ex	 turpi	 causa	 can	 adequately	
explain	judicial	intervention	in	these	cases.		
	
To	determine	the	validity	of	the	ex	turpi	causa	analysis,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	each	of	the	
circumstances	in	which	the	exception	is	employed.		
	
In	 situation	 1,	 a	 claim	 for	 payment	 under	 a	 letter	 of	 credit	 by	 the	 beneficiary	 who	 has	
submitted	fraudulent	documents	would	certainly	arise	ex	turpi	causa	and	would	furnish	the	
paying	bank	with	a	defence.	In	situation	3,	the	beneficiary’s	fraud	would	entitle	the	paying	
bank	to	bring	a	direct	claim	for	reimbursement.	This	rationale	would	also	account	for	the	case	
in	which	the	applicant	sought	an	injunction	against	the	fraudulent	beneficiary	to	prevent	him	
presenting	documents	for	payment	(situation	4b).	It	is	the	personal	fraud	of	the	beneficiary	
in	 these	cases	which	would	 justify	 intervention	on	the	basis	of	ex	 turpi	causa.	The	courts’	
refusal	to	assist	a	dishonest	 litigant	 is	evident	when	the	fraud	exception	operates	 in	these	
circumstances	and	deprives	the	beneficiary	of	contractual	rights.	
	
By	 contrast,	 in	 a	 claim	 for	 reimbursement	 by	 the	 issuing	 bank	 (situation	 2)	 or	where	 the	
applicant	seeks	an	injunction	against	his	bank	(situation	4a),	the	fraudulent	beneficiary	is	not	
a	party	 to	 the	action.	 The	 court	 in	 these	 situations	 is	not	being	asked	 to	aid	a	 fraudulent	
claimant	but	rather	to	allocate	losses	between	innocent	parties	(situation	2)	or	to	effectively	
create	a	 cause	of	 action	where	 the	applicant	 seeks	an	 injunction	against	 the	 issuing	bank	
(situation	4a).	This	is	the	opposite	of	a	judicial	refusal	to	become	embroiled	in	a	network	of	
contracts	 tainted	 with	 fraud.	 As	 such,	 ex	 turpi	 causa	 provides	 a	 much	 less	 convincing	
																																																						
160	Brindle	and	Cox	(n29)	724.	
161	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.		
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explanation	of	intervention	in	these	circumstances.162	For	ease	of	exposition,	the	following	
table	demonstrates	those	cases	in	which	ex	turpi	causa	provides	a	valid	juridical	basis	for	the	
operation	of	the	fraud	exception.	
	
Situation	 Ex	turpi	causa?	
(1)	Bank	refuses	to	pay	beneficiary	
	
Yes	
(2)	Applicant	refuses	reimbursement	
	
No	
(3)	Bank	seeks	reimbursement	from	beneficiary	
	
Yes	
(4a)	Applicant	seeks	injunction	against	IB	
	
(4b)	Applicant	seeks	injunction	against	
beneficiary	
No	
	
Yes	
Table	1:	Ex	turpi	causa	as	juridical	basis	
	
Given	 the	 inability	of	ex	 turpi	 causa	 to	explain	 judicial	 intervention	 in	all	 circumstances	 in	
which	the	exception	may	operate,	it	becomes	relevant	to	consider	whether	broader	principles	
from	the	law	of	illegality	may	assist	in	this	respect.	In	particular,	the	question	is	whether	the	
notion	of	taint	–	whereby	a	prima	facie	lawful	contract	is	declared	unenforceable	because	it	
is	collateral	to	an	 illegal	transaction163	-	could	be	used	to	explain	 intervention	 in	cases	not	
directly	involving	the	fraudulent	beneficiary	(situations	2	and	4a).	The	author’s	view	is	that	
this	analysis	does	not	underpin	judicial	activity	in	these	situations.	In	the	first	place,	the	author	
has	not	found	any	cases	in	which	such	an	argument	has	been	made	and,	moreover,	the	courts	
do	 not	 speak	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘unenforceability’	 when	 the	 fraud	 exception	 operates	 in	 these	
circumstances.	Interestingly,	and	by	way	of	contrast,	these	ideas	have	been	explicitly	used	in	
the	more	recent	development	of	an	illegality	exception	to	payment	in	credit	transactions.164	
																																																						
162	Todd	has	made	this	argument	in	relation	to	the	claim	for	reimbursement,	see	P	Todd,	‘Non-genuine	shipping	
documents	and	nullities’	[2008]	LMCLQ	547,	556.	
163	A	comprehensive	account	of	the	law	of	illegality	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	project.	Readers	are	directed	to	R	
Buckley,	Illegality	and	Public	Policy	(3rd	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2013).	
164	Group	Josi	Re	v	Walbrook	Insurance	Co	Ltd	[1996]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	345,	354	per	Staughton	LJ;	Mahonia	Ltd	v	JP	
Morgan	Chase	Bank	(No	1)	[2003]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	911,	[66],	[68]	per	Colman	J;	Mahonia	Ltd	v	JP	Morgan	Chase	Bank	
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This	 suggests	 to	 the	 author	 that	 the	 courts	 regard	 the	 fraud	 and	 illegality	 exceptions	 as	
distinct.	Finally,	intervention	in	situation	4a	requires	the	court	to	create	a	cause	of	action	for	
the	applicant	against	the	issuing	bank.	This	willingness	of	the	courts	to	involve	themselves	in	
this	 situation	 is	 to	 be	 contrasted	with	 the	 typical	 judicial	 refusal	 to	 become	 embroiled	 in	
contracts	tainted	with	fraud.		
	
The	 foregoing	 discussion	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 ex	 turpi	 causa	 cannot	 explain	 judicial	
intervention	in	all	circumstances	in	which	the	fraud	exception	is	employed.	A	supplementary	
basis	for	the	exception	has	been	suggested	in	case	law165	to	which	attention	now	turns.	
	
ii. The	implied	term	analysis	
More	recent	case	law	has	explained	the	fraud	exception	on	the	basis	of	an	implied	term.166	
This	responds	to	the	fact	that,	in	certain	situations,	the	operation	of	the	exception	depends	
on	the	bank’s	knowledge	of	fraud.167	If,	for	example,	the	court’s	desire	was	simply	to	prevent	
its	processes	being	used	to	facilitate	a	fraud,	the	bank’s	knowledge	of	fraud	prior	to	payment	
would	 be	 unnecessary.168	 This,	 however,	 remains	 an	 important	 criterion	 which	 must	 be	
satisfied	in	situations	2	and	4a.169	In	Czarnikow-Rionda	v	Standard	Bank,	Rix	J	discussed	the	
fraud	 exception	 in	 light	 of	 the	 contractual	 relationships	 created	 by	 the	 letter	 of	 credit.	
Drawing	on	previous	cases	which	interpreted	the	source	of	the	exception	as	contractual,170	
he	argued	that	“payment	in	the	face	of	fraud	can[not]	be	a	mere	matter	of	discretion	by	a	
bank:	it	must	be	either	within	its	mandate	or	not,	and	either	a	matter	of	obligation	or	not.”171	
Rix	J	further	described	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	as	“an	authoritative	expression	
																																																						
and	West	LB	[2004]	All	ER	(D)	10,	[428],	[432]-[433]	per	Cooke	J.	A	lengthier	discussion	of	the	impact	of	illegality	in	
credit	transactions	is	omitted	from	this	thesis	for	reasons	of	space.	Readers	are	directed	to	Horowitz	(n100)	Ch	7	
for	a	comprehensive	treatment	of	illegality	in	this	context.	
165	Czarnikow-Rionda	v	Standard	Bank	[1999]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	187.	
166	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.14].	For	a	comprehensive	account	of	implied	terms	under	English	law	see,	Chitty	
(32nd	ed.)	(n20)	chapter	14.	
167	The	criteria	which	must	be	satisfied	to	trigger	the	fraud	exception	will	be	considered	shortly,	see	Part	C	of	this	
chapter.	
168	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J.	
169	Ibid	205;	Gian	Singh	(n81)	9	per	Lord	Diplock;	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.41].	See	later	discussion,	Part	C(iv).	
170	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J	citing	inter	alia	Harbottle	(n31);	Tukan	Timber	(n31);	Discount	Records	
(n27).	
171	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J.	
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of	the	source	in	law	of	the	implied	limitation	on	a	bank’s	mandate.”172	In	English	contract	law,	
the	purpose	of	 implying	 terms	was	recently	considered	by	 the	Supreme	Court	 in	Marks	&	
Spencer	v	BNP	Paribas	Securities.173	The	Court	held	that	the	purpose	of	 implication	was	to	
“discover	 what	 the	 parties	 have	 agreed”174	 and	 only	 authorised	 the	 insertion	 of	 terms	 if	
“without	 the	 term,	 the	 contract	would	 lack	 commercial	or	practical	 coherence.”175	 For	an	
implied	term	to	operate	in	the	letter	of	credit	context,	it	would	need	to	conform	to	this	test.	
As	with	the	task	above,	the	discussion	will	now	consider	in	which	of	the	situations	the	implied	
term	analysis	can	explain	judicial	intervention.	Due	to	the	autonomous	nature	of	the	contracts	
created	by	 the	 credit,	 this	 supplementary	 analysis	 has	 the	 greatest	 potential	 in	 situations	
where	there	is	a	direct	relationship	involving	the	paying	bank.	It	 is	for	this	reason	that	the	
implied	 term	 analysis	 cannot	 explain	 the	 position	 as	 between	 applicant	 and	 beneficiary	
(situation	4b).176	
	
It	is	convenient	to	begin	by	considering	the	contract	between	the	bank	and	beneficiary	as	this	
is	the	focus	of	the	implied	term	analysis	in	Jack177	and	adopted	by	Bridge.178	On	this	basis,	the	
term	would	be	relevant	as	a	defence	to	non-payment	by	the	bank	(situation	1)	and	as	a	cause	
of	 action	 to	 recover	 payment	 from	 the	 fraudulent	 beneficiary	 (situation	 3).	 Any	 cause	 of	
action	provided	by	the	implied	term	in	situation	3	would	operate	alongside	an	action	in	deceit	
or	restitution.	
	
The	 authors	 of	 Jack	 suggest	 that	 the	 term	 would	 amount	 to	 a	 representation	 by	 the	
beneficiary	that	the	documents	did	not	to	his	knowledge	contain	material	misrepresentations	
nor	were	part	of	an	attempt	to	defraud	the	bank	or	its	customer.179	It	is	not	impossible	that	
such	 a	 term	 could	 conform	 to	 the	 test	 enunciated	 in	 the	Marks	 &	 Spencer’s	 case.	 The	
																																																						
172	Ibid	203	per	Rix	J.	
173	Marks	&	Spencer	plc	v	BNP	Paribas	Securities	Service	Trust	Co	(Jersey)	Ltd	[2015]	UKSC	72,	[22]-[32]	per	Lord	
Neuberger	clarifying	the	approach	in	Attorney	General	of	Belize	v	Belize	Telecom	[2009]	1	WLR	1988.	
174	Marks	&	Spencer	(n173)	[69]	per	Lord	Carnwarth.	
175	Ibid	[21]	per	Lord	Neuberger.	
176	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n145)	229.	
177	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.14].	
178	This	is	the	focus	of	the	discussion	in	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.14]	and	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	
congruence’	(n145)	229.	
179	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.14].	
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reference	to	the	bank’s	customer	does	not	raise	any	conflict	with	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	
since	the	latter	gives	way	when	the	fraud	exception	operates.		
	
The	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 implied	 term	 –	 as	 formulated	 in	 Jack	 –	 can	 explain	 judicial	
intervention	in	situations	1	and	3.	In	the	absence	of	definitive	judicial	comment	on	the	matter,	
a	couple	of	brief	comments	will	be	offered.	It	would	be	relatively	straightforward	to	recognise	
an	 implied	term	in	situation	3	as	 it	would	augment	the	existing	post-contractual	causes	of	
action	available	to	the	bank.	The	implied	term	involves	a	more	complicated	analysis	in	respect	
of	situation	1	because	the	term	would	need	to	function	as	a	defence	to	non-payment	by	the	
bank.	There	is	nothing	to	prevent	the	development	of	such	an	analysis	but	it	would	require	
senior	judicial	consideration.	Indeed,	until	such	time	as	the	courts	have	examined	the	implied	
term	analysis	in	more	detail,	the	precise	content	and	utility	of	any	term	remains	a	matter	for	
academic	speculation.	
	
By	contrast,	the	implied	term	analysis	is	particularly	promising	as	between	the	issuing	bank	
and	 the	 applicant.	 The	 term	 would	 provide	 a	 defence	 where	 the	 applicant	 refuses	
reimbursement	(situation	2)	and	create	a	cause	of	action	when	an	injunction	is	sought	against	
the	 bank	 (situation	 4a).	 The	 content	 of	 the	 term	 would	 relate	 to	 the	 bank’s	 contractual	
mandate	 to	 make	 payment	 to	 the	 beneficiary.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 rule	 of	 apparent	
compliance	 contained	 in	 the	 UCP	 600	 entitles	 the	 banks	 to	 pay	 when	 the	 presented	
documents	appear	to	comply.	The	bank,	however,	will	not	be	entitled	to	reimbursement	if	it	
knew	 at	 the	 time	 of	 payment	 that	 the	 documents	were	 fraudulent	 notwithstanding	 their	
apparent	compliance.180	The	implied	term,	therefore,	would	provide	a	concrete	basis	for	this	
qualification	to	the	bank’s	entitlement	to	pay.		
	
Support	 for	 this	 analysis	 is	 provided	 by	 Enonchong181	 and	 by	 analogy	 to	 some	 case	 law	
discussion.	In	Tukan	Timber,	Hirst	J	argued	that	an	applicant	would	have	a	“cast-iron	claim	for	
damages”182	 against	 a	 bank	 which	 paid	 against	 apparently	 compliant	 documents	 in	
circumstances	when	it	had	knowledge	of	fraud.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	what	Hirst	J	
																																																						
180	Brindle	and	Cox	(n29)	[8-088]-[8-089].	
181	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.06].	
182	Tukan	Timber	(n31)	177	per	Hirst	J	cited	in	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J.	
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had	in	mind	was	an	implied	contractual	term	to	underpin	this	claim	since	there	is	nothing	to	
suggest	that	the	parties	had	expressly	contracted	on	this	basis.		
	
The	implied	term	analysis	is	yet	to	be	tested	by	a	senior	English	court.183	In	Alternative	Power,	
a	case	where	the	credit	applicant	sought	an	injunction	against	the	issuing	bank	(situation	4a),	
the	Privy	Council	did	not	discuss	the	juridical	basis	of	the	fraud	exception.184	The	references	
to	ex	 turpi	 causa	 throughout	 the	 judgment185	 are	 disappointing	 given	 the	 inability	 of	 the	
maxim	 to	 explain	 the	 fraud	 exception	 in	 these	 circumstances.	 Indeed,	 the	 implied	 term	
analysis	would	be	particularly	useful	 in	contracts	 involving	the	credit	applicant	and	 issuing	
bank,	as	is	the	case	in	situations	2	and	4a.	An	implied	term	in	the	contract	between	issuing	
bank	and	beneficiary	would	provide	a	further	defence	in	situation	1	and	an	additional	claim	
for	reimbursement	in	situation	3.	
	
The	foregoing	analysis	should	make	clear	that	ex	turpi	causa	cannot	convincingly	explain	the	
variety	 of	 contexts	 in	 which	 the	 fraud	 exception	 can	 be	 utilised.	 This	 difficulty	 could	 be	
rectified	 either	 by	 recognising	 fraus	 omnia	 corrumpit	 as	 the	 appropriate	 maxim	 or	 by	
admitting	 that	 the	 contracts	 are	 more	 interconnected	 than	 doctrine	 would	 suggest.	 It	 is	
submitted	that	this	latter	solution	is	unlikely	given	the	primacy	accorded	to	autonomy	by	the	
courts.	 In	 addition,	 the	 contractual	 analysis	would	 strengthen	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 fraud	
exception	 and	 would	 provide	 an	 additional	 basis	 for	 judicial	 intervention	 in	 certain	
circumstances.	The	validity	of	the	contractual	analysis	remains	to	be	settled	by	subsequent	
case	law.	Assuming	this	analysis	is	valid,	the	following	table	sets	out	the	juridical	basis	or	bases	
applicable	in	each	of	the	situations	in	which	the	fraud	exception	might	be	invoked.	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
183	 It	has	gained	academic	support,	however,	 see	Malek	and	Quest,	 Jack	 (n32)	 [9.26];	K	Donnelly,	 ‘Nothing	 for	
nothing:	A	nullity	exception	in	letters	of	credit?’	[2008]	JBL	316,	322	who	describes	it	as	“more	principled”;	the	
majority	of	textbooks	cite	the	implied	term	analysis	as	an	alternative	or	additional	basis	for	intervention	in	cases	of	
fraud,	see	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.14];	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n108)	1101;	Brindle	and	
Cox	(n29)	[8-087].	
184	Alternative	Power	(n156).	
185	Ibid	[37]	[46]	[78]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
193	
	
Situation		 Juridical	Basis/Bases	
(1)	Bank	refuses	to	pay	beneficiary	
	
Ex	turpi	causa	
Implied	term:	IB	and	Beneficiary	
(2)	Applicant	refuses	reimbursement	
	
Implied	term:	IB	and	Applicant	
(3)	Bank	seeks	reimbursement	from	beneficiary	 Ex	turpi	causa	
Implied	term:	IB	and	Beneficiary	
(4a)	Applicant	seeks	injunction	against	IB	
	
(4b)	Applicant	seeks	injunction	against	
beneficiary	
Implied	term:	IB	and	Applicant	
	
Ex	turpi	causa	
Table	2:	Ex	turpi	causa	and	implied	term	analysis	
	
As	it	stands,	judicial	intervention	is	largely	premised	on	the	notion	that	‘fraud	unravels	all’.	
The	phrase	itself	suggests	a	fairly	expansive	jurisdiction.	Broader	contextual	considerations	
related	 to	 the	 documentary	 credit	 as	 a	 financing	 device	 have	 militated	 against	 liberal	
intervention	by	the	courts.	This	is	particularly	evident	when	one	considers	the	way	in	which	
the	 criteria	pertaining	 to	 the	 fraud	exception	have	been	 framed.	The	 following	discussion	
establishes	the	criteria	necessary	to	invoke	the	fraud	exception	at	trial,	relevant	in	situations	
1-3,	discussed	above.	This	is	followed	by	the	additional	criteria	which	must	be	satisfied	for	
relief	at	the	interlocutory	stage,	as	will	be	required	in	situation	4a	and	b.	
	
	
D. Criteria		
The	leading	case	on	the	fraud	exception	in	English	law	is	United	City	Merchants.186	The	case	
involved	the	sale	of	a	fibre	glass	plant	between	English	sellers	and	Peruvian	buyers	which	was	
financed	by	documentary	credit.	The	sellers	had	assigned	their	rights	and	obligations	under	
the	credit	to	United	City	Merchants.	The	credit	required	shipment	to	be	made	by	15/12/1976	
from	 London	 to	 Callao.	 The	 first	 presentation	 of	 documents	 was	 rejected.	 A	 second	
presentation	 stated	 that	 shipment	 had	 been	 made	 from	 London	 on	 15/12/1976.	 The	
documents	 therefore	 appeared	 to	 conform	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 credit.	 The	 second	
																																																						
186	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4).	This	is	also	the	leading	English	case	on	illegality	in	a	letter	of	credit.	
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presentation	 was	 also	 rejected.	 The	 bank	 contended	 that	 it	 had	 information	 which	
demonstrated	that	shipment	had	not	been	effected	on	the	specified	date	and,	moreover,	that	
this	was	known	to	the	beneficiary	before	the	second	presentation.	The	specific	allegation	was	
that	 the	 documents	 had	 been	 fraudulently	 backdated	 by	 the	 loading	 broker	 to	meet	 the	
requirements	of	 the	credit.	The	beneficiary	and	 its	assignee	brought	an	action	against	 the	
negotiating	bank	demanding	payment	(situation	1).		
	
At	first	instance,	Mocatta	J	held	that	the	beneficiary	was	entitled	to	payment	as	the	fraud	had	
been	 committed	 by	 an	 independent	 third	 party	 without	 the	 beneficiary’s	 knowledge	 or	
authorisation.187	The	Court	of	Appeal	disagreed,	holding	that	the	fraudulent	backdating	of	the	
bill	barred	the	beneficiary’s	right	to	payment,	irrespective	of	the	author	of	the	false	shipment	
date.	The	focus	was	on	the	nature	and	quality	of	the	documents	rather	than	the	identity	of	
their	creator.188	Accordingly,	the	Court	of	Appeal	unanimously	allowed	the	appeal	because	
the	bank’s	obligation	to	pay	was	only	triggered	by	the	presentation	of	genuine	documents	
which	 conformed	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 credit.189	 If	 the	 bank	 knew,	 therefore,	 that	 forged	
documents	 were	 presented,	 it	 had	 no	 obligation	 to	 pay;	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 forger	 was	
“immaterial.”190		
	
The	House	of	Lords	restored	the	decision	of	the	first	instance	judge.	Lord	Diplock	commenced	
his	judgment	by	reinforcing	the	doctrine	of	autonomy,	
	
The	 whole	 commercial	 purpose	 for	 which	 the	 system	 of	 confirmed	 irrevocable	
documentary	credits	has	been	developed	in	international	trade	is	to	give	to	the	seller	
an	assured	right	to	be	paid	before	he	parts	with	control	of	the	goods	that	does	not	
permit	of	any	dispute	with	the	buyer	as	to	the	performance	of	the	contract	of	sale	
being	used	as	a	ground	for	non-payment	or	reduction	or	deferment	of	payment.191		
																																																						
187	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1979]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	267,	278	per	Mocatta	
J	(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(First	Instance)).	
188	United	 City	Merchants	 v	 Royal	 Bank	 of	 Canada	 (The	 American	 Accord)	 [1981]	 1	 Lloyd’s	 Rep.	 604,	 623	 per	
Stephenson	LJ,	628	per	Ackner	LJ,	632	per	Griffiths	LJ	(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	
Appeal)).	
189	Ibid	628	per	Ackner	LJ,	632	per	Griffiths	LJ.	
190	Ibid	632	per	Griffiths	LJ.	
191	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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He	continued,	
	
To	 this	 general	 statement	 of	 principle…there	 is	 one	 established	 exception…that	 is,	
where	the	seller,	for	the	purpose	of	drawing	on	the	credit,	fraudulently	presents	to	
the	 confirming	 bank	 documents	 that	 contain	 expressly	 or	 by	 implication,	material	
representations	of	fact	that	to	his	[the	seller’s]	knowledge	are	untrue.192	
	
As	 the	 bill	 of	 lading	 had	 been	 backdated	 by	 a	 third	 party,	 without	 the	 beneficiary’s	
knowledge,193	 the	 fraud	 exception	did	 not	 operate	 to	 deprive	 the	 assured	of	 payment.194	
More	generally,	a	party	seeking	to	invoke	the	fraud	exception	will	need	to	satisfy	each	of	the	
criteria	established	in	United	City	Merchants.	For	clarity,	these	are	summarised	here:	
	
i. A	material	misrepresentation	of	fact	in	the	documents	
ii. Fraud	known	to	the	beneficiary	
iii. The	representee	relies	on	the	fraud	
iv. Fraud	known	to	the	bank	(relevant	in	situations	1,	2	and	4a)	
	
i. Material	misrepresentation	of	fact	in	the	documents	
The	fraud	must	involve	a	material	misrepresentation	of	fact,	express	or	implied,	within	the	
documents.	 By	way	of	 example,	 the	documents	would	 contain	misrepresentations	of	 fact	
when	 apparently	 compliant	 documents	 were	 presented	 but	 the	 beneficiary	 had	 shipped	
rubbish,	 as	 in	 Discount	 Records	 v	 Barclays.195	 Equally,	 the	 presentation	 of	 apparently	
compliant	 documents	where	 nothing	 had	 been	 shipped,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 facts	 of	
Etablissement	Esefka,196	would	satisfy	this	criterion.	As	a	final	example,	documents	which	had	
been	altered	to	conceal	a	breach	of	the	credit	contract	–	the	date	or	place	of	shipment,	for	
																																																						
192	Ibid	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
193	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
194	Ibid	11	per	Lord	Diplock.	This	was	subject	to	the	decision	on	the	illegality	point.	The	House	of	Lords	held	that	the	
beneficiary	was	entitled	to	payment	for	sums	which	did	not	constitute	a	money	transaction	in	disguise.		
195	Discount	Records	(n27);	Sztejn	(n134)	721.	
196	Etablissement	Esefka	International	Anstalt	v	Central	Bank	of	Nigeria	[1979]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	445.	
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example	–	would	also	meet	this	test.197	It	should	be	noted,	for	clarity,	that	the	fraud	exception	
did	not	operate	in	any	of	these	cases	because	of	difficulties	in	establishing	the	other	criteria.	
These	examples	are	included	to	illustrate	‘misrepresentation	of	fact’	in	this	context.				
	
A	difficulty	arises	in	relation	to	the	standard	of	‘materiality’.	This	was	not	conclusively	resolved	
in	 United	 City	 Merchants	 in	 which	 Lord	 Diplock	 rejected	 two	 conceptions	 of	 materiality	
without	providing	a	definitive	standard.198		
	
The	authors	of	Jack	suggest	that	materiality	should	be	assessed	by	reference	to	the	bank’s	
obligation	to	pay.199	Applied	to	the	facts	of	United	City	Merchants,	had	the	documents	in	fact	
shown	the	actual	(late)	shipment	date,	the	bank	would	have	had	no	liability	to	pay	and	could	
have	 rejected	 the	 documents	 for	 non-compliance.	 This	 must	 be	 the	 correct	 approach.	
Notably,	 this	 standard	 of	 materiality	 would	 not	 embrace	 all	 documentary	 defects.	 It	 is	
suggested	in	Jack,	for	example,	that	a	bill	of	lading	which	had	been	falsely	dated	to	conceal	
the	real	date	of	shipment	but	where	shipment	had	nonetheless	occurred	within	the	permitted	
period	 would	 be	 a	 false,	 but	 immaterial,	 representation.200	 This	 suggests	 that	 some	 lies,	
though	false,	would	fall	short	of	the	materiality	standard	to	be	actionable	for	the	purposes	of	
the	 exception.	 	 This	 has	 echoes	of	 the	 recent	 insurance	decision	 in	Versloot	 in	which	 the	
collateral	lie	was	excluded	from	the	fraudulent	claims	jurisdiction.201	The	false	but	immaterial	
standard	is	yet	to	be	tested	by	the	trade	finance	courts.		
	
An	alternative	standard	of	materiality	was	suggested	by	counsel	for	the	plaintiff	beneficiaries	
in	Rafsanjan	Pistachio	Producers	v	Bank	Leumi.202	It	was	contended	that	a	statement	would	
only	be	material	if	it	reduced	the	value	of	the	bank’s	security	on	resale.203	This,	presumably,	
																																																						
197	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4).	
198	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.23]	-	[5.25];	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	
Lord	Diplock	rejected	a	materiality	standard	that	would	have	entitled	the	bank	to	refuse	payment	if	the	documents	
accurately	 reflected	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 goods	 and	 information	 about	 shipment	 but	 that	 these	 statements	
demonstrated	that	there	had	been	a	breach	of	the	credit	contract,	8	per	Lord	Diplock	also	rejected	a	standard	by	
which	materiality	would	be	assessed	according	to	the	resale	value	of	the	goods	were	the	bank	required	to	realise	
its	security.		
199	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.17].	
200	Ibid	[9.17].	
201	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	296	et	seq.	
202	Rafsanjan	Pistachio	Producers	Cooperative	v	Bank	Leumi	[1992]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	513,	541.	
203	Ibid	541.	
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was	designed	to	confine	the	materiality	enquiry	since	an	assessment	would	only	be	required	
when	 the	 bank	 needed	 to	 realise	 its	 security	 following	 the	 applicant’s	 insolvency.	 This	
suggestion	was	not	accepted	in	Rafsanjan.	Indeed,	Hirst	J	commented	that	such	an	analysis	
“misse[d]	the	point”	because	the	fraud	rule	was	designed	to	prevent	dishonest	litigants	using	
the	courts’	processes	to	perpetrate	a	fraud.204		It	would	be	contrary	to	principle,	therefore,	if	
the	operation	of	the	fraud	exception	depended	on	the	bank’s	ability	to	sell	the	documents	at	
a	later	date.	
	
Fraud	in	the	transaction	
The	requirement	that	the	fraud	appears	in	the	documents	is	a	significant	restriction	on	the	
scope	of	the	exception	and	calls	into	question	the	explanatory	power	of	‘fraud	unravels	all’.	
The	question	is	whether	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	–	either	misrepresentation	in	relation	to	the	
underlying	contract	or	an	intentional	failure	to	ship	any	of	the	contract	goods205	–	is	sufficient	
to	prevent	payment	under	the	credit.		
	
As	 a	 starting	 point,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	United	 City	Merchants	which	 overtly	 precludes	 an	
extension	 to	 fraud	 in	 the	 transaction.206	 Caution	 is	 required,	 however,	 given	 that	 Lord	
Diplock’s	intention	was	to	make	judicial	intervention	possible	only	in	the	most	exceptional	of	
cases.207	This	is	apparent	in	his	concern	to	safeguard	the	viability	of	the	credit	mechanism,	
stating	 that	 a	 broader	 fraud	 exception	would	 “undermine	 the	whole	 system	 of	 financing	
international	trade	by	means	of	documentary	credits.”208	
	
Nevertheless,	there	are	powerful	policy	arguments	supporting	such	an	extension.	In	the	first	
place,	if	the	rationale	of	the	exception	is	that	fraud	unravels	all,	it	should	not	matter	where	
the	beneficiary’s	wrongdoing	is	located.209	To	confine	actionable	fraud	to	that	located	in	the	
documents	would,	as	Enonchong	has	argued,	further	hinder	the	courts’	ability	to	discourage	
																																																						
204	Ibid	541-542	per	Hirst	J.	The	logical	conclusion	of	this	analysis	would	suggest	that	the	purpose	of	the	fraud	rule	
is	to	secure	the	full	value	of	the	documents	to	the	bank.	
205	Sztejn	(n134)	721	per	Shientag	J.	
206	Horowitz	(n100)	[2.15].	
207	Ibid	[2.15].	
208	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
209	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.26];	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.18];	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	
143.	This	echoes	the	arguments	used	to	support	the	nascent	development	of	an	illegality	exception	in	English	law:	
Mahonia	Ltd	(2003)	(n164)	[68]	per	Colman	J;	Mahonia	Ltd	(2004)	(n164)	[431]	per	Cooke	J.	
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fraud	in	international	transactions.210	Fraud	in	the	transaction	has	also	been	recognised	as	
sufficient	in	performance	bond	cases.211	This,	admittedly,	is	a	weaker	basis	for	extending	the	
exception	given	the	very	few	documentary	requirements	in	bond	transactions.212	
	
Recent	case	law	does	suggest	that	English	courts	would	now	be	prepared	to	recognise	fraud	
in	the	transaction.	In	Group	Josi	Re,	the	credit	applicant	sought	to	disrupt	payment	on	the	
basis	 that	 the	 underlying	 contract	 of	 reinsurance	 had	 been	 induced	 by	 fraudulent	
misrepresentation	 and/or	 non-disclosure.213	 Although	 the	 injunction	 was	 ultimately	
refused,214	the	fact	that	the	alleged	wrongdoing	related	to	the	underlying	transaction	did	not	
concern	the	court.	The	applicant	in	Czarnikow-Rionda	also	sought	to	invoke	the	exception	on	
the	basis	of	 fraudulent	misrepresentation.215	The	 injunction	was	refused	at	 the	balance	of	
convenience	stage,	but	again	the	court	had	no	objection	that	the	fraud	was	not	documentary	
in	nature.216	
	
The	express	recognition	of	fraud	in	the	transaction	would	require	consideration	from	a	senior	
court.	 In	particular,	the	court	would	need	to	determine	the	necessary	degree	of	proximity	
between	the	fraud	and	the	credit	contract.217	This	would	overcome	Horowitz’s	concern	that	
any	extension	to	fraud	in	the	transaction	would	unduly	complicate	matters	for	the	banks.218		
At	present,	there	appears	to	be	weak	judicial	support	for	an	expanded	conception	of	fraud	to	
include	wrongdoing	by	the	beneficiary	in	relation	to	the	underlying	sale.	Until	such	time	as	
the	 extension	 is	 confirmed,	 the	 restriction	 of	 actionable	 fraud	 to	 that	 apparent	 in	 the	
documents	constitutes	a	 significant	 limitation	on	 the	extent	 to	which	 fraud	unravels	all	 in	
documentary	credit	transactions.		
	
																																																						
210	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.18].	
211	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n108)	1101;	Themehelp	Ltd	v	West	[1996]	QB	84,	98-99	per	Waite	LJ.	
212	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	(n111)	[9.79].	
213	Group	Josi	Re	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n164)	358.	
214	Ibid	364	per	Staughton	LJ,	369	per	Saville	LJ.	
215	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165).	
216	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.25];	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	143.	
217	Commentators	in	favour	of	a	connection	between	the	fraud	and	the	documentary	credit	 include	Malek	and	
Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.26]	and	Horowitz	(n100)	[2.28].	
218	Horowitz	(n100)	[2.28].	
199	
	
ii. The	beneficiary	knows	the	misrepresentation	to	be	untrue	
The	beneficiary	must	know	at	the	time	of	presentation	that	the	documents	contain	material	
misrepresentations.219	 This	 will	 be	 satisfied	 either	 where	 the	 beneficiary	 has	 himself	
committed	the	fraud	or	where	he	adopts	the	fraud	of	another.220	Enonchong	has	argued	that	
the	position	in	English	law	with	respect	to	agents	is	not	yet	clear.221		On	normal	principles,	
however,	one	would	expect	that	the	beneficiary	would	be	responsible	for	the	fraudulent	acts	
of	 his	 authorised	 agent222	 provided	 these	 were	 not	 designed	 to	 deceive	 the	 beneficiary	
himself.223		
	
The	level	of	knowledge	mirrors	that	found	in	the	tort	of	deceit.	As	such,	fraud	will	be	proven	
when	 the	 beneficiary	 presents	 documents	which	 contain	 “a	 false	 representation	made	 (i)	
knowingly	(ii)	without	belief	 in	 its	truth	or	 (iii)	 recklessly,	careless	of	whether	 it	be	true	or	
false.”224	The	authors	of	Jack	have	suggested	the	possibility	of	a	broader	standard,	namely	
that	liability	would	be	imposed	when	the	beneficiary	had	suspicions	about	the	document(s)	
but	failed	to	examine	them	properly.225	This	would	increase	the	types	of	behaviour	sufficient	
to	invoke	the	fraud	exception	as	well	as	creating	evidential	difficulties.226	This	has	yet	to	be	
argued	before	a	court	but,	given	the	restrictive	approach	to	fraud,	the	author	suggests	that	it	
would	be	unlikely	if	the	exception	was	widened	in	this	way.		
	
																																																						
219	Group	Josi	Re	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n164)	360	per	Staughton	LJ.	
220	W	Blair,	 ‘Commentary	on	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence	in	international	trade’	 in	Worthington,	S.	
(ed.),	Commercial	Law	and	Commercial	Practice	(Hart,	2003),	245	(the	exception	extends	to	the	position	where	the	
beneficiary	takes	documents	honestly	but	later	learns	of	fraud.)	
221	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.34]	citing	Re	Hampshire	Land	[1896]	2	Ch	743	and	Lloyd	v	Grace	
Smith	[1912]	AC	715.	But	see	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n29)	232,	234	where	the	fraud	exception	
includes	the	fraud	of	the	beneficiary’s	agent.	
222	Kwei	Tek	Chao	v	British	Traders	&	Shippers	Ltd	[1954]	2	QB	459,	470	per	Devlin	J,	“if	Slootmakers	had	made	
fraudulent	 representations	 to	Wilhelmson,	 the	agent	of	 the	shipping	company,	 in	order	 to	procure	 the	bills	of	
lading,	the	defendants	would	have	been	liable	although	they	had	not	expressly	authorized	it,	because	Slootmakers	
would	have	been	doing	improperly	the	very	act	which	they	had	been	authorized	to	do;	but	that	is	not	the	question	
which	I	have	to	consider.”	
223	 F	 Reynolds	 (ed.),	 Bowstead	 &	 Reynolds	 on	 Agency	 (18th	 ed.	 Sweet	 &	 Maxwell,	 2006),	 [8-064]	 –	 [8-065];	
Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.35]	citing	Kwei	Tek	Chao	(n222)	471	per	Devlin	J.	
224	Derry	v	Peek	(1889)	14	App	Cas	337,	376	per	Lord	Herschell.	
225	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.18].	This	standard	of	knowledge	is	relevant	in	the	marine	insurance	context	in	
relation	 to	 the	defence	of	 unseaworthiness	under	 s.39(5)	MIA	1906,	 see	Compania	Maritima	 San	Basilio	 SA	 v	
Oceanus	Mutual	Underwriting	Association	(Bermuda)	Ltd	(The	Eurysthenes)	[1977]	QB	49,	68	per	Lord	Denning	MR.		
226	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.18].	See	also	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	142.	
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The	decision	 to	confine	actionable	 fraud	 to	 that	 committed	by	 the	beneficiary	or	with	his	
knowledge	places	two	important	limits	on	the	scope	of	the	fraud	exception.	First,	it	means	
that	 moral	 fraud	 –	 innocent	 misrepresentations	 of	 which	 the	 representor	 was	 wholly	
unaware227	–	will	not	be	actionable.	The	court	must	content	 itself	that	the	beneficiary	has	
knowingly	committed	fraud.	The	second	consequence	is	that	wrongdoing	committed	by	other	
parties	 in	the	chain	 is	 irrelevant	for	the	purposes	of	the	fraud	exception,	even	though	this	
wrongdoing	may	result	in	forged	and	null	documents	being	presented	to	the	bank.	The	courts	
have	once	again	relied	on	the	commercial	demand	for	an	unassailable	payment	mechanism	
to	justify	their	approach.228	A	more	compelling	explanation,	in	the	author’s	view,	relates	to	
the	fact	that	ex	turpi	causa	is	explicitly	designed	to	prevent	a	fraudster	profiting	from	his	own	
wrongdoing.	Accordingly,	it	is	entirely	logical	that	only	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	triggers	the	
exception.	
	
The	decision	to	restrict	actionable	fraud	to	that	carried	out	by	the	beneficiary	has	forced	the	
courts	 to	 consider	whether	 forgery	 and	 nullity	 unconnected	 to	 the	 beneficiary	 constitute	
independent	bases	for	refusing	payment	under	a	credit.229		
	
Forgery	
The	 leading	discussion	of	 forgery	 appears	 in	 the	Court	 of	Appeal	 judgment	 in	United	City	
Merchants.	Stephenson	LJ	described	a	forged	document	in	the	following	terms,		
	
A	document	may	tell	a	lie	about	itself,	e.g.,	about	the	person	who	made	it,	or	the	time	
or	place	of	making.	If	it	tells	a	lie	about	the	maker,	it	is	a	forgery;	if	it	tells	a	lie	about	
the	time	or	place	of	making	"where	either	 is	material",	 it	 is	a	 forgery:	Forgery	Act,	
1913,	 s.1(2)…Or	 the	 document	 may	 tell	 a	 lie	 about	 its	 contents.	 Then	 it	 is	 no	
forgery…230		
	
																																																						
227	Redgrave	v	Hurd	(1881)	20	Ch	D	1,	see	earlier	discussion	in	Chapter	One,	text	to	fn	15.	
228	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
229	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n145)	235.	
230	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n188)	618	per	Stephenson	LJ.	See	also	Ackner	LJ’s	judgment	at	628.	
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The	bill	of	lading	produced	in	United	City	Merchants	told	two	lies	about	itself,	namely	the	date	
and	place	of	its	creation.231	It	was	properly	regarded	as	a	forgery.	The	question,	therefore,	
was	whether	forgery	of	a	third	party	–	the	loading	broker	–	was	sufficient	to	prevent	payment	
under	the	credit.	The	Court	of	Appeal	answered	in	the	affirmative,	citing	the	fact	that	a	forged	
document,	 even	 if	 the	 beneficiary	 was	 unaware	 of	 the	 defects,	 was	 not	 a	 complying	
document.232	Ackner	LJ	continued,		
	
A	banker	cannot	be	compelled	to	honour	a	credit	unless	all	the	conditions	precedent	
have	been	performed,	and	he	ought	not	to	be	under	an	obligation	to	accept	or	pay	
against	documents	which	he	knows	to	be	waste	paper…	The	buyer's	instructions	to	
the	banker	must	be	construed	as	requiring	the	acceptance	of	valid	documents	only,	
and	the	banker's	promise	to	the	seller	must	be	similarly	construed.233	
	
Lord	Diplock	firmly	disapproved	of	this	position	on	appeal	noting	that	additional	exceptions	
to	autonomy	would	have	a	detrimental	impact	on	international	trade.	
	
This	 proposition	 which	 does	 not	 call	 for	 knowledge	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
seller/beneficiary	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 inaccuracy	 would	 embrace	 the	 fraud	
exception	 and	 render	 it	 superfluous…[T]he	 more	 closely	 this	 bold	 proposition	 is	
subjected	to	legal	analysis,	the	more	implausible	it	becomes;	to	assent	to	it	would,	in	
my	view,	undermine	the	whole	system	of	financing	international	trade	by	means	of	
documentary	credits.234	
	
The	conclusive	position	with	respect	to	forgery,	therefore,	is	that	it	does	not	constitute	an	
additional	basis	for	refusing	payment	under	the	credit.	Lord	Diplock’s	analysis	makes	clear	
that	the	bank	will	be	obliged	to	honour	the	presentation	unless	the	forgery	can	be	connected	
to	the	beneficiary	at	the	time	of	presentation.235	
	
																																																						
231	Ibid	618	per	Stephenson	LJ.	
232	Ibid	623	per	Stephenson	LJ,	628	per	Ackner	LJ.	
233	Ibid	628	per	Ackner	LJ.	
234	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
235	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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Nullity	
Wrongdoing	by	a	party	other	than	the	credit	beneficiary	may	render	the	document	a	nullity.	
A	null	document	has	no	legal	value	and	is	essentially	a	worthless	piece	of	paper.236	In	Kwei	
Tek	Chao,	Devlin	J	considered	that	the	relevant	test	was	whether	the	alteration	related	“to	
the	whole	or	to	the	essence	of	the	instrument	or	not.”237	The	focus,	therefore,	is	whether	the	
document	is	capable	of	serving	its	intended	commercial	function.	The	bill	of	lading	in	United	
City	Merchants,	despite	the	misstatements	relating	to	the	time	and	place	of	shipment,	was	“a	
valid	 transferable	 receipt	 for	 the	 goods	 giving	 the	 holder	 a	 right	 to	 claim	 them	 at	 their	
destination,	Callao,	and	was	evidence	of	the	terms	of	the	contract	under	which	they	were	
being	carried.”238	The	document	was	thus	not	a	nullity.		
	
There	are	numerous	examples	of	nullity	in	the	case	law.	A	document	purporting	to	be	issued	
by	 a	 company	which	 does	 not	 exist	would	 count	 as	 a	 nullity239,	 for	 example,	 as	would	 a	
document	signed	by	a	person	who	honestly,	but	wrongly,	believed	he	was	entitled	to	do	so.240	
A	bill	of	 lading	either	covering	non-existent	cargo	on	a	non-existent	ship241	or	a	forged	bill	
covering	existing	cargo	would	equally	count	as	nullities.242	In	certain	circumstances,	a	forgery	
may	additionally	render	a	document	a	nullity,	such	as	when	the	bill	of	lading	was	not	issued	
by	the	company	purporting	to	be	the	issuer243	and	where	a	certificate	of	insurance	is	tendered	
without	a	valid	policy.244	
	
Nullities	cause	problems	for	parties	taking	the	documents	as	security;	the	credit	applicant	and	
the	 issuing	bank.	The	documents	enable	 the	ultimate	buyer	 to	 take	delivery	and	maintain	
subsequent	actions	in	respect	of	damage.245	The	documents	also	enable	the	paying	bank	to	
																																																						
236	Montrod	 (n31)	[43]	“worthless	 in	the	sense	that	 it	 is	not	genuine	and	has	no	commercial	value,	whether	as	
security	for	the	goods	or	otherwise”	
237	Kwei	Tek	(n222)	476	per	Devlin	J.	
238	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
239	Beam	Technology	(MfG)	Pte	Ltd	v	Standard	Chartered	Bank	[2002]	SGCA	53;	D	Neo,	‘A	nullity	exception	in	letter	
of	credit	transactions’	[2004]	Sing	JLS	46,	68.	
240	Montrod	(n31)	[56].	
241	Todd,	‘Non	genuine	shipping	documents’	(n162)	562;	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	
(n111)	[9.152],	[9.156].	
242	 As	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Motis	 Exports	 Ltd	 v	 Dampskibsselskabet	 AF	 1912	 Aktieselskab	 and	
Aktieselskabet	Dampskibsselskabet	Svendborg	[2000]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	211,	217	per	Mance	LJ. 
243	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n29)	231.	
244	Ibid	231.	
245	Bridge,	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n1)	[18-008],	[18-018];	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	(n111)	
[5.5].	
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recoup	its	losses	in	the	event	of	the	applicant’s	insolvency	prior	to	reimbursement.246	These	
actions	 are	 impossible	 where	 the	 documents	 are	 nullities.	Whether	 nullities	 constitute	 a	
further	basis	for	denying	payment	is,	therefore,	critical.	
	
Lord	Diplock	did	not	conclusively	resolve	the	nullity	question	in	United	City	Merchants.247		The	
issue	subsequently	came	before	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	Montrod	v	Grundkotter.248	The	credit	
stipulated	that	an	inspection	certificate	should	be	signed	by	the	credit	applicant.	During	the	
transaction,	 however,	 the	beneficiary	was	mistakenly	 led	 to	believe	 that	 it	 could	 sign	 the	
certificate	on	behalf	of	the	applicant.	It	duly	did	so.	The	credit	applicant	argued	for	a	nullity	
exception	 which	 would	 enable	 presentations	 to	 be	 rejected	 which	 contained	 documents	
which	were	“not	genuine	and	ha[d]	no	commercial	value.”249	This	was	unanimously	rejected	
by	the	Court	of	Appeal,		
The	creation	of	a	general	nullity	exception,	the	formulation	of	which	does	not	seem	
to	me	susceptible	of	precision,	involves	making	undesirable	inroads	into	the	principles	
of	 autonomy	 and	 negotiability	 universally	 recognised	 in	 relation	 to	 letter	 of	 credit	
transactions…Further	 such	 an	 exception	 would	 be	 likely	 to	 act	 unfairly	 upon	
beneficiaries	participating	in	a	chain	of	contracts	in	cases	where	their	good	faith	is	not	
in	 question.	 Such	 a	 development	 would	 thus	 undermine	 the	 system	 of	 financing	
international	trade	by	means	of	documentary	credits.250		
As	it	stands,	therefore,	a	document	which	is	a	nullity	or	has	been	forged	must	be	accepted	as	
good	 currency	 unless	 the	 defect	 can	 be	 connected	 to	 the	 beneficiary	 in	 time.251	 This	
undermines	 the	doctrine	of	 strict	compliance	since	 it	 is	difficult	 to	see	how	forged	or	null	
documents	could	ever	be	regarded	as	those	required	by	the	credit.	Nevertheless,	the	courts	
have	justified	their	refusal	to	create	further	exceptions	to	autonomy	by	the	need	to	ensure	
																																																						
246	As	recognised	in	Beam	Technology	(n239)	[33];	Lorenzon	(n54)	116.	
247	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
248	Montrod	(n31).	
249	Ibid	[43].	
250	Ibid	[58]	per	Potter	LJ.	
251	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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that	 the	credit	 remains	an	unassailable	payment	mechanism.252	The	difficulties	created	by	
this	analysis	and	an	alternative	approach	to	nullities	will	be	considered	in	Chapter	Five.	
	
The	discussion	now	reverts	to	the	criteria	the	claimant	will	need	to	establish	to	invoke	the	
fraud	exception.	The	third	of	these	–	reliance	and	loss	–	considers	the	impact	of	the	fraud	on	
the	claimant’s	behaviour.	This	is	not	a	particularly	difficult	hurdle	to	meet	in	English	law.	
	
iii. Reliance	and	loss	
An	ordinary	claim	in	the	tort	of	deceit	will	require	the	claimant	to	prove	that	they	relied	on	
the	 misrepresentation	 and	 subsequently	 suffered	 loss.253	 This	 has	 to	 some	 extent	 been	
modified	by	 the	 recent	decision	 in	Hayward	v	Zurich.254	The	Supreme	Court	held	 that	 this	
element	 of	 the	 test	 would	 be	 satisfied	 where	 the	 claimant	 had	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	
misrepresentation.255	 The	 application	 of	 these	 requirements	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 fraud	
exception	depends	on	whether	the	bank	has	made	payment.	
	
Where	 payment	 is	 outstanding,	 the	 claimant	 –	 either	 the	 beneficiary	 (situation	 1)	 or	 the	
applicant	(situations	4a	and	b)	-	need	show	only	the	potential	loss	that	would	have	occurred	
had	the	bank	made	payment.	This	was	considered	in	Rafsanjan	Pistachio	where	the	bank	had	
refused	 payment	 due	 to	 fraud	 (situation	 1).	 The	 beneficiary	 contended	 that	 the	 reliance	
requirement	would	only	be	satisfied	where	the	bank	had	actually	made	payment.256	Hirst	J	
swiftly	disposed	of	this	argument	stating	that	it	“demonstrate[d]	a	complete	misconception	
of	the	relevant	principle.”257	He	further	held	that	the	bank	had	established	potential	reliance	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 “unanimous	 evidence	 of	 all	 the	 bank’s	 witnesses”258	 and	 an	 objective	
appreciation	of	the	circumstances.	This	must	be	the	correct	approach.	If	actual	reliance	had	
																																																						
252	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock	(forgery);	Montrod	(n31)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ	(nullity).	See	later,	Chapter	Five,	where	it	will	
be	argued	that	the	judicial	approach	to	forgery	and	nullity	undermine	the	rationale	for	a	narrow	fraud	exception.	
253	Standard	Chartered	Bank	v	Pakistan	National	Shipping	Corp.	(No.	2)	[1998]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	684,	704	per	Cresswell	
J;	M	Jones,	A	Dugdale	and	M	Simpson	(eds.),	Clerk	and	Lindsell	on	Torts	(21st	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2015)	[18-01].		
254	Hayward	v	Zurich	Insurance	Co.	[2016]	UKSC	48.	
255	Ibid	[67],	[71]	per	Lord	Toulson.	
256	Rafsanjan	(n202)	542.	
257	Ibid	542	per	Hirst	J.	
258	Ibid	542	per	Hirst	J.	
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to	be	established	prior	to	payment,	 it	would	be	 impossible	for	an	 interim	 injunction	to	be	
issued	in	any	circumstances.259		
	
The	 position	 is	 necessarily	 different	when	 the	 bank	 has	made	 payment.	Where	 the	 bank	
attempts	 to	 recover	 from	the	beneficiary	 in	 the	 tort	of	deceit	 (situation	3),	 it	will	need	to	
demonstrate	actual	reliance	and	loss.	This	is	not	a	difficult	burden	to	satisfy.260	Indeed,	it	was	
held	 in	 Komercni	 Banka	 v	 Stone	 &	 Rolls	 that	 acceptance	 of	 the	 documents	 by	 the	 bank	
constituted	reliance	on	the	beneficiary’s	fraudulent	statements.261	The	issue	of	reliance	will	
be	 similarly	 straightforward	 where	 the	 bank	 seeks	 reimbursement	 from	 his	 customer	
(situation	2).		
	
A	fourth	criterion	–	that	the	fraud	be	patent	to	the	bank	–	is	required	in	certain	circumstances.	
This	 requirement	must	 be	 demonstrated	 if	 the	 applicant	 wishes	 to	 resist	 reimbursement	
(situation	2).	It	is	also	relevant	in	two	cases	where	payment	is	outstanding;	where	the	bank	
defends	non-payment	on	the	basis	of	fraud	(situation	1)	and	where	the	applicant	seeks	an	
injunction	against	the	issuing	bank	(situation	4a).		
	
iv. Fraud	known	to	the	bank	
In	the	earlier	discussion,	the	fraud	exception	was	said	to	depend	on	two	juridical	bases;	ex	
turpi	 causa	 and	 an	 implied	 term.	 The	 supplementary	 analysis	 –	 the	 implied	 term	 –	 was	
required	to	account	for	the	fact	that	in	certain	circumstances,	the	fraud	exception	requires	
proof	of	the	bank’s	knowledge	of	fraud	at	the	time	it	made	payment.262	If,	for	example,	the	
judicial	 desire	 was	 simply	 to	 prevent	 its	 processes	 being	 used	 by	 dishonest	 litigants,	 the	
knowledge	requirement	would	be	unnecessary.263	It	appears	therefore,	that	this	requirement	
serves	only	to	increase	the	already	considerable	burden	on	the	claimant	and	correspondingly	
reduce	the	likelihood	of	judicial	intervention.	Accordingly,	Rix	J	proposed	an	amendment	to	
ex	turpi	causa	in	Czarnikow-Rionda,	
																																																						
259	Ibid	542	per	Hirst	J;	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.47].	
260	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.48].	
261	Komercni	Banka	v	Stone	&	Rolls	[2003]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	383,	400	per	Toulson	J.	
262	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J.	
263	Ibid	203	per	Rix	J.	
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It	would	be	less	pithy	but	more	accurate	to	fill	out	the	dictum	by	saying	that	fraud	
unravels	 the	 bank’s	 obligation	 to	 act	 on	 the	 appearance	 of	 documents	 to	 be	 in	
accordance	with	a	credit’s	requirements	provided	that	the	bank	knows	in	time	of	the	
beneficiary’s	fraud.264	
	
The	critical	question	in	relation	to	this	criterion	is	one	of	timing;	when	must	the	bank	have	
knowledge	of	the	fraud?	The	answer	depends	on	the	circumstances	in	which	fraud	is	pleaded.		
The	issuing	bank	is	only	entitled	to	reimbursement	where	it	has	paid	without	notice	of	the	
fraud.	Accordingly,	to	resist	a	claim	for	reimbursement	 in	situation	(2),	 the	applicant	must	
prove	that	the	bank	knew	of	the	fraud	before	it	made	payment.	This	was	established	in	United	
Trading	v	Allied	Arab	Bank,265	
	
where	payment	has	in	fact	been	made,	the	bank's	knowledge	that	the	demand	made	
by	the	beneficiary	on	the	performance	bond	was	fraudulent	must	exist	prior	to	the	
actual	payment	to	the	beneficiary	and	that	its	knowledge	at	that	date	must	be	proved.	
Accordingly,	if	all	a	plaintiff	can	establish	is	such	knowledge	after	payment,	then	he	
has	failed	to	establish	his	cause	of	action.	The	bank	would	not	have	been	in	breach	of	
any	duty	in	making	the	payment	without	the	requisite	knowledge.	We	doubt	that	this	
is	really	open	to	contest.266	
	
The	timing	issue	has	proved	more	difficult	in	circumstances	where	payment	is	yet	to	be	made,	
as	in	situations	1	and	4a.	In	general	terms,	Edward	Owen	Engineering	v	Barclays	is	authority	
for	the	proposition	that	the	bank	can	only	refuse	payment	where	 it	had	knowledge	at	the	
time	of	the	demand.267	A	problem	arises,	however,	where	a	bank	suspects	fraud	but	can	only	
justify	rejection	of	documents	with	evidence	gathered	between	the	time	of	presentation	and	
trial.	 	 The	 courts	 have	 struggled	 to	 determine	 whether	 subsequently	 acquired	 evidence	
should	be	admissible	for	the	purposes	of	the	fraud	exception.		
																																																						
264	Ibid	199	per	Rix	J.	
265	United	Trading	Corporation	v	Allied	Arab	Bank	Ltd	[1985]	2	Lloyd's	Rep	554.	
266	Ibid	560	per	Ackner	LJ.	
267	Edward	Owen	(n31)	172	per	Lord	Denning	MR,	173	per	Browne	LJ.	
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In	Bolivinter	v	Chase	Manhattan,	 it	was	suggested	obiter	 that	evidence	acquired	after	 the	
bank’s	refusal	to	pay	should	be	sufficient	to	invoke	the	fraud	exception,268		
	
…if,	as	Lord	Diplock	said,	the	principle	is	that	"fraud	unravels	all"	and	if	the	issue	is	
whether	payment	should	now	be	made,	 it	 is	nothing	to	the	point	that	at	an	earlier	
stage	the	fraud	was	unknown	to	the	payer	and	so	could	not	begin	its	unravelling,	if	
fraud	is	now	known	to	him	and	has	now	unravelled	his	obligations.269	
	
When	 the	 issue	was	 subsequently	 considered	 in	Balfour	 Beatty	 v	 Technical	 &	 General,270	
Waller	LJ	felt	constrained	by	the	general	proposition	established	in	Edward	Owen.271	He	did	
concede,	however,	that	it	would	be	absurd	if	the	bank	could	not	rely	on	evidence	unearthed	
after	the	refusal	to	pay	as	this	would	effectively	require	the	court	to	assist	the	fraudster.272	
To	resolve	this	difficulty,	Waller	LJ	suggested	that	if	the	bank	was	able	to	prove	fraud	by	the	
time	of	the	hearing,	it	would	have	a	cause	of	action	for	fraudulent	misrepresentation	against	
the	 beneficiary.273	 If	 the	 bank	 then	 obtained	 summary	 judgment	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
misrepresentation,	 this	 would	 cancel	 out	 any	 liability	 which	 it	 otherwise	 owed	 to	 the	
beneficiary.274		
	
The	circuity	of	Waller	LJ’s	solution275	prompted	Mance	LJ	to	search	for	a	more	straightforward	
alternative	in	Solo	Bank	v	Canara.276	He	suggested	that	the	court	should	simply	use	its	general	
power	to	protect	its	processes	from	fraud	in	these	circumstances.	To	do	otherwise	“would	
affront	 good	 sense,	 and	 probably	 general	 principles	 relating	 to	 illegality,	 if	 Courts	 were	
obliged	to	give	judgment	in	favour	of	a	beneficiary	now	shown	to	be	acting	fraudulently.”277	
																																																						
268	Bolivinter	(n96)	256	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR.	
269	Ibid	256	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR.	
270	Balfour	Beatty	Civil	Engineering	v	Technical	&	General	Guarantee	Co	Ltd	[2000]	CLC	252.	
271	Ibid	259	per	Waller	LJ.		
272	Ibid	259	per	Waller	LJ.	
273	Ibid	259	per	Waller	LJ.	
274	Ibid	260	per	Waller	LJ.	
275	 See	 the	 critiques	of	 this	 analysis	 in	N	Enonchong,	 ‘The	autonomy	principle	of	 letters	of	 credit:	An	 illegality	
exception?’	[2006]	LMCLQ	404,	415-416;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.075].	
276	Solo	Industries	Ltd	v	Canara	Bank	[2001]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	578.	
277	Ibid	[21]	per	Mance	LJ.	
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This	was	subsequently	endorsed	in	Mahonia	v	JP	Morgan	Chase	Bank.278	The	simplicity	of	this	
approach	is,	as	Enonchong	has	argued,	“preferable”279	to	the	solution	advanced	in	Balfour	
Beatty,	not	least	because	it	accords	with	the	overarching	basis	of	the	fraud	exception.	
	
E. Standards	of	proof	
A	discussion	of	the	standard	of	proof	requires	us	to	distinguish	what	must	be	proved	at	trial	
and	at	the	interlocutory	stage.	Regardless	of	the	stage	at	which	the	exception	is	invoked,	the	
standard	of	proof	places	a	considerable	burden	on	the	claimant.280	It	is	convenient	to	discuss	
standards	of	proof	together	before	going	on,	in	Part	F,	to	consider	the	additional	procedural	
requirements	for	injunctive	relief.		
	
As	a	civil	issue,	the	normal	standard	of	proof	applies	at	trial;	the	balance	of	probabilities.	This	
is	subject	to	jurisprudence	suggesting	that	the	standard	is	heightened	in	cases	involving	more	
serious	 allegations.	 The	 leading	 case	 is	 Hornal	 v	 Neuberger	 in	 which	 fraudulent	
misrepresentation	was	alleged.281	Following	a	review	of	the	authorities,	the	Court	of	Appeal	
concluded	that	an	intermediate	standard	of	proof	was	appropriate,	
	
The	more	serious	the	allegation	the	higher	the	degree	of	probability	that	is	required:	
but	it	need	not,	in	a	civil	case,	reach	the	very	high	standard	required	by	the	criminal	
law.282	
	
As	noted	in	the	insurance	discussion,	the	standard	of	proof	was	subsequently	considered	in	
Re	H	(Minors).283	The	House	of	Lords	determined	that	the	ordinary	civil	standard	remained	
applicable	in	serious	cases,	but	that	more	“cogent	evidence”284	would	be	required	to	convince	
a	 court	 that	 the	 alleged	 event	 had	 occurred.285	 This	 has	 been	 universally	 accepted	 as	
applicable	in	documentary	credit	cases.286	Interestingly,	and	unlike	the	position	in	insurance,	
																																																						
278	Mahonia	Ltd	(2003)	(n164)	[46]	per	Colman	J.	
279	Enonchong,	‘The	autonomy	principle	–	illegality’	(n275)	415;	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[5.61].	
280	Enonchong,	‘The	autonomy	principle	–	illegality’	(n275)	413.	
281	Hornal	v	Neuberger	[1957]	1	QB	247	
282	Ibid	258	per	Denning	LJ.	
283	Re	H	(Minors)	[1996]	AC	563,	586-587	per	Lord	Nicholls.	
284	Ibid	586	per	Lord	Nicholls	citing	In	re	Dellow’s	Will	Trusts	[1964]	1	WLR	451,	455	per	Ungoed-Thomas	J.	
285	Re	H	(n283)	586	per	Lord	Nicholls.	
286	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.32];	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n108)	1102.	
209	
	
the	 appropriateness	 of	 an	 intermediate	 standard	 has	 not	 been	 questioned	 in	 the	 trade	
finance	context.	This	is	probably	because	few	fraud	cases	come	before	the	courts.	There	is	no	
reason,	however,	that	Hjalmarsson’s	arguments	made	in	the	insurance	context	would	not	be	
equally	relevant	in	respect	of	documentary	credits.287	Allegations	of	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	
do	not	raise	any	human	rights	issues	that	would	make	the	defendant	worthy	of	the	protection	
afforded	by	a	higher	standard	of	proof.288	
	
The	position	 is	more	 complicated	when	an	 injunction	 is	 sought	 to	prevent	 the	bank	 from	
making	 payment	 (situation	 4a)	 or	 to	 prevent	 the	 beneficiary	 presenting	 documents	 for	
payment	(situation	4b).	The	courts	have	struggled	to	enunciate	the	appropriate	standard	of	
proof	in	these	circumstances.	Various	expressions	appear	in	the	case	law	including	that	there	
must	be	proof	of	“established	or	obvious	fraud”289,	a	“real	prospect”290	of	establishing	fraud	
and	“a	good	arguable	case	that	on	the	material	available	the	only	realistic	inference”	is	that	
the	beneficiary	was	fraudulent.291	However	expressed,	the	burden	will	not	be	discharged	by	
an	“uncorroborated	statement	of	the	customer.”292	This	is	a	high	threshold	which	is	indicative	
of	the	tension	between	the	autonomy	principle	and	an	attainable	standard	of	proof.293		
	
There	has	also	been	 some	discussion	about	whether	 there	 should	be	a	 lower	 standard	of	
proof	when	an	injunction	is	sought	to	prevent	the	beneficiary	tendering	documents	(situation	
4b).	Waite	LJ	favoured	a	lower	standard	in	these	circumstances	in	Themehelp,	arguing	that	
where	the	beneficiary	was	yet	to	seek	payment,	an	injunction	would	not	pose	the	“slightest	
threat…to	 autonomy”.294	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Group	 Josi	 Re	 criticised	 this	 approach,	
however,	holding	that	“the	effect	on	the	lifeblood	of	commerce	will	be	precisely	the	same	
whether	the	bank	is	restrained	from	paying	or	the	beneficiary	is	restrained	from	asking	for	
																																																						
287	J	Hjalmarsson,	‘The	standard	of	proof	in	civil	cases:	An	insurance	fraud	perspective’	(2013)	17	Int	J	E&P	47.	See	
earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	374	et	seq.	
288	Ibid	63,	71.	
289	Edward	Owen	(n31)	169	per	Denning	LJ.	
290	Solo	Industries	(n276)	1815-1816	per	Mance	LJ.	
291	United	Trading	(n265)	561	per	Ackner	LJ.	
292	Bolivinter	(n96)	257	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR.	
293	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n108)	1102.	
294	Themehelp	(n211)	99	per	Waite	LJ.	This	approach	was	endorsed	in	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	202	per	Rix	J.	
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payment.”295	Academic	commentary	also	appears	to	favour	a	single	test.296	The	approach	in	
Themehelp	 is	perhaps	best	regarded	as	an	aberration	given	that	the	doctrine	of	autonomy	
demands	that	payment	is	only	disrupted	in	the	most	exceptional	of	circumstances.297	
	
In	Alternative	Power	 Supply,	 the	Privy	Council	 reviewed	 the	authorities	 and	proposed	 the	
following	test,	
	
it	must	be	clearly	established	at	the	interlocutory	stage	that	the	only	realistic	inference	
is	 (a)	 that	 the	 beneficiary	 could	 not	 honestly	 have	 believed	 in	 the	 validity	 of	 its	
demands	under	the	letter	of	credit	and	(b)	that	the	bank	was	aware	of	the	fraud.298	
	
The	“only	realistic	inference”299	standard	is	necessarily	lower	than	the	burden	the	applicant	
would	need	to	discharge	at	trial.300	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	the	applicant	is	more	
likely	to	succeed	at	the	interim	stage.	This	is	because	the	UCP	requires	banks	to	determine	
documentary	 compliance	 within	 five	 banking	 days301	 which	 significantly	 increases	 the	
practical	burden	of	proof	for	the	applicant.302	 In	any	event,	the	applicant	will	also	need	to	
satisfy	the	court	of	additional	matters,	discussed	in	Part	F,	to	obtain	an	interim	injunction.	
	
The	Privy	Council’s	insistence	on	the	bank’s	knowledge	is	also	interesting	since	this	would	be	
an	unnecessary	criterion	if	the	purpose	of	the	fraud	exception	was	simply	to	prevent	fraud.303	
The	 knowledge	 requirement	 perhaps	 further	 confirms	 the	 judicial	 preference	 for	 the	
																																																						
295	Group	Josi	Re	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n160)	361	per	Staughton	LJ.	See	also	the	judgment	at	first	instance,	Group	Josi	
Re	 v	Walbrook	 [1995]	 1	WLR	1017,	 1030	per	 Phillips	 J	 stating	 that	 to	 establish	different	 tests	would	 “rob	 the	
beneficiary	of	much	of	the	benefit	which	a	letter	of	credit	is	intended	to	bestow.”	
296	Favourable	views	are	found	in	Brindle	and	Cox	(n29)	732.	But	for	the	opposing	view	see	McKendrick,	Goode	on	
Commercial	Law	(n108)	1099;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.083];	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.77].	
297	Group	Josi	Re	(Court	of	Appeal)	 (n160)	361	per	Staughton	LJ;	Group	Josi	Re	(First	 Instance)	 (n295)	1030	per	
Phillips	J.	See	also	Sirius	Insurance	Co	v	FAI	General	Insurance	Ltd	[2003]	EWCA	Civ	470;	[2003]	1	WLR	2214,	[31]	
per	May	LJ,	[34]	per	Carnwarth	LJ.	This	was	not	discussed	by	the	Privy	Council	in	Alternative	Power	(n156).	
298	 Alternative	 Power	 (n156)	 [59]	 per	 Lord	 Clarke.	 The	 decision	 was	 referred	 to	 in	 National	 Infrastructure	
Development	Company	Ltd	v	Banco	Santander	SA	[2016]	EWHC	2990	(Comm)	but	the	Court	did	not	express	any	
opinion	about	the	correctness	of	the	Privy	Council’s	discussion	of	fraud.	
299	Alternative	Power	(n156)	[59]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
300	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	202	per	Rix	J.	
301	UCP	600	art.	14(b).	
302	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.008];	G	McMeel,	‘Letters	of	credit	and	the	fraud	exception	–	the	threshold	
test	for	injunctive	relief’	[2015]	LMCLQ	19,	22.	
303	This	underlines	the	importance	of	the	implied	term	analysis	as	an	additional	explanation	of	judicial	intervention	
in	cases	of	fraud.	See	earlier	discussion,	text	to	fn	166.	
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autonomy	 of	 the	 mechanism,	 expressed	 as	 the	 “integrity	 of	 banking	 contracts”304	 in	
Czarnikow-Rionda.	 From	a	practical	perspective,	 this	 additional	 requirement	 increases	 the	
burden	on	the	party	wishing	to	invoke	the	fraud	exception	and	makes	it	less	likely	that	he	will	
overcome	the	“strong	presumption	in	favour	of	the	fulfilment	of	the	independent	banking	
commitments.”305	
	
	
F. The	injunction	
In	 situation	 4,	 the	 applicant	 seeks	 an	 injunction	 against	 either	 the	 paying	 bank	 or	 the	
beneficiary.	Where	the	injunction	targets	the	beneficiary,	the	conclusion	of	these	proceedings	
will	also	be	of	interest	to	the	issuing	bank.306	This	is	because	the	outcome	will	enable	the	bank	
to	act	confidently	in	its	decision	to	honour	the	credit	or	to	refuse	payment.307	Further	criteria,	
derived	from	the	House	of	Lords’	decision	in	American	Cynamid	v	Ethicon,308	are	relevant	at	
the	 interim	 stage.	 Claimants	 will	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 three-stage	 test;	 i)	 the	merits	 of	 the	
evidence,	ii)	the	adequacy	of	damages	as	a	remedy	and	iii)	the	overall	balance	of	convenience.	
This	is	a	difficult	test	and	many	applicants	fall	at	the	first	hurdle,	failing	to	prove	fraud	to	the	
requisite	standard.		
	
i. The	merits	of	the	evidence	
A	claim	of	 fraud	at	 the	 interim	stage	must	be	proved	according	 to	 the	 test	established	 in	
Alternative	Power	Supply,	discussed	above.309	In	relation	to	the	quality	of	evidence	required,	
the	following	comments	made	by	Ackner	LJ	in	United	Trading	are	useful,		
	
…strong	corroborative	evidence	of	the	allegation,	usually	in	the	form	of	contemporary	
documents,	 particularly	 those	 emanating	 from	 the	 buyer	 [the	 beneficiary	 of	 the	
performance	bond]…For	the	evidence	of	fraud	to	be	clear,	we	would	also	expect	the	
buyer	to	have	been	given	the	opportunity	to	answer	the	allegation	and	to	have	failed	
																																																						
304	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	202	Rix	J.	
305	Ibid	202	Rix	J.	
306	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.40].	
307	Ibid	[9.40].	
308	American	Cynamid	Co	v	Ethicon	[1975]	AC	396.	
309	Alternative	Power	(n156)	[59]	per	Lord	Clarke;	see	earlier	discussion,	text	to	fn	298.	
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to	provide	any,	or	any	adequate	answer	in	circumstances	where	one	could	properly	
be	expected.310	
	
The	notion	that	the	alleged	fraudster	should	be	given	“a	fair	and	proper	opportunity”311	to	
rebut	the	allegations	has	been	endorsed	by	academic	commentators.312	
	
This	places	a	considerable	burden	on	the	claimant,	not	least	because	the	evidence	must	be	
gathered	within	the	five	banking	days	allowed	for	document	examination.313	It	is	unsurprising,	
therefore,	 that	 there	 are	 “vanishingly	 rare”314	 examples	 of	 claimants	 satisfying	 this	 first	
criterion	 for	 injunctive	 relief.	 Indeed,	 the	 author	 is	 aware	 of	 only	 one	 case	 involving	 a	
traditional	 letter	of	credit	where	the	claimant	adduced	sufficient	evidence	 in	 time.	 In	 that	
case	–	Tukan	Timber315	-	the	credit	required	that	receipts	were	signed	by	one	of	the	buyer’s	
two	 directors	 and	 it	 was	 successfully	 established	 that	 signatures	 in	 respect	 of	 two	
presentations	 were	 forged.	 The	 second	 presentation	 was	 “manifestly…crude	 and	 plainly	
dishonest.”316	The	Court	held	that	the	seller-beneficiary	could	only	have	inferred	that	these	
documents	–	which	he	then	went	on	to	present	for	payment	–	were	not	what	they	appeared	
to	 be.317	 Although	 the	 injunction	was	 not	 ultimately	 granted,318	Tukan	 Timber	 is	 a	 useful	
example	 of	 “one	 of	 those	 very,	 very	 rare	 cases	 wherein	 the	 strict	 burden	 of	 proof	 was	
satisfied”.319		
																																																						
310	United	Trading	(n265)	561	per	Ackner	LJ;	It	should	be	noted	that	United	Trading	concerned	a	performance	bond	
and	not	a	letter	of	credit	and	so	it	was	the	seller	seeking	to	prevent	banks	making	payment	under	the	bond.	The	
jurisprudence	 relating	 to	 the	 fraud	exception	has	developed	 in	 tandem	 in	 relation	 to	 these	autonomous	bank	
undertakings.		See	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n4)	6	per	Lord	Diplock.	
311	United	Trading	(n265)	561	per	Ackner	LJ.	
312	Horowitz	(n100)	[5.43]	describing	the	approach	as	“commendable’;	McMeel	(n302)	21.	
313	UCP	600	art.	14(b).	
314	McMeel	(n302)	21.	
315	Tukan	Timber	(n31).	
316	 Ibid	176	per	Hirst	 J.	One	of	 the	documents	was	purportedly	signed	 in	1983	but	bore	 the	new	name	of	 the	
company	which	had	not	been	registered	until	December	1984.	The	document	also	bore	the	same	date	as	an	earlier	
rejected	document.	
317	Ibid	176	per	Hirst	J.	
318	Ibid	177	per	Hirst	J	noting	that	the	applicant	had	failed	to	prove	that	the	beneficiary	would	have	made	a	third	
presentation	 under	 the	 credit	 and	 “I	 should,	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	my	 discretion,	 have	 refused	 the	 order	 sought,	
applying	the	American	Cynamid	Co.	v.	Ethicon	principles.”	
319	Ibid	176	per	Hirst	J.	Although	the	beneficiary	met	the	necessary	standard	of	proof,	he	was	unable	to	satisfy	the	
remaining	criteria	for	the	grant	of	an	injunction.	Cases	in	which	the	first	criterion	has	been	satisfied	in	relation	to	a	
performance	bond	include	Themehelp	(n211)	91-93,	100	per	Waite	LJ	and	in	relation	to	a	standby	letter	of	credit	
in	Kvaerner	John	Brown	Ltd	v	Midland	Bank	plc	[1998]	CLC	446,	450	per	Cresswell	J.	
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ii. The	adequacy	of	damages	as	a	remedy	
Where	sufficient	evidence	of	fraud	has	been	established,	the	court	will	consider	the	second	
limb	of	American	Cynamid;	whether	damages	would	be	an	adequate	remedy	 in	 lieu	of	an	
injunction.320	If	damages	would	be	an	adequate	remedy	for	the	applicant,	the	injunction	will	
be	refused	no	matter	how	strong	his	prima	facie	case	may	be.321	Damages	will	very	often	be	
considered	 adequate,	 particularly	 where	 the	 party	 to	 be	 injuncted	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	
compensate	the	applicant.322	This	will	almost	certainly	be	the	case	in	actions	against	the	bank	
as	evidenced	by	the	decisions	in	Discount	Records323	and	GKN	Contractors.324	
	
If	a	remedy	in	damages	would	not	be	adequate	for	the	credit	applicant,	the	court	must	then	
consider	the	defendant’s	position.	The	courts	will	need	to	determine	whether	damages	would	
adequately	compensate	the	defendant	bank	or	beneficiary	if	it	subsequently	won	at	trial.	This	
aspect	of	the	test	makes	it	“highly	unlikely”325	that	an	injunction	will	be	issued.	This	is	because	
reputational	damage	caused	to	the	bank	as	a	result	of	non-payment	will	be	difficult	to	remedy	
by	way	of	a	payment	in	damages.326	Indeed,	this	was	the	reason	the	injunction	was	refused	
in	 Tukan	 Timber;	 any	 damage	 to	 the	 bank	 was	 not	 compensable	 by	 the	 plaintiff’s	 cross-
undertaking	in	damages.327	
	
iii. The	overall	balance	of	convenience	
The	 final	 element	 of	 the	American	 Cynamid	 test	 is	 the	 overall	 balance	 of	 convenience.	 It	
requires	courts	to	consider	whether	the	grant	or	refusal	of	an	injunction	is	least	likely	to	result	
in	 injustice.328	 This	 is	 a	 considerable	 hurdle	 for	 the	 applicant	 to	 overcome.	 Reference	 is	
																																																						
320	American	Cynamid	(n308)	408.	
321	Ibid	408.	
322	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[10.26].	
323	Discount	Records	(n27)	320.	
324	GKN	Contractors	v	Lloyd’s	Bank	(1985)	30	BLR	48,	51.	
325	Bridge,	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n1)	[24-31];	Alternative	Power	(n156)	[79]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
326	M	Bridge,	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(8th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2010)	[24-028].	
327	Tukan	Timber	(n31)	176.		
328	Bridge,	Benjamin	(8th	ed.)	(n326)	24-028;	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.74]	“it	will	be	considered	whether	
more	harm	will	be	done	by	granting	or	refusing	the	injunction.”	
214	
	
commonly	made	to	Kerr	J’s	speech	in	Harbottle	in	which	he	described	this	task	as	constituting	
an	 “insuperable	 difficulty…[in	 which]…The	 balance	 of	 convenience	 would…be	 hopelessly	
weighted	against	the	plaintiffs.”329	
	
In	documentary	credit	disputes,	one	would	expect	to	see	the	same	factors	being	weighed	by	
the	courts.330	These	include	the	autonomy	of	the	payment	mechanism	and	potential	damage	
to	the	bank’s	reputation.331	Subsequent	difficulty	for	the	applicant-buyer	to	recover	under	
the	contract	of	sale	if	fraud	is	substantiated	at	trial	will	also	be	relevant,	although	the	courts	
have	generally	been	unpersuaded	that	such	difficulty	justifies	an	injunction.	In	Harbottle,	Kerr	
J	 commented	 that	 “these	 are	 risks	which	 the	merchants	 take…This	 is	 unfortunate	 for	 the	
plaintiffs,	 but	 it	 is	what	 they	 have	 agreed.332	 Two	 further	 factors	 are	 likely	 to	 reduce	 the	
applicant’s	 chance	 of	 success,	 namely	 if	 the	 credit	 will	 expire	 during	 the	 currency	 of	 the	
injunction333	and	the	availability	of	a	freezing	injunction	over	the	beneficiary’s	assets.334	The	
latter	course	of	action	is	particularly	advantageous	since	it	will	provide	some	protection	to	
the	applicant	and,	as	the	case	law	suggests,	does	not	threaten	the	autonomy	of	the	credit	
mechanism.335		
	
The	balance	of	these	factors	is	not	a	neutral	exercise,	but	starts	from	“a	strong	presumption	
in	 favour	 of	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 independent	 banking	 commitments.”336	 Indeed,	 a	
consideration	of	these	factors	led	Rix	J	to	comment	on	the	difficulty	of	achieving	interim	relief,	
	
I	do	not	know	that	it	can	be	affirmatively	stated	that	a	Court	would	never,	as	a	matter	
of	balance	of	convenience,	 injunct	a	bank	from	making	payment	under	 its	 letter	of	
																																																						
329	Harbottle	(n31)	155	per	Kerr	J.	
330	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.75].	
331	Ibid	[9.75].	
332	Harbottle	(n31)	155-156	per	Kerr	J.	
333	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	(n2)	[10.27].	See,	Permasteelisa	Japan	KK	v	Bougesstroi	Banca	Intesa	
SpA	[2007]	EWHC	3508	(QB);	Themehelp	(n211)	106	per	Balcombe	LJ.	
334	Senior	Courts	Act	1981	s.37;	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.82];	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203	per	Rix	J	(noting	
that	the	availability	of	Mareva	relief	was	“a	highly	important	consideration	and	goes	very	far	to	undermine	his	[the	
claimant’s]	complaint	about	the	difficulties	of	his	position.”)	
335	Z	Ltd	v	A-Z	[1982]	QB	558,	574	per	Lord	Denning	MR;	Bolivinter	(n96)	257	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR;	Themehelp	
(n211)	103	per	Evans	LJ;	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	203-204	per	Rix	J.	But	see	the	majority	reasoning	in	Themehelp	
(n211)	100-101	per	Waite	LJ	and	107	per	Balcombe	LJ.	
336	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	202	per	Rix	J.	Confirmed	in	Alternative	Power	(n156)	[59]	per	Lord	Clarke.	
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credit…All	that	can	be	said	is	that	the	circumstances	in	which	it	should	be	done	have	
not	so	 far	presented	 themselves,	and	 that	 it	would	of	necessity	 take	extraordinary	
facts	to	surmount	this	difficulty.337	
	
Even	where	the	claimant	has	successfully	established	fraud	to	the	requisite	standard,	itself	
not	 an	 easy	 task,	 these	 concerns	 will	 generally	 extinguish	 the	 claim.338	 The	 courts	 have	
expressed	 concern	 that	 if	 interim	 injunctions	were	more	 readily	 attainable,	 it	 “would	 risk	
endangering	 confidence	 in	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 system	of	 financing	 international	 trade”339	
based	 on	 autonomous	 undertakings.	 There	 is	 also	 concern	 that	 banks	 would	 suffer	 in	
reputational	 terms	 if	 injunctions	 were	 more	 readily	 available,340	 though	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
imagine	any	reputational	damage	if	non-payment	resulted	from	a	court	order.341	The	broader	
contractual	context	of	the	credit	further	complicates	a	claim	for	injunctive	relief.	In	Discount	
Records,342	the	alleged	fraud	was	uncovered	in	front	of	a	representative	of	the	issuing	bank	
but	it	was	likely	that	the	beneficiary	had	already	received	payment	by	discounting	the	credit	
before	the	maturity	date.	An	injunction	in	these	circumstances	would	not	have	affected	the	
fraudster	 but	 only	 have	 prevented	 reimbursement	 of	 the	 confirming	 bank.	 Undoubtedly,	
banks	would	become	less	willing	to	finance	transactions	by	documentary	credit	if	the	losses	
flowing	from	fraud	were	borne	by	the	confirming	institution.		
	
Applicants	have	only	been	successful	in	obtaining	an	injunction	in	cases	involving	a	standby	
credit.343	It	is	submitted	that	although	the	claimant	will	need	to	satisfy	the	same	procedural	
requirements	 irrespective	of	 the	 type	of	 credit,	 the	 judicial	 appreciation	of	 the	 remaining	
criteria	will	 differ.	 Ellinger	 and	Neo	have	 argued	 convincingly	 that	 the	 critical	 point	 is	 the	
																																																						
337	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	204	per	Rix	J.	
338	Alternative	Power	(n156)	[79]	per	Lord	Clarke:	“the	reasons	why	reported	cases	of	injunctions	being	granted	(or	
continued)	under	the	fraud	exception	are	so	rare	are	(a)	because	it	is	almost	never	possible	to	establish	the	test	for	
fraud	as	opposed	to	a	mere	possibility	of	fraud,	but	also	(b)	because	the	balance	of	convenience	will	almost	always	
militate	against	the	grant	of	an	injunction.”	
339	Bridge,	Benjamin	(8th	ed.)	(n326)	24-028	citing	Discount	Records	(n27)	320,	Bolivinter	(n96)	257	per	Sir	John	
Donaldson	MR	and	Czarnikow-Rionda	(n165)	204	per	Rix	J.	
340	Bolivinter	(n96)	257	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR.	See	also	McMeel	(n302)	23.	
341	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n32)	[9.75].	
342	 Discount	 Records	 (n27).	 See	 also	 Czarnikow-Rionda	 (n165)	 in	 which	 the	 beneficiary	 had	 already	 received	
payment	via	the	negotiating	or	confirming	banks.	Rix	J	noted	at	204-205	that	the	injunction	would	only	serve	to	
prevent	the	reimbursement	of	those	banks	and	would	not	hamper	the	alleged	fraudster.	
343	See	Kvaerner	John	Brown	(n319);	Themehelp	(n211).	
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relative	importance	of	payment	to	the	beneficiary.344	In	a	documentary	credit,	the	beneficiary	
will	expect	payment	on	the	presentation	of	conforming	documents	and	delay	may	impact	his	
ongoing	ability	to	trade.345	By	contrast,	prompt	payment	is	less	critical	for	the	beneficiary	of	
a	standby	credit.		This	is	because	the	standby	beneficiary	cannot	know	at	the	outset	whether	
his	counterpart	will	fail	to	perform	and	consequently	whether	he	will	need	to	draw	on	the	
credit.	Accordingly,	non-payment	of	 the	credit	 in	 these	circumstances	would	have	a	much	
lesser	impact	for	the	standby	beneficiary	than	his	counterpart	under	a	traditional	credit.346		
	
	
IV. Conclusion	
The	documentary	credit	provides	parties	trading	overseas	with	a	reliable	payment	mechanism	
and	mitigates	many	 of	 the	 risks	 involved	 in	 international	 trade.	 The	 credit	 can	 serve	 the	
purposes	 of	 the	 commercial	 community	 due	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 autonomy	 and	 strict	
compliance	which	facilitate	a	mechanism	built	on	speed	and	certainty.	The	credit	is,	however,	
unable	to	solve	all	the	risks	inherent	in	international	trade.	A	major	unresolved	risk	relates	to	
the	possibility	that	the	credit	beneficiary	will	engage	in	fraud.	This	risk	is	borne	by	the	buyer	
which	the	courts	suggest	is	mitigated	through	careful	ex	ante	screening.		
	
The	UCP	is	silent	as	to	the	impact	fraud	by	a	beneficiary	will	have	on	the	credit	transaction.	
The	English	courts	have	recognised	a	fraud	exception	to	autonomy	which	can	be	invoked	in	
interim	 proceedings	 and	 at	 trial.	 This	 responds	 to	 public	 policy	 concerns	 to	 ensure	 that	
fraudulent	litigants	are	not	able	to	profit	from	their	dishonesty.	It	is	evident	that	in	balancing	
the	need	to	promote	international	trade	and	the	deterrence	of	fraud,	the	English	courts	have	
had	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 commercial	 community	 at	 the	 forefront.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 narrow	
exception	 coupled	 with	 onerous	 procedural	 requirements.347	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	
courts	have	prioritised	“considerations	of	speed	and	convenience,	[which]	override[]	those	of	
security.”348	The	result,	as	Todd	has	argued,	may	well	be	that	“many	claims	which	are	in	fact	
																																																						
344	Ellinger	and	Neo	(n35)	163.	
345	Ibid	163.	
346	Ibid	163.	
347	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.008].	
348	Ibid	[4.008].	
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fraudulent	 [will]	 succeed.”349	 The	 credit	 applicant	 remains	 entitled	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 for	
breach	on	the	underlying	contract	of	sale,	although	the	success	of	this	action	will	depend	on	
the	availability	and	honesty	of	the	credit	beneficiary.350	
	
The	narrow	parameters	of	the	fraud	exception	were	justified	by	reference	to	the	commercial	
importance	of	a	swift,	unassailable	payment	mechanism.	The	following	chapter	critiques	the	
judicial	construction	of	the	fraud	rule	and	thereby	addresses	the	third	research	question.	In	
particular,	 it	will	 suggest	 that	 the	balance	drawn	by	the	English	courts	 is	not	 inevitable.351	
Subsequent	courts	have	reiterated	the	United	City	Merchants	analysis	without	considering	
the	more	expansive	approaches	adopted	elsewhere	or	the	unfortunate	consequences	that	
this	analysis	creates	for	 international	trade.	A	further	critique	 is	built	upon	empirical	work	
conducted	in	the	United	States.352	This	research	demonstrates	that	commercial	parties	use	
the	credit	mechanism	more	informally	than	doctrine	suggests.	This	will	be	used	to	develop	an	
argument	 that	 fraud	deterrence	 is	 not	merely	 a	 pre-contractual	 issue,	 as	 the	 courts	 have	
suggested,	but	that	mechanisms	exist	throughout	the	exchange	to	control	fraud.	As	it	stands,	
“a	successful	plea	of	fraud	appears	to	be	illusory.”353	The	totality	of	the	arguments	presented	
in	Chapter	Five	demonstrate	that	a	different	policy	balance	could	be	drawn;	indeed,	a	balance	
which	gives	greater	credence	to	the	notion	that	‘fraud	unravels	all.’
																																																						
349	Ibid	[4.056].	
350	Todd,	‘Outlawing	dishonest	international	traders’	(n119)	394;	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.041].	
351	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n3)	[4.014].	
352	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n8).	
353	WS	Chong,	‘The	abusive	calling	of	performance	bonds’	[1990]	JBL	414,	416.	
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Chapter	Five	
Documentary	Credits:	A	Critique	of	the	Judicial	Response	to	Fraud	
	
The	phrase	‘fraud	unravels	all’	does	not	adequately	explain	the	effect	of	beneficiary	fraud	in	
the	 documentary	 credit	 context.	 There	 are,	 after	 all,	 no	 examples	 of	 a	 credit	 applicant	
successfully	 invoking	 the	 exception	 to	 prevent	 payment	 and	 the	 necessary	 procedural	
requirements	 are	 particularly	 onerous.	 As	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	
demonstrated,	 the	 limited	scope	of	 the	exception	 is	 the	result	of	 the	courts	weighing	two	
competing	policy	concerns;	the	autonomy	of	the	credit	and	fraud	prevention.1	
	
In	the	English	context,	this	balance	has	been	drawn	in	favour	of	the	doctrine	of	autonomy.2	
The	fraud	exception	is	narrow,	permitting	judicial	intervention	to	restrain	payment	only	in	the	
most	exceptional	of	cases	and	only	when	the	fraud	can	be	connected	to	the	beneficiary.	Given	
its	design	as	a	swift,	unassailable	payment	mechanism,	the	credit	demands	minimal	inroads	
into	the	doctrine	of	autonomy.	This	has	been	used	by	the	courts	to	justify	the	limited	confines	
of	the	fraud	exception.		
	
The	starting	point	adopted	by	MacDonald	Eggers	 in	his	work	on	deceit	was	the	suggestion	
that	rules	on	fraud	developed	to	deter	lying	in	the	commercial	and	social	sphere.3	In	the	credit	
context,	however,	the	courts	have	consistently	eschewed	the	notion	that	the	fraud	exception	
serves	any	instrumental	purpose	relating	to	deterrence.4	This	makes	sense	when	we	consider	
that	the	exception	is	most	commonly	invoked	to	allocate	losses	between	two	innocent	parties	
and	will	only	rarely	target	the	fraudster	directly.5	It	is,	after	all,	difficult	to	see	how	a	legal	rule	
could	function	as	a	deterrent	if	it	does	not	target	the	wrongdoer.	The	courts	have	therefore	
allocated	responsibility	 for	 fraud	deterrence	to	the	parties	as	an	aspect	of	pre-contractual	
																																																						
1	N	Enonchong,	The	Independence	Principle	of	Letters	of	Credit	and	Demand	Guarantees	(OUP,	2011),	[1.03]-[1.05]	
2	This	is	the	same	decision	as	was	reached	in	the	United	States,	see	Asbury	Park	&	Ocean	Cove	Bank	v	National	City	
Bank	35	NYS	2d	985	(Sup	Ct	1942)	per	Shientag	J:	“the	efficacy	of	the	letter	of	credit	as	an	instrument	for	financing	
trade	is	the	primary	consideration.”	
3	P	MacDonald	Eggers,	Deceit:	The	Lie	of	the	Law	(Informa	law,	2009),	[1.4].	
4	Sanders	v	Maclean	(1883)	11	QBD	327,	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
5	See	earlier,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	144.	
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negotiations.6	If	the	current	legal	framework	is	to	be	charged	with	any	instrumental	purpose,	
perhaps	it	is	to	encourage	parties	to	take	more	effective	precautions	ex	ante.7		
	
The	rationale	of	the	narrow	fraud	exception	–	the	needs	of	the	commercial	community	–	is	a	
perfectly	legitimate	guideline	for	the	trade	finance	courts.	There	has	not,	however,	been	any	
consideration	of	whether	the	fraud	exception	actually	serves	this	purpose.	The	discussion	in	
this	chapter	fills	this	gap.	Two	arguments	will	be	developed	to	contend	that	commercial	need	
does	not	dictate	the	restrictive	parameters	imposed	by	the	English	courts.	A	third	argument	
then	challenges	the	judicial	view	that	fraud	deterrence	in	credit	transactions	is	confined	to	
the	pre-contractual	stage.	For	convenience,	the	arguments	are	summarised	here:	
	
1. In	 comparison	 to	 the	 English	 rule,	 the	 fraud	 exception	 in	 the	 United	 States	
encompasses	a	much	broader	range	of	behaviour	and	the	criteria	for	injunctive	relief	
are	less	onerous.	This	more	expansive	approach	has	not	reduced	the	popularity	of	the	
credit	 mechanism	 and	 has	 not	 adversely	 affected	 the	 banking	 system.	 This	
undermines	the	English	insistence	on	a	narrow	rule	for	reasons	of	commercial	need.	
	
2. In	setting	the	 limits	of	the	fraud	exception	 in	United	City	Merchants,8	 the	House	of	
Lords	misstated	 the	 contractual	 basis	 of	 the	 credit	 and	 conflated	distinct	 issues	of	
documentary	compliance	and	defences	to	payment.	This	has	resulted	in	consequences	
which	 are	 detrimental	 to	 commercial	 need	 which	 are	 difficult	 to	 equate	 with	 the	
rationale	of	the	fraud	exception.		
	
3. Empirical	work	on	documentary	credits	demonstrates	that	parties	use	the	credit	in	a	
radically	different	manner	than	predicted	by	doctrine.	This	forces	a	reconsideration	of	
fraud	deterrence	in	credit	transactions.	It	is	argued	that	mechanisms	to	counter	fraud	
																																																						
6	Sanders	(n4)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
7	A	similar	argument	has	been	made	in	an	analysis	of	the	general	contract	law,	see	E	Zamir	and	B	Medina,	Law,	
Economics,	and	Morality	(OUP,	2010),	287:	“if	deception	produces	any	positive	outcomes	at	all,	these	outcomes	
are…:	 incentivizing	 people	 to	 ex	 ante	 obtain	 socially	 beneficial	 information,	 disseminating	 information	 in	 the	
market,	or	facilitating	efficient	contracting.”	
8	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1982]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	1	(hereafter	referred	
to	as	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)).	
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exist	 throughout	 the	 exchange	 relationship,	 and	 not	 simply	 ex	 ante	 as	 the	 courts	
contend.	
	
I. The	American	Approach	to	Fraud	
The	widespread	use	of	the	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	(UCP	600)9	has,	to	a	considerable	
extent,	 harmonised	 the	 legal	 framework	 relating	 to	 credits.	 The	UCP,	 however,	makes	no	
provision	 for	 fraud,	 considering	 that	 this	 is	a	 task	 for	which	national	 jurisdictions	are	best	
equipped.10	The	effect	of	 fraud	by	 the	beneficiary	will	depend,	 therefore,	on	 the	 relevant	
provisions	of	the	governing	law.11	The	resulting	divergence	provides	scope	for	comparative	
analysis	and	the	position	in	the	United	States	has	been	chosen	for	this	purpose.	
	
The	United	States	provides	a	good	point	of	comparison	given	the	shared	basis	for	the	fraud	
exception12	and	the	mature	body	of	law	which	has	developed	both	in	relation	to	fraud	and	
the	 availability	 of	 interlocutory	 injunctions.	 An	 indication	 of	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 American	
jurisprudence	is	evident	in	the	annual	survey	of	letter	of	credit	cases	published	in	The	Business	
Lawyer	 since	1965.13	 The	 comparison	 is	 also	 triggered	by	Ackner	 LJ’s	 comments	 in	United	
Trading	v	Allied	Arab	Bank,	
	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	 in	 America,	 where	 concern	 to	 avoid	 irreparable	
damage	to	international	commerce	is	hardly	likely	to	be	lacking,	interlocutory	relief	
appears	to	be	more	easily	obtainable…Moreover,	their	conception	of	fraud	is	far	wider	
than	 ours	 and	 would	 appear	 to	 include	 ordinary	 breach	 of	 contract…	 There	 is	 no	
suggestion	that	this	more	liberal	approach	has	resulted	in	the	commercial	dislocation	
which	has,	by	 implication	at	 least,	been	 suggested	would	 result	 from	 rejecting	 the	
respondent's	submissions	as	to	the	standard	of	proof	required	from	the	plaintiffs.14	
																																																						
9	 The	 current	 version	 is	 ICC,	 ‘The	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	 for	Documentary	Credits’	 (2007	Revision,	 ICC	
Publication	no.	600)	(hereafter	referred	to	as	the	UCP).	
10	ICC	Banking	Commission,	‘Latest	queries	answered	by	the	ICC	Banking	Commission’	(1997)	3(2)	Documentary	
Credits	Insight	6	cited	in	A	Davidson,	‘Fraud,	the	Prime	Exception	to	the	Autonomy	Principle	in	Letters	of	Credit’	
(2003)	8	Intl.	Trade	&	Bus	L	Ann	23,	26.	
11	See	earlier,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	60.	
12	Sztejn	v	J	Henry	Schroder	Banking	Corp	177	Misc	719	(NY	Misc	1941);	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	
6;	D	Horowitz,	Letters	of	Credit	and	Demand	Guarantees:	Defences	to	Payment	(OUP,	2010),	[2.09].	
13		H	Bailey,	‘Commercial	paper,	bank	deposits	and	collections	and	letters	of	credit’	(1965)	20	Bus	Law	711.	
14	United	Trading	Corporation	v	Allied	Arab	Bank	Ltd	[1985]	2	Lloyd's	Rep	554,	561.	
222	
	
	
If	Ackner	LJ’s	comments	were	accurate,	it	would	suggest	that	the	American	courts	have	drawn	
a	very	different	balance	between	the	competing	policy	considerations	of	autonomy	and	fraud	
prevention	than	their	English	counterparts.	This	section	examines	the	limits	of	the	American	
fraud	exception	and	the	availability	of	injunctive	relief.	This	is	used	to	consider	whether	the	
“thrombosis”15	with	which	the	English	courts	are	preoccupied	–	and	have	used	to	 justify	a	
narrow	exception	–	has	occurred	in	the	United	States.	
	
A. Conception	of	fraud	in	the	United	States	
The	English	courts	have	restricted	the	availability	of	the	fraud	exception	to	circumstances	in	
which	the	fraud	is	apparent	on	the	face	of	the	documents	and	committed	by	the	beneficiary.	
By	contrast,	the	American	courts	have	embraced	both	documentary	fraud	and	fraud	in	the	
transaction.	This	is	traced	to	the	decision	in	Sztejn	v	J	Henry	Schroder.16	The	fraud	in	that	case	
consisted	of	the	seller’s	intentional	failure	to	ship	any	of	the	goods	which	had	been	ordered.	
This	was	properly	characterised	by	Shientag	J	as	fraud	in	the	transaction17	but,	given	that	the	
documents	appeared	to	conform,	also	consisted	of	material	misrepresentations	of	fact	in	the	
bill	 of	 lading.	 Ackner	 LJ	 further	 contended	 that	 ordinary	 breach	 of	 the	 underlying	 sales	
contract	was	sufficient	to	disrupt	payment	under	a	credit.18	This,	with	respect,	overstated	the	
breadth	of	the	American	position.	It	is	only	fraud	that	will	trigger	the	exception.19	
	
The	fraud	exception	has	since	been	codified	in	Article	5,	Uniform	Commercial	Code	(UCC)	and	
the	statute	has	been	enacted	in	almost	all	American	states.20	The	exception	was	first	drafted	
in	1962	and	was	the	version	in	force	at	the	time	of	Ackner	LJ’s	comments.	The	1962	version	
made	the	defence	available	where	a	document	was	“forged	or	fraudulent	or	there	is	fraud	in	
																																																						
15	 Intraco	 Ltd	 v	 Notis	 Shipping	 Corporation	 of	 Liberia	 (The	 Bhoja	 Trader)	 [1981]	 2	 Lloyd’s	 Rep.	 256,	 257	 per	
Donaldson	LJ.	
16	Sztejn	(n12).	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	134.	
17	Sztejn	(n12)	722	per	Shientag	J.	
18	United	Trading	(n14)	561	per	Ackner	LJ.	
19	Sztejn	 (n12)	634	per	Shientag	 J.	This	was	consistent	with	earlier	American	case	 law.	See	Maurice	O’Meara	v	
National	Park	Bank	146	NE	636	(NY	Ct	App,	1925),	639	per	McLaughlin	J:	the	bank	was	bound	to	pay	“irrespective	
of	whether	it	knew,	or	had	reason	to	believe,	that	the	paper	was	not	of	the	tensile	strength	contracted	for.”	
20	 Uniform	 Law	 Commission,	 ‘UCC	 Article	 5,	 Letters	 of	 Credit	 (1995)’	 available	 at:	
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%205,%20Letters%20of%20Credit%20(1995)	
(accessed	08/09/2017).	
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the	transaction.”21	The	reference	to	forgery	and	fraud	in	the	transaction	confirms	Ackner	LJ’s	
view	that	the	American	exception	was	broader	than	its	English	counterpart.		
	
The	Iranian	hostage	crisis	between	1979	and	1981	triggered	significant	litigation	relating	to	
standby	letters	of	credit.22	There	was	a	concern	that	the	Iranian	government	and/or	state-
governed	banks	would	make	fraudulent	demands	on	standbys,23	which	had	been	obtained	as	
security	 for	 the	 performance	 obligations	 of	 American	 contractors.	 This	 was	 concerning	
because	the	breakdown	of	the	Iranian	political	system	effectively	removed	any	possibility	that	
an	American	applicant	would	obtain	redress	following	payment.24	In	Itek	Corp	v	First	National	
Bank	of	Boston,25	an	injunction	was	granted	on	the	basis	that	access	to	Iranian	courts	was	
“futile”26	and	“the	fact	that	damages	may	be	reasonably	calculable	will	provide	Itek	with	little	
consolation	in	the	event	those	damages	ultimately	prove	uncollectible.”27	The	Court	in	Itek	
also	held	that	a	refusal	to	issue	an	injunction	in	circumstances	of	fraud	would	undermine	the	
“fundamental	 purpose”	 of	 letters	 of	 credit	 which	was	 to	 prevent	 one	 party	 enjoying	 the	
benefits	of	both	parties’	performance	simultaneously.28	A	similar	result	was	reached	in	Harris	
Corp	v	National	 Iranian	Radio	&	Television	where	the	court	 largely	rejected	the	arguments	
that	the	applicant	could	have	negotiated	for	better	protection	ex	ante29	and	was	swayed	by	
considerations	of	the	difficulty	of	recovery.30	The	judicial	desire	to	protect	the	American	credit	
applicants	in	these	circumstances	is	not	demonstrated	in	every	case	involving	an	allegation	of	
fraud	but,	is	explained	by	the	exceptional	nature	of	the	prevailing	political	situation.31		
	
																																																						
21	UCC	§5-114(2)	(1962).	
22	For	a	comprehensive	account	of	litigation	during	this	period,	see	H	Getz,	‘Enjoining	the	international	standby	
letter	of	credit:	The	Iranian	letter	of	credit	cases’	(1980)	21	Harv	Intl	LJ	189.	
23	X	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	in	the	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit:	A	Comparative	Survey	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2002),	79.	
24	Getz	(n22)	212.	
25	Itek	v	First	National	Bank	of	Boston	511	F	Supp.	1341	(D.	Mass	1981),	1349.	
26	Ibid	1348.	
27	Ibid	1350;	Similar	points	were	made	in	Stromberg-Carlson	Corp	v	Bank	Melli	467	F	Supp	530	(SDNY	1979),	533	
per	Weinfeld	J:	if	injunctive	relief	was	denied,	the	applicant	would	be	left	to	take	proceedings	in	Iran	“which	would	
make	any	relief	questionable.”	
28	Itek	(n25)	1350.	
29	Harris	Corp	v	National	Iranian	Radio	and	Television	(1982)	691	F	2d	1344,	[55].	
30	Ibid	[48].	At	[55],	the	applicant	could	not	be	expected	to	bear	“the	risk	of	a	fraudulent	demand.”	
31	J	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	Commercial	and	Standby	Credits	(4th	ed.	AS	Pratt	&	Sons,	2007),	[7-106];	
Foxboro	Co	v	Arabian	American	Oil	Co	805	F2d	34	(1st	Cir.	1986),	[9].	
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The	judicial	willingness	to	intervene	during	the	Iranian	crisis	would	suggest	there	was	some	
merit	in	Ackner	LJ’s	comments,	particularly	as	there	was	no	indication	that	credits	declined	in	
popularity	at	this	time.	In	the	years	immediately	before	the	UCC	was	revised,	however,	it	was	
suggested	that	injunctive	relief	was	being	issued	too	frequently.32	The	Task	Force	addressed	
this	concern	by	amending	Article	5	to	include	specific	criteria	for	the	grant	of	an	injunction.33	
In	the	Official	Comment	to	the	UCC,	it	was	noted	that	“[t]he	standard	for	injunctive	relief	is	
high,	 and	 the	 burden	 remains	 on	 the	 applicant	 to	 show,	 by	 evidence	 and	 not	 by	 mere	
allegation,	 that	such	relief	 is	warranted."34	Article	5	now	requires	 that	 four	conditions	are	
satisfied	before	an	injunction	will	be	issued.35	These	largely	mirror	the	requirements	under	
English	 law.36	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 not	 to	 consider	 in	 detail	 the	 judicial	
interpretation	 of	 these	 criteria,	 but	 to	 consider	whether	 there	 is	 still	 force	 in	 Ackner	 LJ’s	
comments	in	relation	to	the	availability	of	injunctive	relief	following	the	revisions	to	the	UCC.		
	
It	 should	be	noted,	however,	 that	 the	 fraud	exception	as	 initially	 codified	 in	1962	did	not	
resolve	all	matters	relating	to	the	fraud	exception.	It	was	unclear,	for	example,	whether	‘the	
transaction’	aspect	of	the	defence	required	the	fraud	to	relate	to	the	letter	of	credit	contract,	
as	would	be	the	case	if	it	had	been	induced	by	fraudulent	misrepresentation,	or	the	underlying	
contract	of	sale.	The	case	law	did	not	clarify	matters.	The	court	in	Cambridge	Sporting	Goods37	
-	a	contract	for	the	sale	of	new	boxing	gloves	which	were	delivered	ripped	and	mildewed	–	
																																																						
32	Task	Force	on	the	Study	of	UCC	Article	5	(Letters	of	Credit),	‘An	examination	of	UCC	Article	5	(Letters	of	Credit)’	
(1989-1990)	45	Bus	Law	1521,	1612	(hereafter	referred	to	as	‘UCC	Task	Force’);	H	Harfield,	‘Code,	customs	and	
conscience	 in	 letter	of	 credit	 law’	 (1971)	4	UCC	 Law	 J	 7,	 8;	HL	Ash	and	 JL	 Schwartz,	 ‘Letters	of	 credit:	 Judicial	
apprehensions	misplaced’	(1983)	5	Nat	LJ	13,	18	cited	in	S	van	Houten,	‘Letters	of	credit	and	fraud:	A	revisionist	
view’	(1984)	62	Can	Bar	Rev	371,	385.	
33	The	availability	of	an	interlocutory	or	permanent	injunction	is	confirmed	by	UCC	§5-109	(2)(b)	(1995	revisions).	
34	American	Law	Institute,	‘[Revised]	Article	5.	Letters	of	Credit.	Official	Comment’	available	at:	http://elearn.uni-
sofia.bg/pluginfile.php/91213/mod_resource/content/1/Revised_UCC_Article_5.pdf	(accessed	14/09/2016),	[4].		
35	UCC	§	5-109(b)	(1995	revisions):	
(1)	the	relief	is	not	prohibited	under	the	law	applicable	to	an	accepted	draft	or	deferred	obligation	incurred	
by	the	issuer;	
(2)	a	beneficiary,	 issuer,	or	nominated	person	who	may	be	adversely	affected	 is	adequately	protected	
against	loss	that	it	may	suffer	because	the	relief	is	granted;	
(3)	all	of	the	conditions	to	entitle	a	person	to	the	relief	under	the	law	of	this	State	have	been	met;	and	
(4)	on	the	basis	of	the	information	submitted	to	the	court,	the	applicant	is	more	likely	than	not	to	succeed	
under	 its	 claim	 of	 forgery	 or	 material	 fraud	 and	 the	 person	 demanding	 honor	 does	 not	 qualify	 for	
protection	under	subsection	(a)(1).	
36	See	earlier	discussion	in	Chapter	Four,	III	(F).	
37	United	Bank	Ltd	v	Cambridge	Sporting	Goods	Corp.	392	NYS	2d	265	(NY	1976)	(the	case	concerned	a	sale	for	a	
consignment	of	new	boxing	gloves	but	those	delivered	were	old,	ripped	and	mildewed.)	
225	
	
held	 that	 Article	 5	 embodied	 a	 flexible	 approach	 to	 fraud	 which	 could	 be	 used	 as	 the	
circumstances	dictated.38	
	
In	response	to	these	concerns,	a	Task	Force	recommended	changes	to	the	fraud	exception.39	
These	were	subsequently	adopted	in	1995.	Article	5,	Uniform	Commercial	Code	now	provides	
that,	 unless	 the	 presenter	 belongs	 to	 a	 protected	 class,40	 the	 issuer	 may	 dishonour	 a	
presentation41	which,	
	
appears	on	its	face	strictly	to	comply	with	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	letter	of	
credit,	but	a	required	document	 is	 forged	or	materially	 fraudulent,	or	honor	of	the	
presentation	 would	 facilitate	 a	 material	 fraud	 by	 the	 beneficiary	 on	 the	 issuer	 or	
applicant42	
	
The	 first	 trigger	 for	 the	 exception	 is	 fraud	 in	 the	 required	 documents.	Most	 notably,	 the	
statute	 does	 not	 explicitly	 require	 that	 this	 fraud	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 beneficiary.43	 This	
significantly	broadens	the	exception	in	comparison	to	the	English	position.	Where	a	document	
has	been	forged	or	is	materially	fraudulent,	the	courts	are	concerned	with	the	nature	of	the	
documents	and	not	the	 identity	of	their	creator.44	Thus,	fraud	perpetrated	by	third	parties	
unconnected	to	the	beneficiary	will	be	caught	by	the	exception.	In	this	sense,	the	relatively	
uncontroversial	 standard	 of	 documentary	 fraud	 is	 far	 broader	 than	 the	 English	 exception	
established	 in	United	City	Merchants.45	Professor	Dolan,	a	 leading	US	academic	working	 in	
this	area,	has	suggested	that	the	House	of	Lords’	decision	is	inconsistent	with	the	wording	of	
																																																						
38	Ibid	271.	
39	See	generally,	Article	5:	Official	Comment	(n34);	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	82.	
40	UCC	§	5-109(a)(1)	(1995	revision).	
41	UCC	§	5-109(2)	(1995	revision).	
42	UCC	§	5-109(a)	(1995	revision).	
43	X	Gao,	‘The	identity	of	the	fraudulent	party	under	the	fraud	rule	in	letters	of	credit	law’	(2001)	24(1)	UNSW	L	Rev	
119,	124.	
44	Ibid	124.	This	was	a	departure	from	the	pre-revision	case	law,	see	for	example,	Larson	v	First	Interstate	Bank	of	
Arizona	NA	603	F	Supp	467	(D	Ariz	1983),	469.	For	academic	support	of	the	pre-revision	position,	see	J	White	and	
R	Summers,	Uniform	Commercial	Code	(vol	3)	(4th	ed.,	1995)	185	as	cited	by	Gao	‘The	identity	of	the	fraudulent	
party’	(n43)	123.	
45	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8).	
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the	UCC46	and,	as	a	result,	the	English	position	establishes	a	“markedly	higher	hurdle”	for	the	
applicant	seeking	to	invoke	the	exception.47	
	
The	second	part	of	Article	5	extends	the	exception	to	circumstances	in	which	the	fraud	would	
constitute	 a	 material	 fraud	 against	 the	 issuer	 or	 the	 applicant.	 This	 includes	 fraudulent	
misrepresentation	by	the	beneficiary	which	has	induced	the	applicant	to	procure	the	credit48	
and	fraud	connected	to	the	underlying	contract	of	sale.49	This	clarified	the	confusion	present	
in	the	initial	codification	of	the	exception,	discussed	above.50	The	identity	of	the	fraudster	is	
critical	to	this	part	of	the	provision	meaning	that	the	exception	will	only	operate	in	response	
to	beneficiary	fraud.	Even	with	this	additional	requirement,	the	recognition	that	fraud	in	the	
transaction	is	sufficient	to	invoke	the	exception	is	much	broader	than	the	English	approach	to	
fraud.	
	
Ackner	LJ’s	comments	on	 the	breadth	of	 the	American	 fraud	exception,	 therefore,	 remain	
valid	following	the	revision	of	Article	5.	The	UCC	permits	payment	to	be	disrupted	in	many	
factual	circumstances	due	to	fraud.	These	 include	straightforward	 incidences	of	backdated	
documents,51	 false	 assertions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 goods	 in	 documentation,52	 	 false	
documentation,53	 the	 presentation	 of	 compliant	 documents	 where	 rubbish	 has	 been	
shipped,54	and	circumstances	in	which	fraud	has	induced	the	underlying	contract	of	sale55	or	
issue	of	the	letter	of	credit.56	Notably,	the	UCC	does	not	make	the	bank’s	knowledge	of	fraud	
a	pre-requisite	to	the	operation	of	the	defence.	This	broadens	the	exception	elaborated	in	
																																																						
46	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	(n31)	[7-85].	
47	Ibid	[7-93].	
48	For	example,	Mid-America	Tire	Inc.	v	PTZ	Trading	768	NE	2d	619	(Ohio	2002)	cited	in	J	Barnes	and	J	Byrne,	‘Letters	
of	credit:	2002	cases’	(2002-2003)	58	Bus.	Law.	1605,	1608	(fraudulent	misrepresentation	by	the	seller	to	induce	
the	buyer	to	enter	the	contract)	
49	 See	 UCC	 Task	 Force	 (n32)	 1625	 for	 the	 recommendation	 that	 the	 revised	 article	 retains	 the	 ‘fraud	 in	 the	
transaction’	defence.	
50	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	37-38.	
51	Siderius	v	Wallace	583	SW2d	852	(Tex.	Civ.	App.,	1979).	
52	Regent	Corp	v	 International	 Inv	&	Commerce	Bank	Ltd	686	NYS	2d	24	 (App	Div	1999)	where	the	beneficiary	
asserted	that	the	goods	were	of	Bangladeshi	origin	to	avoid	charges	due	on	Pakistani	goods.		
53	Shaffer	v	Brooklyn	Park	Garden	Apartments	250	NW	2d	172	(1977)	where	the	preconditions	for	the	issue	of	a	
certificate	had	not	been	satisfied	but	the	document	was	issued	anyway.		
54	Sztejn	(n12);	Cambridge	Sporting	Goods	(n37).	
55	NMC	Enterprises	Inc,	v	Columbia	Broadcasting	Sys	Inc.	14	UCC	Rep.	Serv.	1427	(Sup.	Ct.	NY	County	1974)	
56	Ibid;	O’Grady	v	First	Union	National	Bank	296	NsC	212,	250	SE2d	587	(1978)	as	cited	in	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	
of	Credit	(n31)	[7-112].	
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Sztejn	where	Shientag	J	insisted	on	the	bank	having	notice	of	the	fraud	at	the	time	the	demand	
for	 payment	 was	 made.57	 The	 absence	 of	 this	 criterion	 further	 establishes	 Article	 5	 as	
embodying	a	more	expansive	position	than	the	English	fraud	exception.		
	
	
B. Standard	of	materiality	
One	of	the	driving	forces	behind	the	reform	of	Article	5	was	the	absence	of	a	standard	against	
which	to	judge	fraudulent	conduct.	The	procedural	history	of	Sztejn	meant	that	this	was	not	
a	live	issue	for	the	court58	and	neither	was	this	dealt	with	in	the	1962	codification.	Moreover,	
later	cases	had	identified	a	range	of	varying	standards	which	had	created	confusion.59	
	
Article	 5	now	demands	 that	 the	 fraud	 is	material.60	 The	Official	 Comment	 to	 the	Uniform	
Commercial	 Code	 made	 clear	 that	 materiality	 was	 to	 be	 judged	 against	 the	 underlying	
contract	and	to	the	impact	of	fraud	on	the	purchaser.61	This	reflects	the	fact	that	the	American	
exception	encompasses	both	documentary	fraud	and	fraud	in	the	underlying	transaction.	An	
example	of	a	material	fraud	was	provided	in	the	Official	Comment.	It	was	suggested	that	a	
shipment	of	998	barrels	of	oil	against	documentation	indicating	a	shipment	of	1000	barrels	
would	 not	 be	 materially	 fraudulent	 because	 this	 shortfall	 was	 an	 “insubstantial	 and	
immaterial”	breach	of	the	underlying	contract.62	A	material	fraud	would	have	been	practiced	
where	the	same	documentation	was	used	to	claim	payment	in	circumstances	where	only	five	
barrels	had	been	shipped.63		
	
Materiality	is	also	the	standard	used	by	the	English	courts	to	determine	whether	the	fraud	is	
actionable.	The	focus,	however,	of	the	enquiry	is	different.	In	the	English	context,	the	concept	
of	materiality	is	linked	to	the	bank’s	obligation	to	make	payment,	namely	whether	truthful	
																																																						
57	Sztejn	(n12)	722	per	Shientag	J.	
58	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	(n31)	[7-67].	
59	UCC	Task	Force	(n32)	1614.	
60	UCC	§	5-109(a)	(1995	revision)	
61	Article	5:	Official	Comment	(n34)	[1]	as	cited	in	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	84.	
62	Article	5:	Official	Comment	(n34)	[1]	cited	in	R	Buckley	and	X	Gao,	‘A	comparative	analysis	of	the	standard	of	
fraud	required	under	the	fraud	rule	in	letters	of	credit	law’	(2003)	13	Duke	J	Comp	&	Intl	L	293,	317.	
63	Ibid.	
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statements	on	the	bill	of	lading	would	have	entitled	the	bank	to	reject	the	presentation.64	If	
the	backdating	could	have	been	connected	to	the	beneficiary	in	United	City	Merchants,	the	
fraud	would	have	been	regarded	as	material	since	the	actual	(late)	date	of	shipment	would	
have	entitled	 the	bank	 to	 reject	 the	presentation.	 This	 is	 a	much	narrower	 conception	of	
materiality	than	used	 in	the	United	States	which	perhaps	reflects	the	fact	that	the	English	
courts	only	recognise	documentary	fraud	as	actionable.		
	
The	materiality	requirement	results	in	a	much	more	flexible	enquiry	in	the	United	States	than	
under	English	law.	This	is	favourable	for	the	credit	applicant	where	the	transaction	is	to	be	
governed	by	the	UCC65	since	the	enquiry	will	take	account	of	the	commercial	realities	of	the	
fraud.	Moreover,	given	that	the	fraud	rule	exists	as	an	exception	to	the	doctrine	of	autonomy,	
it	 is	 wholly	 legitimate	 that	 courts	 look	 beyond	 the	 credit	 itself	 to	 assess	 materiality.	
Accordingly,	 it	 is	much	 easier	 to	 reconcile	 the	American	 approach	 to	materiality	with	 the	
nature	of	the	fraud	exception	than	its	English	counterpart.		
	
	
C. Availability	of	injunctions		
In	United	Trading,	Ackner	LJ	contended	that	an	applicant	would	find	it	far	easier	to	obtain	
injunctive	relief	in	the	United	States	than	under	English	law.66	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	
version	of	Article	5	in	force	at	the	time	of	Ackner	LJ’s	comments	did	not	specify	conditions	to	
be	 satisfied	before	 relief	would	be	 granted.67	 Thus,	 the	early	American	 authorities	 do	not	
provide	a	single	test	for	 injunctive	relief.	 It	 is	possible,	however,	to	 identify	several	factors	
which	 appear	 routinely	 in	 the	 judicial	 discussions.	 These	 include,	 for	 example,	 substantial	
evidence	as	to	the	merits	(proof	of	fraud),	the	balance	of	hardships	in	favour	of	the	injunction	
applicant,	and	a	consideration	of	the	broader	public	interest.68	Commentators	viewed	these	
factors	as	a	means	of	“prevent[ing]	a	flood	of	injunctions	based	upon	the	liberalization	of	the	
																																																						
64	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	7-8	per	Lord	Diplock	(rejecting	two	standards	of	materiality);	A	Malek	
and	D	Quest,	Jack:	Documentary	Credits	(4th	ed.	Tottel	Publishing,	2009)	[9.17].	See	earlier	discussion	in	Chapter	
Four,	III	(C)(i).	
65	See	also	C	Destrée	and	C	Spanos,	‘Sensitivity	to	fraud:	Demand	guarantees	&	standby	letters	of	credit’	(March	
2002)	52(2)	Keeping	Good	Companies	94,	97.	
66	United	Trading	(n14)	561	per	Ackner	LJ.	
67	UCC	Task	Force	(n32)	1534.	
68	See,	for	example,	Dynamics	Corp	of	America	v	Citizens	&	Southern	National	Bank	356	F	Supp	991	(ND	Ga	1973);	
Larson	(n44).	
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fraud	exception.”69	These	are	not	dissimilar	to	the	requirements	an	applicant	would	need	to	
satisfy	under	English	law70	but	the	American	courts	have	been	prepared	to	approach	these	
considerations	in	a	manner	more	favourable	to	the	credit	applicant.	
	
Interestingly,	 in	 the	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 credit	 applicant	 was	 successful	 in	 obtaining	 an	
injunction	 under	 the	 1962	 codification	 of	 the	 exception,71	 the	 courts	 discussed	 the	 same	
policy	considerations	which	were	employed	in	England	to	refuse	relief.	Indeed,	the	notion	of	
pre-contractual	due	diligence	has	been	important	with	the	American	courts	determining	that	
the	risk	of	beneficiary	fraud	should	fall	on	the	credit	applicant	“who	selected	him	rather	than	
[]	an	innocent	third	party	or	upon	the	issuer.”72	Despite	this,	injunctions	have	been	granted	in	
cases	where	payment	under	the	credit	would	cause	further	loss	to	the	applicant73	and	where	
their	prospects	of	later	recovery	against	the	beneficiary	were	slim.74	This	is	a	direct	contrast	
to	the	position	in	England	where	courts	have	repeatedly	insisted	that	the	difficulty	of	later	
actions	against	the	beneficiary	will	not	assist	the	applicant	in	claims	for	relief.75	
	
The	 American	 cases	 have	 explicitly	 recognised	 that	 fraud	 prevention	 is	 a	 relevant	 policy	
concern76	and	that	the	refusal	to	grant	injunctive	relief	in	cases	of	fraud	would	send	the	wrong	
message	to	fraudsters.77	It	was	stated	in	Larson	that,	
	
the	 failure	 to	 issue	 an	 injunction	where	otherwise	 appropriate	would	 send	 a	 clear	
signal	 to	 those	 inclined	 to	engage	 in	 fraudulent	activities	 that	 they	are	 likely	 to	be	
																																																						
69	van	Houten	(n32)	387;	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	(n31)	[7-78]	(noting	that	criteria	for	an	injunction	should	
counter	the	broad	meaning	of	fraud	under	US	law).	
70	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Four,	III	(E).	
71	For	example,	Itek	(n25);	American	National	Bank	&	Trust	Co.	v	Hamilton	Industries	Inc.	583F	Supp	164	(ND	III	
1984);	 Paccar	 International	 Inc.	 v	 Commercial	 Bank	 of	 Kuwait	 587	 F.Supp	 783	 (CD	 Cal.	 1984);	Regent	 Corp	 v	
International	Investment	&	Commerce	Bank	Ltd	686	NY	S2d	24	(App	Div	1999).	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	
(n31)	 [7-79]	 (arguing	 that	 even	 if	 an	 injunction	 is	 subsequently	 discharged,	 delay	 has	 already	 affected	 the	
beneficiary	and	diminished	the	efficiency	of	the	mechanism.)	See	also	M	Moses,	‘Letters	of	credit	and	the	insolvent	
applicant:	A	recipe	for	bad	faith	dishonor’	(2005-2006)	57	Ala	L	Rev	31,	37.	
72	Shaffer	(n53)	179;	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	138.	
73	Shaffer	(n53).	
74	Ibid;	Dynamics	Corp	(n68).	
75	RD	Harbottle	(Mercantile)	Ltd	v	Nat	West	Bank	Ltd	[1978]	QB	146,	155-156	per	Kerr	J.	
76	Shaffer	(n53)	180:	the	role	of	the	court	is	to	balance	the	“protection	of	the	consumer	from	the	beneficiary’s	fraud	
against	maintenance	of	the	letter	of	credit	as	a	commercial	instrument	and	business	device.”	
77	Itek	(n25).	
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rewarded...there	 is	 at	 least	 as	 much	 public	 interest	 in	 discouraging	 fraud	 as	 in	
encouraging	the	use	of	letters	of	credit.78	
	
Moreover,	 the	 refusal	 of	 injunctions	 in	 such	 circumstances	 would	 have	 “an	 even	 greater	
adverse	impact	upon	issuing	banks,	and	ultimately	discourage	the	use	of	letters	of	credit.”79	
The	courts	are	clearly	attuned	to	the	fact	that	a	mechanism	which	facilitated	fraud	would	not	
be	 attractive	 to	 the	 commercial	 community.	 These	 arguments	 have	 not	 been	 made	 in	
England.	
	
In	 both	 jurisdictions,	 the	 applicant	will	 need	 to	 show	 that	 he	will	 be	without	 an	 effective	
remedy	if	the	injunction	is	refused.80	This	should	be	relatively	difficult	given	that	the	credit	
expressly	 preserves	 subsequent	 actions	 on	 the	 underlying	 contract.	 Indeed,	 the	 UCC	
facilitates	this	process	as	a	result	of	the	warranty	provisions	in	art	5-110.	In	the	event	that	the	
presentation	is	honoured,	the	beneficiary	is	taken	to	have	warranted	that	the	documents	do	
not	 contain	 forgery	 or	 fraud81	 and	 that	 the	 presentation	 does	 not	 violate	 any	 agreement	
between	applicant	and	beneficiary.82	If	it	later	transpires	that	the	beneficiary	has	breached	
the	warranty,	the	applicant	will	be	entitled	to	bring	an	action	for	damages.	This	is	designed	to	
reduce	actions	for	injunctive	relief	and	encourage	parties	to	settle	disputes	after	payment	has	
been	made.83	
	
Despite	the	statutory	warranties,	American	courts	have	interpreted	this	criterion	generously,	
permitting	applicants	to	adduce	evidence	that	the	beneficiary	would	be	unable	to	satisfy	“a	
post-honor	damage	claim.”84	In	Hendricks	v	Bank	of	America,	evidence	that	the	beneficiary	
was	in	financial	distress	and	likely	to	dissipate	the	proceeds	of	the	credit	before	the	applicant	
																																																						
78	Larson	(n44)	470	citing	Itek	(n25)	1351.	
79	Itek	(n25).	
80	J	Dolan,	‘Letters	of	credit,	article	5	warranties,	fraud,	and	the	beneficiary’s	certificate’	(1985-1986)	41	Bus	Law	
347,	356.	
81	UCC	§	5-110(a)(1)	(1995	revisions).	
82	UCC	§	5-110(a)(2)	(1995	revisions).	
83	B	Wunnicke,	D	Wunnicke	and	P	Turner,	Standby	and	Commercial	Letters	of	Credit	(3rd	ed.	Aspen	Law	&	Business,	
2000	(2013	Supplement))	4-26.1;	J	Barnes	and	J	Byrne,	‘Revision	of	UCC	Article	5’	(1995)	50	Bus	Law	1449,	1457.	
See	generally,	R	Dole,	‘Warranties	by	beneficiaries	of	letters	of	credit	under	revised	article	5	of	the	UCC:	The	truth	
and	nothing	but	the	truth’	(2002-2003)	39	Hous	L	Rev	375.	
84	Langley	v	Prudential	Mortgage	64	UCC	Rep	Serv.	2d	(West	661,	667)	(ED	Ky,	2007).	
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could	 obtain	 a	 remedy	was	 sufficient	 for	 these	 purposes.85	 Similar	 arguments	 have	 been	
wholly	rejected	 in	the	English	context.86	 In	Harbottle,	 for	example,	Kerr	 J	commented	that	
“these	are	risks	which	the	merchants	take…This	is	unfortunate	for	the	plaintiffs,	but	it	is	what	
they	have	agreed.”87	This	suggests	that	an	American	applicant	 is	more	 likely	to	satisfy	this	
criterion	than	his	English	counterpart.	
	
The	 evidential	 burden	 on	 the	 applicant	 and	 the	 additional	 policy	 arguments	 considered	
relevant	by	the	English	courts	 lends	credence	to	Ackner	LJ’s	comments	following	the	1995	
revisions.	The	English	applicant	must	provide	additional	evidence,	in	particular	relating	to	the	
bank’s	knowledge	of	the	fraud,88	before	an	injunction	to	restrain	payment	will	be	granted.	
Injunctive	relief	under	US	law	does	not	require	the	knowledge	of	the	bank	as	an	independent	
requirement.	 In	 addition,	 refusals	 by	 English	 courts	 to	 issue	 injunctions	 are	 rooted	 in	
considerations	of	the	efficiency	of	the	mechanism	and	the	reputation	of	banks.89	By	contrast,	
the	 American	 courts	 have	 focused	 solely	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 mechanism90	 without	
considering	the	reputation	of	US	banks	in	actions	for	injunctive	relief.		
	
In	 conclusion,	 the	 fraud	 exception	 is	more	 likely	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 United	 States	 than	 in	
England.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this.	The	American	conception	of	fraud	embraces	a	
broader	 range	 of	 conduct	 including	 fraud	 in	 the	 transaction	 and	 documentary	 fraud	
attributable	 to	 a	 third	 party.	 In	 addition,	 the	 applicant	 need	 not	 establish	 the	 bank’s	
independent	knowledge	at	the	time	of	payment	and	will	have	the	benefit	of	a	more	flexible	
standard	of	materiality.	These	criteria	make	 it	difficult	 for	 the	credit	applicant	 litigating	 in	
England	to	obtain	relief.91	In	relation	to	the	availability	of	injunctive	relief,	the	1995	revisions	
																																																						
85	Hendricks	v	Bank	of	America	398	F.3d	1165	(9th	Cir,	2005).	Later	courts	have	denied	relief	where	the	claimant	has	
been	unable	to	demonstrate	this,	see	Drago	v	Holiday	Isle	537	F	Supp	2d	1219,	1222	(SD	Ala	2007);	Jameson	v	Pine	
Hill	No.	07-0111-WSB,	2007	WL	623807	(SD	Ala	Feb	23,	2007).	
86	 Themehelp	 Ltd	 v	West	 [1996]	 QB	 84,	 101	 per	Waite	 LJ	 noting	 the	 “appreciable	 risk”	 That	 assets	might	 be	
dissipated,	103	per	Evans	LJ:	“the	present	case	cries	out	for	Mareva	relief”	but	see	also	107	per	Balcombe	LJ	noting	
that	Mareva	relief	may	come	too	late.	See	also,	M	Bridge,	Benjamin's	Sale	of	Goods	(9th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	
2015)	[24-034]	where	the	difference	between	the	US	and	English	approaches	is	noted.	
87	Harbottle	(n75)	155-156	per	Kerr	J.	
88	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Four,	III	(D)	(iv).	
89	Discount	Records	v	Barclays	Bank	[1975]	1	WLR	315,	320	per	Megarry	J;	Bolivinter	Oil	SA	v	Chase	Manhattan	Bank	
[1984]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	251,	257	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	MR;	Czarnikow-Rionda	v	Standard	Bank	[1999]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	
187,	204	per	Rix	J.	
90	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	(n31)	[7-79],	[7-88].	
91	Ibid	[7-93].	
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have	made	the	position	more	onerous	for	the	American	applicant.	Despite	this,	the	American	
claimant	remains	in	a	favourable	position	as	against	his	English	counterpart.	This	is	because	
the	American	courts	are	willing	to	interpret	the	‘irreparable	injury’	criterion	more	favourably.	
It	would	also	appear	that	fewer	factors	militate	against	the	grant	of	an	injunction	in	America	
than	in	England.		
	
What	then	does	this	mean	for	the	arguments	by	English	courts	that	the	narrow	approach	to	
fraud	 is	 justified	by	commercial	need?	The	American	exception	would	suggest	 that	such	a	
narrow	approach	is	not	necessary	to	ensure	an	efficient	mechanism.	 In	the	first	place,	the	
codification	 of	 the	 American	 exception	 has	 enabled	 legislators	 to	 “balance	 competing	
interests	 or	 perspectives	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 fairly	 reflects	 the	 reasonable	 commercial	
expectations	of	the	parties.”	92	This	is	an	enviable	position93	which	cannot	be	replicated	in	the	
English	common	law	system.	In	addition,	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	mechanism	
is	any	less	popular	in	the	United	States	than	in	England.	If	anything,	the	widespread	use	of	
standby	credits	in	domestic	transactions	in	America,94	to	which	Article	5	also	applies,95	would	
suggest	 commercial	 acceptance	of	 the	 fraud	 standard.	 The	 volume	of	 litigation	 related	 to	
letters	of	credit	has	justified	an	annual	survey	published	in	The	Business	Lawyer.96	This	hints	
at	the	relative	size	of	the	market	in	the	United	States	but,	more	importantly,	that	even	the	
possibility	of	litigation	has	not	had	a	negative	impact	on	the	market	for	credits.		Accordingly,	
it	would	be	more	accurate	to	characterise	 the	English	approach	as	a	distinct	policy	choice	
connected	 to	 the	 judicial	 conception	 of	 market	 need	 rather	 than	 an	 inevitable	 balance	
between	competing	policy	arguments.97		
	
The	American	exception	demonstrates	 that	a	more	expansive	approach	 to	 fraud	does	not	
necessarily	result	in	the	thrombosis	so	feared	by	the	English	courts.	The	second	critique	of	
																																																						
92	UCC	Task	Force	(n32)	1538:	stating	that	the	purpose	was	“to	preserve	and	enhance	the	integrity	of	the	letter	of	
credit	as	a	vital	instrument	of	commerce.	In	so	doing,	it	has	sought	to	balance	competing	interests	or	perspectives	
in	a	manner	which	fairly	reflects	the	reasonable	commercial	expectations	of	the	parties.”		
93	J	Barnes	and	J	Byrne,	‘Letters	of	credit’	(2005	–	2006)	61	Bus	Law	1591,	1596:	“US	courts	applying	US	law	are	
uniquely	advantaged	in	having	a	comprehensive	codification	of	the	letter	of	credit	fraud	exception.”	
94	Malek	and	Quest,	 Jack	 (n64)	 [12.14];	M	Bridge,	Benjamin's	 Sale	of	Goods	 (8th	ed.	 Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2010),	
[23.237].	
95	Article	5:	Official	Comment	(n34)	1.	
96	The	first	survey	was	published	as	Bailey	(n13).	
97	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(2nd	ed.	Informa,	2010),	[4.014].	
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the	English	approach	to	fraud	argues	that	the	judicial	reasoning	in	United	City	Merchants	is	
flawed	and	that	this	has	set	in	motion	consequences	which	are	detrimental	to	commercial	
need.	This	severely	undermines	the	traditional	justification	for	a	narrow	fraud	exception.	
	
	
II. A	Critical	Analysis	of	United	City	Merchants	
The	 narrow	 contours	 of	 the	 English	 fraud	 exception	 are	 justified	 by	 reference	 to	 the	
supremacy	of	autonomy	and	commercial	need.	However,	 in	 constructing	 the	 limits	of	 the	
fraud	exception,	the	House	of	Lords	made	an	unfortunate	misstep	in	their	characterisation	of	
the	banks’	duties	under	the	letter	of	credit.	This	mischaracterisation	is	flawed	in	contractual	
terms	and	by	reference	to	the	UCP	(A).	An	alternative	analysis,	based	largely	on	arguments	
made	by	Professor	Roy	Goode,98	will	 then	be	offered	to	demonstrate	how	the	principle	of	
strict	compliance	and	the	fraud	exception	should	operate	(B).	Attention	will	then	turn	to	the	
unintended	consequences	of	this	decision	and	suggest	that	these	in	no	way	contribute	to	the	
efficiency	of	the	documentary	credit	as	a	payment	device	(C).		
	
A. A	critique	of	the	reasoning	in	United	City	Merchants	
The	fundamental	difficulty	with	Lord	Diplock’s	analysis	exists	in	his	account	of	when	the	bank	
becomes	bound	to	make	payment	to	the	beneficiary.	The	credit	in	United	City	Merchants	was	
governed	 by	 the	UCP	 500	which	 imposed	 a	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 care	 on	 banks	when	 they	
examined	documents.99	Lord	Diplock	stated	that,		
	
the	contractual	duty	of	each	bank	under	a	confirmed	irrevocable	credit	is	to	examine	
with	reasonable	care	all	documents	presented	in	order	to	ascertain	that	they	appear	
on	their	face	to	be	in	accordance	with	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	credit,	and,	if	
they	do	so	appear,	to	pay.100	
	
																																																						
98	For	example,	R	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	in	P	Cane	and	J	Stapleton	(eds.),	Essays	for	Patrick	Atiyah	
(Clarendon	Press,	1991),	228-243;	E	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(4th	ed.	Penguin,	2010)	1105-1106.	
99	UCP	500	art.	13(a).	This	reference	to	reasonable	care	does	not	appear	in	the	current	version	of	the	UCP,	the	UCP	
600,	but	this	does	not	substantively	affect	the	burden	on	the	paying	bank,	see	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n64)	[8.3]-
[8.7].	
100	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	7	per	Lord	Diplock	(emphasis	in	original).	
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The	 difficulty	 is	 that	 Lord	 Diplock	 equated	 the	 bank’s	 contractual	 obligation	 to	 pay	 with	
apparent	compliance.	This	was,	with	respect,	incorrect.	The	UCP	500	only	obliged	banks	to	
pay	when	the	stipulated	documents	–	as	distinct	from	documents	which	appeared	to	be	those	
stipulated	in	the	credit	–	were	presented.101	This	is	also	the	case	under	the	UCP	600	where	the	
obligation	to	pay	the	beneficiary	is	only	triggered	by	a	complying	presentation.102	This	reflects	
the	importance	of	genuine	documents	within	credit	transactions.	In	this	light,	the	words	from	
Equitable	Trust	v	Dawson	Partners	bear	repeating,		
	
It	is	both	common	ground	and	common	sense	that	in	such	a	transaction	the	accepting	
bank	can	only	claim	indemnity	if	the	conditions	on	which	it	is	authorised	to	accept	are	
in	the	matter	of	the	accompanying	documents	strictly	observed.	There	is	no	room	for	
documents	which	are	almost	the	same,	or	which	will	do	just	as	well.	Business	could	
not	proceed	securely	on	any	other	lines.103	
	
How,	 then,	 did	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 come	 to	 misunderstand	 the	 respective	 rights	 and	
obligations	of	the	parties	involved	in	documentary	credit	transactions?	This	is	an	interesting	
question,	not	least	because	the	Lord	Diplock’s	judgment	diverged	significantly	from	the	Court	
of	Appeal	decision	despite	counsel	presenting	virtually	identical	arguments	to	the	respective	
courts.104	There	would	seem	to	be	two	explanations	of	this	error.		
	
The	first	of	these	relates	to	numerous	references	to	apparent	compliance	within	the	UCP	500.		
The	rule	of	apparent	compliance	is	designed	to	protect	a	bank	which,	despite	a	(reasonable)	
examination	of	the	documents,	failed	to	uncover	defects	in	the	documents		which	later	come	
																																																						
101	UCP	500	art.	9(a)	“An	irrevocable	credit	constitutes	a	definite	undertaking	of	the	Issuing	Bank,	provided	that	the	
stipulated	documents	are	presented…and	that	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	Credit	are	complied	with.”	
102	UCP	600	art.	7(a)	and	art.	15(a)	(issuing	bank),	art.	8(a)	and	art.	15(b)	(confirming/negotiation	bank);	UCP	500	
art.	9(a)	“an	irrevocable	Credit	constitutes	a	definite	undertaking	of	the	issuing	Bank,	provided	that	the	stipulated	
documents	are	presented	to	the	Nominated	Bank	or	to	the	Issuing	bank	and	that	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	
Credit	are	complied	with.”	UCP	art.	9(b)	sets	out	the	same	duty	for	confirming	banks.	
103	Equitable	Trust	Co	of	New	York	v	Dawson	Partners	Ltd	(1926)	27	Ll	L	Rep	49,	52	per	Viscount	Sumner.	
104	Compare	the	following	judgments	where	counsels’	arguments	are	summarised:	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	
Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1983]	AC	168,	173-178;	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	
American	Accord)	[1982]	QB	208,	213-215.	For	further	discussion	of	the	approach	taken	by	the	Court	of	Appeal,	
see	later,	text	to	fn	139.	
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to	light.105	Reimbursement	is	entirely	appropriate	in	these	circumstances	given	that	payment	
was	made	in	good	faith	without	notice	of	the	fraud	and	that	banks	bear	no	responsibility	for	
the	genuineness	of	documents.106	Without	reimbursement,	banks	may	well	become	unwilling	
to	finance	international	transactions	by	way	of	documentary	credit.	As	noted	above,	however,	
the	 UCP	 only	 imposes	 a	 contractual	 obligation	 to	 pay	 when	 the	 documents	 actually	
conform.107	The	effect	of	Lord	Diplock’s	analysis	–	that	the	bank	owes	the	beneficiary	a	duty	
to	pay	against	apparently	compliant	documents	–	would	extend	this	same	protection	to	the	
beneficiary.	This	is	an	entirely	inappropriate	use	of	the	rule	of	apparent	compliance	since	the	
UCP	only	entitles	the	beneficiary	to	payment	when	he	has	presented	documents	stipulated	
by	the	credit.	Interestingly,	all	but	one	reference	to	apparent	compliance	was	removed	when	
the	UCP	was	revised	in	2007.108	This	indicates	the	potential	for	confusion	within	the	UCP	500	
and	will	be	examined	further	in	due	course.109	
	
A	further	explanation	of	the	analysis	–	that	the	bank	is	obliged	to	make	payment	when	the	
documents	 appear	 to	 comply	–	 lies	 in	 Lord	Diplock’s	 view	 that	 the	bank	 should	be	under	
identical	duties	in	its	contract	with	the	beneficiary	and	the	applicant.110	He	began	by	stating	
that	
the	contractual	duty	owed	by	confirming	and	issuing	banks	to	the	buyer	to	honour	the	
credit	on	presentation	of	apparently	conforming	documents	despite	the	fact	that	they	
contain	inaccuracies	or	even	are	forged111	
	
																																																						
105	M	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence	in	international	trade’	in	Worthington,	S.	(ed.),	Commercial	
Law	and	Commercial	Practice	(Hart,	2003).233.	This	was	the	result	in	Gian	Singh	v	Banque	de	l'Indochine	[1974]	1	
WLR	1234,	1238-1239	per	Lord	Diplock:	“in	business	transactions	financed	by	documentary	credits	banks	must	be	
able	 to	 act	 promptly	 on	 presentation	 of	 the	 documents.	 	 In	 the	 ordinary	 case	 visual	 inspection	 of	 the	 actual	
documents	presented	is	all	that	is	called	for.		The	bank	is	under	no	duty	to	take	any	further	steps	to	investigate	the	
genuineness	of	a	signature	which,	on	the	face	of	it,	purports	to	be	the	signature	of	the	person	named	or	described	
in	the	letter	of	credit.”	
106	UCP	600	art.34.	
107	UCP	500	art.	9(a)-(b).	
108	UCP	600	art.	14(a);	Horowitz	(n12)	[2.08]	“Arguably,	this	is	all	the	more	the	case	under	the	UCP	600,	where	the	
‘on	the	face’	terminology	has	been	removed	from	all	but	one	article.”	
109	See	later,	text	to	fn	218.	
110	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
111	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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Lord	Diplock	then	asserted	that	it	would	be	“strange”112	if	there	was	not	a	corresponding	duty	
to	the	credit	beneficiary	i.e.	to	make	payment	when	the	documents	appeared	to	conform.	It	
is	respectfully	submitted	that	Lord	Diplock	was	incorrect	here.	In	the	first	place,	the	doctrine	
of	 autonomy	demands	 that	 each	 contract	 is	 enforced	by	 reference	 to	 its	own	 terms.113	 It	
follows	that	there	is	no	need	for	the	contracts	within	the	network	to	be	written	on	identical	
terms.	It	is	also	particularly	odd	that	the	bank	should	owe	its	customer	–	the	credit	applicant	
–	a	duty	to	pay	in	circumstances	when	it	knows	the	documents	are	forged	or	inaccurate.	This	
is	tantamount	to	saying	that	the	bank	owes	its	customer	a	duty	to	be	defrauded	or,	at	best,	
to	be	misled	by	the	documents.114	 In	any	event,	 it	would	be	legitimate	to	assume	that	the	
bank	owed	a	greater	loyalty	to	its	(potentially	longstanding)	customer	from	whom	it	receives	
remuneration.	
	
The	proposition	that	banks	should	pay	when	the	documents	appear	to	conform	impacted	on	
the	court’s	consideration	of	third	party	forgeries.	Lord	Diplock	held	that	forged	documents,	
including	cases	 in	which	the	forgery	rendered	the	document	a	nullity,	did	not	constitute	a	
ground	for	refusing	payment.115	This	was	even	the	case	where	the	forgery	or	nullity	had	been	
discovered	prior	to	payment.116	He	justified	his	position	in	the	following	terms,		
	
This	is	certainly	not	so	under	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code	as	against	a	person	who	
has	 taken	a	draft	drawn	under	 the	credit	 in	 circumstances	 that	would	make	him	a	
holder	in	due	course,	and	I	see	no	reason	why,	and	there	is	nothing	in	the	Uniform	
Commercial	Code	to	suggest	that,	a	seller/beneficiary	who	is	ignorant	of	the	forgery	
should	 be	 in	 any	 worse	 position	 because	 he	 has	 not	 negotiated	 the	 draft	 before	
presentation.117	
	
																																																						
112	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
113	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n97)	[4-021].	
114	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(4th	ed.	Penguin,	2010)	1105;	Horowitz	(n12)	[2.11].	
115	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
116	Ibid	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
117	Ibid	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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Lord	Diplock	 is	certainly	correct	 that	 the	holder	 in	due	course	enjoys	a	privileged	position	
under	the	UCC.118		This	is	unsurprising	given	that	this	person	has	taken	the	draft	for	value,	in	
good	faith	and	without	notice	of	any	defect	in	the	document.119	What	is	not	clear,	however,	
is	why	the	seller-beneficiary	who	could	have	negotiated	the	credit,	but	chose	not	to,	should	
be	 granted	 equivalent	 protection.	 With	 respect,	 Lord	 Diplock	 had	 evidently	 misread	 the	
relevant	provisions	of	 the	UCC	since	 the	beneficiary	 is	excluded	 from	the	 list	of	parties	 to	
whom	the	bank	must	make	payment	in	cases	of	forgery.120	Given	that	the	beneficiary’s	right	
to	payment	hinges	on	actual	compliance,	it	is	impossible	to	see	how	the	mere	fact	that	he	
could	have	negotiated	the	documents	could	alter	the	contractual	position	between	him	and	
the	bank.121	It	is	noteworthy	that	Lord	Diplock’s	approach	to	forgery	was	roundly	rejected	in	
the	 Singaporean	 case	 of	 Lambias	 v	HSBC	on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 bank’s	 rejection	 of	 forged	
documents	would	not	extinguish	the	beneficiary’s	ability	to	bring	an	action	for	the	price	on	
the	underlying	contract	of	sale.122	
	
Despite	these	analytical	difficulties,	Lord	Diplock’s	approach	has	been	followed	in	subsequent	
case	 law.123	 Bridge	 has	 described	 this	 position	 as	 the	 orthodox	 view.124	 By	 contrast,	 the	
decision	has	been	“roundly	condemned”125	by	the	academic	community.	The	most	persuasive	
arguments	have	been	made	by	Professor	Goode	who	has	offered	an	alternative	analysis	of	
how	the	fraud	exception	should	operate	in	concert	with	the	doctrine	of	strict	compliance.	This	
																																																						
118	The	version	of	the	UCC	in	force	at	the	time	protected	the	holder	in	due	course:	UCC	§5-114(2)(a).	This	is	retained	
in	the	revised	version	of	article	five:	UCC	§5-109(a)(1).	
119	UCC	§3-302	(a)(2).	
120	UCC	§5-109	(a)(1):	“the	issuer	shall	honor	the	presentation,	if	honor	is	demanded	by	(i)	a	nominated	person	who	
has	given	value	in	good	faith	and	without	notice	of	forgery	or	material	fraud,	(ii)	a	confirmer	who	has	honored	its	
confirmation	in	good	faith,	(iii)	a	holder	in	due	course	of	a	draft	drawn	under	the	letter	of	credit	which	was	taken	
after	 acceptance	by	 the	 issuer	or	nominated	person,	or	 (iv)	 an	assignee	of	 the	 issuer's	or	nominated	person's	
deferred	obligation	that	was	taken	for	value	and	without	notice	of	forgery	or	material	fraud	after	the	obligation	
was	incurred	by	the	issuer	or	nominated	person”	
121	Goode,	‘Reflections	on	letters	of	credit	–	1’	[1980]	JBL	291,	294;	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	
231.	
122	Lambias	v	HSBC	[1993]	2	SLR	751,	763	per	Goh	Phai	Cheng	JC.	
123	Montrod	Ltd	v	Grundkötter	Fleischvertreibs	GmbH	[2002]	1	WLR	1975,	[56]	per	Potter	LJ:	The	fraud	exception	
“should	not	be	avoided	or	extended	by	the	argument	that	a	document	presented,	which	conforms	on	its	face	with	
the	terms	of	the	letter	of	the	credit,	is	none	the	less	of	a	character	which	disentitles	the	person	making	the	demand	
to	payment	because	it	is	fraudulent	 in	itself,	 independently	of	the	knowledge	and	bona	fides	of	the	demanding	
party.”	
124	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	239.	
125	M	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	cif	contracts’	(1998)	available	at:	http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3805/1/1622-2033-1-
SM.pdf	(accessed	16/07/2016)	6.	
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is	a	compelling	analysis,	particularly	considering	earlier	dicta	supporting	a	similar	conclusion.	
We	first	consider	Goode’s	alternative	analysis	before	discussing	the	consequences	which	flow	
from	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants.	It	will	be	contended	that	these	consequences	are	
detrimental	to	the	needs	of	commerce	which	weaken,	therefore,	the	traditional	justification	
of	the	narrow	fraud	exception.	
			
B. An	alternative	analysis	
Professor	Goode’s	alternative	analysis	makes	an	important	distinction	between	pre-requisites	
to	payment	and	defences	to	payment.126	This	envisages	a	two-stage	enquiry	and,	at	the	risk	
of	doing	Goode’s	arguments	a	disservice,	his	approach	is	briefly	summarized	here.		
	
The	first	stage	of	the	enquiry	relates	to	compliance:	do	the	documents	strictly	conform	to	the	
terms	of	the	credit?	This	requires	the	court	to	focus	on	the	nature	of	the	documents	and,	if	
the	 documents	 do	 not	 conform,	 the	 bank	 is	 entitled	 to	 reject	 the	 presentation.127	 The	
beneficiary	would	simply	have	failed	to	satisfy	the	pre-conditions	entitling	him	to	payment	in	
these	circumstances	although	he	may	re-tender	documents	subject	to	the	expiry	of	the	credit.	
The	standard	of	strict	compliance	which	has	been	developed	by	the	English	courts	permits	
the	rejection	of	documents	which	contain	minor	discrepancies,128	subject	to	the	typographical	
errors	permitted	by	 the	UCP.129	The	appropriate	standard	of	non-conformity	has	varied	 in	
Goode’s	analysis	over	the	years	but,	at	its	broadest,	would	encompass	documents	which	have	
been	forged,	contain	fraudulent	misrepresentations	and	are	nullities.130	The	identity	of	the	
party	who	is	responsible	for	these	discrepancies	is	wholly	irrelevant	at	this	stage.	As	Goode	
has	made	clear,		
	
The	 beneficiary…is	 only	 entitled	 to	 be	 paid	 if	 the	 documents	 are	 in	 order.	 A	
fraudulently	completed	bill	of	lading	does	not	become	a	conforming	document	merely	
because	the	fraud	is	that	of	a	third	party.131	
	
																																																						
126	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	228,	232.	
127	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n114)	1106.	
128	Kredietbank	Antwerp	v	Midland	Bank	[1999]	CLC	1108,	[12]	per	Evans	LJ.	
129	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertaking’	(n98)	228;	UCP	600	art.	30.	
130	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n114)	1106.	
131	Goode,	‘Reflections	–	1’	(n121)	294.	
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It	is	also	irrelevant	to	argue	that	the	good	faith	of	the	beneficiary	should	make	any	difference	
to	 the	question	of	documentary	 compliance.	This	 is	because	even	 the	most	 scrupulous	of	
behaviour	 could	 not	 transform	non-compliant	 documents	 into	 the	 genuine	 ones	 required	
under	the	credit.132	
	
Defences	to	payment	only	become	relevant	once	the	beneficiary	has	satisfied	the	necessary	
pre-conditions	to	payment.	This	is	the	second	phase	of	the	enquiry.	Payment	at	this	stage	is	
virtually	guaranteed	–	as	demanded	by	the	commercial	community	–	since	the	doctrine	of	
autonomy	insulates	the	credit	from	disputes	connected	to	the	underlying	contract.133	Indeed,	
the	exceptional	nature	of	judicial	intervention	is	appropriate	at	this	stage	since	the	beneficiary	
will	have	 fulfilled	 the	obligations	entitling	him	to	payment.	Accordingly,	 it	 is	 right	 that	 the	
identity	 of	 the	 fraudster	 is	 critical	 at	 this	 stage134	 and	 it	 is	 only	 when	 the	 fraud	 can	 be	
connected	to	the	beneficiary	that	the	fraud	exception	will	operate.	
	
The	consequences	of	the	fraud	exception	further	distinguish	the	second	phase	of	the	enquiry	
from	the	initial	question	of	compliance	addressed	by	the	courts.	Where	the	beneficiary	has	
engaged	in	conduct	sufficient	to	invoke	a	defence	–	for	example,	the	submission	of	documents	
he	 knows	 to	 contain	material	 misrepresentations	 –	 the	 right	 to	 payment	 is	 permanently	
barred.	The	court	refuses	to	engage	with	the	beneficiary	in	these	circumstances	as	is	typical	
of	defences	premised	on	ex	turpi	causa.	There	would	be	no	opportunity	for	him	to	retender	
compliant	documentation	as	would	be	the	case	during	the	first	phase	of	the	enquiry.	
	
There	 is	 much	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 sequential	 analysis	 is	 appropriate	 in	 relation	 to	
documentary	presentations	under	a	letter	of	credit.	In	the	first	place,	the	doctrine	of	strict	
compliance	supports	this	approach;	after	all,	the	parties	have	contracted	for	the	presentation	
of	actually	compliant	–	and	thus	genuine	–	documents.	In	addition,	there	was	considerable	
dicta	supporting	a	sequential	approach	prior	to	the	House	of	Lords’	decision	in	United	City	
Merchants.	 In	 Edward	 Owen	 Engineering	 v	 Barclays	 Bank,	 Denning	 LJ	 made	 clear	 that	
payment	was	only	due	when	“the	documents	are	 in	order	and	the	terms	of	the	credit	are	
																																																						
132	Ibid	294.	
133	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	233;	M	Brindle	and	R	Cox,	Law	of	Bank	Payments	(3rd	ed.	Sweet	
&	Maxwell,	2004)	[8.087].	
134	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	232-233.	
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satisfied.”135	He	continued	that	“the	bank	ought	not	to	pay	under	the	credit	if	it	knows	that	
the	 documents	 are	 forged	 or	 that	 the	 request	 for	 payment	 is	 made	 fraudulently	 in	
circumstances	when	there	is	no	right	to	payment.”136	Shortly	after	the	decision	in	United	City	
Merchants,	Gutteridge	and	Megrah	suggested	that,	in	respect	of	the	earlier	English	cases,	it	
was	“permissible	to	assume	that	what	they	had	in	mind	was	fraud	by	a	beneficiary.”137	There	
is,	with	respect,	no	basis	for	this	given	that	Lord	Denning	MR’s	comments	do	not	explicitly	
require	the	wrongdoing	to	be	connected	to	the	credit	beneficiary.138	The	same	analysis	was	
employed	by	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 in	United	City	Merchants	 as	 the	 following	comments	by	
Ackner	LJ	make	clear,	
	
A	banker	cannot	be	compelled	to	honour	a	credit	unless	all	the	conditions	precedent	
have	been	performed,	and	he	ought	not	to	be	under	an	obligation	to	accept	or	pay	
against	documents	which	he	knows	to	be	waste	paper.	To	hold	otherwise	would	be	to	
deprive	the	banker	of	that	security	for	the	advances,	which	is	a	cardinal	feature	of	the	
process	of	financing	carried	out	by	means	of	the	credit.139	
	
The	sequential	analysis	has	also	been	acknowledged	in	American	case	law.140	The	point	was	
made	succinctly	 in	Old	Colony	Trust	Co	v	Lawyers’	Title	&	Trust	Co.;	 if	a	bank	knows	that	a	
document	 is	 false	 or	 forged	 it	 “cannot	 be	 called	 upon	 to	 recognize	 such	 a	 document	 as	
complying	with	the	terms	of	a	letter	of	credit.”141	These	earlier	cases	were	used	to	develop	
the	 fraud	exception	 in	Sztejn	 v	 Schroder.142	 In	 that	 case,	 Shientag	 J	 commented	 that	 “the	
																																																						
135	Edward	Owen	Engineering	v	Barclays	Bank	International	[1979]	1	QB	159,	169	citing	Bank	Russo-Iran	v	Gordon	
Woodroffe	&	Co	[1972]	116	Sol	J	921,	10	CL	296	per	Browne	J.	
136	Edward	Owen	(n135)	169.	
137	HC	Gutteridge	and	M	Megrah,	The	Law	of	Bankers’	Commercial	Credits	(7th	ed.	Europa	Publications,	1984),	188.	
But	cf.	R	King	(ed.)	Gutteridge	&	Megrah’s	Law	of	Bankers’	Commercial	Credits	(8th	ed.	Europa	Publications,	2001)	
which	does	not	comment	on	this	particular	 issue,	169	fn	10	where	a	quotation	from	Edward	Owen	 is	provided	
without	further	comment.	
138	Edward	Owen	(n135)	169	per	Lord	Denning	MR:	the	bank	ought	not	to	pay	“if	it	knows	that	the	documents	are	
forged	or	that	the	request	for	payment	is	made	fraudulently	in	circumstances	when	there	is	no	right	to	payment.”	
139	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1981]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	604,	628	per	Ackner	
LJ	(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	Appeal))	
140	R	Buckley	and	X	Gao,	‘The	development	of	the	fraud	rule	in	letter	of	credit	law:	The	journey	so	far	and	the	road	
ahead’	(2002)	23(4)	Uni	of	Penn	J	of	Int	Ec	Law	663,	676.	
141	Old	 Colony	 Trust	 Co	 v	 Lawyers’	 Title	 &	 Trust	 Co	 297	 F	 152	 (1924),	 158.	 See	 also	 Buckley	 and	 Gao,	 ‘The	
development	of	the	fraud	rule’	(n140)	676.	
142	Sztejn	(n12);	--,	‘Decisions’	(1942)	42	Colum	LR	149,	150-151:	“It	seems	clear	that	the	presentation	of	forged	
documents	would	not	satisfy	the	requirements	of	the	letter	of	credit	and	that	the	bank	may	defend	on	the	grounds	
of	forgery.”	
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application	of	this	doctrine	[of	autonomy]	presupposes	that	the	documents	accompanying	
the	draft	are	genuine	and	conform	in	terms	to	the	requirements	of	the	letter	of	credit.”143	
Although	Sztejn	was	highly	influential	in	Lord	Diplock’s	judgment,	he	overlooked	the	first	stage	
of	the	sequential	analysis	and	limited	his	consideration	of	forgery	and	fraud	to	the	operation	
of	defences.144		
	
The	author	takes	the	view	that	the	sequential	analysis	is	to	be	preferred	since	it	acknowledges	
the	distinct	roles	of	strict	compliance	and	autonomy	and	reflects	the	bargain	the	parties	have	
made.	 The	 analysis	 has	 been	 endorsed	 by	 a	 range	 of	 academic	 commentators.145	
Unfortunately,	however,	Goode	has	not	been	entirely	consistent	as	to	whether	the	sequential	
analysis	would	have	led	to	a	different	result	on	the	facts	of	United	City	Merchants.	He	has,	on	
several	occasions,	argued	that	 forgery,	nullity	and	third	party	 fraud	all	 render	a	document	
non-conforming.146	This	is	a	broad	approach	to	the	compliance	question147	and	would	have	
justified	rejection	of	the	backdated	bill	of	lading	in	United	City	Merchants.	This,	incidentally,	
was	the	unanimous	result	reached	by	the	Court	of	Appeal.148	Goode	has	also	expressed	the	
view	that,	despite	the	flawed	reasoning	of	the	House	of	Lords,		
	
the	ruling…might	 just	possibly	be	sustainable	on	the	ground	that	the	 insertion	of	a	
false	shipping	date	in	the	bill	of	lading	did	not	prevent	it	from	being	what	it	purported	
to	be,	so	that	it	could	be	validly	tendered	by	a	beneficiary	in	good	faith149	
	
This	 indicates	 a	 narrower	 approach	 in	 which	 non-conformity	 is	 equated	 with	 documents	
which	have	no	legal	effect.	This	would	entitle	banks	to	reject	nullities	for	non-compliance	but	
would	recognise	forgeries,	including	the	bill	submitted	in	United	City	Merchants,	as	compliant.	
																																																						
143	Sztejn	(n12)	634.	
144	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	232.	
145	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.01],	[3.10];	R	Hooley,	‘Fraud	and	letters	of	credit:	Is	there	a	nullity	exception?’	[2002]	CLJ	279,	
280;	A	Guest	et	al.,	Benjamin’s	Sale	of	Goods	(7th	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2006)	[23-143];	Neo	‘A	nullity	exception	in	
letter	of	credit	transactions?’	[2004]	Sing	JLS	46,	60;	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	 (n31)	[7-65]:	“It	 is	also	
consistent	with	the	doctrine	of	the	strict	compliance	rule	to	say	that	a	beneficiary	who	presents	fraudulent	of	false	
documents	has	not	complied	with	the	credit.”	
146	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	228-9,	230,	232,	Goode,	‘Reflections	–	1’	(n121)	294.	
147	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.18],	[3.20].	
148	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n139)	623	per	Stephenson	LJ,	628	per	Ackner	LJ	and	633	per	Griffiths	
LJ.	
149	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	231.	
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The	above	comments	in	which	Goode	appears	to	favour	the	narrower	approach	also	suggest	
that	the	good	faith	of	the	beneficiary	can	affect	the	bank’s	response	to	the	documents.	This	
must	be	incorrect	since	the	assessment	of	documentary	compliance	is	objective	and	should	
be	disassociated	from	the	mindset	of	the	beneficiary.	Notwithstanding	Goode’s	inconsistent	
approach	 to	 the	 appropriate	 standard	 of	 non-conformity,	 the	 author	 maintains	 that	 the	
sequential	analysis	is	correct	and	will	argue,	in	due	course,	for	the	narrower	conception	of	
non-compliance.150	At	this	stage,	it	is	convenient	to	discuss	the	consequences	which	flow	from	
the	flawed	reasoning	in	United	City	Merchants.	These	consequences	are	detrimental	to	the	
efficiency	of,	and	commercial	confidence	in,	the	credit	mechanism.	This	is	difficult	to	square	
with	 the	policy	 construction	of	 the	 fraud	exception;	 to	 preserve	 the	 credit	 as	 an	 efficient	
system	of	trade	financing.	
	
C. The	unintended	consequences	of	the	reasoning	in	United	City	Merchants	
The	reasoning	adopted	by	the	House	of	Lords	in	United	City	Merchants	is	detrimental	to	the	
efficiency	 of	 the	 documentary	 credit	 mechanism.	 This	 undermines	 the	 rationale	 of	 Lord	
Diplock’s	 judgment;	 to	 ensure	 the	 credit’s	 continued	 acceptability	 within	 the	 commercial	
community.	 This	 is	 not,	 strictly	 speaking,	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 elaboration	 of	 the	 fraud	
exception	itself	but	rather	the	result	of	Lord	Diplock’s	conflation	of	fraud,	forgery	and	nullity.	
As	 Bridge	 has	 made	 clear,	 the	 “question	 of	 forgery	 and	 nullity	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	
definition	of	fraud	but	should	not	be	seen	as	bound	up	exclusively	with	fraud.”151	The	purpose	
of	this	section	is	to	explore	the	detrimental	consequences	of	this	reasoning	by	noting,	in	part	
i,	the	impact	on	commercial	confidence.	Parts	ii	and	iii	then	focus	on	the	difficulties	flowing	
from	Lord	Diplock’s	approach	to	forgery	and	nullity,	respectively.	The	extent	to	which	these	
consequences	militate	in	favour	of	a	new	approach	to	forged	and	null	documents	presented	
under	a	letter	of	credit	is	then	considered	(part	iv).	
	
i. Commercial	confidence	in	the	documents		
Given	 that	 the	 fraud	 exception	 is	 founded	 on	 ex	 turpi	 causa,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	
exception	is	only	triggered	by	the	beneficiary’s	wrongdoing.	However,	the	narrow	contours	
																																																						
150	See	later,	Part	II	(C)(iv).	
151	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	230.	
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of	the	fraud	exception	and	the	court’s	refusal	to	adopt	the	sequential	analysis,	means	that	
forged	 documents,	 third	 party	 fraud	 and	 nullities	 will	 not	 constitute	 bases	 for	 stopping	
payment.152	 	This	effectively	permits	non-genuine	documents	where	 the	defect	cannot	be	
attributed	to	 the	beneficiary	 to	circulate	between	commercial	parties.153	This	 is	a	concern	
because	the	credit	mechanism,	as	all	documentary	transactions,	rely	to	a	large	extent	on	trust.		
	
Documentary	 transactions	can	only	 function	when	the	contracting	parties	and	banks	have	
confidence	 that	 the	 requisite	 documents	 are	 what	 they	 appear	 to	 be.154	 The	 relatively	
unhindered	circulation	of	non-genuine	documents,	therefore,	is	likely	to	undermine	faith	in	
the	credit	mechanism.	Such	considerations	have	played	a	significant	role	in	the	development	
of	the	law	relating	to	bills	of	exchange.155	In	Master	v	Miller,	Lord	Kenyon	commented	that	
such	instruments	“which	are	circulated	throughout	Europe,	should	be	kept	with	the	utmost	
purity,	and	that	the	sanctions	to	preserve	them	from	fraud	should	not	be	lessened.”156	This	
issue	was	colourfully	highlighted	by	Cresswell	J	 in	his	characterisation	of	antedated	bills	as	
“the	 cancer	 of	 international	 trade.”157	 It	 is	 surprising,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	
delivered	 a	 judgment	 which	 permits	 the	 circulation	 of	 non-genuine	 documents	 between	
traders.	It	is	also	not	possible	to	give	Lord	Diplock	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	here.	His	express	
refusal	to	permit	banks	to	reject	documents	“even	where	the	fact	that	the	document	is	forged	
deprives	it	of	all	legal	effect	and	makes	it	a	nullity,	and	so	worthless	to	the	confirming	bank	as	
security	 for	 its	 advances	 to	 the	 buyer”158	 demonstrates	 his	 awareness	 of	 the	 potential	
consequences	of	his	decision.	
	
Given	that	the	contours	of	the	fraud	exception	were	constructed	with	commercial	need	in	
mind,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	 reduced	 confidence	 in	 the	 mechanism	 will	 facilitate	
international	trade.	If	parties	are	unable	to	place	their	trust	in	the	documents,	banks	may	well	
																																																						
152	R	Hooley,	‘Fraud	and	letters	of	credit,	part	1’	(2003)	3	JIBFL	91	(online	publication,	page	numbers	omitted).	
153	Ibid;	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.20].	
154	I	Carr,	International	Trade	Law	(5th	ed.	Routledge,	2014)	468;	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	
(n105)	216;	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	130-131.	
155	MacDonald	Eggers	(n3)	11.	
156	Master	v	Miller	(1791)	4	TR	320,	330	per	Lord	Kenyon.	
157	Standard	Chartered	Bank	v	Pakistan	National	Shipping	Corp	(No.	2)	[2000]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	218,	221	per	Cresswell	
J.		
158	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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become	 less	 willing	 to	 finance	 credit	 transactions159	 or	 else	 demand	 significantly	 higher	
compensation	for	their	services.	The	banks	could	also	require	parties	to	take	additional	steps	
to	 authenticate	 the	 documentation	 thus	 increasing	 the	 expense	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	
mechanism.		
	
ii. The	issues	relating	to	forgery	
The	House	of	Lords	rejected	forgery	as	an	 independent	basis	 to	prevent	payment	under	a	
documentary	credit.	Lord	Diplock	held	that	a	defence	which	did	not	require	the	beneficiary	
to	have	knowledge	of	 the	wrongdoing	“would	embrace	 the	 fraud	exception	and	 render	 it	
superfluous.”160	This	indicates	his	conflation	of	two	distinct	issues;	documentary	compliance	
and	defences	to	payment.	As	discussed	earlier,	the	identity	of	the	wrongdoer	only	becomes	
relevant	in	relation	to	defences.	The	approach	to	forgery	fails	to	respect	the	parties’	allocation	
of	risk	(a)	and	elevates	the	documentary	credit	above	other	negotiable	instruments	(b).	This	
is	likely	to	impact	on	commercial	certainty,	exactly	the	consequence	that	Lord	Diplock	sought	
to	avoid	in	his	construction	of	the	fraud	exception.		
	
	
a. Distorts	contractual	risk	allocation	with	respect	to	known	forgery	
The	letter	of	credit	is	properly	regarded	as	a	compromise	method	of	trade	financing	since	it	
provides	reassurance	to	both	buyer	and	seller.161	This	is	particularly	evident	in	the	balance	
drawn	 in	 respect	of	 the	 forgery	 risk.	 If	 strict	 compliance	 is	 analysed	as	 a	pre-condition	 to	
payment,	the	risk	that	third	party	defects	are	discovered	prior	to	payment	is	borne	by	the	
beneficiary.	By	contrast,	the	rule	of	apparent	compliance	places	the	risk	that	documents	are	
subsequently	 discovered	 to	 be	 forgeries	 on	 the	 applicant.	 The	 applicant	 may	 of	 course	
attempt	to	shift	this	loss	back	to	his	immediate	seller	by	way	of	an	action	on	the	underlying	
contract.	
	
The	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	fails	to	give	due	respect	to	this	allocation	of	risk.	It	puts	
the	whole	risk	of	forgery	–	both	known	and	unknown	at	the	time	of	presentation	–	onto	the	
																																																						
159	EP	Ellinger,	‘Fraud	in	documentary	credits’	[1981]	JBL	258,	269.	
160	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
161	See	earlier,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	11.	
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credit	 applicant.	 This	 is	because	 Lord	Diplock’s	 analysis	 contractually	obliges	banks	 to	pay	
unless	the	forgery	can	be	connected	to	the	beneficiary	at	the	time	of	presentation.	
	
This	 lack	 of	 respect	 is	 surprising	 for	 several	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 ICC’s	
Commercial	Crime	Service	enables	banks	to	refer	documents	for	authentication	within	the	
period	permitted	 for	examination.162	This	 creates	 the	distinct	possibility	 that	banks	would	
definitively	know	that	a	document	was	not	genuine	but	would,	on	Lord	Diplock’s	analysis,	
nevertheless	be	contractually	bound	to	pay.163	This	is	illogical	given	that	the	bank,	by	contrast,	
can	reject	documents	for	technical	discrepancies.	Moreover,	non-genuine	documents,	against	
which	 the	 bank	 is	 bound	 to	 pay,	 are	more	 likely	 to	 indicate	 an	 issue	with	 the	 underlying	
transaction	than	those	containing	technical	defects.164	 It	 is	worth	recalling	that	part	of	the	
doctrine	 of	 strict	 compliance	 is	 fraud	 deterrence	 since	 discrepancies	 may	 indicate	 a	
substantive	issue	with	the	beneficiary’s	performance.165	
	
The	existence	of	the	Commercial	Crime	Service	also	points	to	broader	issues	relating	to	the	
credit	mechanism.	In	the	first	place,	the	Service	facilitates	knowledge	acquisition	by	the	bank	
which	is	surprising	given	that	the	bank’s	role	is	intended	to	be	purely	administrative.	It	would	
be	 interesting,	therefore,	to	see	how	a	court	would	reconcile	the	bank’s	discovery	of	non-
conformity	via	the	Commercial	Crime	Service	with	Article	34	UCP	which	expressly	disclaims	
the	bank’s	liability	for	the	effectiveness	and	genuineness	of	documents.166	The	Commercial	
Crime	 Service	 provides	 further	 support	 for	 the	 sequential	 analysis	 i.e.	 that	 forged	 or	 null	
documents	could	be	rejected	 for	non-conformity.	This	 is	because	there	would	seem	to	be	
little	 role,	 if	 any,	 for	 the	Service	 if	 the	bank	was	 contractually	obliged	 to	pay,	 as	per	 Lord	
Diplock’s	judgment,	despite	the	discovery	of	defects	before	payment	had	been	made.		
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Secondly,	the	judges	have	consistently	followed	the	parties’	agreed	risk	allocation	elsewhere	
in	the	credit	network.	In	relation	to	the	fraud	exception,	for	example,	Kerr	J	made	clear	that	
the	courts	would	not	be	swayed	by	the	difficulties	of	later	actions	on	the	underlying	contract	
because	“these	are	risks	which	the	merchants	take…This	is	unfortunate	for	the	plaintiffs,	but	
it	is	what	they	have	agreed.167		
	
Finally,	 the	 decision	 in	 United	 City	 Merchants	 departs	 from	 what	 would	 ordinarily	 be	
recognised	as	an	efficient	allocation	of	risk.		The	risk	would	generally	be	placed	on	the	party	
closest	 to	 the	 potential	 forger	 as	 he	 is	 in	 the	 best	 position	 to	 prevent	 and	 uncover	 such	
forgeries.168	Applying	this	logic	to	the	credit	context,	one	would	expect	the	beneficiary	to	bear	
the	risk	in	respect	of	forgeries	discovered	prior	to	presentation.	Indeed,	this	was	Stephenson	
LJ’s	 approach	 in	United	 City	Merchants	 noting	 that	 it	 was	 the	 beneficiary	 “who	 put	 [the	
loading	broker]	in	the	position	in	which	he	made	the	bill,	and	made	it	fraudulently,	and…it	is	
they…who	 should	 pay.”169	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 loss	 does	 not	 fall	 on	 the	beneficiary	 in	 these	
circumstances	is	surprising,		
	
English	law…appears	to	protect	shrewd	sellers	who	utilise	the	services	of	third	parties	
who	are	discreet	enough	to	keep	their	fraudulent	practices	to	themselves.	The	law	in	
effect	encourages	sellers	not	to	inquire	into	the	details	of	the	activities	of	third	parties	
involved	 in	 their	 transactions	 so	 long	 as	 the	 bills	 of	 lading	 appear	 valid,	 for	 any	
knowledge	of	wrongdoing	would	jeopardise	the	sellers’	chance	of	being	paid.170	
	
The	 judicial	 disregard	 for	 the	 parties’	 agreement	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 consequences	 for	
commercial	certainty	and	the	popularity	of	the	credit	mechanism.	If	non-conformity	was	to	
be	interpreted	broadly,	banks	would	be	able	to	reject	forged	documents	irrespective	of	the	
forger’s	identity.	This	solution	would	tend	to	reduce	the	incidence	of	fraud171	and	transfer	the	
																																																						
167	Harbottle	(n75)	155-156	per	Kerr	J.	
168	A	Schwartz	and	R	Scott,	Commercial	Transactions	Principles	and	Policies	(The	Foundation	Press,	1982)	21,	918;	
A	Kronman,	‘Mistake,	disclosure,	information,	and	the	law	of	contracts’	(1978)	7	J	Leg.	Stud.	1,	4.	
169	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	Appeal)	(n139)	623	per	Stephenson	LJ.	
170	GL	Smith,	‘Irrevocable	letters	of	credit	and	third	party	fraud:	The	American	Accord’	(1983-1984)	24	Va	J	Intl	L	55,	
70-71.	
171	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	 (n23)	133	(arguing	that	public	policy	and	considerations	of	fraud	prevention	militate	in	
favour	of	this	construction).	
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risk	of	forgery	discovered	prior	to	presentation	to	the	beneficiary.	It	will	be	remembered	from	
the	 foregoing	 discussion	 that	 these	 documents	 remain	 effective	 to	 transfer	 ownership	 in	
goods.	The	author’s	conclusions	on	whether	a	broad	or	narrow	approach	 to	conformity	 is	
preferred	will	be	discussed	in	due	course	(iv).		
	
	
b. A	distinction	between	documentary	credits	and	negotiable	instruments	
The	 House	 of	 Lords’	 approach	 to	 forgery	 also	 creates	 an	 unhelpful	 distinction	 between	
documentary	credits	and	negotiable	instruments,	such	as	bills	of	exchange	and	bank	notes.172	
The	comparison	between	the	credit	and	negotiable	instruments	is	appropriate	because	these	
mechanisms	are	all	designed	to	be	“as	good	as	cash.”173	Indeed,	it	is	this	characteristic	of	the	
documentary	credit	 that	serves	to	ensure	swift	payment	 in	 international	 transactions.	The	
fewer	ways	in	which	a	payment	under	one	of	these	instruments	can	be	disrupted,	the	more	
it	will	resemble	cash.174	
	
The	result	in	United	City	Merchants	means	that	the	law	will	respond	differently	to	the	forgery	
of	a	required	document	under	a	letter	of	credit	than	to	a	forged	bill	of	exchange.	In	the	context	
of	documentary	credits,	the	discovery	that	a	required	document	has	been	forged	will	have	no	
impact	on	the	bank’s	duty	to	pay,	unless	that	forgery	can	be	attributed	to	the	beneficiary	in	
time.	By	contrast,	the	Bills	of	Exchange	Act	1882	provides,		
	
where	a	signature	on	a	bill	is	forged	or	placed	thereon	without	the	authority	of	the	
person	whose	 signature	 it	 purports	 to	 be,	 the	 forged	 or	 unauthorised	 signature	 is	
wholly	inoperative,	and	no	right	to	retain	the	bill	or	to	give	a	discharge	therefor	or	to	
																																																						
172	M	Bridge,	 ‘Documents	and	 contractual	 congruence’	 (n105)	231	 recognises	 “divergence”	between	 letters	of	
credit	and	bills	of	exchange.	It	is	arguable	that	the	English	courts’	refusal	to	recognise	nullity	as	a	separate	defence	
to	payment	in	Montrod	corresponds	with	the	treatment	of	negotiable	instruments.	See	M	Bridge,	The	International	
Sale	of	Goods:	Law	and	Practice	(2nd	ed.	OUP,	2007)	[6.82]	where	he	argues	that	“…non	est	factum,	which	have	a	
close	kinship	with	documentary	nullities,	may	be	asserted	even	against	a	holder	 in	due	course	of	a	negotiable	
instrument.”	
173	Power	Curber	v	Bank	of	Kuwait	[1981]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	394,	398	per	Denning	LJ;	Safa	v	Banque	du	Caire	[2000]	2	
Lloyd’s	Rep.	600,	605	per	Waller	LJ.	
174	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	231.	
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enforce	payment	thereof	against	any	party	thereto	can	be	acquired	through	or	under	
that	signature.175	
	
Accordingly,	 the	holder	of	 a	bill	 of	 exchange	will	 be	unable	 to	obtain	payment	where	 the	
signature	was	forged,	even	though	the	forgery	was	carried	out	by	a	third	party	or	that	the	
creditor	was	unaware	of	that	fact.	The	same	rationale	is	applied	to	bank	notes.176	
	
The	approach	to	forgery	 in	the	 law	of	negotiable	 instruments	must	be	designed	to	ensure	
confidence	in	the	mechanism.	There	also	appears	to	be	an	efficiency	consideration	at	play	
here,	namely	that	the	instrument	becomes	inoperative	as	soon	as	the	forgery	is	established.	
There	is	no	need	to	connect	the	wrongdoing	with	the	person	presenting	the	instrument.	We	
have	seen	in	the	context	of	the	fraud	exception	the	difficulties	associated	with	proving	the	
mindset	of	the	beneficiary.177	It	is	unlikely	that	the	commercial	community	would	explicitly	
countenance	the	development	of	a	payment	mechanism	which	took	a	different,	and	more	
permissive,	 approach	 to	 forgery	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 highly	 liquid	 instruments.	 This	 is	
however	 the	 bizarre,	 and	 no	 doubt	 unintended,	 effect	 of	 the	 decision	 in	 United	 City	
Merchants.	
	
iii. The	issues	relating	to	nullity	
Although	 the	 impact	 of	 null	 documents	 on	 the	 beneficiary’s	 right	 to	 payment	 was	 not	
conclusively	 settled	 in	 United	 City	 Merchants,178	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 Lord	 Diplock’s	
approach	to	non-genuine	documents	 influenced	the	subsequent	consideration	of	nullity	 in	
Montrod	v	Grundkotter.179	The	Court	of	Appeal	refused	to	recognise	nullity	as	an	independent	
basis	for	rejection	of	the	documents	citing	inter	alia	the	unacceptable	threat	that	this	would	
pose	 to	 the	doctrine	of	autonomy.180	This	 is	evidence	of	 the	Court’s	 refusal	 to	accept	 the	
sequential	 analysis	 in	 which	 documentary	 compliance	 is	 considered	 in	 isolation	 before	
defences	to	payment	become	relevant.	The	circulation	of	null	documents	causes	problems	
																																																						
175	Bills	of	Exchange	Act	1882	s.24.	
176	C	Proctor,	Mann	on	the	Legal	Aspect	of	Money	(7th	ed.	OUP	2012)	[1.74].	
177	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Four,	Part	III	(D)	(ii).	
178	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
179	Montrod	(n123)	[55]	per	Potter	LJ.	
180	Ibid	[56]	per	Potter	LJ.	
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for	parties	using	documentary	credits	to	finance	their	transactions.	The	first	of	these	relates	
to	the	security	that	the	documents	represent	for	the	ultimate	buyer	and	the	issuing	bank	(a).	
The	approach	to	nullity	also	distinguishes	documentary	credits	from	CIF	contracts	and	this	is	
not	justifiable	on	policy	grounds	(b).	
	
a. The	documents	as	security	
Transactions	financed	by	a	letter	of	credit,	much	like	other	documentary	transactions,	rely	on	
the	fact	that	the	shipping	documents	transfer	ownership	and	other	contractual	rights	from	
seller	to	buyer.	In	particular,	the	documents	enable	the	ultimate	buyer	to	take	delivery	of	the	
goods181	and	to	bring	a	subsequent	action	if	the	goods	have	been	damaged	in	transit.182	But	
the	documents	must	be	genuine	for	this	purpose;	the	buyer	will	be	unable	to	assert	title	or	
any	other	right	in	respect	of	the	goods	when	he	has	received	nullities.183	Although	the	credit	
arrangement	places	the	risk	of	poor	quality	goods	on	the	final	buyer,	 it	 is	not	designed	to	
transfer	the	risk	of	worthless	documents	to	the	person	in	this	position.	This	is	because	the	
doctrine	 of	 strict	 compliance	 should	 operate	 to	 screen	 out	 nullities	 before	 payment.	 The	
judicial	approach	to	nullity	thus	exposes	him	to	a	greater	risk	–	an	inability	to	collect	the	goods	
or	bring	legal	action	in	respect	of	them	–	than	he	was	willing	to	accept	under	the	credit.	
	
The	documents,	perhaps	more	 importantly,	also	 represent	security	 for	 the	 issuing	bank	 in	
exchange	for	the	advances	it	makes	to	the	beneficiary	on	the	applicant’s	behalf.184	This	reflects	
the	fact	that	the	credit	mechanism	transfers	the	risk	of	buyer	insolvency	from	the	beneficiary	
to	 the	 issuing	bank.	This	 risk	 is	mitigated	by	 two	 factors;	 firstly,	 that	 the	bank	 retains	 the	
documents	 until	 it	 has	 been	 reimbursed	 by	 the	 buyer	 and,	 in	 addition,	 the	 bank’s	 direct	
knowledge	 of	 the	 applicant’s	 creditworthiness.185	 This	 enables	 the	 bank	 to	 determine	
																																																						
181	Lickbarrow	v	Mason	100	ER	35	(1787),	39	per	Ashhurst	J;	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n86)	[18-007];	R	Goode,	Proprietary	
Rights	and	Insolvency	in	Sales	Transactions	(2nd	ed.	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	1989),	59-60.	
182	Carriage	of	Goods	by	Sea	Act	1992	s.2(1);	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	216.	Or	to	
bring	an	action	in	negligence	against	the	carrier,	as	was	the	case	in	Niru	Battery	Manufacturing	v	Milestone	Trading	
Ltd	(No.	1)	[2002]	2	All	ER	(Comm)	705.	
183	P	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	(4th	ed.	Informa,	2007),	[9.148].	
184	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	 Law	 (n114)	1106:	 the	 tender	of	worthless	documents	 “undermines	 the	
security	of	transactions	for	banks	where	they	advance	funds	to	their	customers	on	the	security	of	the	documents.”	
185	Smith	(n170)	94-95:	“The	reply	was	unanimous:	the	credit-worthiness	of	the	customer	is	the	overriding	and	
sometimes	 exclusive	 basis	 on	which	 banks	 issue	 letters	 of	 credit.	 Expenses	 incurred	 in	 resale	 and	 the	 usually	
dramatic	discount	at	which	goods	are	resold	in	order	to	realize	security	makes	the	value	of	the	goods	as	represented	
by	the	documents	of	almost	academic	significance	in	practice.”	See	also,	K	Donnelly,	‘Nothing	for	nothing:	A	nullity	
exception	in	letters	of	credit’	[2008]	JBL	316,	357.	
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whether	to	issue	the	credit	and	on	what	terms.186	In	the	event	of	the	buyer’s	insolvency	prior	
to	reimbursement,	the	issuing	bank	can	sell	the	documents	in	the	market	to	recoup	its	losses.	
This	is	impossible	where	the	bank	has	received	nullities.	
	
The	bill	of	lading	in	United	City	Merchants	was	not	a	nullity	since	the	fraud	merely	related	to	
the	date	and	place	of	shipment.	It	remained	a	valid,	transferable	receipt	for	the	goods187	and	
did	not	diminish	the	bank’s	security	interest	to	any	material	degree.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	
commentators,	 while	 criticising	 the	 reasoning	 that	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 employed,	 have	
accepted	the	result	on	the	facts.188	But	the	House	of	Lords	also	refused	to	recognise	the	bank’s	
interest	as	an	overriding	concern	in	circumstances	where	the	documents	were	“worthless	to	
the	confirming	bank	as	security	for	its	advances	to	the	buyer.”189	This	is	very	difficult	to	justify	
since	 a	 bank	 in	 receipt	 of	 nullities	 will	 be	 unable	 to	mitigate	 its	 loss	 in	 the	 event	 of	 the	
applicant’s	 insolvency.190	Of	course,	 the	bank’s	knowledge	of	 the	buyer’s	 financial	position	
means	that	insolvency	is	relatively	unlikely	to	occur	since	the	bank	would	refuse	to	issue	a	
credit	to	a	customer	with	a	poor	credit	history.191	Unexpected	insolvencies	no	doubt	occur,	
however,	and	in	such	circumstances	the	bank	would	have	no	means	of	mitigating	its	loss	and	
would	not	receive	any	consideration	for	its	performance.	This	is	a	wholly	unsatisfactory	result	
which	is	directly	attributable	to	the	court’s	refusal	to	recognise	nullity	as	a	matter	affecting	
documentary	compliance.	
	
b. A	distinction	between	documentary	credits	and	CIF	contracts	
The	result	of	the	Court	of	Appeal’s	decision	in	Montrod	is	that	the	presentation	of	a	nullity	
will	make	no	difference	to	the	bank’s	duty	to	pay	if	the	documents	appear	to	conform.	This	
distinguishes	 the	documentary	 credit	 from	 the	 treatment	of	 nullities	 presented	under	CIF	
contracts.		
																																																						
186	Moses	(n71)	73	(describing	the	insolvency	of	credit	applicants	as	“rare”	provided	the	issuing	bank	has	engaged	
in	adequate	pre-contractual	screening.)	
187	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	per	Lord	Diplock;	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	132.	
188	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	231:	“the	ruling…might	just	possibly	be	sustainable	on	the	ground	
that	the	insertion	of	a	false	shipping	date	in	the	bill	of	lading	did	not	prevent	it	from	being	what	it	purported	to	be,	
so	that	it	could	be	validly	tendered	by	a	beneficiary	in	good	faith”;	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	133.	
189	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	per	Lord	Diplock.	
190	Gao,	The	Fraud	Rule	(n23)	129-130.	Recognised	as	a	possibility	in	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	9	
per	Lord	Diplock.	
191	Moses	(n71)	41;	Smith	(n170)	94-95.	
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In	 the	 context	 of	 CIF	 contracts,	 the	 judgment	 in	Gill	&	Duffus	 v	 Berger	 created	 a	 general	
proposition	that	the	buyer	was	required	to	accept	apparently	conforming	documents.192	To	
do	otherwise,	Lord	Diplock	remarked,	“would	destroy	the	very	roots	of	the	system	by	which	
international	trade,	particularly	in	commodities,	is	enabled	to	be	financed.”193	At	first	glance,	
this	would	suggest	that	the	approach	to	nullities	is	identical	in	CIF	and	documentary	credit	
contracts	 and,	 moreover,	 depends	 on	 similar	 policy	 considerations.	 In	 the	 CIF	 context,	
however,	 this	 general	 proposition	 is	 modified	 by	 two	 considerations.	 Firstly,	 the	 seller	 is	
required	 to	 tender	 genuine	 documents,	 as	 distinct	 from	 those	 which	 only	 appear	 to	 be	
genuine.194	The	buyer,	therefore,	can	reject	non-genuine	documents195	without	incurring	any	
liability	to	pay	the	seller.196	It	is	the	character	of	the	documents	which	is	important	here	and	
not	the	mindset	of	the	seller	at	the	time	of	presentation.	In	addition,	case	law	following	Gill	
&	Duffus	has	confined	the	application	of	the	general	proposition	to	enable	the	buyer	to	reject	
backdated197	or	null	documents198	even	though	the	presentations	may	appear	to	conform.	
The	 current	 position,	 therefore,	 is	 that	 nullity	 will	 enable	 the	 CIF	 buyer	 to	 reject	 the	
documents	whereas	the	issuing	bank	will	be	required	to	make	payment	where	the	documents	
presented	under	a	credit	appear	to	comply.	
	
The	question	then	is	whether	this	difference	in	the	treatment	of	nullities	matters.	In	general	
terms,	Professor	Bridge	has	argued	that	CIF	and	documentary	credit	contracts	need	not	be	
identical	in	their	approach	to	the	quality	of	tendered	documents	as	they	“are	very	different	
contracts.”199	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 merit	 in	 this	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 given	 that	 the	 banks’	
involvement	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 autonomy	 in	 credit	 transactions	
																																																						
192	Gill	&	Duffus	SA	v	Berger	&	Co	Inc	[1984]	AC	382	
193	Ibid	391	-392	per	Lord	Diplock.	
194	Hindley	&	Co	v	East	Indian	Produce	Co	[1973]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	515,	518	per	Kerr	J	“an	implied	term	of	a	contract	
of	this	nature	that	the	bill	of	lading	shall	not	only	appear	to	be	true	and	accurate	in	the	material	statements	which	
it	contains,	but	that	such	statements	shall	in	fact	be	true	and	accurate.”	James	Finlay	&	Co	v	Kwik	Hoo	Tong	[1929]	
1	KB	400,	416	per	Sankey	LJ	holding	that	the	bill	of	lading	must	be	genuine.	
195	For	example,	where	the	bill	of	 lading	covers	goods	not	actually	shipped:	Hindley	 (n191)	518;	a	bill	of	 lading	
bearing	a	false	shipment	date:	James	Finlay	(n194)	413	per	Greer	LJ,	Kwei	Tek	Chao	v	British	Traders	and	Shippers	
[1954]	2	QB	459,	482	per	Devlin	J.	
196	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n86)	[19-149].	
197	Panchaud	Frères	SA	v	Etablissements	General	Grain	Co	[1970]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	53,	58	per	Lord	Denning	MR;	Proctor	
&	Gamble	v	Becher	GmbH	[1988]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	88,	91	per	Leggatt	J.	
198	Hindley	&	Co	(n194)	519	per	Kerr	J;	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n86)	[19-035].	
199	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	239.	
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distinguish	 the	 mechanisms.200	 While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 autonomy	 has	 no	 application	 in	 the	
context	of	a	CIF	sale,201	the	overwhelming	weight	of	academic	commentary,	with	which	the	
author	agrees,	makes	clear	that	this	distinction	is	irrelevant	when	it	comes	to	nullity.202	This	
is	because	a	finding	that	a	document	has	no	legal	value	does	not	involve	an	enquiry	into	the	
goods	or	the	underlying	contract.203	Rather,	the	enquiry	would	simply	relate	to	the	quality	or	
character	of	 the	tendered	document.	This	would	 in	no	way	threaten	the	autonomy	of	 the	
contracts	created	by	the	documentary	credit.	It	would	be	preferable,	therefore,	for	the	law	
to	take	the	same	approach	to	nullity	in	CIF	and	letter	of	credit	contracts.204		
	
The	 difference	 in	 treatment	 also	makes	 little	 sense	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 efficient	 risk	
allocation.	The	CIF	seller	and	the	credit	beneficiary	are	both	the	closest	party	to	the	source	of	
the	nullity	or	backdating,	in	their	respective	transactions.	Ordinary	patterns	of	risk	allocation,	
discussed	 above,205	would	 impose	 liability	 on	 the	 party	 best	 placed	 to	 identify	 defects	 at	
source,	either	because	he	takes	the	documents	directly	or	selects	the	third	party	charged	with	
creating	them.206	There	is	no	reason	that	the	approach	ordinarily	regarded	as	efficient	should	
be	applicable	in	the	CIF	context	but	not	in	relation	to	letters	of	credit.	This	creates	incentives	
for	the	CIF	seller	to	take	care	in	selecting	third	parties	but	absolves	the	credit	beneficiary	from	
all	responsibility	in	this	respect.		
	
Analytical	difficulties	apart,	 the	divergent	approaches	 to	nullity	have	a	significant	practical	
consequence	in	determining	which	party	is	without	funds	during	the	ensuing	litigation.	In	the	
CIF	 context,	 the	 buyer	 can	 shift	 the	 risk	 of	 loss	 immediately	 back	 onto	 his	 seller	 if	 the	
documents	are	non-compliant	or	contain	latent	defects,	such	as	a	false	shipping	date.207	The	
onus	 is	 then	on	the	seller	to	bring	an	action	for	wrongful	rejection.	This	 is	contrary	to	the	
position	involving	a	letter	of	credit	where	the	buyer-applicant	must	bring	an	action	against	
																																																						
200	Ibid	239;	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	cif	contracts’	(n125)	6.	
201	P	Todd,	‘Non-genuine	shipping	documents	and	nullities’	[2008]	LMCLQ	547,	566.	
202	 Bridge,	 ‘Documents	 and	 contractual	 congruence’	 (n105)	 234;	 Horowitz	 (n12)	 [3.16],	 [3.29];	 Neo,	 ‘A	 nullity	
exception’	(n145)	60.		
203	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	235;	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.16].		
204	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	234.	
205	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	168.	
206	Schwartz	and	Scott	(n168)	21,	918.	Note	that	this	is	the	logic	adopted	in	United	City	Merchants	(Court	of	Appeal)	
(n139)	623	per	Stephenson	LJ.	
207	Benjamin	(9th	ed.)	(n86)	[19-080].	
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the	 seller	 for	 breach,	 having	 already	 reimbursed	 the	 issuing	 bank.	 This	 places	 the	 credit	
applicant	in	a	much	less	favourable	position	which	is	difficult	to	justify	given	the	foregoing	
discussion	of	risk	allocation.	
	
Given	the	clear	 judicial	 reluctance	to	recognise	nullity	as	a	basis	 for	rejection,208	Professor	
Bridge	has	attempted	to	reconcile	this	inconsistency	between	CIF	contracts	and	documentary	
credits.	 His	 solution	 was	 to	 draw	 an	 analogy	 with	 the	 decision	 in	 Cargill	 International	 v	
Bangladesh	 Sugar.209	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 court	 held	 that	 a	 beneficiary	 who	 obtained	 an	
overpayment	under	a	performance	bond	had	a	duty	 to	account	 for	 the	excess.210	Bridge’s	
suggestion	was	that	the	credit	beneficiary	would	be	under	a	similar	implied	duty	to	account	
for	the	price	where	the	credit	applicant	had	rejected	the	goods	for	non-conformity.211	With	
respect,	this	solution	only	goes	so	far.	To	put	the	onus	on	the	buyer	to	bring	an	action	for	the	
price	 complicates	 matters	 and	 would	 require	 additional	 litigation.	 In	 addition,	 Bridge’s	
solution	is	only	likely	to	work	in	respect	of	the	honest	seller	who,	as	an	intermediate	party	in	
a	string	sale,	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	physical	defects	and	could	in	turn	shift	the	loss	back	
onto	his	seller.	By	contrast,	in	circumstances	where	the	nullity	is	part	of	a	fraudulent	scheme	
but	the	credit	applicant	is	unable	to	invoke	the	fraud	exception,	an	action	for	the	price	may	
constitute	no	solution	whatsoever.	It	follows	that	the	position	must	be	modified	–	to	equate	
the	approach	 in	documentary	credits	with	the	CIF	position	–	by	the	appellate	courts	 in	an	
appropriate	case.	
	
iv. A	new	approach	to	nullity	and	forgery?	
The	practical	and	analytical	difficulties	flowing	from	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	are	
not	so	much	attributable	to	the	restrictive	approach	to	fraud,	but	to	Lord	Diplock’s	conflation	
of	 forgery,	 nullity	 and	 fraud.	 Significantly,	 these	 consequences	 undermine	 Lord	 Diplock’s	
justification	for	a	narrow	approach	to	fraud	by	the	beneficiary;	to	maintain	the	documentary	
credit	 as	 an	 efficient	 method	 of	 trade	 financing.	 The	 sequential	 analysis	 propounded	 by	
																																																						
208	Montrod	(n123)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ.	
209	Cargill	International	v	Bangladeshi	Sugar	&	Food	Industries	Corp	[1998]	1	WLR	461.	(confirmed	in	Tradigrain	SA	
v	State	Trading	Corporation	of	India	[2006]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	216,	[26]	per	Christopher	Clarke	J.)	as	cited	in	Bridge,	
‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	240.	
210	Cargill	(n209)	469	per	Potter	LJ.	
211	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	239-240.	
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Goode,	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,212	provides	a	means	of	disentangling	these	related	
issues.	It	should	be	noted	that	Goode’s	analysis	is	not	simply	of	theoretical	interest;	indeed,	
as	 founder	 of	 the	 Centre	 for	 Commercial	 Law	 Studies,213	 he	 could	 hardly	 be	 described	 as	
lacking	real-world	insight.	To	this	end,	this	part	of	the	discussion	considers	the	extent	to	which	
the	 detrimental	 consequences	 flowing	 from	 United	 City	 Merchants	 demand	 a	 different	
approach	to	forged	and	null	documents.		
	
The	sequential	analysis	first	considers	the	conformity	of	the	documents.	As	noted	above,	non-
conformity	has	been	conceptualised	in	both	broad	and	narrow	terms	in	the	literature.	The	
broad	view	of	non-conformity	would	entitle	 the	bank	 to	 reject	documents	 containing	any	
known	 forgery,	 fraudulent	 misstatement	 or	 nullity	 at	 the	 time	 of	 presentation.	 There	 is	
considerable	 academic	 support	 for	 this	 standard	 of	 non-conformity,214	 including	 Goode	
himself	in	the	following	comments,	
	
The	short	point	is	that	the	UCP	and	the	terms	of	every	credit	require	the	presentation	
of	specified	documents,	that	is,	documents	which	are	what	they	purport	to	be,	and	
there	is	no	warrant	for	the	conclusion	that	this	entitles	the	beneficiary	to	present,	for	
example,	 any	old	piece	of	paper	which	purports	 to	be	a	bill	 of	 lading…even	 if	 it	 is	
forged,	unauthorised,	or	otherwise	fraudulent.215	
	
By	contrast,	the	narrower	conception	of	non-conformity	regards	only	null	documents	as	non-
conforming.	 The	 focus	 is	whether	 the	 presented	 documents	 are	 capable	 of	 fulfilling	 their	
intended	 purpose.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 approach	Goode	 uses	 to	 justify	 the	 actual	 result	 in	
United	City	Merchants	given	that	“the	insertion	of	a	false	shipping	date	in	the	bill	of	lading	did	
not	prevent	it	from	being	what	it	purported	to	be.”216	
	
																																																						
212	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	126	et	seq.	
213	 Queen	 Mary	 University	 of	 London,	 ‘About	 the	 Centre	 for	 Commercial	 Law	 Studies	 (CCLS)’	 available	 at:	
http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/about/index.html	(accessed	02/09/2016).	
214	Hooley,	‘Fraud	and	letters	of	credit’	(n145)	280;	Neo,	‘A	nullity	exception’	(n145)	60;	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.21].	
215	McKendrick,	Goode	on	Commercial	Law	(n114)	1106.	
216	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	(n98)	231.	
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Whichever	standard	of	non-conformity	is	preferred,	it	must	be	emphasised	that	to	recognise	
forgery	or	nullity	as	independent	bases	to	reject	documents	would	not	create	a	new	defence	
to	payment.	Rather,	 it	would	 simply	 enable	 the	banks	 to	 fulfil	 their	 intended	 function;	 to	
determine	objectively	whether	the	presented	documents	are	those	required	under	the	credit.	
Furthermore,	to	depart	from	the	current	judicial	approach	to	nullity	and	forgery	would	not	
undermine	the	principle	of	autonomy.	This	is	because,	as	Neo	has	noted,	“a	fraud	in	relation	
to	a	document	that	renders	it	a	nullity	must	surely	be	directly	linked	to	the	document	itself	
rather	than	a	matter	confined	to	the	underlying	contract.”217	The	doctrine	of	autonomy	would	
only	be	threatened	if	issues	relating	to	the	underlying	contract	were	used	to	disrupt	payment	
under	the	credit	itself.	
	
The	author’s	 view	 is	 that	 the	narrow	approach	 to	non-conformity	 is	 to	be	preferred.	 This	
reflects	the	fact	that	null	documents	cannot	fulfil	their	intended	commercial	function	whereas	
forged	documents	remain	capable	of	representing	the	goods.	To	treat	null	documents	as	non-
conforming	 would	 overcome	many	 of	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 the	 current	 judicial	
approach	to	nullity.	Most	notably,	the	circulation	of	non-genuine	documents	would	reduce	
and	this	would	safeguard	the	bank’s	position	in	the	event	of	the	credit	applicant’s	insolvency.		
The	author’s	preference	for	the	narrow	conception	of	non-conformity	is	borne	of	pragmatism,	
designed	 to	 reflect	 the	 importance	 of	 maintaining	 the	 credit	 as	 an	 efficient	 device	 for	
financing	international	trade	without	unduly	increasing	the	number	of	rejected	presentations.	
The	 price	 of	 pragmatism,	 however,	 is	 a	 loss	 of	 conceptual	 clarity	 because	mere	 forgeries	
would	not	be	regarded	as	non-compliant	even	though	they	cannot	sensibly	be	regarded	as	
the	documents	 stipulated	by	 the	credit.	This	means	 that	 the	consequences	of	 the	current	
approach	to	forgery	–	a	distinction	between	documentary	credits	and	negotiable	instruments	
and	the	judicial	failure	to	respect	the	parties’	risk	allocation	with	regard	to	forgery	–	remain.	
As	these	issues	are	largely	problematic	from	a	conceptual	standpoint,	the	author’s	contention	
is	 that	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 credit	mechanism	 overrides	 these	 conceptual	 difficulties	 and	
justifies	the	narrow	approach	to	non-conformity.		
	
																																																						
217	Neo,	‘A	nullity	exception’	(n145)	60.	
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For	this	to	become	a	reality,	a	case	would	need	to	reach	the	Supreme	Court	to	overcome	both	
the	House	of	 Lords’	 decision	 in	United	City	Merchants	 and	 that	of	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 in	
Montrod.	Taking	the	approach	to	non-conformity	in	United	City	Merchants	first,	the	UCP	600	
makes	it	easier	to	recognise	a	null	document	as	non-complying	than	it	was	under	the	UCP	
500.218	This	is	because	the	definition	of	complying	presentation	in	Article	2	explicitly	refers	to	
documents	 “in	 accordance	 with	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 credit.”219	 Documents	
without	 any	 legal	 effect	 could	 never	 satisfy	 this	 definition.	 Furthermore,	 the	 numerous	
references	 to	 ‘on	 their	 face’	 have	been	 removed	which	 serves	 to	 confirm	 that	 the	bank’s	
obligation	to	pay	is	triggered	by	a	complying	presentation,	and	not	merely	one	which	appears	
to	 conform.220	 These	 revisions	 to	 the	 UCP	 should	 enable	 a	 modern	 court	 to	 confine	 the	
decision	in	United	City	Merchants	to	credits	which	incorporated	the	UCP	500.	
	
The	Court	of	Appeal	firmly	rejected	a	nullity	exception	to	autonomy	in	Montrod221	without	
considering	 the	 issue	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 non-compliance.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 approach	 of	 the	
Singaporean	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	Beam	 Technology	 v	 Standard	 Chartered	 Bank222	provides	
useful	guidance	as	to	how	a	future	court	might	distinguish	Montrod.	In	Beam,	the	buyer	had	
notified	 the	 seller	 that	 air	 waybills	 would	 be	 issued	 by	 freight	 forwarders,	 Link	 Express,	
although	 it	 later	 transpired	 that	 the	 named	 entity	 did	 not	 exist.	 The	 Singaporean	 Court	
preferred	the	reasoning	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	United	City	Merchants223	and	advocated	the	
sequential	analysis	in	the	following	terms,		
	
While	 the	 underlying	 principle	 is	 that	 the	 negotiating/confirming	 bank	 need	 not	
investigate	the	documents	tendered,	it	is	altogether	a	different	proposition	to	say	that	
the	 bank	 should	 ignore	 what	 is	 clearly	 a	 null	 and	 void	 document	 and	 proceed	
nevertheless	 to	 pay.	 Implicit	 in	 the	 requirement	 of	 a	 conforming	 document	 is	 the	
assumption	that	the	document	is	true	and	genuine	although	under	the	UCP	500	and	
common	law,	and	in	the	interest	of	 international	trade,	the	bank	is	not	required	to	
																																																						
218	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.26].	
219	UCP	600	art.2.	
220	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.26];	UCP	arts.	2,	6,	7.	
221	Montrod	(n123)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ.	
222	Beam	Technology	(MfG)	Pte	Ltd	v	Standard	Chartered	Bank	[2002]	SGCA	53.	
223	Ibid	[31]	per	Chao	Hick	Tin	JA,	Tan	Lee	Meng	J.	
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look	beyond	what	appears	on	the	surface	of	the	documents.	But	to	say	that	a	bank,	in	
the	face	of	a	forged	null	and	void	document	(even	though	the	beneficiary	is	not	privy	
to	that	forgery),	must	still	pay	on	the	credit,	defies	reason	and	good	sense.	It	amounts	
to	saying	that	the	scheme	of	things	under	the	UCP	500	is	only	concerned	with	commas	
and	full	stops	or	some	misdescriptions,	and	that	the	question	as	to	the	genuineness	
or	otherwise	of	a	material	document,	which	was	the	cause	for	the	issue	of	the	LC,	is	
of	no	consequence.224	
	
The	Court	 further	distinguished	 the	decision	 in	Montrod	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
document	in	the	English	case	was	“not…essential”225	in	that	it	related	only	to	the	quality	of	
the	 goods.	 While	 this	 reasoning	 is	 tenuous	 –	 compliance	 depends	 on	 all	 documentary	
conditions	 detailed	 in	 the	 credit	 being	 complied	 with	 –	 the	 decision	 in	 Beam	 usefully	
demonstrates	 the	desire	 to	move	away	 from	the	English	approach.	 Indeed,	 the	Court	also	
suggested	that	the	definitional	issues	identified	by	Potter	LJ226	could	be	overcome,		
	
…there	 could	 be	 difficulties	 in	 determining	 under	what	 circumstances	 a	 document	
would	be	considered	material	or	a	nullity,	such	a	question	can	only	be	answered	on	
the	facts	of	each	case.	One	cannot	generalise.	It	 is	not	possible	to	define	when	is	a	
document	 a	 nullity.	 But	 it	 is	 really	 not	 that	 much	 more	 difficult	 to	 answer	 such	
questions	than	to	determine	what	is	reasonable,	an	exercise	which	the	courts	are	all	
too	familiar	with.227	
	
The	fact	that	the	Singaporean	court	easily	overcame	the	supposed	definitional	issues	makes	
it	particularly	disappointing	that	the	House	of	Lords	refused	leave	to	appeal	in	Montrod.228	
The	approach	to	nullity	contended	for	here	depends	on	a	suitable	case	reaching	the	Supreme	
Court.	There	is,	as	noted	elsewhere	in	this	thesis,	an	absence	of	recent	case	law	on	the	proper	
parameters	of	the	fraud	exception,	though	this	is	more	likely	attributable	to	the	chilling	effect	
																																																						
224	Ibid	[33]	per	Chao	Hick	Tin	JA,	Tan	Lee	Meng	J.	
225	Ibid	[31]	Chao	Hick	Tin	JA,	Tan	Lee	Meng	J.	
226	Montrod	(n123)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ.	
227	Beam	Technology	(n222)	[36]	per	Chao	Hick	Tin	JA,	Tan	Lee	Meng	J.	
228	Montrod	(n123)	1999.	
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of	United	 City	Merchants	 than	 an	 actual	 absence	of	 fraud.229	One	 can	 readily	 understand	
commercial	parties’	reluctance	to	litigate	seemingly	settled	doctrine.	The	situation	has	not	
been	helped	by	subsequent	judicial	and	academic	discussion	which	has	continued	to	conflate	
the	related	issues	of	fraud,	forgery	and	nullity	and	to	characterise	them	as	requiring	additional	
inroads	 into	 autonomy.230	While	 the	 author	 believes	 the	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 viewing	
nullity	as	a	matter	affecting	documentary	compliance	are	strong,	there	is	not,	at	the	time	of	
writing,	a	case	making	its	way	to	the	Supreme	Court	which	would	enable	the	matter	to	be	
reconsidered.	
	
The	final	critique	of	the	judicial	approach	to	fraud	is	based	in	empirical	work	conducted	in	the	
United	States.	The	analysis	is	used	to	suggest	that	informal	mechanisms	to	control	fraud	exist	
throughout	the	life	of	exchange,	and	not	merely	in	the	pre-contractual	stage	as	English	case	
law	contends.		
	
III. The	Empirical	Critique	
The	 final	 critique	 of	 the	 English	 courts’	 approach	 to	 fraud	 is	 rooted	 in	 empirical	 work	
conducted	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.231	 This	work	 undermines	 the	 traditional	
explanation	 of	 the	 credit	mechanism,	 namely	 that	 it	 is	 a	 device	 for	 assuring	 the	 seller	 of	
payment,	and	undermines	the	significance	of	strict	compliance.	This	section	reflects	on	the	
empirical	picture	of	credit	use	and	reconsiders	fraud	deterrence	from	this	perspective.		
	
The	empirical	work	 indicates	 that	parties	use	credits	more	 informally	 than	doctrine	would	
suggest.	 Payments	 were	 routinely	 made	 against	 seriously	 defective	 documentary	
presentations.	 The	 assurance	 of	 payment	 was	 therefore	 transformed	 into	 a	 payment	
discretion,	precisely	one	of	the	risks	that	the	seller	sought	to	abrogate	by	using	the	credit	in	
																																																						
229	See	Bridge,	The	International	Sale	of	Goods:	Law	and	Practice	(2nd	ed.	OUP,	2007),	[6.84]:	“failure	of	fraud	cases	
to	go	to	trial	gives	rise	to	some	difficulty	in	defining	fraud	and	giving	instructive	examples”	
230	Montrod	(n123)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ;	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n64)	[9.23]:	“such	a	rule	[on	nullity]	will	assist	the	
integrity	of	the	system	of	documentary	credits	as	a	means	of	financing	international	transactions,	whereas	any	
widening	of	the	exception	will	detract	from	it.”,	[9.24];	EP	Ellinger	and	D	Neo,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	Documentary	
Letters	of	Credit	(Hart,	2010),	168.	See	also	Horowitz	(n12)	[3.12].	A	notable	exception,	other	than	Goode,	is	Bridge,	
‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	213,	230:	“despite	language	used	in	some	of	the	cases,	fraud	on	
the	one	hand	and	forgery	and	nullity	on	the	other	hand	are	analytically	separate,	the	latter	are	not	variations	of	
fraud.”;	L	Chin	and	Y	Wong,	‘Autonomy	–	A	nullity	exception	at	last?’	[2004]	LMCLQ	14,	18;	Neo,	‘A	nullity	exception’	
(n145)	67.	
231	R	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	payment	transactions’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2494.	
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the	first	place.	The	focus	of	the	discussion	here	is	to	examine	what	this	empirical	evidence	
means	 for	 fraud	 and	 fraud	 prevention	 in	 documentary	 credits.	 It	 will	 be	 suggested	 that	
deterrence	is	not	just	a	pre-contractual	issue,	as	the	English	courts	have	typically	suggested,232	
but	one	that	survives	the	duration	of	the	exchange	and	is	managed	by	the	same	forces	that	
shape	the	informal	use	of	the	mechanism.	
	
The	 empirical	 data	 is	 now	presented	 (A).	 The	discussion	will	 first	 consider	why	 the	 credit	
remains	 popular	 given	 that	 its	 practical	 operation	 differs	 considerably	 from	 the	 written	
contract.	 Two	 explanations	 will	 be	 offered;	 firstly,	 Mann’s	 suggestion	 that	 the	 credit	
constitutes	 verification	 by	 the	 issuing	 bank	 that	 the	 buyer	 has	 the	 capacity	 to,	 and	 will	
actually,	 pay	 against	 discrepant	 documents	 (i)	 and	 secondly,	 Katz’s	 contention	 that	 the	
mechanism	can	only	be	understood	in	the	context	of	providing	reassurance	to	both	parties	
(ii).	 This	 analysis	 situates	 the	 credit	 mechanism	 in	 the	 broader	 relational	 network	 of	 the	
market.	The	final	part	of	the	discussion	considers	what	the	empirical	data	tells	us	about	fraud	
in	credit	transactions	(B).	The	data	will	be	used	to	provide	concrete	support	for	the	judicial	
account	of	deterrence	before	developing	a	relational	framework	to	suggest	that	deterrence	
mechanisms	are	present	throughout	the	life	of	the	exchange.		
	
A. The	empirical	work	
The	empirical	 study	which	 forms	 the	basis	 for	 the	discussion	was	 conducted	by	Professor	
Ronald	Mann	in	the	late	1990s.233	He	sought	to	test	anecdotal	evidence	which	suggested	that	
documentary	 credits	 functioned	 very	 differently	 in	 practice	 than	predicted	by	doctrine.234	
Mann	gathered	data	relating	to	500	credit	transactions	from	five	American	banks	involving	
the	American	party	as	exporter	in	half	of	the	transactions,	and	importer	in	the	other	half.235	
He	also	conducted	interviews	with	ten	bank	managers	whose	institutions	specialised	in	letters	
of	credit.236	
	
																																																						
232	Sanders	(n4)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
233	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231).	
234	Ibid	2495.	
235	Ibid	2496-2497.	
236	Ibid	2497.	
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The	major	 finding	 from	Mann’s	work	was	 that	 documentary	 presentations	were	 typically	
discrepant	but	that	discrepancies	were	not	used	as	a	means	to	refuse	payment.237	Indeed,	
only	 27%	 of	 the	 500	 presentations	 strictly	 conformed	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 credit.238	 The	
discrepancies	 ranged	 in	 severity	 from	 technical	 defects,	 such	 as	 issues	 with	 presentation	
rather	than	performance,239	to	missing	documents	and	those	which	indicated	default	on	the	
underlying	contract.240	To	be	clear,	all	of	these	discrepancies	would	have	been	sufficient	for	
the	bank	to	refuse	payment.	Instead,	full	payment	was	made	against	all	but	one	discrepant	
presentation.241	 In	 this	 latter	 case,	 the	 beneficiary	 received	 94%	 of	 the	 contract	 price.242	
Payment	was	made	via	the	waiver	process243	and,	in	most	cases,	waiver	was	obtained	within	
one	banking	day.244		
	
Mann’s	results	indicate	that	the	day-to-day	operation	of	the	credit	differs	considerably	from	
the	doctrinal	account	of	the	mechanism.	The	difficulty	for	our	purposes	is	that	the	data	do	
not	admit	of	simple	interpretation.	The	results	were	not	explicable	by	reference	to	the	relative	
size	 of	 the	 parties	 nor	 their	 respective	 location.245	 Unfortunately,	 the	 data	 are	 no	 longer	
available	for	further	interrogation.246		
	
The	data	fundamentally	challenges	the	doctrinal	account	of	the	mechanism	in	which	swift,	
certain	payment	is	achieved	by	the	presentation	of	conforming	documents.	While	the	waiver	
mechanism	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 elongate	 the	 process	 in	 Mann’s	 study,247	 the	 mechanism	
necessarily	 complicates	 the	 autonomous	 nature	 of	 payment.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 waiver	
process	tasks	the	buyer	with	the	payment	decision.	This	resurrects	the	risk	that	the	buyer	
																																																						
237	Ibid	2502.	This	was	described	as	“a	general	pattern	of	discrepancy.”	
238	Ibid	2502.	
239	Ibid	2504-2505.	
240	Ibid	2503-2504.	
241	Ibid	2513.	
242	Ibid	2513.	
243	The	survey	was	conducted	in	the	late	1990s	during	which	time	the	UCP	500	was	in	force.	Art.	14(c)	UCP	500	
established	the	waiver	process.	This	has	now	been	replaced	by	art.	16(b)	in	the	UCP	600.	
244	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2514.	
245	Ibid	2507.	
246	Mann	offered	the	dataset	to	other	academics	for	interpretation	and	analysis,	see	ibid	2497	(fn	8	in	original).	
Accordingly,	I	sought	to	obtain	the	data	during	this	thesis	but	in	personal	correspondence	with	Professor	Mann	he	
has	 confirmed	 that	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 available,	 see	 statement	 by	 Professor	 Ronald	 Mann	 (Personal	 email	
correspondence,	20	May	2015)	(on	file	with	the	author).	
247	It	would	appear	that	in	the	majority	of	cases	that	the	use	of	waiver	did	not	unduly	delay	payment,	see	ibid	2514.	
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might	 behave	 opportunistically,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 factors	 unrelated	 to	 documentary	
compliance	may	 sway	 the	 decision.	However,	 the	 data	 revealed	 a	 total	 absence	 of	 buyer	
opportunism	during	waiver.248	This	is	interesting	because	it	is	hard	to	imagine	that	in	none	of	
those	transactions	had	market	fluctuations	rendered	the	bargain	‘bad’	for	the	buyer.249	Both	
Katz	and	Gillette	have	argued	that	the	buyer	should	only	be	concerned	by	discrepancies	which	
indicate	substantive	default	on	the	underlying	contract.250	The	problem	with	this	argument	is	
that	some	of	the	discrepancies	were	substantive	in	nature	and	full	payment	was	still	made.	
This	 suggestion	also	overlooks	 the	possibility	 that	exact	 compliance	might	be	 required	 for	
reasons	only	peripherally	connected	to	the	transaction,	for	example	so	that	the	goods	can	
clear	 customs.251	 The	 data	 further	 challenged	 the	 doctrinal	 account	 of	 the	mechanism	 by	
indicating	that	the	bank	does	not	simply	act	 in	an	administrative	capacity	but	 is	more	of	a	
middleman	between	the	buyer	and	seller.	The	basis	for	this	will	be	considered	when	assessing	
the	analyses	of	the	empirical	work	in	the	forthcoming	sections.252	
	
For	the	purposes	of	the	forthcoming	analysis,	it	is	assumed	that	the	results	are	transferable	
to	the	UK	context.	In	the	first	place,	Mann’s	survey	is	likely	to	have	included	UK	parties	trading	
with	American	counterparts,	whether	as	importer	or	exporter.253	If	this	is	the	case,	it	would	
suggest	that	UK	parties	are	also	using	the	credit	in	an	informal	manner.	Evidence	gathered	by	
SITPRO,	a	non-departmental	body	funded	by	the	UK	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	
Skills254	has	also	demonstrated	a	very	high	rate	of	discrepancies	on	first	presentation.255	These	
																																																						
248	Ibid	2513-2514.	
249	Either	due	to	a	fall	in	the	market	or	the	prospect	of	a	better	deal	with	another	party.	
250	AW	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral	assurance	mechanism.	Comments	on	Ronald	Mann’s	‘The	role	of	letters	of	
credit	 in	payment	 transactions’	 (1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2554,	 2566;	C	Gillette,	 ‘Letters	of	 credit	as	 signals.	
Comments	on	Ronald	Mann’s	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	payment	transactions’’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	
2537,	2539.	
251	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n64)	[8.37].	
252	See	later,	Part	III	(i)	and	(ii).	
253	 The	 data	 are	 no	 longer	 available	 to	 determine	 how	many	 transactions	 involved	 a	 UK	 party.	 Statement	 by	
Professor	Ronald	Mann	(Personal	email	correspondence,	20	May	2015)		
254	 SITPRO,	 ‘SITPRO	 Simplifying	 International	 Trade’	
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100918113753/http:/www.sitpro.org.uk/	(accessed	03/05/2017)	
255	SITPRO	and	Midland	Bank,	Letter	of	Credit	Management	and	Control	(SITPRO	1985):	almost	half	of	1215	sets	of	
documents	were	discrepant	on	first	presentation.	Later	studies	conducted	by	SITPRO	provide	further	evidence	of	
this	and	are	documented	in	C	Schmitthoff,	'Discrepancies	of	documents	in	letter	of	credit	transactions'	[1987]	JBL	
94,	94-95.	SITPRO	was	a	non-departmental	government	body	with	responsibility	for	harmonising	procedures	and	
documentation	 for	 international	 trade	and	advising	 traders,	 the	business	 community	and	government	on	best	
practice.	SITPRO	closed	in	2011	and	its	functions	were	passed	to	the	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills,	
see	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cable-announces-further-quango-closures.	
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ideas	have	also	been	picked	up	to	a	limited	extent	in	case	law256	and	academic	commentary.257	
Where	 perhaps	 this	 UK	 data	 differs	 from	 that	 collected	 in	 the	 US	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 cure.	
Schmitthoff	described	the	SITPRO	data	using	the	phrase	“failure	rate”258	and	this	may	suggest	
that	the	first	presentation	was	rejected	by	the	confirming	bank.	Regardless	of	the	idea	of	cure,	
the	 high	 rate	 of	 initial	 discrepancy	 nevertheless	 suggests	 that	 the	 practical	 operation	 of	
credits	 in	the	UK	does	not	mirror	the	traditional	account	of	the	mechanism.	The	following	
analysis	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	the	empirical	evidence	is	transferable	to	the	UK	context.	
	
Two	explanations	of	the	empirical	data	will	now	be	provided.	A	disclaimer	 is	required;	the	
purpose	of	these	analyses	was	to	advance	debate	surrounding	documentary	credits	based	on	
the	empirical	evidence	rather	to	provide	a	‘once	and	for	all’	account	of	their	use.259		
	
i. Mann’s	analysis:	Documentary	credit	as	verification	institution	
The	way	that	credits	are	used	in	practice	does	not	guarantee	payment	to	the	seller.	This	is	
contrary	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 account	 of	 the	 mechanism.	 As	 such,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	
consider	why	parties	opt	for	an	expensive	mechanism260	but	then	use	it	in	a	way	that	deprives	
it	of	 its	unique	quality.	Mann	himself	provided	one	such	analysis	 for	 the	continued	use	of	
documentary	credits.	
	
Mann	first	discredited	the	notion	that	parties	using	credits	had	a	poor	understanding	of	the	
mechanism	or	chose	the	device	out	of	habit.261	Those	using	credits	are	sophisticated	market	
actors	 and	 it	 was	 “implausible	 that	 [they]…would	 organize	 such	 a	 large	 number	 of	
transactions	 in	a	way	that	systematically,	 repeatedly,	and	pointlessly	 increases	 the	cost	of	
																																																						
256	Bankers	Trust	Co	v	State	Bank	of	India	[1991]	2	Lloyd's	Rep	443,	449	per	Lloyd	LJ.	
257	J	Ulph,	‘The	UCP	600:	Documentary	credits	in	the	21st	century’	[2007]	JBL	355,	356	suggests	70%	of	documents	
are	discrepant	on	first	presentation.	
258	Schmitthoff,	‘Discrepancies	of	documents’	(n255)	95.	The	notion	that	discrepant	presentations	are	cured	in	the	
UK	is	strengthened	by	R	Bergami,	'Will	the	UCP	600	provide	solutions	to	letter	of	credit	transactions?'	(2007)	3	Intl	
Rev	of	Bus	Research	Papers	41,	42	where	it	is	said	that	discrepancies	cost	£133	million/year	to	cure	in	the	UK	alone.	
259	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2533.	Indeed,	Katz	(n250)	2573	and	Mann	(n231)	2533	both	implored	
other	academics	to	gather	further	data	to	test	these	assumptions.	The	author	has	found	no	evidence	that	anyone	
has	yet	taken	up	this	challenge.	
260	Letters	of	credit	typically	cost	one	quarter	of	1%	of	the	value	of	the	goods	sold	i.e.	in	a	transaction	worth	£1	
million,	the	letter	of	credit	would	cost	£2500,	see	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2499.	
261	Ibid	2515-2516.	
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transactions.”262	Instead	the	evidence	suggested	that	credits	were	not	the	default	choice	in	all	
international	exchanges263	but	were	employed	in	exchanges	where	there	was	an	absence	of	
relational	 ties.264	 This	 suggests	 a	 degree	 of	 discrimination	 in	 their	 use265	 which	 makes	 it	
possible	to	dispose	of	the	idea	that	parties	are	using	credits	out	of	habit.	
	
Mann	 then	 suggested	 that	 the	 traditional	 understanding	 of	 the	mechanism	 –	 guaranteed	
payment	to	the	seller	–	was	incomplete	since,	in	practice,	the	credit	did	not	provide	sellers	
with	a	legal	right	to	payment.266	The	data	also	suggested	the	defects	were	not	cured,	even	in	
cases	in	which	cure	would	have	been	straightforward,267	which	led	Mann	to	argue	that	the	
presentation	 of	 strictly	 complying	 documents	 was	 less	 important	 than	 suggested	 in	 the	
doctrinal	account.268	
	
A	baseline	assumption	in	Mann’s	analysis	was	that	commercial	parties	opted	for	a	letter	of	
credit	 because	 they	 believed	 it	 strengthened	 the	 underlying	 transaction.	 The	 doctrinal	
account	would	suggest	that	this	strength	is	the	virtual	guarantee	of	payment	to	the	seller.	If	
the	 practical	 usage	 of	 the	 credit	 does	 not	 provide	 this	 guarantee	 i.e.	 because	 strictly	
conforming	 documents	 are	 not	 routinely	 presented,	 the	 letter	 of	 credit	must	 bolster	 the	
underlying	transaction	in	some	other	way	and	by	providing	something	that	the	parties	cannot	
(easily)	obtain	themselves.269	Mann	argued	that	the	very	issue	of	the	credit	provided	two	types	
of	information:	firstly,	that	the	buyer	can	and	will	pay	notwithstanding	documentary	defects	
and	secondly,	that	the	transaction	is	legitimate.270	This	discussion	focuses	on	the	first	type	of	
information,	 a	 signal	 of	 the	 buyer’s	 creditworthiness	 and	 non-opportunistic	 behaviour	
directed	to	the	seller.	
	
																																																						
262	Ibid	2516.	
263	Ibid	2518.	
264	Ibid	2518.	
265	Ibid	2518.	
266	Ibid	2519.	
267	Ibid	2535:	“the	defects	were	curable	in	about	62%	of	the	341	cases	in	which	there	was	a	defect…overall,	the	
defects	were	cured	in	35%	of	the	193	cases	for	which	the	defects	were	curable.”	
268	Ibid	2519.		
269	Ibid	2521.	
270	Ibid	2521.	
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In	Mann’s	analysis,	the	issuing	bank	acts	as	a	reputational	intermediary	for	the	buyer.271	The	
feasibility	of	systems	in	which	a	third	party	stands	for	the	behaviour	of	another	depends	on	
the	existence	of	a	sanction	should	that	third	party	provide	false	 information.272	This	would	
typically	 be	 a	 reputational	 sanction.	 The	 effectiveness	 of	 such	 sanctions	 demands	 that	
credible	information	about	a	party’s	behaviour	is	available	and	that	it	can	be	transferred	to	
others	considering	dealing	with	that	party.273	Mann	contended	that	a	reputational	sanction	
existed	in	the	credit	context	in	that	a	bank’s	ongoing	business	would	suffer	if	payments	were	
unsuccessful.274	Mann	did	not	consider	how	notice	of	default	would	be	circulated	amongst	
the	potential	trading	community.	
	
A	system	of	reputational	intermediation	makes	sense	in	the	context	of	letters	of	credit.	Firstly,	
the	seller	can	assess	the	reputation	of	a	foreign	bank	far	easier	than	it	can	a	foreign	buyer.275	
This	may	be	due	to	the	existence	of	information	local	to	the	seller276	or	simply	because	there	
are	fewer	specialist	documentary	credit	banks	than	there	are	potential	trading	partners.277	In	
this	way	then	the	letter	of	credit	minimises	transaction	costs.	Assuming	this	to	be	the	case,	
the	 bank	 can	 provide	 information	 about	 the	 buyer	 that	 the	 seller	 would	 otherwise	 find	
difficult	to	obtain.	This	information	relates	to	the	buyer’s	creditworthiness,	namely	his	ability	
to	pay,	and	that	he	will	not	opportunistically	refuse	payment	during	the	waiver	process.	The	
bank’s	 information	 is	 built	 on	 ex	 ante	 screening,278	 actual	 knowledge	 of	 the	 buyer	 from	
previous	 interactions	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 monitor	 the	 buyer’s	 behaviour	 throughout	 the	
transaction.279	 The	 interview	 evidence	 confirmed	 the	 banks’	 dislike	 for	 opportunistic	
rejections,	 with	 one	 interviewee	 noting	 that	 the	 bank	 would	 cease	 to	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	
opportunistic	clients.280		
																																																						
271	Ibid	2521.	See	more	generally	on	this	topic:	R	Mann,	‘Verification	institutions	in	financing	transactions’	(1998-
1999)	87	Geo	LJ	2225,	2258	et	seq.	
272	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2541.	
273	Ibid	2544.	
274	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2521-2522,	2525.	
275	Ibid	2522.	
276	Ibid	2533.	
277	Ibid	2533.	
278	Ibid	2526.	Screening	by	the	bank	to	ensure	the	creditworthiness	of	the	applicant	also	makes	sense	as	part	of	the	
doctrinal	story.	For	example,	Moses	(n71)	62	argues	that	it	is	particularly	important	in	the	event	of	the	applicant’s	
insolvency	since	the	bank	will	become	obliged	to	make	payment	against	a	complying	presentation.	
279	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2529.	
280	Ibid	2526-2527.	
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It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 use	 of	 a	 letter	 of	 credit	 goes	 beyond	 reputational	
intermediation;	 it	 displaces	 the	 buyer	 as	 the	 primary	 obligor	 for	 payment	 under	 the	
contract.281	Of	course,	there	is	the	possibility	that	the	underlying	contract	will	revive,	where,	
for	example	the	bank	fails	or	the	credit	expires,	and	with	it	the	buyer’s	duty	to	pay	under	the	
original	 contract.282	 In	 these	 circumstances	 the	 creditworthiness	 of	 the	 buyer	 would	 be	
important	to	the	seller.	In	general	terms,	however,	this	is	not	how	the	credit	is	designed	to	
work;	it	is	intended	that	the	bank	makes	payment	in	the	first	instance	and	is	then	reimbursed	
by	the	buyer.	The	absence	of	strict	compliance	creates	a	potential	difficulty	for	the	beneficiary	
if	 the	 applicant	 subsequently	 goes	 insolvent.283	 Once	 the	 issuing	 bank	 (or	 trustee	 in	
bankruptcy)	has	become	aware	of	the	 insolvency,	they	will	not	permit	discrepancies	to	be	
waived,	even	if	the	applicant	had	already	sanctioned	payment.284	Notably,	the	UCP	does	not	
bind	the	paying	bank	to	the	applicant’s	decision	on	waiver285	and	in	these	rare286	circumstances	
the	risk	of	insolvency	will	be	borne	by	the	beneficiary,	much	like	in	a	transaction	without	the	
support	of	a	documentary	credit.		
	
For	Mann,	the	continued	use	of	credits	was	explained	by	the	information	that	the	issuing	bank	
provided	to	the	seller.	This	information	served	to	reassure	the	seller	that	the	buyer	would	pay	
against	 discrepant	 documents	 and	 was	 secured	 by	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 reputational	 sanction	
against	the	bank.		
	
ii. Katz’s	analysis:	Documentary	credits	and	bilateral	incentives	
An	 alternative	 analysis	 of	 the	 empirical	 data	was	 provided	 by	 Professor	 Avery	 Katz.287	 He	
contended	that	Mann’s	account	was	incomplete	because	it	failed	to	recognise	that	credits	are	
																																																						
281	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2541-2542.	
282	The	idea	of	the	letter	of	credit	as	‘conditional	payment’	is	evident	in	WJ	Alan	&	Co	v	El	Nasr	Export	and	Import	
Co	[1972]	2	QB	189,	210	per	Lord	Denning	MR.	
283	Moses	(n71)	34.	This	is	not	a	problem	in	the	doctrinal	account	of	the	mechanism	since	seller’s	routinely	present	
strictly	 compliant	 documents	 which	 assure	 them	 of	 payment	 from	 the	 bank,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 applicant’s	
subsequent	insolvency.	
284	Ibid	34.	
285	UCP	600	art.	16	(c)(iii)(b).	
286	Moses	(n71)	73.	
287	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250).	
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designed	to	reassure	both	parties.288	Moreover,	he	suggested	that	the	credit	could	not	simply	
be	about	the	flow	of	information	from	bank	to	seller	as	similar	information	was	available	more	
cheaply	from	other	sources.289	Of	course,	if	sellers	simply	wanted	an	assurance	of	payment,	
the	bank	could	send	a	stronger	signal	by	opening	itself	to	legal,	and	not	simply	reputational,	
liability.290	The	routine	presentation	of	discrepant	documents	means	that	the	bank	does	not	
become	legally	bound	to	make	payment.	
	
In	 Katz’s	 analysis,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 credit	was	 to	 provide	 both	 parties	with	 an	 incentive	 to	
perform.291	To	demonstrate	how	the	credit	fulfilled	this	function,	Katz	distinguished	two	sets	
of	 actions	 which	 were	 undertaken	 in	 the	 period	 before	 documents	 were	 presented	 for	
payment.	These	actions	provide	concrete	information	to	the	parties	about	each	other.	
	
The	 first	 category	 is	observable	behaviour	which	cannot	be	easily	or	cheaply	verified	by	a	
third-party	enforcer,	such	as	a	court.292	These	are	the	actions	that	the	parties	take	soon	after	
agreeing	to	trade	and	depend	in	large	part	on	the	broader	network	in	which	the	agreement	
is	located.	Examples	of	these	behaviours	include	the	exchange	of	preliminary	documentation	
in	which	the	precise	specification	of	the	goods	is	confirmed,	amendments	to	the	underlying	
agreement	as	well	as	information	obtained	through	conversations	with	other	market	actors	
and	gossip.293	This	provides	information	about	each	party’s	character	and	indicates	how	they	
are	 likely	 to	 perform	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 exchange.	 Indications	 of	 cooperation	 and	
flexibility	in	this	phase	would	suggest	that	the	party	is	committed	to	the	transaction.	Parties	
can	rely	on	this	information	because	it	comes	directly	from	their	experience	and	from	other	
market	participants.294	As	these	soft	signals	cannot	be	verified	by	a	court,	these	actions	cannot	
form	the	basis	of	legal	obligations.	295	Incidentally,	the	existence	of	such	information	channels	
																																																						
288	Ibid	2555-2556.	
289	Ibid	2557-2558.	
290	Ibid	2555.	
291	Ibid	2555-2556;	The	bilateral	assurance	provided	by	the	mechanism	is	also	recognised	by	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	
credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2539.	
292	Katz	(n250)	2564.	
293	Ibid	2564.	
294	O	Williamson,	‘Transaction-cost	economics:	The	governance	of	contractual	relations’	(1979)	22(2)	J	Law	&	Ec	
233,	 248;	G	Gundlach,	 ‘Exchange	 governance:	 The	 role	 of	 legal	 and	nonlegal	 approaches	 across	 the	 exchange	
process’	(1994)	13(2)	J	of	Pub	Pol	&	Mark.	246,	253.	
295	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2564-2565.	
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would	constitute	the	means	by	which	the	reputational	sanction	in	Mann’s	analysis	could	be	
transmitted.296	
	
The	 second	 type	 of	 action	which	 occurs	 before	 the	 presentation	 of	 documents	 is	 directly	
related	to	the	parties’	substantive	obligations	under	the	contract.297	As	such,	they	are	easily	
and	 cheaply	 verifiable	 by	 a	 court	 and	 can	 therefore	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 legally	 enforceable	
duties.298	 These	 include	 the	 completion	 and	 procurement	 of	 detailed	 documentation	
evidencing	performance	such	as	the	commercial	invoice,	bill	of	lading	and	certificates	issued	
by	 third	 parties.299	 The	 completion	 of	 these	 tasks	 provides	 a	 strong	 signal	 of	 a	 party’s	
willingness	to	perform	their	substantive	obligations	but	are	expensive	and	time	consuming	
for	the	parties	to	complete.300		
	
On	this	analysis,	the	period	prior	to	the	presentation	of	documents	provides	information	to	
both	buyer	and	seller	about	their	counterpart’s	willingness	to	perform	and	commitment	to	
the	transaction.	Katz	further	contended	that	the	exchange	of	information	during	this	phase	
determined	whether	presentation	and	payment	would	be	dealt	with	strictly	or	on	a	more	
informal	basis.301	Katz	distinguished	two	scenarios	for	this	purpose.			
	
If	 the	 buyer	 received	 sufficient	 soft	 signals	 indicating	 substantive	 performance,	 Katz	
suggested	 that	 he	would	 be	 less	 concerned	 about	 exact	 documentary	 compliance.302	 The	
buyer,	assured	of	substantive	performance	in	this	way,	would	be	likely	to	waive	defects.	This	
would	reduce	the	costs	associated	with	strict	compliance	for	the	seller.303	The	buyer	may	also	
receive	indications	of	deficient	performance	in	the	early	phases	of	exchange.304	If	this	was	the	
case,	 the	 buyer	 would	 be	 unwilling	 to	 accept	 discrepant	 documents	 and,	 in	 these	
																																																						
296	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	271	et	seq.;	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2544.	
297	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2565.	
298	Ibid	2565.	
299	Ibid	2565.	
300	 Gillette,	 ‘Letters	 of	 credit	 as	 signals’	 (n250)	 2540:	 strict	 compliance	 is	 expensive	 because	 it	 requires	more	
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circumstances,	one	would	expect	parties	to	behave	in	accordance	with	the	written	terms	of	
the	credit.305	
	
Pre-presentation	 information	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 reassure	 the	 buyer	 that	 substantive	
performance	is	forthcoming.	The	opportunity	to	minimise	the	expense	of	strict	compliance	
provides	an	incentive	for	the	seller	to	perform	his	substantive	obligations	without	adhering	
strictly	to	the	documentary	conditions.306	This	is	only	half	of	the	story.	To	reassure	both	parties	
that	their	counterpart	will	perform,	the	mechanism	also	needs	to	provide	an	incentive	for	the	
buyer.	This	is	where	the	issuing	bank	becomes	significant	in	Katz’s	analysis.307	By	issuing	the	
credit,	the	bank	reassures	the	seller	that	the	buyer	will	not	behave	opportunistically	during	
waiver.308	The	 information	comes	 from	the	same	sources	as	 in	Mann’s	analysis,	namely	ex	
ante	screening	and	monitoring	during	performance.309	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	issuing	
bank	 has	 a	more	 limited	 role	 in	 Katz’s	 analysis;	 the	 information	 provided	 relates	 only	 to	
whether	 the	 buyer	 will	 pay	 (opportunism)	 and	 not	 to	 whether	 the	 buyer	 can	 pay	
(creditworthiness).310	This	comports	with	the	doctrinal	account	of	the	mechanism;	once	the	
credit	has	been	issued,	the	seller	should	have	no	regard	for	the	buyer’s	creditworthiness	since	
he	will	ordinarily	look	to	the	bank	for	payment.311	
	
Much	like	Mann,	Katz	relied	on	the	notion	of	reputational	intermediation	by	the	issuing	bank	
on	behalf	of	its	customer,	the	credit	applicant.	In	order	that	such	intermediation	is	effective,	
there	must	be	a	sanction	imposed	on	the	bank	if	the	buyer	behaves	opportunistically.	Katz	
recognised	both	reputational	and	legal	penalties	for	this	purpose.312	This	goes	further	than	
Mann’s	analysis	where	the	penalty	was	limited	to	a	reputational	sanction.	According	to	Katz,	
a	bank	which	rejected	substantially	complying	documents	would	suffer	a	reputational	penalty	
because	it	and	its	customers	would	garner	a	reputation	for	nit-picking.313	Sellers	dealing	with	
																																																						
305	Ibid	2565,	2567.	
306	Ibid	2566.	
307	Ibid	2566.	
308	Ibid	2566.	
309	Ibid	2567.	
310	Ibid	2566.	
311	Gillette	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2542.	This	ignores	the	possibility	that	the	seller	may	need	to	seek	
payment	directly	from	the	buyer	as	where	the	credit	has	expired	or	the	bank	has	itself	gone	insolvent.	
312	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2566-2567.	
313	Ibid	2567.	
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that	bank	in	the	future	would	know	that	strict	compliance	was	required	which	would	increase	
the	price	of	dealing	through	that	bank.314	This	would	render	the	bank	and	its	customers	a	less	
attractive	proposition.	In	Katz’s	estimation,	however,	a	reputational	penalty	is	insufficient	to	
support	 the	 bank’s	 signal	 alone.315	 As	 such,	 he	 suggested	 that	 the	 threat	 of	 legal	 liability	
strengthened	the	bank’s	signal	and	created	an	incentive	for	effective	monitoring.316	The	threat	
of	legal	liability	exists	because	a	seller	who	had	performed	substantively	could	subsequently	
procure	strictly	complying	documents,317	albeit	at	greater	expense,	at	which	point	the	bank	
would	become	 legally	obliged	to	pay.	The	combination	of	 these	sanctions	 incentivised	the	
bank	to	monitor	the	buyer	effectively.318	
	
Contractual	arrangements	which	are	underpinned	by	a	 strict	 legal	 framework	but	operate	
informally	are	common	in	the	empirical	contract	literature.319	Indeed,	Katz	himself	makes	this	
link.320	To	adopt	Professor	Lisa	Bernstein’s	language,	the	strict	legal	framework	constitutes	a	
series	of	‘endgame’	norms	which	are	employed	when	the	relationship	has	broken	down.321	
The	flexible	and	informal	operation	of	the	credit	are	explicable	as	 ‘relationship-preserving’	
norms	which	dictate	the	day-to-day	interactions	between	the	parties.322	Where	the	parties	
are	 engaged	 in	 a	 successful	 ongoing	 relationship,	 documentary	 discrepancies	 may	 not	
warrant	 asserting	 one’s	 legal	 rights	 by	 demanding	 strict	 conformity	 of	 the	 presented	
documents.323	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 one	 would	 expect	 to	 see	 a	 greater	 insistence	 on	 strict	
compliance	in	one	shot	transactions	than	in	exchanges	between	repeat	players.324	The	data	
																																																						
314	Ibid	2567.	
315	Ibid	2560-2562	(the	reasons	are	not	particularly	relevant	for	this	analysis).	
316	Ibid	2566-2567	
317	Ibid	2566.	
318	Ibid	2567.	Katz	does	not	suggest	how	these	incentives	motivate	the	bank	in	this	way.	
319	For	example,	L	Bernstein,	‘Private	commercial	law	in	the	cotton	industry:	Creating	cooperation	through	rules,	
norms,	and	institutions’	(2000-2001)	99	Mich	L	Rev	1724;	S	Macaulay,	‘Non-contractual	relations	in	business:	A	
preliminary	 study’	 (1963)	 28(1)	 Am	 Soc	 Rev	 55;	 R	 Ellickson,	 ‘Of	 Coase	 and	 cattle:	 Dispute	 resolution	 among	
neighbors	in	Shasta	County’	(1986)	38	Stan	LR	623.	
320	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2569.	
321	L	Bernstein,	 ‘Merchant	 law	 in	a	merchant	court:	Rethinking	the	 law’s	search	for	 immanent	business	norms’	
(1996)	144	U	Pa	L	Rev	1765,	1796-1797.	This	may	not	be	the	full	picture.	See	D	Campbell,	‘Arcos	v	Ronaasen	as	
relational	contract’	in	D	Campbell,	L	Mulcahy	and	S	Wheeler	(eds.),	Changing	Concepts	of	Contract:	Essays	in	Honour	
of	Ian	Macneil	(Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013)	(arguing	that	an	insistence	on	strict	legal	obligations	may	be	perfectly	
acceptable	within	competitive	markets.)	
322	Bernstein,	‘Merchant	law’	(n321)	1796-1798.	
323	Gillette	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n25)	2540.	
324	See	also	ibid	2546	where	he	makes	a	similar	point	in	relation	to	the	types	of	exchange	in	which	the	letter	of	
credit	is	employed.	
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was	not	differentiated	in	this	way	and,	as	noted	above,325	are	no	longer	available	for	further	
analysis.	
	
A	degree	of	precision	is	required	here.326	The	studies	which	are	traditionally	used	to	exemplify	
the	 power	 of	 reputational	 sanctions	 involve	 economic	 exchange	 between	 ethnically	
homogenous	 communities327	 or	 in	 geographically	 closed	 spaces.328	 The	 efficiency	 of	
reputational	sanctions	in	these	settings	depends	on	the	shared	norms	of	market	participants	
and	 the	direct	 channels	 through	which	 sanctions	 can	be	 levied.	By	 contrast,	documentary	
credit	contracts	typically	involve	strangers,	separated	both	geographically	and	culturally.	It	is	
important	 to	 consider,	 therefore,	 whether	 the	 characteristics	 indicative	 of	 reputational	
penalties	exist	in	the	credit	context.		
	
To	begin	with	the	geographical	distance	separating	parties	to	a	credit	transaction,	the	studies	
of	 internet	 sales	 provide	 support	 for	 reputational	 sanctions	 in	 long	 distance	 contracts	
between	anonymous	parties.	This	requires	a	small	diversion	from	the	main	argument.	These	
transactions	arguably	bear	greater	 similarity	 to	 letter	of	 credit	 contracts329	 than	studies	of	
closed	commercial	societies.	The	scale	of	internet-based	commerce	would	today	suggest	that	
mechanisms	 have	 evolved	 to	 counter	 the	 natural	 absence	 of	 trust	 between	 anonymous	
parties.	Rietjens’	work	provides	a	useful	example	of	how	eBay,	the	online	auction	website,	
has	 created	 a	 community	 of	 traders	 providing	 publicly-available	 feedback	 after	 each	
transaction.330	This	 reputation	system	“collects,	distributes	and	aggregates	 feedback	about	
participants’	past	behaviour”331	which	can	be	used	to	predict	future	behaviour.332	The	cost	of	
poor	performance	is	primarily	reputational	 in	these	markets	which,	as	 in	the	case	of	eBay,	
																																																						
325	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	246.	
326	This	element	of	the	analysis	was	developed	as	a	result	of	a	question	and	answer	session	with	Professor	Sally	
Wheeler	at	‘Main	Currents	in	the	Contemporary	Sociology	of	Law’	(Centre	for	Law	and	Society	Conference,	Cardiff	
School	of	Law	and	Politics,	10	June	2016)	
327	L	Bernstein,	‘Opting	out	of	the	legal	system:	Extra-legal	contractual	relations	in	the	diamond	industry’	(1992)	21	
JLS	115.	
328	Bernstein,	‘Private	commercial	law’	(n319);	Macaulay,	‘Non-contractual	relations’	(n319).	
329	B	Rietjens,	‘Trust	and	reputation	on	eBay:	Towards	a	legal	framework	for	feedback	intermediaries’	(2006)	15(1)	
Info	&	Comm	Tech	L	55,	60:	transactions	“conducted	with	people	or	organizations	who	are	strangers	to	each	other	
and	often	have	an	unknown	record	of	past	behaviour.”	
330	Ibid	58-59.	
331	Ibid	59	citing	P	Resnick	et	al.,	‘Reputation	systems’	(2000)	43	Communications	of	the	ACM	45,	46.	
332	C	Gillette,	 ‘Reputation	and	 intermediaries	 in	electronic	commerce’	(2002)	62(4)	Louisiana	L	Rev	1165,	1167;	
Mann,	‘Verification	institutions’	(n271)	2230;	C	Weizsacker,	Barriers	to	Entry	(Farrar	Straus	Giroux,	1981)	72-73.	
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may	 also	 be	 underpinned	 by	 a	 formal	 enforcement	 structure.333	 Although	 enforcement	
mechanisms	in	consumer	internet	contracts	are	of	 little	direct	interest	to	the	project,	they	
demonstrate	that	reputation	can	constrain	behaviour	in	long	distance,	anonymous	exchanges	
provided	an	effective	feedback	loop	exists.		
	
The	second	issue	to	consider	is	the	cultural	distance	which	may	exist	in	credit	transactions.	
The	studies	involving	ethnically	identical	traders	demonstrate	that	shared	community	norms	
moderate	behaviour.	It	is,	of	course,	virtually	impossible	to	attribute	a	similar	group	of	shared	
norms	to	all	commercial	parties	using	documentary	credits.	There	is,	however,	evidence	to	
suggest	that	common	norms	exist	within	industries.334	As	Beale	and	Dugdale	found	in	their	
study	 of	 engineering	manufacturers,	 for	 example,	 “certain	 terms	 and	 certain	 customs	 or	
“unwritten	laws”	were	widely	accepted.”335	These	tacit	understandings	enabled	the	parties	
to	economise	on	contractual	planning336	and	provided	a	foundation	for	how	parties	would	
behave	 during	 the	 transaction.	 The	 ability	 of	 norms	 to	moderate	 behaviour	 in	 the	 credit	
context	will	be	considered	in	detail	in	due	course.	At	this	stage,	however,	there	is	nothing	to	
suggest	that	similar	unwritten	rules	do	not	exist	between	the	parties	to	a	credit	transaction	
which	constrain	harmful	behaviour.		
	
The	main	 thrust	 of	 Katz’s	 analysis	 is	 that	 the	 credit	mechanism	motivates	both	parties	 to	
perform	substantively	and	provides	reassurance	of	their	counterpart’s	performance.	This	is	
achieved,	from	the	buyer’s	perspective,	from	knowledge	he	acquires	about	the	seller	in	the	
pre-contractual	phase.	The	issuing	bank	provides	reassurance	to	the	seller	that	the	buyer	will	
not	seize	on	trivial	discrepancies	during	waiver.	Reputational	and	legal	sanctions	underpin	the	
role	 of	 the	 issuing	 bank	 in	 this	 analysis.	 This	 is	 a	 more	 comprehensive,	 and	 therefore	
preferable,	analysis	than	that	offered	by	Professor	Mann.	
	
																																																						
333	Rietjens	(n329)	62,	73.	
334	Macaulay,	‘Non-contractual	relations’	(n319)	62-63;	H	Beale,	and	T	Dugdale,	‘Contracts	between	businessmen:	
Planning	and	the	use	of	contractual	remedies’	(1975)	2(1)	Brit	J	Law	&	Soc	45,	47;	R	Lewis,	‘Contracts	between	
businessmen:	Reform	of	the	law	of	firm	offers	and	an	empirical	study	of	tendering	in	the	building	industry’	(1982)	
9	J	Law	&	Soc	153,	169.	
335	Beale	and	Dugdale	(n334)	47.	
336	Ibid	47,	59.	
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The	empirical	work	challenges	the	orthodox,	doctrinal	account	of	the	credit	mechanism.	It	is	
my	 contention	 that	 the	 empirical	 work	 can	 lead	 us	 to	 a	 different	 view	 about	 fraud	 in	
transactions	financed	by	documentary	credit.	 Indeed,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	argues	
that	fraud	deterrence	is	not	simply	a	matter	for	partner	selection	ex	ante,	but	a	background	
matter	for	the	duration	of	the	exchange.		
	
B. Empirical	evidence	of	documentary	credits:	Implications	for	fraud	
Unlike	other	commercial	fraud	rules,	the	trade	finance	courts	do	not	characterise	the	fraud	
exception	as	a	deterrent.	This	 is	because	the	contracting	parties	are	deemed	to	undertake	
sufficient	 pre-contractual	 screening	 to	 combat	 the	 risk	 of	 fraud.	 This	 is	 not	 routinely	
questioned.	It	is	argued	here	that	the	judicial	account	of	deterrence	lacks	detail	with	regard	
to	 the	mechanics	of	pre-contractual	 screening	and	also	 fails	 to	explain	how	 incentives	 for	
fraud	during	performance	are	mitigated.		After	establishing	the	shortcomings	of	the	judicial	
account	(1),	 the	empirical	evidence	–	and	 in	particular,	Katz’s	analysis	thereof	–	 is	used	to	
suggest	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 fraud	 deterrence	 in	 documentary	 credit	
transactions.	 It	 is	 argued,	 firstly,	 that	 reputational	 sanctions	 function	ex	ante	 to	 constrain	
fraud	across	transactions	(2).	The	empirical	evidence	is	then	used	to	develop	two	arguments	
about	how	incentives	to	fraud	during	performance	are	mitigated	(3).		
	
i. Limitations	of	the	judicial	account	
As	far	as	the	trade	finance	courts	are	concerned,	deterrence	is	a	matter	for	the	contractual	
parties	 and	 depends	 on	 the	 selection	 of	 an	 appropriate	 counterpart.337	 Lord	 Bingham’s	
comments	 in	HIH	 Casualty	 usefully	 summarise	 the	 judicial	 view;	 “parties	 entering	 into	 a	
commercial	contract…will	assume	the	honesty	and	good	faith	of	the	other;	absent	such	an	
assumption	they	would	not	deal.”338	Despite	the	apparent	 logic	of	this	assertion,	there	are	
several	shortcomings	with	this	judicial	account	of	deterrence.		
	
																																																						
337	Sanders	(n4)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
338	HIH	Casualty	&	General	Insurance	v	Chase	Manhattan	Bank	[2003]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	61,	[15]	per	Lord	Bingham.	
273	
	
Firstly,	and	much	like	the	position	in	insurance,339	there	is	no	empirical	evidence	underpinning	
this	assertion.340	The	courts	are	reliant,	as	so	often,	on	judicial	 intuition	and	speculation.	 It	
remains	the	case	that	we	do	not	know	for	sure	whether	parties	would	refuse	to	deal	with	a	
party	whose	honesty	was	in	doubt.341		
	
Second,	 the	 courts	 are	 silent	 about	 how	pre-contractual	 screening	 operates	 and	 on	what	
calibre	of	 information	 it	 relies.	 There	 is	 an	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 sufficient	 information	
about	a	party’s	character	and	propensity	to	fraud	is	easily	and	cheaply	available	in	the	market.	
This	is	difficult	to	accept	at	face	value.	If	we	remember	that	the	credit	is	chosen	to	compensate	
for	the	lack	of	information	about	a	party’s	creditworthiness,342	one	would	assume	that	similar	
difficulties	hamper	discovery	about	a	party’s	propriety.	The	argument	made	in	(2)	is	that	the	
empirical	 data	 can	 be	 used	 to	 overcome	 this	 shortcoming	 of	 the	 judicial	 account	 of	
deterrence.	
	
The	judicial	account	further	assumes	that	the	entire	fraud	risk	can	be	mitigated	ex	ante.	This	
wholly	ignores	the	possibility	that	incentives	to	fraud	arise	during	performance,	either	due	to	
structural	weaknesses	of	the	mechanism	or	to	the	underlying	character	or	financial	position	
of	the	trader.	Given	that	the	fraud	exception	is	not	characterised	as	a	deterrent,343	it	appears,	
from	the	court’s	perspective,	that	there	is	no	mechanism	to	deter	fraud	in	performance.	The	
geographical	 separation	 of	 trading	 parties,	 economic	 fluctuations	 and	 containerisation344	
make	 fraud	both	possible	and	difficult	 to	detect	during	 this	phase	of	 the	 transaction.	The	
courts’	failure	to	consider	deterrence	at	this	stage	is	a	notable	shortcoming.	In	part	(3),	the	
empirical	data	is	used	to	suggest	that	deterrents	do	exist	in	this	phase	of	the	transaction	and	
rely	largely	on	norms	which	have	developed	between	the	parties.		
	
																																																						
339	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Three,	text	to	fn	1.	
340	J	Davey,	‘Honesty	&	the	relational	commercial	contract:	Towards	a	law	of	post-contractual	misrepresentation’,	
(Insurance	Fraud	Symposium,	University	of	Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016),	11.	
341	Ibid	11:	noting	the	absence	of	work	concerning	whether	commercial	parties	“genuinely	expect	honesty	or	‘else	
[they]	would	not	deal’	for	all	aspects	of	performance.”	
342	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2522.	See	also,	Moses	(n71)	36.	
343	Sanders	(n4)	343	per	Bowen	LJ;	Todd,	Bills	of	Lading	and	Bankers	Documentary	Credits	(n183)	[6.2],	[6.49].	
344	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n97)	[4-058].	
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ii. An	empirical	explanation	of	pre-contractual	screening	and	fraud	
The	courts	confine	deterrence	to	the	pre-contractual	stage.	While	there	is	a	certain	logic	to	
the	 contention	 that	 sophisticated	 parties	 would	 take	 steps	 to	 ensure	 the	 reliability	 of	
potential	counterparts,	the	courts	do	not	specify	the	mechanics	of	pre-contractual	screening	
nor	the	type	of	information	on	which	it	depends.	The	empirical	data	is	used	here	to	expand	
upon	the	judicial	account	and	demonstrate	how	pre-contractual	screening	may	prevent	fraud	
in	credit	transactions.		
	
In	his	analysis,	Katz	hypothesised	the	existence	of	information	channels	which	connected	the	
individual	parties	and	wider	market	participants.345	These	channels	conveyed	“soft	signals”;346	
information	which	was	sufficient	for	the	parties	to	determine	how	to	behave	but	which	could	
not	form	the	basis	for	legal	obligations	nor	be	verified	by	a	court.347	The	quality	of	information	
conveyed	in	the	early	phases	of	performance	dictated	the	formality	of	the	parties’	exchange.	
Where,	for	example,	soft	signals	of	compliant	performance	were	conveyed,	the	buyer	was	
willing	to	waive	strict	documentary	compliance.	Conversely,	Katz	suggested	that	indications	
of	deficient,	and	by	extension	fraudulent,	performance	would	cause	the	credit	applicant	to	
insist	on	strict	compliance.348	To	be	clear,	it	is	not	suggested	that	this	option	was	exercised	by	
any	of	the	credit	applicants	in	Mann’s	study	since	the	documentary	defects	were	waived,	and	
full	payment	made,	in	all	but	one	of	the	discrepant	presentations.349	
	
Strict	 documentary	 compliance	 has	 several	 consequences	 for	 the	 beneficiary.	 Firstly,	 the	
transaction	costs	of	the	instant	exchange	will	increase	as	he	will	be	required	to	monitor	third	
parties	more	closely	and	may	incur	costs	to	cure	defects	and	retender	documents.350	More	
broadly,	signals	of	fraudulent	behaviour	in	one	transaction	will	have	consequences	for	future	
business.351	As	some	of	these	soft	signals	are	generated	by	other	market	actors,	evidence	of	
fraud	will	impact	the	trader’s	reputation.	This	will	reduce	the	quantity	of	positive	soft	signals	
																																																						
345	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2564.	
346	Ibid	2564.	
347	Ibid	2564-2565.	
348	Ibid	2565,	2567.	
349	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2513.	
350	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2565;	Gillette,	‘Letters	of	credit	as	signals’	(n250)	2540.	
351	T	Hawkins,	CM	Wittmann	and	M	Beyerlein,	‘Antecedents	and	consequences	of	opportunism	in	buyer-supplier	
relations:	Research	synthesis	and	new	frontiers’	(2008)	37	Ind.	Mark.	Man.	895,	907.	
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he	can	send	in	future	transactions	which	in	turn	will	make	those	exchanges	more	expensive.	
On	 this	 basis,	 it	 is	 argued	 here	 that	 the	 reputational	 and	 associated	 financial	 costs	 of	
fraudulent	performance	have	the	capacity	to	constrain	misconduct.	
	
This	 argument	 depends	 on	 the	 recognition	 in	 the	 business	 management	 and	 economics	
literatures	 that	 reputation	 is	 able	 to	 exercise	 a	moderating	 effect	 on	 behaviour.352	 These	
literatures	demonstrate	that	reputation	can	play	this	role	where	there	are	channels	through	
which	 information	of	 poor	 performance	 can	be	 circulated	 to	 other	market	 participants.353	
Provided	these	channels	exist,	reputation	overcomes	the	fact	that	parties	cannot	predict	with	
certainty	how	their	counterpart	will	behave	over	the	course	of	the	exchange.	Weizsacker’s	
‘extrapolation	principle’	explains	how	reputation	functions,		
	
…the	 phenomenon	 that	 people	 extrapolate	 the	 behavior	 of	 others	 from	 past	
observations	 and	 that	 this	 extrapolation	 is	 self-stabilizing,	 because	 it	 provides	 an	
incentive	for	others	to	live	up	to	these	expectations...By	observing	others'	behavior	in	
the	 past,	 one	 can	 fairly	 confidently	 predict	 their	 behavior	 in	 the	 future	 without	
incurring	further	costs.354	
In	 the	 credit	 context,	 Katz’s	 analysis	 provides	 clear	 support	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 channels	
through	 which	 reputational	 information	 can	 flow.355	 The	 precondition	 for	 reputational	
sanctions	to	constrain	behaviour,	as	suggested	in	the	business	management	literature,	is	met.	
Accordingly,	the	suggestion	is	that	the	risk	of	such	sanctions	encourages	parties	to	behave	in	
accordance	 with	 the	 express	 terms	 and	 informal	 norms	 of	 their	 agreement	 to	 minimise	
transaction	costs	in	the	current	exchange	and	attract	future	business.356	This	reinforces	the	
judicial	account	of	deterrence	as	an	ex	ante	matter	and	demonstrates	more	specifically	how	
pre-contractual	screening	can	prevent	fraud.	
																																																						
352	R	Coase,	‘The	nature	of	the	firm:	Influence’	(1988)	4	J	of	L,	Ec	&	Org	33,	44:	opportunism	is	“effectively	checked	
by	the	need	to	take	account	of	future	actions	on	business”;	G	Gundlach	and	R	Achrol,	‘Governance	in	exchange:	
Contract	law	and	its	alternatives’	(1993)	12(2)	J	of	Pub	Pol	&	Mark.	141,	143.	
353	 For	 example,	 Gillette,	 ‘Reputation	 and	 intermediaries’	 (n332)	 1169;	Mann,	 ‘Verification	 institutions’	 (n271)	
2256;	H	Collins,	Regulating	Contracts	(OUP,	1999)	114.	
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2016)	available	at:	http://ftp.iza.org/dp10188.pdf	(accessed	15/09/2016),	7,	19.	
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iii. Mitigating	the	fraud	risk	during	performance	
The	 judicial	 suggestion	 that	 the	 fraud	 risk	 is	 mitigated	 ex	 ante	 through	 careful	 partner	
selection	ignores	the	fact	that	opportunities	for	fraud	may	arise	during	performance.	Such	
opportunities	may	stem	from	economic	or	market	 fluctuations	or	difficulties	 linked	 to	 the	
shipment	of	the	goods	which	are	beyond	the	beneficiary’s	control.	A	comprehensive	account	
of	deterrence	necessarily	 requires	 consideration	of	how	 these	opportunities	 for	 fraud	are	
managed.	The	remainder	of	the	chapter	uses	Mann’s	empirical	data	to	develop	two	novel	
suggestions	 as	 to	 how	 fraud	 is	mitigated	 during	 performance.	 The	 first	 contends	 that	 an	
exchange	of	positive	soft	signals	in	the	early	phases	of	the	exchange	reduces	the	force	of	any	
subsequent	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	 (a).	 The	 second	 contention	 suggests	 that	 a	 relational	
model	of	 governance	develops	 to	 constrain	opportunistic	behaviour	because	of	 the	 social	
norms	which	evolve	between	the	parties	in	the	initial	phases	of	the	exchange	(b).	
	
a. Positive	soft	signals	reduce	incentives	for	fraud	
The	first	argument	relies	on	the	soft	signals	exchanged	between	the	parties	in	the	early	phases	
of	performance.	The	following	example	illustrates	the	position.	Imagine	that	the	beneficiary	
has	shipped	the	correct	goods	but	cannot	obtain	strictly	compliant	documentation	because,	
due	to	 issues	beyond	his	control,	 the	shipment	was	 late	or	 from	a	different	port.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	 the	 seller	 has	 three	 options:	 (i)	 to	 tender	 non-conforming	 documents	 and	
hope	the	buyer	waives	the	defects,	(ii)	to	seek	an	amendment	to	the	credit	or	(iii)	to	procure	
falsified	documentation	so	that	 the	presentation	appears	to	comply	with	the	terms	of	 the	
credit.	None	of	these	options	is	entirely	risk	free.	In	option	(i)	the	buyer	may	refuse	waiver.357	
In	 (ii),	 amending	 the	 credit	 involves	 delay,	 additional	 expense358	 and	 requires	 the	 buyer’s	
agreement.	The	risk	of	option	(iii)	is	obvious;	should	the	fraud	be	discovered,	the	beneficiary	
risks	his	right	to	payment.359	
	
																																																						
357	This	is	on	the	basis	that	it	is	not	possible	to	obtain	conforming	documentation	once	the	goods	have	been	shipped	
late	or	from	the	wrong	place.	
358	Malek	and	Quest,	Jack	(n64)	[3.37].	
359	Provided	that	the	applicant	can	establish	the	necessary	criteria	for	an	injunction,	see	earlier	discussion	in	Chapter	
Four,	III	(E).	
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Adopting	 the	 analysis	 suggested	by	Katz,	 the	 seller	who	has	 sent	 sufficient	 soft	 signals	 of	
substantive	compliance	need	not	be	concerned	in	this	hypothetical	illustration.	He	should	be	
confident	that	his	buyer	will	waive	the	defects	and	permit	payment.	This	theoretically	reduces	
the	incentives	for	him	to	behave	fraudulently.	Accordingly,	the	beneficiary	who	has	shipped	
the	correct	goods	but	is	unable	to	obtain	conforming	documentation	should	choose	option	
(i),	provided	sufficient	soft	signals	of	reliability	have	been	communicated	to	his	buyer.	
	
b. 	The	relational	governance	argument	
The	 final	 argument	 is	 more	 complex	 and	 makes	 use	 of	 literatures	 in	 contract	 theory,	
economics	and	business	management.	The	starting	point	is	the	activities	that	Katz	suggested	
took	 place	 in	 the	 time	 between	 agreement	 and	 document	 presentation.	 These	 activities	
included	finalising	the	detail	of	the	products,	specifying	the	practical	aspects	of	shipment	and	
the	completion	of	preliminary	documentation.360		
	
The	 suggestion	 that	 the	 exchange	 evolves	 after	 the	 written	 contract	 is	 signed	 adopts	 a	
relational	view	of	contract.	Relational	contract	theory	views	economic	transactions	and	the	
way	in	which	exchange	hazards	are	mitigated	in	fundamentally	different	terms	than	classical	
and	neo-classical	theory.361	These	are	significant	distinctions	which	will	now	be	discussed.	
	
1. Models	of	contracting	behaviour	
Classical	and	neo-classical	contract	law	regarded	economic	transactions	as	“simple,	one-time	
bargaining	between	individual	actors	pursuing	individual	outcomes.”362	This	characterises	the	
contracting	parties	as	self-interested	actors	who	pursue	outcomes	to	maximise	their	own	gain	
from	the	transaction.363	This	may	mean,	therefore,	that	a	seller	would	take	advantage	of	a	
rise	 in	 the	market	 to	 extract	 a	 higher	 price	 from	 his	 buyer.	 The	 classical	 analysis	 further	
considered	that	the	parties	discussed	the	entirety	of	their	exchange	during	negotiations	and	
																																																						
360	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2564.	
361	Much	has	been	written	on	 relational	 contract	 theory	and	 its	 intricacies	are	not	at	 issue	here.	An	 indicative	
selection	of	sources	not	cited	here	include	D	Campbell,	L	Mulcahy	and	S	Wheeler,	Changing	Concepts	of	Contract:	
Essays	 in	Honour	 of	 Ian	Macneil	 (Palgrave	Macmillan,	 2013);	D	 Campbell,	 ‘Good	 faith	 and	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 the	
‘relational’	contract’	(2014)	77	MLR	475;	R	Scott,	‘The	case	for	formalism	in	relational	contract’	(1999)	94(3)	Nw	U	
L	Rev	847;	I	Macneil,	‘Relational	contract:	What	we	do	and	do	not	know’	(1985)	Wis	L	Rev	483;	I	Macneil,	‘The	many	
futures	of	contract’	(1973-1974)	47	S	Cal	L	Rev	691.	
362	Gundlach,	‘Exchange	governance’	(n294)	246.	
363	R	Brownsword,	‘From	co-operative	contracting	to	a	contract	of	co-operation’	in	D	Campbell	and	P	Vincent-Jones	
(eds.),	Contract	and	Economic	Organisation	(Dartmouth	Publishing	Co.,	1996),	15.	
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committed	this	agreement	to	paper.	The	resulting	contract	set	out	the	parties’	substantive	
obligations	as	well	as	their	rights	in	the	event	of	breach	by	the	other	party.364	Since	the	entire	
agreement	 was	 contained	 within	 the	 written	 contract,	 the	 wider	 context	 in	 which	 the	
exchange	 took	 place	was	 considered	 irrelevant.	 The	 contract	was	 self-contained,	 isolated	
from	all	prior	and	future	events.365	
	
By	contrast,	a	relational	approach	recognises	economic	exchange	as	a	social	endeavour366	and	
explicitly	 takes	 account	 of	 the	 social,	 economic	 and	market	 context	 in	which	 the	 specific	
exchange	is	embedded.367	This	is	an	important	distinction	because	it	moves	away	from	the	
view	 that	 economic	 exchange	 is	 an	 isolated,	 singular	 event	 and	 instead	 recognises	
transactions	 as	 a	 spectrum	 of	 behaviour.368	 This	 is	 usefully	 demonstrated	 by	 Macneil’s	
relational-discrete	axis.	On	the	left-hand	side	of	the	axis	is	the	“as-if-discrete”	transaction;	the	
one-shot	 exchange	 between	 strangers	whose	 shared	 context	 perhaps	 consists	 solely	 of	 a	
common	language	and	currency.369	An	example	typically	cited	in	the	literature	is	“purchasing	
local	spirits	from	a	shopkeeper	in	a	remote	area	of	a	foreign	country	to	which	one	never	again	
expects	 to	 visit	 nor	 refer	 his	 friends.”370	 At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 this	 spectrum	 is	 the	 highly	
relational	exchange	which	develops	over	time	to	accommodate	the	needs	of	the	parties	and	
to	changes	in	the	world	beyond	the	relation.371	Such	exchanges	are	“usually	associated	with	
long-term,	flexible	and	open-ended	agreements	that	display	a	high	degree	of	reliance	on	trust	
and	ongoing	co-operation	 in	performance,	 rather	than	 law.”372	The	relational	analysis	also	
moves	away	from	the	proposition	that	contracting	parties	are	inherently	self-interested.	The	
																																																						
364	This	is	known	as	presentiation	–	the	process	of	bringing	all	potential	matters	into	the	present	for	the	purposes	
of	contractual	planning.	See	I	Macneil,	‘Economic	analysis	of	contractual	relations:	Its	shortfalls	and	the	need	for	a	
rich	 classificatory	 apparatus’	 (1981)	 75	Nw	U	 L	 Rev	 1018,	 1019,	 1039;	 C	Mitchell,	Contract	 Law	 and	 Contract	
Practice:	Bridging	the	gap	between	legal	reasoning	and	commercial	expectations	(Hart	Publishing,	2013),	173.	
365	Gundlach,	'Exchange	governance'	(n294),	246.	See	also	P	Atiyah,	Essays	on	Contract	(Clarendon	Press	1986)	5-6	
where	the	neoclassical	conception	of	exchange	is	explained	as	“the	(1)	discrete,	(2)	two-party,	(3)	commercial,	(4)	
executory,	(5)	exchange.”	
366	D	Campbell	(ed.),	The	Relational	Theory	of	Contract:	Selected	Works	of	Ian	Macneil	(Sweet	and	Maxwell,	2001)	
130;	I	Macneil,	‘Values	in	contract	law:	Internal	and	external’	(1983)	78	Nw	U	L	Rev	340,	341-342	“all	contracts	are	
relational.	Nevertheless,	some	contracts…are	far	more	relational	than	others.”	(emphasis	in	original).	
367	I	Macneil,	'Reflections	on	relational	contract	theory	after	a	neo-classical	seminar'	in	D	Campbell,	H	Collins	and	J	
Wightman	(eds),	Implicit	Dimensions	of	Contract	(Hart	Publishing	2003),	217.	
368	I	Macneil,	Contracts:	Exchange	Transactions	and	Relations	(2nd	ed.	Foundation	Press,	1978),	12.	
369	Macneil,	‘Values’	(n366)	343;	Mitchell	(n364)	175.	
370	Williamson,	‘Transaction-cost	economics’	(n294)	247.	
371	I	Macneil,	‘Contracts:	Adjustment	of	long-term	economic	relations	under	classical,	neoclassical,	and	relational	
contract	law’	(1977-1978)	72	Nw	U	L	Rev	854,	889-890.	
372	Mitchell	(n364)	175-176.	
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model	 instead	 recognises	 the	 nuances	 of	 human	 behaviour	 and	 provides	 for	 both	 the	
competitive	and	cooperative	aspects	of	behaviour.	
	
The	 social	 and	 market	 context	 is	 significant	 in	 the	 relational	 analysis	 of	 contract.	 This	
conceptualises	exchange	as	an	embedded	activity	which	 is	not	 isolated	 from	 the	world	 in	
which	 it	 takes	place.	 This	 is	 important	 because	 this	wider	 context	will	 inform	 the	parties’	
expectations	 about	 the	 transaction.373	 Indeed,	 a	 relational	 analysis	 regards	 economic	
exchange	 as	 having	 the	 “propensity	 to	 generate	 norms,	 define	 or	 inform	 parties’	
expectations,	 provide	 sources	 of	 reassurance,	 facilitate	 co-operation,	 [and]	 create	
interdependence.”374	 These	 norms	 and	 expectations	may	 develop	 as	 a	 result	 of	 personal	
interaction375	 and	 by	 virtue	 of	 specific	 trade	 or	 industry	 practices.376	 These	 norms	 and	
understandings	 are	 typically	 unspoken	 and	 do	 not	 form	part	 of	 the	written	 contract.	 The	
result	 is	 that	 the	written	agreement	 is	 likely	 to	be	 incomplete	 since	parties	will	 avoid	 the	
expense	of	detailed	planning	in	circumstances	where	these	norms	are	a	sufficient	guide	for	
conduct.377	
	
2. The	mitigation	of	contractual	hazards	
International	 trade	 is	 risky	 because	 the	 parties	 do	 not	 perform	 their	 obligations	
simultaneously.	This	means	that	market	fluctuations	may	incentivise	one	or	both	parties	to	
breach,	or	act	 in	a	manner	 inconsistent	with,	 the	 terms	of	 the	original	deal.	These	 risks	–	
broadly	 referred	 to	 as	 exchange	 hazards	 –	 need	 to	 be	 mitigated	 to	 safeguard	 economic	
exchange.	In	the	context	of	international	sales,	the	seller’s	primary	concern	is	that	the	buyer	
will	be	unable	or	unwilling	 to	pay	when	 the	goods	are	delivered.	The	buyer’s	 concern,	by	
contrast,	 relates	 to	 the	 probity	 of	 the	 seller.	 These	 risks	 explain	 the	 use	 of	 documentary	
credits	to	support	international	sales	transactions.	The	credit,	however,	is	unable	to	prevent	
the	 beneficiary	 engaging	 in	 fraudulent	 conduct.	 The	 discussion	 draws	 on	 literatures	 in	
																																																						
373	Ibid	172.	
374	D	Kimel,	‘The	choice	of	paradigm	for	the	theory	of	contract:	Reflections	on	the	relational	model’	(2007)	27	OJLS	
233,	236.	
375	Discussed	in	Mitchell	(n364)	175;	S	Wheeler,	 'Contracts	and	corporations'	 in	P	Cane	and	H	Kritzer	(eds),	The	
Oxford	Handbook	of	Empirical	Legal	Research	(OUP	2010),	127.	
376	I	Macneil,	The	New	Social	Contract	(Yale	University	Press,	1979),	37.	Beale	and	Dugdale	(n334)	47.	
377	Beale	and	Dugdale	(n334)	47-48.	
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contract	theory	and	business	management	to	consider	how	the	fraud	risk	is	mitigated	during	
credit	transactions.	
	
Before	 considering	 how	 classical	 and	 relational	 contract	 theory	 explain	 the	 mitigation	 of	
hazards,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 define	 ‘opportunism’	 and	 ‘governance’.	 A	 party	 who	 takes	
advantage	of	one	of	these	hazards	for	private	gain	would	be	characterised	as	opportunistic.	
The	literature	defines	opportunism	as	“self-interest	seeking	with	guile.”378	The	reference	to	
‘guile’	here	distinguishes	opportunism	from	ordinary	competitive	behaviour,	acceptable	 in	
the	market.	 It	 includes	“lying,	stealing,	cheating,	and	calculated	efforts	to	mislead,	distort,	
disguise,	obfuscate,	or	otherwise	confuse.”379	This	embraces	the	deliberate	breach	of	express	
contractual	terms380	–	which	would	typically	meet	the	legal	definition	of	fraud381	–	as	well	as	
conduct	which	contravenes	the	parties’	own	set	of	norms.382	
	
Governance	 mechanisms	 are	 required	 to	 combat	 the	 risks	 of	 opportunism	 and	 preserve	
economic	exchange.	As	Dixit	has	described,		
	
…if	market	economies	are	to	succeed,	they	need	a	foundation	of	mechanisms	to	deter	
such	privately	profitable	but	socially	dysfunctional	behaviors,	and	thereby	to	sustain	
adequate	incentives	to	invest,	produce,	and	exchange.	In	other	words,	markets	need	
the	underpinning	of	institutions	of	economic	governance.383	
	
Given	the	fundamental	differences	between	classical	and	relational	contract	theory,	it	should	
come	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 the	 governance	 mechanisms	 required	 to	 safeguard	 exchange	
similarly	differ	between	these	competing	theories.	
	
																																																						
378	O	Williamson,	Markets	and	Hierarchies	(The	Free	Press,	1975),	6.	
379	O	Williamson,	The	Economic	Institutions	of	Capitalism	(The	Free	Press,	1985)	47.	
380	K	Wathne	and	J	Heide,	‘Opportunism	in	interfirm	relationships’	(2000)	64	J	of	Marketing	36,	38.	
381	Derry	v	Peek	(1889)	14	App	Cas	337.	
382	O	Williamson,	‘Opportunism	and	its	critics’	(1993)	14(2)	Manag	and	Decision	Econ	97,	101;	Macneil,	‘Economic	
analysis	 of	 contractual	 relations’	 (n364)	 1023	 defining	 opportunism	 as	 “self-interest	 seeking	 contrary	 to	 the	
principles	of	the	relation	in	which	it	occurs.”	
383	A	Dixit,	Lawlessness	and	Economics	(Princeton	University	Press,	2004),	2.	
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Classical	and	neo-classical	theory,	as	discussed	above,	consider	that	the	contracting	parties	
commit	everything	to	paper	in	advance	of	performance.	This	means	that	the	contract	sets	out	
legal	sanctions	to	respond	to	breach.	With	the	certainty	of	this	framework	in	mind,	classical	
theory	presumes	that	a	decision	to	behave	opportunistically	is	taken	in	full	cognisance	of	the	
resulting	 legal	 penalty.	 It	 further	 presumed	 that	 an	 individual	 only	 decides	 to	 act	
opportunistically	 where	 the	 gains	 from	 fraud	 exceeded	 the	 legal	 penalty.	 In	 the	 classical	
analysis,	 therefore,	 the	 law	 provided	 a	 disincentive	 to	 opportunism	 –	 the	 threat	 of	 legal	
sanctions	–	which	was	designed	 to	keep	 the	exchange	on	course.	 Following	a	breach,	 the	
courts	would	simply	give	effect	to	the	penalties	contained	in	the	contract.384	
	
By	contrast,	relational	scholars	do	not	view	the	contract	as	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	
exchange.	This	means	that	it	will	be	unable	to	constitute	the	single	source	of	guidance	for	the	
parties	 or	 the	 courts	 in	 dealing	 with	 disputes.	 This	 does	 not	 remove	 the	 law	 from	 the	
governance	equation	entirely	but	it	does	mean	that	an	additional	governance	mechanism	is	
required.	 The	 relational	 model	 suggests	 that	 tacit	 understandings	 and	 industry	 norms	
generated	by	economic	exchange	function	as	a	governance	mechanism.	Norms	are	effectively	
an	unwritten	code	of	conduct	which	“circumscribe[s]	acceptable	behavior	between	exchange	
partners.”385		
	
The	balance	of	these	mechanisms	–	legal	sanctions	and	relational	governance	–	will	depend	
on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 specific	 transaction	 under	 discussion.	 As	 a	 general	 guide,	
exchanges	 appearing	 towards	 the	 ‘as-if-discrete’	 end	 of	Macneil’s	 axis	 would	 typically	 be	
reliant	on	legal	sanctions	for	governance.386	By	contrast,	one	would	expect	highly	relational	
transactions	 to	 display	 evidence	 of	 relational	 governance	 in	 the	 parties’	 response	 to	
difficulties	during	performance.387	It	may	also	be	the	case	that	exchanges	towards	the	right	
of	 the	 spectrum	 display	 relational	 governance	 in	 some	 areas	 but	 rely	 on	 comprehensive	
																																																						
384	J	Feinman,	‘Critical	approaches	to	contract	law’	(1982-1983)	30	UCLA	L	Rev	829,	832.	
385	S	Sheng,	 J	Brown,	C	Nicholson	and	L	Poppo,	 ‘Do	exchange	hazards	always	 foster	 relational	governance?	An	
empirical	test	of	the	role	of	communication’	(2006)	23	Intl.	J	of	Research	in	Marketing	63,	65.	
386	Mitchell	(n364)	173.	
387	R	Speidel,	‘The	characteristics	and	challenges	of	relational	contracts’	(1999-2000)	94	Nw	U	L	Rev	823,	827,	829.	
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contractual	 planning	 and	pre-agreed	 legal	 sanctions	 in	others.388	Of	 course,	 the	particular	
balance	of	governance	will	depend	on	the	transaction	under	discussion.		
	
The	suggestion	made	here	is	that	exchange	hazards	in	credit	transactions	may	be	governed	
relationally.	To	develop	this	argument,	the	hallmarks	of	transactions	demonstrating	relational	
governance	will	be	examined	(3)	before	considering	whether	these	are	replicated	in	credit	
transactions	(4).	This	is	made	possible	by	Katz’s	analysis	of	the	empirical	data,	most	notably	
that	the	exchange	evolves	after	the	written	agreement	is	signed.		
	
3. The	hallmarks	of	relational	governance	
Relational	 governance	 has	 been	 used	 extensively	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 economics	 and	 business	
management	 to	explain	behaviour	 in	economic	exchange.389	The	discussion	 in	 this	 section	
identifies	 the	 norms	 typically	 found	 in	 these	 relations	 and	 explains	 how	 norms	 constrain	
opportunistic	conduct.	
	
Transactions	 which	 display	 relational	 governance	 are	 characterised	 by	 norms	 of	 trust,390	
flexibility391	 and	 commitment.392	 These	 exchanges	will	 be	 less	 susceptible	 to	 opportunism	
because	 these	 norms	 encourage	 exchange-sustaining	 behaviour.	 When	 confronted	 by	
economic	conditions	which	create	an	incentive	for	opportunism	–	such	as	a	rise	or	fall	in	the	
market	–	a	party	within	a	relational	exchange	will	likely	forgo	this	opportunity	for	private	gain	
and	 instead	 be	 willing	 to	 renegotiate	 or	 offer	 a	 concession	 to	 his	 counterpart.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	norms	constitute	a	“general	protective	device	against	deviant	conduct.”393	
																																																						
388	Beale	and	Dugdale	(n334)	47,	51.	
389	Sources	not	cited	elsewhere	in	this	thesis	include	G	Baker,	R	Gibbons	and	K	Murphy,	‘Relational	contracts	and	
the	theory	of	the	firm’	(2002)	Feb	Quart.	J	Economics	39;	R	Gulati,	‘Does	familiarity	breed	trust?	The	implications	
of	 repeated	 ties	 for	 contractual	 choices	 in	 alliances’	 (1995)	 38(1)	 Acad.	Man.	 J	 85;	M	 Paulin,	 J	 Perrien	 and	 R	
Ferguson,	‘Relational	contract	norms	and	the	effectiveness	of	commercial	banking	relationships’	(1997)	8(5)	Int	J	
of	Service	Ind.	Man	435;	M	Yaqubi,	‘Antecedents,	consequences	and	control	of	opportunistic	behavior	in	strategic	
networks’	(2009)	7(2)	J	of	Bus	&	Ec.	Research	15.	
390	A	Zaheer	and	N	Venkatraman,	‘Relational	governance	as	an	interorganizational	strategy:	An	empirical	test	of	the	
role	of	trust	in	economic	exchange’	(1995)	16(5)	Strat.	Man.	J	373,	378;	J	Jarillo,	‘On	strategic	networks’	(1988)	9(1)	
Strat.	Man.	J	31,	36.	
391	L	Poppo	and	T	Zenger,	'Do	formal	contracts	and	relational	governance	function	as	substitutes	or	complements?'	
(2002)	23	Strategic	Management	Journal	707,	710.	
392	R	Scott,	 ‘A	 relational	 theory	of	default	of	 rules	 for	commercial	 contracts’	 (1990)	19	 J	 Leg	Stud.	597,	614;	G	
Gundlach,	R	Achrol	and	J	Mentzer,	‘The	structure	of	commitment	in	exchange’	(1995)	59(1)	J	of	Mark.	78,	78,	85-
86.	
393	B	Heide	and	G	John,	‘Do	norms	really	matter?’	(1992)	56(2)	J	of	Marketing	32,	35.	
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The	ability	of	norms	to	shape	behaviour	in	a	way	which	safeguards	economic	exchange	has	
been	explained	in	both	economic	and	sociological	terms.	The	economic	explanation	relies	on	
the	fact	that	the	expectation	of	future	exchange	encourages	cooperation	in	the	present.394	In	
short,	the	risk	of	reputational	damage	keeps	parties	honest.395	This	suggests	that	cooperation	
is	 a	 rational,	 deliberate	 choice396	 in	which	 the	 long-term	 commercial	 gains	 are	 considered	
greater	than	those	which	would	be	achieved	through	short-term	opportunism.397	
	
The	sociological	explanation,	by	contrast,	relies	on	the	idea	of	control	from	within	the	relation.	
Lai	et	al	have	suggested	that	behaviour	is	controlled	in	two	ways;	through	the	internalisation	
of	relational	norms	and	self-control.398	Where	the	norms	mirror	the	individual’s	own	set	of	
values,	we	would	describe	the	norms	as	having	been	internalised.399	Subsequent	behaviour	in	
accordance	with	shared	norms	occurs	because	the	actor	has	accepted	them	as	correct	and	
gains	an	intrinsic	benefit	from	compliance.400	In	addition,	appropriate	behaviour	is	achieved	
through	self-discipline.	Macaulay,	for	example,	argued	that	social	ties	created	“pressures	for	
conformity	 to	 expectations.”401	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 pressures,	 parties	 refrain	 from	
opportunistic	 conduct	 by	 exercising	 self-discipline	 and	 moral	 control.402	 Parties	 may	 also	
conform	due	to	 the	social	consequences	of	opportunism.	The	earlier	discussion	suggested	
that	 a	 poor	 reputation	 makes	 exchange	 expensive	 and	 risks	 future	 business.403	 These	
reputational	effects	may,	in	certain	communities,	extend	into	the	social	and	personal	life	of	
																																																						
394	Poppo	and	Zenger	(n391)	710.	
395	B	Richman,	‘Firms,	courts	and	reputation	mechanisms:	Towards	a	positive	theory	of	private	ordering’	(2004)	104	
Colum	L	Rev	2328,	2335.	
396	Poppo	and	Zenger	(n391)	710.	
397	O	Williamson	and	S	Winter,	The	Nature	of	the	Firm	Origins,	Evolution	and	Development	(OUP,	1993)	71;	B	Klein	
and	K	Leffler,	'The	role	of	market	forces	in	assuring	contractual	performance'	(1981)	89	J	of	Pol	Econ	615,	616-7.	
The	language	adopted	in	these	accounts	implies	a	law	&	economics	understanding	of	rationality;	Klein	and	Leffler,	
for	example,	speak	in	terms	of	wealth	maximisation.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	modern	behavioural	understanding	
of	behaviour	has	not	permeated	these	discussions.		
398		C	Lai	et	al.,	'Governance	mechanisms	of	opportunism:	Integrating	from	transaction	cost	analysis	and	relational	
exchange	theory'	(2005)	5	台灣管理學刊	1,	2.	
399	H	Kelman,	‘Compliance,	identification	and	internalization:	Three	processes	of	attitude	change.’	(1958)	2(1)	J	of	
Conflict	Resolution	51,	53.	
400	Ibid	53.	This	echoes	the	work	of	N	Mazar	and	D	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life	and	its	policy	implications’	
(2006)	25(1)	J	of	Pub	Pol	&	Mark.	117,	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	see	text	to	fn	110	et	seq.	
401	Macaulay,	‘Non-contractual	relations’	(n319)	63.	
402	A	Larson,	‘Network	dyads	in	entrepreneurial	settings:	A	study	of	the	governance	of	exchange	relations’	(1992)	
37(1)	Admin	Science	Quarterly	76,	90.	
403	See	earlier,	text	to	fn	314	et	seq.	
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opportunistic	 market	 participants.404	 In	 Bernstein’s	 studies	 of	 the	 cotton	 and	 diamond	
industries,	she	identified	that	individuals	who	had	not	met	appropriate	standards	of	conduct	
in	commercial	life	would	also	be	shunned	in	social	situations.405		
	
In	both	the	economic	and	sociological	accounts,	repeat	exchange	is	considered	valuable.	This	
is	because	it	provides	parties	with	concrete	and	valuable	information	about	who	to	trust.406	
This	overcomes	parties’	lack	of	knowledge	about	the	future	behaviour	of	their	counterpart407	
and	reduces	the	need	to	invest	in	expensive	contractual	safeguards.408		
	
The	marketing	 literature	confirms	the	existence	of	relational	governance	 in	 joint	ventures,	
strategic	alliances	and	 licensing	agreements.409	What	these	 ‘exchanges’	have	 in	common	is	
their	extended	duration410	and	a	 relatively	equal	balance	of	power	between	 the	parties.411	
Efficient	communication	channels	in	these	settings	enable	the	parties	to	respond	to	problems	
which	arise	during	the	transaction412	and	form	personal	relationships.413	It	is	the	combination	
of	these	factors	which	foster	the	development	of	relational	norms.		
	
4. Application	to	the	documentary	credit	context	
The	 critical	 question	 is	whether	 transactions	 financed	by	documentary	 credit	 embody	 the	
factors	indicative	of	relational	exchange.	The	position	advanced	here	is	that,	in	general	terms	
																																																						
404	Richman	(n395)	2344-2345.	
405	Bernstein,	‘Opting	out	of	the	legal	system’	(n327)	138—140,	157;	Bernstein,	‘Private	commercial	law’	(n319)	
1748-1750.	
406	 Poppo	 and	 Zenger	 (n391)	 710;	 M	 Granovetter,	 ‘Economic	 action	 and	 social	 structures:	 The	 problem	 of	
embeddedness’	 (1985)	 91(3)	 American	 J	 of	 Sociology	 481,	 490;	 R	 Gulati,	 ‘Does	 familiarity	 breed	 trust?	 The	
implications	of	repeated	ties	for	contractual	choice	in	alliances’	(1995)	38(1)	Academy	of	Management	J	85,	86,	
107.	
407	See	earlier,	von	Weizsacker	(n332).	
408	E	Posner,	‘Law,	economics,	and	inefficient	norms’	[1996]	144	U	Penn	L	Rev	1697,	1705.	
409	 R	 Kingshott,	 ‘The	 impact	 of	 psychological	 contracts	 upon	 trust	 and	 commitment	 within	 supplier-buyer	
relationships:	A	social	exchange	view’	(2006)	35	Ind.	Mark.	Man.	724;	Y	Lee	and	S	Cavusgil,	 ‘Enhancing	alliance	
performance:	The	effects	of	contractual-based	versus	relation-based	governance’	(2006)	59	J	of	Bus	Res.	896;	Gulati	
(n353).	See	also	the	work	on	 ‘vested	outsourcing’	 i.e.	K	Vitasek	and	K	Manrodt,	 ‘Vested	outsourcing:	A	flexible	
framework	for	collaborative	outsourcing’	(2012)	5(1)	Strategic	Outsourcing	4,	6	which	promotes	a	model	in	which	
parties	 are	 “mutually	 committed	 to	 each	 other’s	 success,	 creating	 a	 long-term	win-win	 relationship	 based	 on	
achieving	mutual	determined	goals.”	
410	Gundlach	and	Achrol	(n352)	141,	144;	Poppo	and	Zenger	(n391)	717,	719.	
411	Sheng	et	al	(n385)	72.	
412	 Ibid	 64,	 67;	Williamson	 also	 recognises	 that	 communication	 can	 encourage	 parties	 to	 develop	 “sensitive”,	
cooperative	problem	solving,	see	Williamson,	‘Transaction-cost	economics’	(n294)	240.	
413	Sheng	et	al	(n385)	67-68.	
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at	least,	credit	transactions	are	capable	of	displaying	the	more	informal	relational	model	of	
governance.			
	
In	Katz’s	analysis,	the	phase	between	agreement	and	performance	enabled	the	exchange	of	
soft	information	about	whether	each	party	would	perform	their	substantive	obligations.414	I	
would	suggest,	however,	that	this	phase	of	the	exchange	also	enables	the	development	of	
relational	norms.	This	is	because	the	early	tasks	will	commonly	require	the	involvement	and	
collaboration	of	buyer	and	seller	and	other	parties	in	the	supply	chain.	As	such,	indications	of	
flexibility	and	cooperation	at	this	stage	will	begin	to	develop	norms	to	govern	the	remainder	
of	the	exchange.	This	is	also	the	stage	at	which	parties	will	interact	to	finalise	the	details	of	
the	exchange.	As	discussed	above,	social	interaction	fosters	personal	relationships	which	in	
turn	solidifies	norms	likely	to	sustain	the	exchange.		
	
It	was	noted	above	that	the	potential	for	repeat	business	would	encourage	parties	to	forgo	
opportunities	for	private	gain.	While	buyer	and	seller	may	be	unknown	to	each	other	at	the	
outset	of	the	transaction	–	which	itself	justifies	the	use	of	a	credit415	–	other	parties	in	the	
contractual	 network	 may	 have	 had	 prior	 dealings.	 This	 includes	 the	 buyer	 and	 seller’s	
relationships	 with	 their	 respective	 banks,	 dealings	 between	 the	 issuing	 and	 confirming	
institutions	as	well	as	other	parties	only	peripherally	connected	to	the	transaction,	such	as	
agents	 of	 the	 buyer	 and	 seller,	 loading	 brokers	 and	 shipping	 line	 employees.	 These	
connections	facilitate	the	flow	of	information	between	buyer	and	seller	and	provide	sources	
of	concrete	information	about	their	counterpart.	These	layers	of	repeat	business	are	likely	to	
depend	 on	 (some)	 industry-specific	 norms	 and	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 influence	 and	 support	 the	
relation	at	hand.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	possible	to	 interpret	the	 informal	operation	of	documentary	
credits,	 despite	 the	 rigid	 contractual	 framework,	 as	 a	 norm	 of	 these	 transactions.	
Furthermore,	Mann	suggested	that	the	acceptability	of	certain	documentary	discrepancies	
would	 depend	 on	 the	 particular	 market.416	 This	 adds	 credence	 to	 the	 relational	 analysis	
because	 it	 suggests	 differences	 in	 market	 context	 affect	 the	 understanding	 of	 a	 given	
exchange.			
																																																						
414	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2564.	
415	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2518.	
416	Ibid	2527.	
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The	 literature	 also	 establishes	 that	 a	 relatively	 equivalent	 balance	 of	 power	 aids	 the	
development	of	relational	governance.417	The	argument	here	is	that	the	use	of	a	documentary	
credit	overcomes,	or	at	 least	reduces,	any	power	asymmetry	which	would	have	otherwise	
existed	between	buyer	and	seller.	This	analysis	holds	both	by	reference	to	the	doctrinal	and	
empirical	accounts	of	 the	credit	mechanism.	On	the	doctrinal	view	of	 the	mechanism,	 the	
credit	makes	payment	contingent	on	the	presentation	of	strictly	conforming	documents.	This	
envisages	an	objective	assessment	by	the	bank	which	 limits	the	pressure	a	powerful	seller	
could	 impose	on	his	buyer.	The	credit	 removes	 the	risk	of	buyer	opportunism	at	payment	
since	this	is	dependent	on	documentary	compliance	alone.	Under	the	empirical	view	of	the	
credit	mechanism,	the	payment	discretion	is	returned	to	the	buyer.	This	does	not	cause	an	
imbalance	in	power	between	the	parties,	however,	since	the	buyer’s	behaviour	during	the	
payment	phase	will	be	closely	monitored	by	the	issuing	bank,	as	described	above.418	These	
analyses	suggest	that	the	credit	creates	a	more	equal	balance	of	power	than	if	the	parties	had	
chosen	to	arrange	the	transaction	differently,	for	example	on	open	account.	This	accords	with	
the	characterisation	of	the	credit	as	a	compromise	mechanism.419		
	
The	position	advanced	here	is	that	relational	governance	is	a	plausible	account	of	deterrence	
in	 the	 performance	 phase	 of	 transactions	 financed	 by	 documentary	 credit.	 If	 correct,	 the	
relational	 mechanism	 reduces	 the	 likelihood	 of	 fraud	 by	 the	 beneficiary	 and	 explains,	
alongside	the	role	of	the	issuing	bank,	the	absence	of	buyer	opportunism	during	waiver.420	
There	 is	 undoubtedly	 scope	 for	 further	 empirical	work	 to	 determine	 the	 accuracy	 of	 this	
contention	and	the	norms	at	work	in	this	context.		
	
It	 is	 important	to	note	that	relational	norms	do	not	guarantee	that	contracting	parties	will	
forgo	every	opportunity	 for	misconduct.	 In	particular,	norms	will	 be	 ineffective	when	one	
party	stands	to	make	a	considerable	gain	from	fraud,	especially	where	these	gains	exceed	the	
																																																						
417	Sheng	et	al	(n385)	72.	
418	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231)	2529;	Katz,	‘Informality	as	a	bilateral’	(n250)	2567.			
419	See	earlier,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	11.	
420	This	was	not	adequately	explained	by	either	of	the	analyses	discussed	above.			
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value	of	future	business.421	In	those	circumstances,	the	defrauded	party	–	typically	the	credit	
applicant	–	would	need	to	rely	on	contractual	mechanisms	and	the	fraud	exception	to	deter,	
and	 subsequently	 sanction,	 the	 beneficiary.	Given	 the	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 invoking	 the	
fraud	exception,422	 it	 is	highly	unlikely	 that	 the	exception	will	ever	operate	 to	deprive	 the	
fraudulent	beneficiary	of	payment.	On	this	basis,	it	becomes	difficult	to	characterise	the	fraud	
exception	as	an	effective	deterrent.	To	this	extent,	therefore,	the	empirical	data	can	be	used	
to	support	the	judicial	assertion	that	the	fraud	exception	does	not	function	as	a	deterrent.423	
	
	
IV. Conclusion	
The	limits	of	the	fraud	rule	are	traditionally	justified	by	reference	to	commercial	need.	This	is	
a	laudable	objective,	but	reflection	is	required	to	ensure	the	rule	serves	its	intended	purpose.	
Accordingly,	this	chapter	has	critically	examined	the	policy	balance	underpinning	the	English	
fraud	exception	from	which	three	critiques	have	emerged.			
	
The	English	courts	have	consistently	rejected	a	broader	fraud	exception	due	to	fears	that	it	
would	paralyse	 international	 trade.	A	comparison	with	 the	American	approach	to	 fraud	 in	
Part	I	demonstrated	that	such	fears	are	unfounded.	The	credit	mechanism	remains	popular	
in	the	United	States	notwithstanding	a	broader	conception	of	fraud	and	greater	availability	of	
injunctive	relief.	In	addition,	the	American	exception	is	the	result	of	legislative	reform	which	
enabled	 policymakers	 to	 balance	 competing	 considerations	 and	 construct	 a	 rule	 in	
consultation	with	the	commercial	community.	This	is	preferable	to	the	piecemeal,	common	
law	development	of	 the	English	 fraud	exception.424	There	 is,	of	course,	no	reason	that	 the	
response	 to	 fraud	 should	 be	 identical	 in	 all	 jurisdictions	 but	 the	 English	 courts	 should	
recognise	that	their	approach	to	fraud	is	a	distinct	policy	choice,	rather	than	the	manifestation	
of	best	commercial	practice.		
	
																																																						
421	E	Posner,	Law	and	Social	Norms	(Harvard	University	Press,	2000)	160;	R	Scott,	‘Conflict	and	cooperation	in	long-
term	contracts’	(1987)	75	Cal	L	Rev	2005,	2030;	Scott,	‘A	relational	theory’	(n392)	615.	See	also,	Mazar	and	Ariely	
(n400)	as	discussed	earlier,	Chapter	Three,	text	to	fn	112.	
422	See	previous	discussion,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	343.	
423	Sanders	(n4)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
424	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	(n31)	[7-94]	describing	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	in	the	following	
terms,	“one	gets	the	feeling	that	such	a	result	is	exactly	what	the	English	judges	desire.”	
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The	House	of	Lords’	judgment	in	United	City	Merchants	was	examined	in	detail	in	Part	II.	In	
his	attempt	to	confine	the	fraud	enquiry,	Lord	Diplock	held	that	the	exception	would	only	
operate	when	 the	 fraud	was	 attributable	 to	 the	beneficiary.425	 This	 is	 perfectly	 legitimate	
given	that	the	exception	is	underpinned	by	ex	turpi	causa.	However,	in	so	doing,	Lord	Diplock	
conflated	–	the	related	but	distinct	–	issues	of	forgery	and	nullity.426	The	result	was	that	banks	
are	contractually	obliged	 to	pay	when	the	documents	appear	 to	conform	notwithstanding	
that	the	tendered	documents	are	known	to	be	forged	or	null.	This	wholly	undermines	the	
doctrine	of	strict	compliance	and	results	in	consequences	which	are	detrimental	to	the	credit	
mechanism.	 These	 consequences	 challenge	 Lord	Diplock’s	 justification	 for	 a	 narrow	 fraud	
rule;	 the	efficiency	of	 the	documentary	 credit	 as	 a	device	 for	 international	 financing.	 This	
prompts	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 proper	 approach	 to	 null	 and	 forged	 documents.	 The	
author’s	preference	would	be	for	the	courts	and	UCP	to	endorse	the	narrow	approach	to	non-
compliance.	 This	 would	 enable	 banks	 to	 reject	 nullities	 as	 non-compliant	 but	 permit	 the	
continued	 acceptance	 of	 known	 forgeries	 as	 good	 tender.	 This	 distinction	 is	 justified	 by	
reference	to	the	fact	that	nullities	cannot	serve	their	intended	commercial	purposes	whereas	
forgeries	remain	capable	of	transferring	ownership	and	providing	security	to	the	paying	bank.	
This	is	a	pragmatic	solution	which	would	not	threaten	the	autonomy	of	the	credit	nor	extend	
the	fraud	exception.				
	
A	 significant	 new	 analysis	 of	 fraud	 deterrence	 in	 documentary	 credit	 transactions	 was	
presented	 in	 Part	 III.	 It	 was	 rooted	 in	 empirical	 work427	 which	 indicated	 a	 more	 flexible	
standard	of	documentary	compliance	in	practice.	The	data	was	initially	employed	to	support	
the	judicial	account	of	deterrence	by	suggesting	sources	of	information	which	might	enable	
parties	to	undertake	pre-contractual	screening.	More	significantly,	the	data	was	then	used	to	
develop	an	account	of	fraud	deterrence	during	the	performance	of	credit	transactions.	It	first	
contended	 that	 the	 informality	 of	 the	 mechanism	 in	 practice	 reduced	 the	 need	 for	 the	
beneficiary	to	engage	in	fraud.	This	is	a	plausible	analysis	in	circumstances	when	the	goods	
have	been	shipped	but	complying	documentation	cannot	be	obtained	for	reasons	beyond	the	
beneficiary’s	control.	The	discussion	then	considered	incentives	to	fraud	which	arise	because	
																																																						
425	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n8)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
426	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence’	(n105)	230.	
427	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit’	(n231).	
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of	market	or	economic	 fluctuations	during	performance.	The	development	of	 cooperation	
and	 interaction	 between	 the	 parties	 in	 the	 early	 phases	 of	 the	 exchange	 prompted	
consideration	of	the	relational	governance	literature.	Exchanges	governed	in	this	manner	rely	
on	 norms	 developed	 between	 the	 parties	 and	 derived	 from	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 the	
exchange	 to	 limit	opportunistic	behaviour.	 It	was	argued	 that	credit	 transactions	bear	 the	
hallmarks	of	relational	exchange	and	that	this	form	of	governance	may	explain	why	parties	
are	deterred	from	behaving	fraudulently	during	performance.	The	combination	of	arguments	
put	forward	in	Part	III	provides	a	comprehensive	account	of	deterrence	in	credit	transactions.	
This	is	a	wholly	novel	analysis	which	challenges	the	judicial	view	that	the	entire	fraud	risk	is	
mitigated	by	careful	partner	selection	ex	ante.			
	
This	thesis	considers	the	extent	to	which	‘fraud	unravels	all’	accurately	expresses	the	legal	
response	to	insurance	claims	fraud	and	fraud	by	the	beneficiary	in	a	transaction	financed	by	
documentary	 credit.	 The	 foregoing	 chapters	 have	 critiqued	 the	 judicial	 construction	 and	
respective	policy	arguments	of	these	rules	from	a	doctrinal	and	comparative	perspective,	and	
in	light	of	a	body	of	evidence	drawn	from	related	disciplines.	The	final	chapter,	Chapter	Six,	
unifies	the	discussion	and	concludes	the	project.
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Chapter	Six	
Conclusion	
	
	
I. Introduction	
This	project	commenced	by	noting	the	simplicity	of	the	maxim	ex	turpi	causa	which	proclaims	
that	fraud	unravels	all.	A	singular	–	and	possibly	punitive	–	approach	to	fraud	was	similarly	
employed	as	the	starting	point	in	MacDonald	Eggers’	excellent	work	on	deceit,		
	
Our	civil	law	of	deceit	theoretically	deals	with	all	lies	in	the	same	way,	no	matter	why	
they	were	told,	provided	of	course	that	they	committed	the	deceived	to	a	course	of	
action	 that	 they	 would	 not	 have	 undertaken	 but	 for	 the	 deception	 and	 that	 they	
caused	damage.1	The	existence	and	formulation	of	a	particular	rule	of	law	may	have	
its	 genesis	 in	 utility,	 certainty	 or	 fairness.	 The	 law	 concerning	 fraud	 and	 deceit,	
attested	 to	 by	 such	 ancient	 advocates	 as	 Hyperides,	 Aristotle	 and	 Cicero,	 is	
underpinned	 by	 our	 moral	 duty	 to	 tell	 the	 truth	 and	 the	 social	 and	 commercial	
necessity	of	deterring	untruths	drawing	the	innocent	to	their	harm.2	
	
MacDonald	Eggers	concludes	his	comprehensive	analysis	of	deceit	by	recommending	a	more	
nuanced	framework	which	would	enable	the	 law	to	operate	 flexibly	and	“mirror	 the	 law’s	
contemporary	policy	or	moral	judgment.”3	The	examination	of	two	related	but	distinct	areas	
of	 law	 –	 fraudulent	 insurance	 claims	 and	 fraud	 in	 documentary	 credit	 transactions	 –	
undertaken	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	 similarly	 demonstrated	 the	 fallacy	 of	 the	 simplistic	 account.	
When	fraud	arises,	the	courts	are	not	automatically	led	to	the	easy	answers	implicit	in	the	
maxim	because	notions	of	deterrence	must	often	be	weighed	against	countervailing	policy	
considerations.	Importantly,	these	competing	concerns	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	specific	
mechanism	 and	 the	 contractual	 context	 in	 which	 the	 fraud	 has	 occurred.	 This	 means,	
																																																						
1	It	was	noted	in	the	Introduction	that	the	response	to	insurance	claims	fraud	and	fraud	in	transactions	financed	by	
documentary	credits	do	not	contain	any	element	of	causation.	This	is	because	the	fraud	rule	is	(typically)	designed	
to	operate	before	the	underwriter	or	applicant	has	been	deceived.	The	requirements	for	a	claim	in	deceit	have	also	
been	modified	by	the	decision	in	Hayward	v	Zurich	Insurance	Co.	[2016]	UKSC	48,	[67],	[71]	per	Lord	Toulson,	see	
earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Two,	text	to	fn	204.		
2	P	MacDonald	Eggers,	Deceit:	The	Lie	of	the	Law	(Informa	Law,	2009),	[1.4].	
3	Ibid	[9.2],	[9.4].	
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therefore,	 that	 the	extent	 to	which	 fraud	unravels	all	depends	on	how	the	courts	balance	
these	competing	issues	within	the	broader	contractual	context.	As	has	been	demonstrated	in	
the	foregoing	discussion	of	fraud	in	marine	insurance	and	documentary	credits,	this	leads	the	
courts	to	conceive	of	fraud	differently	and	to	propose	solutions	aligned	with	the	judicial	view	
of	the	specific	mechanism.	The	divergent	accounts	of	fraud	developed	by	the	insurance	and	
trade	finance	courts	explain	the	absence	of	a	single	theoretical	framework	within	this	thesis.	
	
This	chapter	summarises	the	main	findings	of	this	research.	Accordingly,	it	is	convenient	to	
recall	the	research	questions	established	at	the	outset	of	this	project:	
	
1. How	is	the	fraud	rule	constructed	in	doctrinal	and	procedural	terms?4	
2. What	policy	arguments	have	been	used	by	the	courts	to	justify	the	scope	of	and	
the	procedural	criteria	required	to	invoke	the	fraud	rule?5	
	
3. To	what	 extent	 are	 these	 policy	 justifications	 valid	 in	 light	 of	 comparative	 and	
empirical	evidence?6	
	
This	discussion	prompts	a	consideration	of	what	these	findings	mean	for	the	future	shape	of	
the	 fraud	 rule	 and	 the	 accompanying	 judicial	 narratives	 in	 these	 contexts.	 This	 task	 is	
undertaken	in	Part	II	(C)	and	Part	III	(C),	respectively.	The	discussion	is	then	widened	in	the	
final	part	of	the	chapter	to	consider,	more	generally,	what	this	research	tells	us	about	English	
commercial	law’s	response	to,	and	conception	of,	fraud.	The	major	call	in	Part	IV	is	for	courts	
and	academics	to	resist	the	lure	of	instinctive	answers	to	hard	policy	questions,	in	preference	
for	 a	 context-specific,	 empirically-informed	 response	 to	 fraud	 which	 overcomes	 the	
idiosyncrasies	of	the	common	law	system.	
	
II. Insurance	
A. The	judicial	response	to	insurance	claims	fraud	
At	first	glance,	the	judicial	response	to	insurance	claims	fraud	is	an	exemplar	of	the	simplistic	
model	propounded	by	the	courts	and	initially	identified	by	MacDonald	Eggers.7	The	judicial,	
																																																						
4	This	was	addressed	in	Chapter	Two	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Four	(documentary	credits).	
5	This	was	addressed	in	Chapter	Two	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Four	(documentary	credits).	
6	This	was	addressed	in	Chapter	Three	(insurance)	and	Chapter	Five	(documentary	credits).	
7	MacDonald	Eggers	(n2)	[1.4].	
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and	 now	 statutory,8	 emphasis	 on	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 gives	 the	 impression	 of	 a	 singular	
response9	which	applies	to	all	types	of	fraudulent	conduct.	Forfeiture	operates	to	deprive	an	
assured	of	the	entirety	of	the	claim	to	which	the	fraud	relates,	including	any	genuine	loss.	The	
rule,	moreover,	is	underpinned	by	ex	turpi	causa	and	only	operates	in	response	to	wrongdoing	
by	 the	 assured.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	 however,	 forfeiture	 responds	 more	 harshly	 than	
would	the	common	law	of	 illegality;	removing	the	assured’s	right	to	claim	for	genuine	loss	
and	requiring	the	repayment	of	interim	sums.10	The	punitive	character	of	the	forfeiture	rule	
is	particularly	apparent	in	these	circumstances.		
	
The	far-reaching	consequences	of	forfeiture	are	routinely	justified	by	reference	to	policy;	the	
deterrence	of	fraud.	Indeed,	the	courts	often	refer	to	industry	statistics	on	the	prevalence	of	
claims	fraud11	and	have	clearly	accepted	the	role	of	legal	sanctions	in	deterrence.	Indeed,	in	
the	tradition	of	rational	choice	theory,	the	insurance	courts	have	conceptualised	deterrence	
as	dependent	on	harsh	legal	sanctions	and	developed	the	forfeiture	rule	accordingly.	
	
The	 dominance	 of	 deterrence	 in	 the	 judicial	 discourse	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 relative	
absence	 of	 competing	 policy	 objectives.	 Issues	 of	 proportionality,	 though	 critical	 in	
overcoming	the	tension	between	forfeiture	and	avoidance	ab	initio	in	this	setting,	have	not	
generally	affected	the	development	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	 It	must	of	course	be	noted	that	
considerations	of	proportionality	were	at	the	heart	of	the	recent	decision	in	Versloot	which	
ring-fenced	collateral	lies	from	the	threat	of	forfeiture.12	This	judgment	is,	however,	the	sole	
occasion	in	which	proportionality	has	been	used	to	alter	the	scope	of	the	forfeiture	rule	in	its	
almost	200-year	history.	In	addition,	the	narrative	propounded	by	the	courts	–	the	vulnerable	
underwriter	 and	 deceitful	 assured	 –	 dovetails	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 deterrence	 and	
underpins	the	importance	of	judicial	intervention	to	prevent	fraud.	
																																																						
8	Insurance	Act	2015	s.12.	
9	There	are,	however,	other	remedies	available	to	the	underwriter,	see,	for	example,	the	earlier	discussion	on	the	
availability	of	damages	in	Parker	v	NFU	Mutual	Insurance	Society	[2012]	EWHC	2156	(Comm),	[2013]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	
IR	253. 
10	Axa	General	Insurance	Ltd	v	Gottlieb	[2005]	EWCA	Civ	112,	[2005]	1	All	ER	(Comm)	445,	[29]	per	Mance	LJ.	
11	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	[2016]	UKSC	48,	[56]	per	Lord	Hughes	(hereafter	
referred	to	as	Versloot	(Supreme	Court));	Royal	&	Sun	Alliance	Insurance	Co	v	Fahad	[2014]	EWHC	4480	(QB),	[24]	
per	Spencer	J;	Direct	Line	Insurance	plc	v	Khan	[2002]	Lloyd’s	Rep.	IR	364,	[38]-[39]	per	Arden	LJ;	Khan	v	Hussain	
(16	May	2007,	Huddersfield	County	Court)	[9]	per	Judge	Hawkesworth	QC.	
12	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
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B. The	critique	of	the	judicial	response	to	fraud	
While	there	is	no	doubt	that	fraud	should	be	deterred	and	sanctioned	appropriately,	this	does	
not	mean	that	the	judicial	approach	to	insurance	fraud	should	be	left	unquestioned.	Three	
key	findings	emerged	from	this	critique	and	are	summarised	here:		
	
i. The	 forfeiture	 rule	 is,	 in	 effect,	 the	 only	 civil	 sanction	 for	 claims	 fraud.	 This	 rule	
operates	counterintuitively	given	the	spectrum	of	fraudulent	behaviour.	
ii. The	judicial	understanding	of	deterrence	depends	on	an	outdated	model	of	decision	
making	which	results	in	ineffective	policy	prescriptions.	
iii. The	characterisation	of	the	underwriter	requires	modernisation	to	reflect	the	insurer’s	
ability	to	take	proactive	steps	to	prevent	fraud	in	today’s	market.	
	
i. The	counterintuitive	nature	of	forfeiture	
The	forfeiture	rule	was	developed	in	the	context	of	exaggerated	claims	and	here	one	can	see	
the	 judicial	 logic;	 the	 threat	 of	 losing	 the	 entire	 claim	 would	 dissuade	 an	 assured	 from	
committing	 fraud.	Over	 time,	however,	 forfeiture	was	presumed	 to	be	 the	 remedy	 for	 all	
types	 of	 fraud	 irrespective	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 claims	 appear	 on	 a	 spectrum	 of	 increasing	
culpability	and	severity.	This	has	 resulted	 in	a	 rule	which	operates	counterintuitively.	As	a	
response	 to	 the	 most	 serious	 wrongdoing	 –	 the	 wholly	 fraudulent	 claim	 –	 forfeiture	 is	
ineffective	because	there	never	was	any	genuine	claim	to	sacrifice.	At	the	lowest	end	of	the	
culpability	scale,	however,	forfeiture	was	draconian	given	that	it	deprived	the	assured	of	an	
insured	 loss.	The	counterintuitive	operation	of	 forfeiture	makes	 little	 sense	given	 that	 the	
courts	 have	 constructed	 the	 rule	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 harsh	 sanctions	 deter.	 Despite	 the	
theoretical	 availability	 of	 damages13	 and	 actions	 in	 deceit,14	 the	 fact	 that	 forfeiture	 is,	 in	
practice,	the	sole	sanction	for	insurance	fraud	cannot	be	reconciled	with	this	conception	of	
deterrence.	
	
																																																						
13	Parker	(n9)	[205]	per	Teare	J.	
14	Insurance	Corporation	of	the	Channel	Islands	v	McHugh	[1997]	1	LRLR	94,	135	per	Mance	J;	Law	Commission,	
Insurance	 Contract	 Law:	 Business	 Disclosure;	 Warranties;	 Insurers’	 Remedies	 for	 Fraudulent	 Claims;	 and	 Late	
Payment	(Law	Com	No	353,	2014),	[22.30].	
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The	Supreme	Court	have	to	some	extent	corrected	the	counterintuitive	nature	of	forfeiture	
in	Versloot;	the	rule	no	longer	applies	to	claims	embellished	by	a	collateral	lie.15	This	is	to	be	
broadly	 welcomed16	 and	 would	 probably	 encompass	 some	 lies	 which	 would	 also	 find	
mitigation	in	MacDonald	Eggers’	justificatory	analysis	in	the	tort	of	deceit.17	However,	if	the	
position	prior	to	Versloot18	was	criticised	for	being	pro-underwriter,	it	is	surely	no	better	for	
the	 law	 to	 develop	 in	 an	 equally	 simplistic,	 albeit	 pro-fraudster,	 direction.	 In	 reality,	 the	
judgment	may	go	too	far	and	simply	shift	the	problem	to	one	of	definition	–	what	exactly	is	a	
collateral	lie?	–	and	focus	attention	on	claims	where	the	assured	has	suppressed	a	defence.19	
The	Association	of	British	Insurers	has	also	expressed	concern	that	the	ruling	in	Versloot	may	
give	the	impression	that	lying	is	acceptable20	and	contradict	recent	public	information	efforts	
undertaken	by	the	industry.21	If	underwriters	are	concerned	about	the	judgment,	they	should	
simply	make	use	of	standard	terms	which	already	provide	remedies	for	claims	tainted	with	
the	pre-Versloot	equivalent	of	a	collateral	lie.22	While	the	precise	impact	of	Versloot	remains	
to	be	seen,	the	earlier	discussion	of	modern	deterrence	theory23	leads	the	author	to		agree	
with	the	late	Lord	Toulson	that	the	decision	will	probably	not	trigger	a	wave	of	fraudulent	
claims,		
	
I	 am	 not	 a	 psychologist,	 but	 I	 am	 sceptical	 about	 the	 idea	 that	 knowledge	 of	 this	
judgment	will	incentivise	people	with	valid	insurance	claims	to	lie	in	support	of	their	
claims.	Those	who	are	honest	will	not	do	so	because	it	would	not	be	in	their	nature,	
while	some	who	are	dishonest	may	do	so	if	they	think	that	they	will	get	away	with	it,	
																																																						
15	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11)	[26]	per	Lord	Sumption.	
16	See	P	Rawlings	and	J	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(2017)	80(3)	MLR	525,	531	where	the	
judgment	is	described	as	achieving	“mixed	reviews”.	
17	MacDonald	Eggers	(n2)	[5.32]-[5.46],	[5.57]-[5.64],	[9.7].	
18	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11).	
19	J	Hjalmarsson,	‘Exit	“fraudulent	means	and	devices”’	[2016]	(July)	Shipping	&	Trade	Law	(published	online,	25	
July	2016).	
20	J	Dalton,	‘Lies	are	lies:	Supreme	Court	ruling	sends	out	the	wrong	message	to	customers’	(27/07/2016)	available	
at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/news/blog-articles/lies-are-lies-supreme-court-ruling-sends-out-the-wrong-message-
to-customers/	(accessed	12/09/2017).	
21	For	example,	ABI,	‘From	Mr	Whippy	to	giggling	conmen	no	let	up	as	insurers	turn	up	the	heat	on	insurance	cheats’	
(13/09/2016)	 available	 at:	 https://www.abi.org.uk/news/news-articles/2016/09/from-mr-whippy-to-giggling-
conmen-no-let-up-as-insurers-turn-up-the-heat-on-insurance-cheats/	(accessed	12/09/2017).	
22	This	is	the	suggestion	made	by	Rawlings	and	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(n16)	532.	In	
the	marine	context,	underwriters	could	contract	on	the	basis	of	International	Hulls	Clauses	(01/11/03),	cl.45.3.1.	
23	See,	in	particular,	Chapter	Three,	Part	I	(C).	
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despite	 the	 risk	 of	 it	 having	 a	 boomerang	 effect	 on	 whether	 the	 court	 believes	
anything	that	they	say.24	
	
Instead	of	Versloot	and	the	statutory	provisions	in	the	2015	Act	settling	the	civil	response	to	
claims	fraud,	it	is	not	hard	to	imagine	further	litigation	to	probe	the	precise	limits	of	the	new	
regime.	As	Richard	Aikens,	former	Lord	Justice	of	Appeal	has	argued	recently,	“we	have	not	
heard	the	last	in	the	“fraudulent	claims”	saga.”25	
	
Whatever	 the	 future	 holds	 for	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 collateral	 lie,	 neither	 Versloot	 nor	 the	
Insurance	Act	2015	does	anything	to	correct	the	imbalance	in	respect	of	the	wholly	fraudulent	
claim.	Of	course,	it	would	be	inappropriate	to	castigate	the	Supreme	Court	in	this	regard	given	
the	narrow	 facts	of	 the	case	before	 them.	 	The	absence	of	a	 further	 remedy	 in	 the	Act	 is	
particularly	noticeable	given	that	the	Law	Commission	had	initially	proposed	a	statutory	cause	
of	 action	 which	 would	 have	 entitled	 underwriters	 to	 recover	 costs	 incurred	 in	 the	
investigation	of	fraudulent	claims.26	As	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	the	proposal	was	not	
taken	 forward	 despite	 the	 broad	 support	 of	 consultees.27	 The	 fact	 that	wholly	 fraudulent	
claims	are	not	addressed	by	the	2015	Act	means	that	there	is	still	not	an	effective	sanction	
for	 the	 most	 serious	 wrongdoing.	 This	 is	 conceptually	 problematic	 given	 the	 court’s	
explanation	of	how	legal	sanctions	deter.	
	
	
ii. An	outdated	model	of	decision	making	
The	second	major	finding	relates	to	the	outdated	model	of	decision	making	which	underpins	
the	judicial	account	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	The	insurance	courts	have	assumed	that	harsh	legal	
sanctions	deter	and	have	 constructed	 forfeiture	on	 this	basis.	 This	mirrors	 rational	 choice	
theory.	 However,	 modern	 deterrence	 theory	 suggests	 that	 harsh	 legal	 penalties	 are	 less	
effective	deterrents	because	decision	makers	do	not	weigh	up	the	prospect	of	punishment	in	
the	objective	manner	assumed	in	a	rational	framework.	Focussing	solely	on	legal	sanctions,	
																																																						
24	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11)	[108]	per	Lord	Toulson.	
25	R	Aikens,	‘When	is	a	“fraudulent	claim”	only	a	“collateral	lie”?’	[2017]	LMCLQ	340,	345.	
26	Law	Commission,	Insurance	Contract	Law:	Post	Contract	Duties	and	Other	Issues	(Law	Com	CP	201),	[8.19].	
27	See	earlier,	Chapter	Three,	text	to	fn	207.	
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modern	research	on	deterrence	indicates	that	sanction	certainty	is	a	much	more	significant	
indicator	 of	 compliance	with	 the	 law	 than	 sanction	 severity.	 The	 key	 to	 deterrence	more	
broadly,	however,	lies	beyond	law.	Decisions	to	engage	in	dishonesty	are	instead	shaped	by	
social	or	informal	sanctions	such	as	guilt	associated	with	contravening	one’s	own	moral	code,	
embarrassment	and	loss	of	reputation.	In	comparison	to	legal	sanctions	imposed	by	the	state,	
informal	penalties	are	levied	by	the	offender	himself	and	his	immediate	community.	Modern	
deterrence	 theory	 demonstrates	 that	 these	 informal	 sanctions	 exercise	 a	 much	 stronger	
deterrent	effect	than	legal	sanctions.	This	is	not	to	say	that	legal	sanctions	are	absent	from	
the	modern	deterrence	model;	indeed,	formal	sanction	threats	provide	a	foundation	for	the	
imposition	 of	 informal	 sanctions28	 and	 confirm	 social	 attitudes	 towards	 wrongdoing.29	
Accordingly,	Chapter	Three	concluded	that	the	forfeiture	rule	could	only	function	as	a	weak	
deterrent	to	opportunistic	claims	fraud.		
	
An	article	 co-written	by	 the	author	and	Professor	 James	Davey30	which	discussed	modern	
deterrence	 theory	 in	 the	 context	 of	 forfeiture	 was	 presented	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	
Versloot.31	 Indeed,	 Lord	Mance	 requested	 the	 empirical	 literature	 on	modern	 deterrence	
theory	to	read	while	writing	his	judgment.	While	these	insights	were	ultimately	not	used	to	
reverse	the	approach	to	collateral	lie	claims,32	the	author	suggests	that	modern	deterrence	
theory	 resulted	 in	 the	 Supreme	Court	 undertaking	 a	much	 deeper	 analysis	 of	 the	 correct	
approach	to	such	claims	than	would	otherwise	have	been	the	case.	Two	considerations	lead	
to	 this	 conclusion.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 the	 considerable	 degree	 to	 which	 the	
Supreme	Court	departed	from	The	Aegeon	 in	formulating	the	new	test.	This	 is	despite	the	
“several	powerful	reasons”33	which	led	Christopher	Clarke	LJ	to	apply	The	Aegeon	as	a	matter	
of	ratio	at	the	Court	of	Appeal.	This	indicates	the	degree	to	which	the	law	applying	to	device	
claims	was	regarded	as	settled	pre-Versloot.	 In	addition,	the	Law	Commission	suggested	in	
																																																						
28	S	Klepper	and	D	Nagin,	'The	deterrent	effect	of	perceived	certainty	and	severity	of	punishment	revisited'	(1989)	
27	Criminology	721,	741;	A	Ogus,	Costs	and	Cautionary	Tales	(Hart	Publishing,	2006),	130.	
29	 R	 Paternoster	 and	 S	 Simpson,	 'Sanction	 threats	 and	 appeals	 to	morality:	 Testing	 a	 rational	 choice	model	 of	
corporate	crime'	(1996)	30	L	&	Soc	Rev	549,	577;	J	Kidwell,	‘A	caveat’	(1985)	Wis	L	Rev	615,	618.	
30	J	Davey	and	K	Richards,	‘Deterrence,	human	rights	and	illegality:	The	forfeiture	rule	in	insurance	contract	law’	
[2015]	LMCLQ	315.	
31	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11).	
32	Ibid	[10]	per	Lord	Sumption,	[108]	per	Lord	Toulson,	[124]	per	Lord	Mance.	
33	Versloot	Dredging	BV	v	HDI	Gerling	Industrie	Versicherung	AG	[2014]	EWCA	Civ	1349,	[2015]	Lloyd’s	Rep	IR	115,	
[106]	per	Christopher	Clarke	LJ	(hereafter	referred	to	as	Versloot	(Court	of	Appeal)).	
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their	 final	report	that	the	 lie	 in	Versloot	 failed	to	satisfy	the	common	law	requirements	of	
substantiality	and	materiality.34	The	Supreme	Court	could	have	taken	a	similar	approach	on	
the	 facts	 of	 Versloot	 to	 permit	 the	 assured	 to	 recover	 without	 making	 any	 significant	
amendments	to	the	test	established	in	The	Aegeon.	The	degree	of	departure	is,	in	the	author’s	
view,	indicative	of	the	level	of	reconsideration	prompted	by	modern	deterrence	theory.	
	
A	final	point	should	be	noted	in	relation	to	rational	choice	theory.	Mazar	and	Ariely’s	work	on	
decisions	 around	 dishonesty	 suggested	 that	 harsh	 legal	 penalties	 can	 serve	 to	 deter	 an	
offender	 when	 he	 stands	 to	 gain	 considerable	 external	 –	 often	 financial	 –	 benefits	 from	
dishonesty.35	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 informal	 sanction	 threats	 are	 no	 longer	 an	 effective	
deterrent.	It	was	argued	in	Chapter	Three	that	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim	was	an	example	
of	 dishonesty	 which	 promised	 considerable	 external	 benefits.	 Accordingly,	 the	 argument	
made	here	is	that	a	harsh	legal	sanction	would	constitute	an	effective	deterrent	to	this	type	
of	claim.	This	is	a	further	reason	why	the	absence	of	an	effective	legal	sanction	to	penalise	
the	wholly	fraudulent	assured,	as	noted	above,	cannot	be	supported.		
	
	
iii. Modernising	the	portrayal	of	the	underwriter	
It	 was	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 Three	 that	 the	 judicial	 characterisation	 of	 the	 underwriter	 as	
vulnerable	was	outdated	and	does	not	reflect	the	modern	state	of	the	 insurance	 industry.	
Today’s	insurer	is	no	longer	required	to	wait	for	news	of	a	casualty	in	a	riverside	coffee	house	
as	 was	 his	 eighteenth-century	 counterpart.	 Instead,	 the	 modern	 underwriter	 is	 a	
sophisticated	entity,	comprising	significant	experience	and	expertise	in	loss	prevention	and	
risk	 reduction.	 It	 has	 access	 to	 databases	 enabling	 a	 pre-contractual	 assessment	 of	 the	
assured’s	 propensity	 for	 fraud	 and	 has	 access	 to	 loss	 adjusters	 and	 investigators	 in	 the	
immediate	 aftermath	 of	 a	 loss.	 These	 modern	 developments	 mitigate	 many	 of	 the	
information	asymmetries	which	would	otherwise	imperil	the	claims	process.		
	
																																																						
34	Law	Com	353	(n14)	[22.24]	“We	think	there	is	an	argument	that	the	“fraudulent	device”	employed	in	that	case	
[Versloot]	does	not	satisfy	the	common	law	requirements	for	fraud	of	substantiality	and	materiality.”	
35	N	Mazar	and	D	Ariely,	‘Dishonesty	in	everyday	life	and	its	policy	implications’	(2006)	25(1)	J	of	Pub	Pol	&	Mark.	
117,	120.	
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The	modernisation	 of	 the	 underwriter	 is	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	 Insurance	 Act	 2015.	 This	 is	
problematic	 since	 it	 further	 entrenches	 the	 narrative	 of	 judicial	 responsibility	 for	 fraud	
deterrence	 and	 wholly	 ignores	 the	 proactive	 steps	 taken	 by	 the	 industry	 to	 reduce	 such	
claims.	This	should	also	be	contrasted	with	the	updated	portrayal	of	 the	underwriter	with	
respect	to	the	assured’s	pre-contractual	disclosure	obligations.	The	Act	requires	underwriters	
to	 take	 a	 more	 active	 role	 during	 the	 disclosure	 process36	 which	 reflects	 the	 insurer’s	
knowledge	of	what	information	is	material	for	underwriting	purposes.	The	remedies	for	the	
assured’s	failure	to	make	a	fair	presentation	are	also	aligned	with	the	impact	of	non-disclosure	
on	the	insurer.37			
	
The	 suggestion	 that	 the	modern	 underwriter	 is	 less	 susceptible	 to	 fraud	 undermines	 the	
centrality	of	deterrence	in	the	judicial	explanation	of	forfeiture.	Indeed,	it	suggests	that	the	
development	of	a	remedial	framework	which	combines	deterrence	and	proportionality	would	
be	appropriate	in	this	context.	It	is	disappointing,	therefore,	that	the	Law	Commission	did	not	
recommend	a	more	nuanced	regime	through	the	introduction	of	a	judicial	discretion	to	mirror	
the	 position	 in	 Australia38	 and	 the	 English	 Criminal	 Justice	 and	 Courts	 Act.39	 The	 limited	
consideration	of	these	alternatives	appears	to	be	attributable	to	Merkin’s	swift	dismissal	of	
the	same	in	his	2006	report	for	the	Commission	in	which	he	noted	that	a	discretion	“would	
send	the	wrong	message.”40	This,	with	respect,	 failed	to	give	due	weight	to	the	successful	
operation	of	the	discretion	in	practice41	and	broad	acceptance	by	the	insurance	industry	in	
Australia.42		
	
	
C. Looking	forward	
It	 remains	 to	 consider	 what	 these	 findings	 mean	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 civil	 response	 to	
insurance	claims	fraud.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	above	discussion	militates	in	favour	of	a	
																																																						
36	Insurance	Act	2015	s.3(4)(b).	
37	Insurance	Act	2015	Sched.	1	(2),	(4)-(6).	
38	Australian	Insurance	Contracts	Act	1984	s.56(2)(3).	
39	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.57(2)(3).	
40	R	Merkin,	 ‘Reforming	 insurance	 law:	 is	 there	a	case	 for	 reverse	transportation?	A	report	 for	 the	English	and	
Scottish	 Law	 Commissions	 on	 the	 Australian	 experience	 of	 insurance	 law	 reform’	 (2006)	 available	 at:	
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/ICL_Merkin_report.pdf	(accessed	24/09/2017),	[6.9].	
41	The	Hon	M	Kirby,	‘Insurance	contract	law	reform—30	years	on’	(2014)	26	ILJ	1,	17.	
42	Merkin	(n40)	[6.9].	
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remedy	to	deter	the	wholly	fraudulent	claim.	The	precise	shape	of	this	remedy	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	thesis43	although	it	should	be	noted	that	a	sliding	scale	of	remedies	would	better	
reflect	the	reality	of	insurance	fraud.	It	is	pleasing	to	see	that	MacDonald	Eggers	reached	a	
similar	conclusion	in	his	restatement	of	the	tort	of	deceit,		
	
…a	liability	in	deceit	should	be	answerable	by	a	broad	range	of	remedies	available	to	
the	claimant,	subject	to	the	court’s	discretionary	control	to	ensure	a	flexible	response	
to	the	deceit	and	its	seriousness.44	
	
Parties	are	free	to	contract	out	of	the	statutory	provisions	on	fraudulent	claims,	subject	to	
the	transparency	requirements	contained	in	the	Act.45	This	entitles	underwriters,	therefore,	
to	contract	expressly	for	investigation	costs	and/or	punitive	damages	in	the	event	of	a	wholly	
fraudulent	claim.	Market	appetite,	as	ever,	will	dictate	whether	policies	will	be	written	on	
such	terms	in	the	future.	From	a	practical	perspective,	underwriters	should	be	encouraged	to	
seek	additional	financial	penalties.	Certainly,	the	courts	do	not	appear	averse	to	making	such	
orders,	as	was	evident	in	Parker46	and	the	several	motor	insurance	claims	in	which	punitive	
damages	have	been	awarded.47		
	
S.12	Insurance	Act	2015	was	not	designed	as	a	‘once	and	for	all’	restatement	of	the	law	on	
fraudulent	 claims.	 Indeed,	 the	 express	 purpose	 of	 the	 Law	 Commission	 was	 to	 develop	
“piecemeal	solutions	for	demonstrated	problems	where	there	was	consensus	for	reform.”48	
Indeed,	the	2015	Act	has	already	been	amended	to	include	provisions	on	damages	for	late	
																																																						
43	 The	 author	 has	 begun	 work	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 suitable	 remedy,	 see	 K	 Richards,	 ‘Redressing	 the	 balance:	
Fabricated	 insurance	 claims	 and	 (harsh)	 civil	 remedies’	 (American	 Society	 of	 Comparative	 Law	
Younger	 Comparativists	 Committee	 Conference,	 Koç	 University	 (Istanbul),	 April	 2017).	 Paper	 on	 file	 with	 the	
author.	
44	MacDonald	Eggers	 (n2)	 [9.7].	See	also	 the	 foreword	 to	 this	book	 in	which	Rix	LJ	 comments	 ‘His	well-argued	
prescription	is	for	the	law	to	restrain	its	opprobrium	for	the	really	deserving	cases	of	deliberate	dishonesty	and	for	
a	more	careful	delineation	of	remedies	to	match	the	seriousness	of	the	case.’	(at	vii).	
45	Insurance	Act	2015	s.17.	
46	Parker	(n9).	
47	 Churchill	 Insurance	 v	 Shajahan	 (11	 September	 2015,	 Birmingham	 County	 Court);	 Tasneem	 v	 Morley	 (30	
September	2013,	Central	London	County	Court);	Vasile	v	Pop	Loan	(17	November	2015,	Willesden	County	Court);	
Liverpool	Victoria	v	Ghadhda	(30	June	2010,	Central	London	County	Court).	
48	T	Goriely,	‘Good	faith:	The	residual	impact	of	s.17	Marine	Insurance	Act	1906’	(Good	Faith	in	Contract	Law,	Exeter	
University,	July	2017).	
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payment.49	 Unlike	 the	 position	 for	 breaches	 of	 fair	 presentation	 under	 the	 Consumer	
Insurance	(Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012,50	there	is	no	suggestion	in	the	2015	Act	
that	s.12	constitutes	“the	only	such	remedies”51	for	fraudulent	claims.	There	is	some	scope,	
therefore,	for	further	amendments	to	the	Act	to	establish	a	distinct	remedy	for	the	wholly	
fraudulent	 claim.	A	 statutory	 remedy	 for	 this	 type	of	 conduct,	 though	unlikely	due	 to	 the	
constraints	on	parliamentary	 time,	would	bring	 conceptual	 clarity	 to	 the	 judicial	model	of	
deterrence.	 The	 imposition	 of	 harsh	 legal	 sanctions	 in	 these	 circumstances	would	 further	
accord	with	modern	 research	 into	dishonesty	 involving	 large	external	benefits.	 In	 short,	 a	
statutory	cause	of	action	or	structural	incentives	to	encourage	underwriters	to	make	use	of	
common	law	remedies	already	in	existence	would	create	an	effective	legal	deterrent	where	
none	currently	exists.		
	
Modern	 deterrence	 theory	 offers	 a	 wealth	 of	 insights	 which	 could	 be	 operationalised	 to	
develop	a	comprehensive	anti-fraud	framework.	In	general	terms,	the	insights	discussed	in	
this	thesis	should	caution	judges	against	relying	solely	on	instinct	to	construct	legal	penalties.	
It	is	worth	reiterating	that	Lord	Mance,	writing	extra-judicially,	reached	the	same	conclusion	
in	respect	of	the	law	on	illegality.52	To	this	end,	the	author’s	recommendation	is	that	such	
insights	 remain	 an	 important	 frame	 of	 reference	 for	 any	 future	 judicial	 or	 parliamentary	
response	to	the	collateral	lie	and	forfeiture,	more	generally.		
	
The	lessons	of	modern	deterrence	theory	should	also	cause	the	insurance	industry	to	reflect	
on	 the	 structural	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	 within	 the	 claims	 process.	 From	 a	 practical	
perspective,	this	could	initiate	the	development	of	a	behaviourally-informed	claim	form	and	
claims	handling	processes	designed	to	trigger	the	deterrent	effect	of	social	sanctions.53	This	
would	also	be	an	opportunity	to	challenge	the	biases	and	heuristics	by	reminding	the	assured	
of	 the	 potential	 sanctions	when	 the	 opportunity	 for	 fraud	 arises.	 This	 is	 significant	 since,	
unchallenged	these	mental	shortcuts	might	otherwise	lead	an	assured	to	commit	fraud.	The	
																																																						
49	Enterprise	Act	2016	ss.28-30	inserting	ss.13A,	16A	into	Insurance	Act	2015.	
50	Consumer	Insurance	(Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012	s.4(3).	
51	Consumer	Insurance	(Disclosure	and	Representations)	Act	2012	s.4(3).	
52	(Lord)	J	Mance,	‘Ex	turpi	causa—When	Latin	avoids	liability’	(2014)	18	Edin	L	Rev	175,	176.	
53	 See	 also	 BBC,	 ‘Insurance	 fraud	 tops	 £1bn	 a	 year	 for	 the	 first	 time’	 (27/07/2013)	 available	 at:	
https://www.abi.org.uk/globalassets/sitecore/files/documents/publications/public/2016/fraud/effective-
counter-fraud-practices-checklist-for-insurers-and-partners.pdf	(accessed	23/07/2017).	
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examples	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three	 demonstrate	 that	 simple	 administrative	 tweaks	
informed	by	behavioural	science	can	reduce	claims	fraud.54	The	final	report	of	the	Insurance	
Fraud	Taskforce	is	promising	in	this	regard.	One	of	the	Taskforce’s	central	recommendations	
was	for	the	ABI	to	commission	research	into	behavioural	economics	to	determine	its	utility	in	
relation	 to	 fraud	 deterrence.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 what	
recommendations	will	emerge	from	this	but,	as	a	direction	of	travel,	it	is	to	be	welcomed.		
	
Industry	 reflection	 would	 also	 serve	 an	 important	 conceptual	 purpose.	 At	 present,	 the	
characterisation	 of	 forfeiture	 as	 a	 deterrent	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 judicial	 intervention	
creates	 the	 impression	 that	 underwriters	 are	 distanced	 from	 efforts	 to	 deter	 fraud.	 The	
recognition	 that	underwriters	 can	enact	 structural	mechanisms	 to	deter	 fraud	would	 shift	
responsibility	for	fraud	prevention.	A	more	balanced	narrative	in	which	the	industry	and	the	
courts	have	a	role	to	play	in	deterrence	would	better	reflect	the	characteristics	of	the	modern	
underwriter	and	the	reality	of	deterrence.	Importantly,	this	would	also	mirror	industry	efforts	
beyond	 the	 courtroom,	 most	 notably	 the	 funding	 of	 the	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Enforcement	
Department,55	industry-wide	data	sharing	via	the	Insurance	Fraud	Bureau56	and	the	creation	
of	the	Insurance	Fraud	Register.57		
	
The	critique	undertaken	in	this	thesis	has	the	potential	to	shape	the	future	development	of	
the	forfeiture	rule	and	of	a	more	comprehensive	and	efficient	deterrence	regime.	The	focus	
now	shifts	to	consider	the	judicial	construction	of	the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	credits.	
	
	
III. Documentary	Credits	
	
																																																						
54	See	earlier	discussion,	Chapter	Three,	text	to	fn	171	et	seq.	
55	 IFED,	 ‘About	 IFED’	 available	at:	 https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-
crime/ifed/Pages/About-IFED.aspx	(accessed	12/09/2017).	
56	Insurance	Fraud	Bureau,	‘About	us’	available	at:	https://www.insurancefraudbureau.org/about-us/supporting-
the-insurance-industry	(accessed	23/07/2017).	
57	 Insurance	 Fraud	 Register,	 ‘About	 the	 IFR’	 available	 at:	 http://www.theifr.org.uk/en/about	 (accessed	
23/07/2017).	
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A. The	judicial	response	to	fraud	
The	 fraud	 exception	 to	 autonomy	 in	 the	 law	 of	 documentary	 credits	 shares	 some	 of	 the	
characteristics	of	the	simplistic	account	of	fraud	rules.	The	exception,	for	example,	has	been	
described	as	“a	clear	application	of…ex	turpi	causa”58	and	is	singular	in	nature,	responding	to	
all	 instances	 of	 fraudulent	 conduct	 in	 the	 same	way.	 The	 development	 of	 the	 exception,	
however,	has	required	the	courts	to	overcome	the	tension	between	two	competing	policy	
considerations;	the	autonomy	of	the	credit	and	fraud	deterrence.	These	considerations	stand	
in	direct	opposition	to	one	another	since	the	requirements	of	an	autonomous	mechanism	–	
swift,	efficient	payment	with	minimal	judicial	intervention	–	would	be	fatal	to	a	rule	designed	
to	 uncover	 and	 deter	 fraud.59	 The	 trade	 finance	 courts	 have	 repeatedly	 demonstrated	 a	
preference	for	autonomy	and	have	refused	to	intervene	in	disputes	relating	to	the	underlying	
transaction.	The	resulting	 fraud	exception	 is	narrow	 in	scope	and	requires	 the	claimant	to	
satisfy	onerous	procedural	criteria	to	invoke	the	exception.	The	courts,	importantly,	will	not	
permit	the	exception	to	be	used	as	a	proxy	for	airing	concerns	about	the	underlying	contract	
of	 sale.	Assuming	 for	a	moment	 that	an	applicant	has	established	evidence	of	beneficiary	
fraud	in	time,	the	impact	of	the	exception	–	to	deny	the	beneficiary	any	right	to	payment	–	
has	the	penal	character	typically	associated	with	civil	law	rules	against	fraud.	
	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 fraud	 exception	 has	 never	 been	 successfully	 established	 in	 English	 law	
reflects	the	practical	difficulty	of	the	procedural	criteria	as	well	as	judicial	adherence	to	the	
autonomy	of	the	credit.	Fraud	may	well	unravel	all	in	hypothetical	terms	but	this	is	not	the	
case	in	practice.	Accordingly,	the	characterisation	of	the	documentary	credit	as	a	‘pay	now,	
argue	 later’	 device’	 is	 apt;	 parties	 are	 left	 to	 settle	 any	 disputes	 subsequently	 under	 the	
contract	 of	 sale.	 As	 for	 deterrence,	 the	 courts	 have	 not	 regarded	 this	 as	 a	 matter	 for	
commercial	law	and	have	instead	assumed	that	parties	mitigate	the	fraud	risk	through	careful	
partner	selection.		
	
The	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 fraud	 exception	 is	 also	 attributable	 to	 the	 broader	 contractual	
network	created	by	the	credit.	The	fraud	rule	does	not	just	arise	as	a	means	of	preventing	
																																																						
58	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1982]	2	Lloyd’s	Rep.	1,	6	per	Lord	Diplock	
(hereafter	referred	to	as	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)).	
59	P	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(2nd	ed.	Informa,	2010),	[2.022]-[2.023].	
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payment	to	the	fraudulent	beneficiary,	but	is	also	employed	by	the	credit	applicant	against	
the	issuing	bank.	In	these	circumstances,	the	applicant	employs	the	fraud	exception	to	refuse	
reimbursement	 to	 the	 issuing	 bank	 or	 to	 prevent	 the	 bank	 from	making	 payment	 to	 the	
beneficiary.	The	fraudulent	beneficiary	is	excluded	from	these	actions	and	the	fraud	exception	
instead	 functions	 as	 a	 loss	 allocation	 device	 between	 two	 innocent	 parties.	 It	 is	
understandable	 that	 deterrence	 is	 much	 less	 relevant	 where	 the	 action	 excludes	 the	
fraudster.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 the	 banks	 within	 the	 contractual	 network	 is	 also	 critical	 in	
understanding	the	judicial	response	to	fraud.	The	limited	opportunity	for	judicial	intervention	
enables	the	banks	to	make	payment	with	confidence.	This	increases	the	certainty	of	payments	
which	the	courts	have	regarded	as	vital	for	the	global	reputation	of	UK	banks.60	
	
B. The	critique	of	the	judicial	response	to	fraud	
It	is	difficult	to	disagree	with	the	proposition	that	courts	should	develop	law	with	commercial	
need	in	mind.	Indeed,	this	notion	underpinned	Lord	Irvine’s	characterisation	of	commercial	
law	 in	 his	 2001	Modern	 Law	Review	 article.61	 To	 focus	 solely	 on	 commercial	 need	 in	 the	
context	 of	 documentary	 credits,	 however,	 overlooks	 another,	 equally	 significant	 policy	
consideration;	the	deterrence	of	fraud.	The	discussion	in	Chapter	Five	critically	examined	the	
trade	finance	courts’	construction	of	the	fraud	exception	and	clear	preference	for	the	doctrine	
of	autonomy.	Three	key	findings	emerged	from	this	discussion:	
	
i. The	balance	between	competing	policy	objectives	surrounding	the	fraud	exception	is	
not	fixed	by	commercial	need.	
ii. The	 conflation	 of	 three	 distinct	 issues	 –	 fraud,	 forgery	 and	 nullity	 –	 in	United	 City	
Merchants	 has	 had	 consequences	 which	 impact	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 credit	
mechanism.	 These	 contradict	 the	 policy	 rationale	 of	 the	 narrow	 English	 fraud	
exception.	
iii. Deterrence	is	not	merely	an	ex	ante	issue	for	the	parties	but	rather	is	a	process	which	
continues	throughout	the	transaction.	
																																																						
60	For	example,	Bolivinter	Oil	SA	v	Chase	Manhattan	Bank	[1984]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep.	251,	257	per	Sir	John	Donaldson	
MR:	 the	 injunction	undermines	 “the	bank’s	 greatest	 asset…namely	 its	 reputation	 for	 financial	 and	 contractual	
probity.	Furthermore,	if	this	happens	at	all	frequently,	the	value	of	all	irrevocable	letters	of	credit	and	performance	
bonds	and	guarantees	will	be	undermined.”	
61	(Lord)	D	Irvine,	‘The	law:	An	engine	for	trade’	(2001)	64(3)	MLR	333.	
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i. The	balance	between	competing	policy	objectives	is	not	
inevitable	
The	 fraud	exception	 requires	national	 jurisdictions	 to	balance	 the	 autonomy	of	 the	 credit	
mechanism	and	fraud	deterrence.	The	International	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	determination	
that	 fraud	 is	 controversial62	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 not	 a	 simple	 answer	 and	 creates	 the	
conditions	 in	which	 divergent	 responses	 to	 fraud	 have	 emerged.	 The	 English	 courts	 have	
consistently	 presented	 this	 policy	 balance	 as	 dictated	 by	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 commercial	
community.	Put	simply,	autonomy	has	been	preferred	to	deterrence	and	this	has	led	to	the	
construction	of	a	narrow	fraud	exception.	The	position	taken	in	this	thesis	is	that	a	different	
balance	could	be	drawn	between	these	competing	policy	objectives.63	
	
The	American	approach	to	fraud	is	a	useful	starting	point.	The	fraud	exception,	embodied	in	
UCC	art	5-109,	adopts	a	more	expansive	definition	of	fraud	which	includes	forgery	and	fraud	
in	the	underlying	transaction.64	Injunctive	relief	is	also	easier	to	obtain	in	the	United	States.	
Significantly,	 this	 more	 expansive	 approach	 to	 fraud	 has	 not	 resulted	 in	 the	 commercial	
dislocation	so	feared	by	the	English	courts.	
	
Of	course,	different	jurisdictions	are	entitled	to	reach	different	conclusions	on	policy	grounds.	
This	much	is	explicit	in	the	ICC’s	decision	to	leave	fraud	to	national	courts.	However,	the	fraud	
exception	has	developed	differently	in	the	jurisdictions	under	discussion.	The	English	fraud	
rule	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 common	 law	 and	 largely	 of	 Lord	 Diplock’s	 speech	 in	United	 City	
Merchants.	Few	fraud	cases	have	since	reached	the	highest	courts	–	no	doubt	in	part	due	to	
the	chilling	effect	caused	by	the	narrow	confines	of	the	rule	–	meaning	that	the	rule	has	not	
undergone	adequate	judicial	scrutiny.	While	the	American	exception	was	initially	developed	
																																																						
62	ICC	Banking	Commission,	‘Latest	queries	answered	by	the	ICC	Banking	Commission’	(1997)	3(2)	Documentary	
Credits	Insight	6	cited	in	A	Davidson,	‘Fraud,	the	Prime	Exception	to	the	Autonomy	Principle	in	Letters	of	Credit’	
(2003)	8	Intl.	Trade	&	Bus	L	Ann	23,	26.	
63	This	view	is	similar	to	that	expressed	in	Canada,	see	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	v	Angelica-Whitewear	[1987]	1	RCS	59,	
72	per	Le	Dain	J:	“differences	of	view	or	emphasis	with	respect	to	these	issues,	reflect	the	tension	between	the	two	
principal	 policy	 considerations:	 the	 importance	 to	 international	 commerce	 of	maintaining	 the	 principle	 of	 the	
autonomy	of	documentary	credits	and	 the…importance	of	discouraging	or	suppressing	 fraud	 in	 letter	of	credit	
transactions”.	
64	Uniform	Commercial	Code	§	5-109	(a)	(1995	revisions).	
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by	the	courts,65	it	is	now	enshrined	in	the	Uniform	Commercial	Code.66	The	1995	revisions	to	
the	UCC	 followed	a	 lengthy	consultation	process	which	permitted	 the	Taskforce	 to	 take	a	
comprehensive	view	of	the	mechanism	with	the	benefit	of	participation	of	a	wide	range	of	
market	actors.67	The	piecemeal	approach	of	the	English	common	law	system	means	that	such	
oversight	is	impossible.		
	
The	broader	definition	of	fraud	in	the	UCC	does	not	mean	that	fraud	deterrence	has	been	
prioritised	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 autonomy.	 Concerns	 about	 unnecessarily	 disrupting	
international	 trade	 are	 equally	 relevant	 in	 the	American	 context.	 This	 is	 apparent	both	 in	
judicial	discussion68	and	in	the	statutory	cause	of	action	facilitating	post-presentation	actions	
against	a	fraudulent	beneficiary.69	Indeed,	the	very	purpose	of	these	warranties	contained	in	
art	 5-110	was	 to	 reduce	 the	actions	 for	 injunctive	 relief	 and	encourage	parties	 to	 resolve	
disputes	following	payment.70	This	demonstrates	that	a	more	permissive	approach	to	fraud	
does	not	necessarily	jeopardise	international	trade	as	feared	by	the	English	judiciary.	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 comment	 on	 the	widespread	 use	 of	 standby	 credits	 in	 America	 and	 to	
consider	 specifically	whether	 the	 greater	 use	 of	 standbys	 has	 dictated	 the	 policy	 balance	
drawn	 in	 the	UCC.	As	a	 starting	point,	 the	 case	underpinning	 the	 fraud	exception	 in	both	
jurisdictions	–	Sztejn	v	Schroder71	–	involved	an	ordinary	documentary	credit	as	distinct	from	
a	standby.	True,	Shientag	J	did	not	reference	fraud	deterrence	explicitly	but	it	is	implicit	in	his	
judgment	that	the	law	should	not	be	used	to	assist	the	fraudster.	Indeed,	he	commented	that	
there	would	be	 “no	hardship”72	 if	 the	bank	 could	 refuse	payment	 to	 a	 fraudster	 and	was	
unwilling	to	extend	the	protection	of	the	autonomy	doctrine	to	a	fraudulent	beneficiary.73	It	
																																																						
65	Sztejn	v	J	Henry	Schroder	Banking	Corp.	177	Misc.	719	(N.Y.	Misc.	1941).	
66	UCC	art.5-109	(1995	Revisions).	
67	Task	Force	on	the	Study	of	UCC	Article	5	(Letters	of	Credit),	‘An	examination	of	UCC	Article	5	(Letters	of	Credit)’	
(1989-1990)	45	Bus	Law	1521.	(Hereafter	referred	to	as	‘UCC	Task	Force’).	
68	Sztejn	(n65)	721	per	Shientag	J.	See	also	J	Dolan,	The	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit	Commercial	and	Standby	Credits	(4th	
ed.	AS	Pratt	&	Sons,	2007),	[7-79],	[7-88].	
69	Uniform	Commercial	Code	§	5-110	(a)	(1995	revisions).	
70	B	Wunnicke,	D	Wunnicke	and	P	Turner,	Standby	and	Commercial	Letters	of	Credit	(3rd	ed.	Aspen	Law	&	Business,	
2000	(2013	Supplement))	4-26.1;	J	Barnes	and	J	Byrne,	‘Revision	of	UCC	Article	5’	(1995)	50	Bus	Law	1449,	1457.	
See	generally,	R	Dole,	‘Warranties	by	beneficiaries	of	letters	of	credit	under	revised	article	5	of	the	UCC:	The	truth	
and	nothing	but	the	truth’	(2002-2003)	39	Hous	L	Rev	375.	
71	Sztejn	(n68).	
72	Ibid	723.	
73	Ibid	722.	
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would	appear,	therefore,	that	the	standby	mechanism	is	not	at	the	root	of	the	policy	balance	
drawn	in	the	United	States	but	that	the	American	position	simply	reflects	a	more	even	balance	
between	the	competing	policies	than	under	English	law.		
	
The	repeated	entrenchment	of	the	English	position	by	subsequent	courts	and	academics	may	
appear	daunting	to	a	court	asked	to	diverge	from	the	orthodox	approach.	By	way	of	analogy,	
it	should	also	be	remembered	that	prior	to	the	Supreme	Court	decision	in	Versloot,74	it	was	
widely	thought	that	the	law	on	insurance	fraud	was	“relatively	settled”.75	 	The	outcome	in	
that	 case	–	 a	narrowing	of	 the	 scope	of	 the	 forfeiture	 rule	 –	 indicates	 that	 courts	will	 be	
prepared	to	engage	in	a	considered	analysis	of	an	orthodox	position,	notwithstanding	its	age	
or	elucidation	by	an	expert	judge.76	
	
	
ii. The	detrimental	consequences	of	conflation		
In	United	City	Merchants,	Lord	Diplock	confirmed	the	existence	of	a	narrow	fraud	exception	
but	in	so	doing,	mischaracterised	the	contractual	basis	of	the	credit	and	conflated	the	distinct	
issues	of	fraud,	forgery	and	nullity.	This	has	resulted	in	several	detrimental	consequences	for	
the	efficiency	of	the	credit	mechanism,	which	undermine	Lord	Diplock’s	very	rationale	for	a	
restrictive	approach	to	fraud.		
	
The	difficulty	stems	 from	the	circumstances	 in	which	Lord	Diplock	held	 that	 the	bank	was	
contractually	obliged	to	make	payment.	He	held	that	the	bank’s	duty	to	pay	was	engaged	by	
the	presentation	of	apparently	complying	documents.77	In	circumstances	when	the	presented	
documents	 were	 fraudulent,	 forged	 or	 null,	 the	 bank	 would	 only	 be	 entitled	 to	 refuse	
payment	when	 the	 defect	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 beneficiary.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 fraud	
exception	 can	 only	 be	 triggered	 by	 the	 personal	 wrongdoing	 of	 the	 beneficiary	 correctly	
reflects	the	juridical	basis	of	the	rule;	ex	turpi	causa.	However,	the	consequence	of	obliging	
																																																						
74	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11).	
75	Law	Com	353	(n14)	[20.6];	[22.22]-[22.24];	Law	Com	201	(n26)	[8.10].	
76	Note	that	Mance	LJ,	as	he	then	was,	who	is	widely	acknowledged	to	be	the	leading	insurance	law	judge	extended	
the	forfeiture	rule	to	fraudulent	device	claims	in	Agapitos	v	Agnew	(The	Aegeon)	[2003]	QB	556,	[45]	and	was	part	
of	the	court	in	Versloot	(Supreme	Court)	(n11).	
77	United	City	Merchants	(House	of	Lords)	(n58)	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
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banks	to	pay	against	apparently	compliant	documents	is	that	it	must	pay	for	known	nullities	
and	 forgeries	unless	 these	can	be	attributed	to	 the	beneficiary.	The	procedural	hurdles	 to	
proving	fraud,	discussed	in	Chapter	Four,	mean	that	the	fraud	exception	will	only	very	rarely	
operate	to	disrupt	payment.	This	 is,	according	to	the	courts,	the	hallmark	of	a	mechanism	
developed	with	commercial	need	in	mind.78	
	
It	was	wholly	legitimate	for	Lord	Diplock	to	focus	on	the	author	of	the	documentary	defect	to	
determine	 whether	 the	 fraud	 exception	 should	 operate.	 However,	 this	 meant	 that	 his	
Lordship	overlooked	a	prior	question:	did	the	documents	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	credit?	
Documents	 which,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 presentation,	 were	 known	 forgeries	 or	 nullities	 should	
properly	 be	 regarded	 as	 non-compliant.	 Since	 compliance	 requires	 banks	 to	 assess	 the	
documents	 objectively,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 person	 responsible	 for	 the	 defect	 is	 wholly	
irrelevant	at	this	stage	of	the	enquiry.79	Indeed,	the	identity	of	the	wrongdoer	only	becomes	
relevant	when	the	documents	have	been	deemed	compliant	and	the	focus	shifts	to	whether	
there	 is	 a	 legitimate	 basis	 for	 the	 bank	 to	 refuse	 payment.	 This	 two-stage	 enquiry	 treats	
questions	of	compliance	as	a	threshold	in	that	considerations	of	fraud	do	not	arise	until	and	
unless	this	threshold	has	been	satisfied.80	 It	 is	unclear	why	the	House	of	Lords	overlooked	
earlier	dicta	establishing	the	two-stage	analysis81	and	diverged	so	considerably	from	the	Court	
of	Appeal	 judgment,	particularly	since	the	arguments	made	by	counsel	for	the	buyer	were	
virtually	 identical	on	appeal.82	The	rule	of	apparent	compliance	 is	also	mischaracterised	 in	
Lord	 Diplock’s	 analysis.	 The	 rule	 was	 established	 to	 safeguard	 the	 bank’s	 right	 to	
reimbursement	when	fraud	was	subsequently	discovered.	The	rule	does	not,	and	was	never	
intended	to,	establish	the	circumstances	in	which	the	bank’s	obligation	to	pay	arises.		
	
The	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	cannot	be	reconciled	with	the	express	terms	of	the	UCP	
and	this	has	resulted	in	several	practical	difficulties	for	the	credit	mechanism.	Most	notably,	
																																																						
78	Ibid	7	per	Lord	Diplock.	
79	R	Goode,	‘Abstract	payment	undertakings’	in	P	Cane	and	J	Stapleton	(eds.),	Essays	for	Patrick	Atiyah	(Clarendon	
Press,	1991),	232.	
80	Ibid	233-234.	
81	Edward	Owen	Engineering	v	Barclays	Bank	International	[1979]	1	QB	159,	169	per	Denning	LJ	citing	Bank	Russo-
Iran	v	Gordon	Woodroffe	&	Co	[1972]	116	Sol	J	921,	10	CL	296	per	Browne	J.	
82	Compare	the	following	judgments	where	counsels’	arguments	are	summarised:	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	
Bank	of	Canada	(The	American	Accord)	[1983]	AC	168,	173-178;	United	City	Merchants	v	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	(The	
American	Accord)	[1982]	QB	208,	213-215.	
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the	court’s	approach	to	nullities	has	effectively	meant	that	documents	devoid	of	commercial	
or	legal	value	can	stand	as	good	currency.	This	is	troubling	since	documentary	transactions	
depend	on	trust.83	A	further	practical	difficulty	relating	to	the	circulation	of	null	documents	
relates	to	the	bank’s	role	in	financing	credit	transactions.	 Indeed,	banks	are	only	willing	to	
finance	such	transactions	because	they	take	the	documents	as	security	to	guard	against	the	
risk	of	applicant	insolvency	prior	to	reimbursement.84	It	goes	without	saying	that	nullities	will	
not	enable	banks	to	recoup	losses	suffered	because	of	their	customer’s	 insolvency.	Similar	
issues	stem	from	the	acceptance	of	forged	documents	as	good	currency,	most	notably	that	
the	 approach	 to	 forgery	 differs	 between	 documentary	 credits	 and	 other	 negotiable	
instruments.		
	
The	doctrinal	analysis	of	the	credit	mechanism	values	the	principles	of	autonomy	and	strict	
compliance	equally.	This	is	not	reflected	in	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	since	the	
court	 demonstrated	 a	 preference	 for	 the	 doctrine	 of	 autonomy.	 This	 is	 not	 merely	 of	
conceptual	 interest	 since	 the	 principle	 of	 strict	 compliance	 performs	 several	 important	
commercial	 functions.85	 These	 are	 inevitably	 undermined	 by	 the	 judgment	 in	United	 City	
Merchants.		
	
The	consequences	of	this	decision	are	also	apparent	in	subsequent	case	law	concerning	the	
circumstances	in	which	banks	can	refuse	payment.	The	failure	to	treat	compliance	and	fraud	
as	 distinct	 elements	 of	 the	 enquiry	 has	 meant	 that	 subsequent	 discussions	 about	
documentary	defects	have	been	mischaracterised	as	exceptions	to	autonomy	rather	than	as	
an	instance	of	a	beneficiary	failing	to	satisfy	the	preconditions	to	payment.	This	is	particularly	
apparent	 in	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal’s	 discussion	 in	 Montrod	 v	 Grundkotter.86	 Subsequent	
discussions	have	become	unduly	dominated	by	fraud	at	the	expense	of	legitimate	enquiries	
focussing	on	documentary	compliance.		
	
																																																						
83	I	Carr,	International	Trade	Law	(5th	ed.	Routledge,	2014)	468;	M	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	congruence	
in	international	trade’	in	Worthington,	S.	(ed.),	Commercial	Law	and	Commercial	Practice	(Hart,	2003),	216;	X	Gao,	
The	Fraud	Rule	in	the	Law	of	Letters	of	Credit:	A	Comparative	Survey	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2002),	130-131.	
84	EP	Ellinger,	‘Fraud	in	documentary	credits’	[1981]	JBL	258,	269.	
85	See	earlier,	Chapter	Four,	text	to	fn	98	et	seq.	
86	Montrod	Ltd	v	Grundkötter	Fleischvertreibs	GmbH	[2002]	1	WLR	1975,	[56]	per	Potter	LJ.	
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This	thesis	has	argued	that	the	conflation	needs	to	be	corrected	in	a	manner	that	gives	due	
consideration	to	the	commercial	need	for	an	efficient	mechanism.	The	suggestion	made	in	
Chapter	Five	was	to	reinstate	the	threshold	analysis	suggested	in	earlier	case	law.87	This	would	
focus	the	initial	enquiry	on	documentary	conformity	and	enable	banks	to	reject	nullities	as	
non-compliant.	 This	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 documents	 will	 be	 required	 to	 function	 as	
security	for	the	ultimate	buyer	and	the	bank	in	the	event	of	its	customer’s	insolvency.	This	
would	 not	 unduly	 hinder	 the	 payment	 process,	 however,	 as	 the	 beneficiary	 can	 resubmit	
documentation	before	the	credit	expires.	This	differs	from	the	impact	of	the	fraud	exception	
whereby	 the	 beneficiary’s	 right	 to	 payment	 is	 permanently	 barred.	 Although	 forged	
documents	are	strictly	speaking	non-compliant,	the	position	advocated	in	this	thesis	would	
entitle	 banks	 to	 make	 payment	 against	 forgeries.	 This	 is	 a	 pragmatic	 approach	 to	 the	
compliance	question	which,	in	the	author’s	view,	can	be	justified	because	forged	documents	
remain	capable	of	serving	their	commercial	purpose.	
	
	
iii. Deterrence	in	documentary	credit	transactions	
The	 courts	 have	 repeatedly	 asserted	 that	 traders	 bear	 responsibility	 for	 mitigating	 fraud	
through	the	careful	pre-contractual	selection	of	honest	counterparts.	The	view	is	that	absent	
honesty,	there	would	be	no	deal.88	There	is	nothing	in	the	judicial	account	to	suggest	how	
such	 information	 is	gathered	or	circulated	between	parties.	The	trade	finance	courts	have	
further	characterised	commercial	law	as	offering	protection	from	insolvency	and	not	to	guard	
against	fraud.89	In	tandem,	this	view	of	the	law	perhaps	explains	the	absence	of	any	judicial	
or	 academic	 discussion	 of	 fraud	 deterrence	 in	 credit	 transactions.	 The	 approach	 to	
documentary	credit	fraud,	therefore,	diverges	significantly	from	both	the	insurance	approach	
to	deterrence	and	the	general	shape	and	function	of	fraud	rules	in	English	law.	This	thesis,	
therefore,	represents	a	significant	and	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	fraud	in	documentary	
credit	 transactions.	The	discussion	 relied	on	empirical	evidence	of	 credit	use,	gathered	by	
																																																						
87	Edward	Owen	(n81)	169	per	Denning	LJ.	
88	J	Davey,	‘Honesty	&	the	relational	commercial	contract:	Towards	a	law	of	post-contractual	misrepresentation’,	
(Insurance	Fraud	Symposium,	University	of	Southampton	Law	School,	13	July	2016),	11.	
89	Sanders	v	Maclean	(1883)	11	QBD	327,	343	per	Bowen	LJ,	
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Professor	 Mann	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.90	 The	 data	 diverged	 considerably	 from	 the	 doctrinal	
account	 of	 credit	 use,	 demonstrating	 that	 payment	was	 achieved	 via	 the	waiver	 process,	
notwithstanding	 serious	 documentary	 discrepancies.	 This	 data	 is	 not	 routinely	 cited	 or	
considered	 in	 the	 English	 context.91	 	 It	 was	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 develop	 two	 specific	
arguments	about	deterrence.	
	
The	 first	 argument	 used	 the	 empirical	 data	 to	 strengthen	 the	 judicial	 account	 of	 fraud	
prevention;	ex	ante	screening.	It	was	contended	that	the	information	channels	identified	in	
Katz’s	analysis	of	 the	data	provided	a	 framework	 in	which	pre-contractual	screening	could	
occur.	These	channels	provided	the	structure	in	which	information	about	a	party’s	reputation	
and	propensity	for	wrongdoing	could	be	dispersed	among	the	community.	This	adds	colour	
and	depth	to	the	judicial	explanation	of	deterrence.	
	
The	second	argument	considered	the	mitigation	of	 incentives	 for	 fraud	which	arise	during	
performance	of	the	credit	contract.	This	was	a	novel	analysis	given	that	the	judicial	account	
confines	deterrence	to	the	pre-contractual	period.	In	particular,	opportunities	for	fraud	arise	
during	performance	when	the	beneficiary	ships	the	contractual	goods	but	cannot	comply	with	
the	terms	relating	to	shipment	or	encounters	financial	difficulty.	It	was	suggested	here	that	
relational	 governance	 operates	 during	 credit	 transactions	 to	mitigate	 incentives	 for	 fraud	
during	performance.	This	is	an	informal	mechanism	of	governance	which	depends	on	norms	
of	trust,	flexibility	and	cooperation	and	industry-specific	norms	to	guide	behaviour	within	the	
transaction.	 A	 relational	 mechanism	 constrains	 misconduct	 in	 commercial	 transactions	
because	of	the	commercial	importance	attached	to	a	good	reputation.	It	was	contended	in	
Chapter	Five	 that	 these	norms	could	plausibly	develop	 in	credit	 transactions	 following	the	
conclusion	of	the	written	contract.	The	process	of	finalising	the	details	of	the	exchange	will	
typically	 require	 parties	 to	 cooperate	 and	 engage	 in	 personal	 interaction.	 These	 are	 the	
hallmarks	of	a	transaction	underpinned	by	relational	governance.	
	
																																																						
90	R	Mann,	‘The	role	of	letters	of	credit	in	payment	transactions’	(1999-2000)	98	Mich	L	Rev	2494.	
91	The	author	has	identified	the	following	two	references	to	the	empirical	work:	Bridge,	‘Documents	and	contractual	
congruence’	(n83)	227	(fn	68	in	original);	J	Ulph,	‘The	UCP	600:	Documentary	credits	in	the	21st	century’	[2007]	JBL	
355,	362	 (fn	29	 in	original).	Neither	account	discusses	 the	data	 in	detail	or	what	 it	might	mean	 for	 the	use	of	
documentary	credits,	as	has	been	undertaken	in	this	thesis.	
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Readers	 will	 note	 that	 neither	 of	 these	 arguments	 about	 deterrence	 refers	 to	 the	 fraud	
exception.	In	this	way,	the	thesis	lends	support	to	the	judicial	account	that	the	fraud	exception	
to	autonomy	is	not	designed	to	deter	fraud.92	Instead,	deterrence	is	explained	by	reference	
to	extra-legal	mechanisms,	namely	due	diligence	in	the	pre-contractual	phase	and	relational	
governance	during	performance.	
	
	
C. Looking	forward	
It	is	convenient	at	this	stage	to	consider	what	these	findings	mean	for	the	future	development	
of	the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	credits.		
	
The	 first,	 and	 perhaps	 overarching,	 impact	 of	 these	 findings	 is	 conceptual	 in	 nature.	 The	
research	 undertaken	 in	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates	 that	 English	 courts	 could	 broaden	 their	
approach	 to	 fraud	and	 the	availability	of	 injunctive	 relief	without	 risking	 the	utility	of	 the	
credit	 mechanism	 or	 the	 reputation	 of	 UK	 banks.	 In	 short,	 the	 English	 courts	 have	 been	
incorrect	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 particular	 contours	 of	 the	 rule	 are	 fixed	 by	 reference	 to	
commercial	need.	To	this	end,	a	more	flexible	and	reflective	approach	to	the	policy	questions	
surrounding	documentary	credits	would	ensure	that	the	law	achieves	its	aim	of	facilitating	
trade.	
	
The	practical	impact	of	these	findings	is	dependent	on	a	suitable	case	reaching	the	appellate	
courts	or	on	legislative	intervention.	The	latter	course	of	action	is	highly	unlikely	given	the	
constraints	on	parliamentary	time.	In	relation	to	judicial	action,	a	case	would	need	to	come	
before	the	Supreme	Court	in	order	to	re-examine	the	House	of	Lords’	decision	in	United	City	
Merchants.	As	argued	 in	Chapter	Five,	a	modern	court	could	simply	distinguish	the	earlier	
decision	on	 the	basis	 that	 the	 transaction	 incorporated	 the	UCP	500,	 as	distinct	 from	 the	
revised	UCP	600	in	common	usage	today.	A	more	courageous	Supreme	Court	would	also	have	
grounds	for	overruling	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants.	Firstly,	the	court	could	argue	
that	 the	House	 of	 Lords	 fundamentally	misunderstood	 that	 the	 beneficiary	was	 under	 an	
express	 contractual	 duty	 to	 present	 strictly	 compliant	 documents	 to	 gain	 payment.	 The	
																																																						
92	Sanders	(n89)	343	per	Bowen	LJ.	
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Supreme	Court	 could	 also	demonstrate	 the	 flawed	understanding	of	 the	 rule	of	 apparent	
compliance	and	reinstate	that	rule	as	a	protective	device	for	banks	and	not	a	standard	for	
establishing	 the	bank’s	duty	 to	make	payment.	 Irrespective	of	which	course	of	action	was	
taken	–	to	distinguish	or	overrule	the	decision	in	United	City	Merchants	–	the	Supreme	Court	
would,	in	general	terms,	be	entitled	to	alter	the	policy	balance	between	fraud	deterrence	and	
autonomy.	More	specifically,	a	judicial	restatement	of	the	proper	role	of	apparent	compliance	
and	the	doctrine	of	strict	compliance	would	enable	banks	to	respond	to	nullities	in	the	way	
suggested	above,	namely	 to	 legitimately	 reject	 such	documents	as	non-compliant	without	
considering	the	party	responsible	for	the	defects.	The	approach	advocated	here	depends	on	
a	suitable	case	reaching	the	Supreme	Court	although,	at	the	time	of	writing,	there	is	no	such	
case	on	the	horizon.	This,	it	should	again	be	noted,	is	attributable	to	the	chilling	effect	of	the	
House	of	Lords’	decision	in	United	City	Merchants.	
	
At	the	time	of	writing,	the	International	Chamber	of	Commerce	are	drafting	a	new	version	of	
the	UCP.	This	is	unlikely	to	deal	with	fraud	given	the	ICC’s	repeated	insistence	that	this	is	a	
matter	for	national	jurisdictions.	However,	to	continue	the	drive	for	clarity	and	further	reduce	
defective	presentations,93	the	UCP	700	could	clarify	the	definition	of	‘complying	presentation’	
in	line	with	the	findings	of	this	thesis.	In	particular,	the	ICC	could	confirm	that	nullities	are	not	
complying	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 UCP.	 This	 would	 firmly	 distinguish	 documentary	
compliance	 and	 fraud	without	 encroaching	 on	 national	 courts’	 jurisdiction	 to	 legislate	 for	
fraud.	 A	 workable	 definition	 of	 nullity	 would	 be	 required	 for	 these	 purposes.	 This	 issue	
troubled	the	English	Court	of	Appeal	in	Montrod	and	was	used	to	reject	the	development	of	
a	nullity	exception	to	payment	in	English	law.94	The	solution	to	the	definition	problem	could	
be	 easier	 than	 the	 English	 courts	 have	 suggested.	 The	 ICC	 offer	 banks	 a	 document	
authentication	service95	which	presumably	relies	on	a	working	definition	of	nullity	to	assess	
documents.	This	would	be	a	fruitful	line	of	enquiry	should	the	ICC	wish	to	enshrine	nullities	
as	non-compliant	 in	 the	UCP	700.	 In	any	event,	 as	a	 voluntary	 set	of	 guidelines	 for	 credit	
																																																						
93	ICC,	‘The	Uniform	Customs	and	Practice	for	Documentary	Credits’	(2007	Revision,	ICC	Publication	no.	600)	(see	
introductory	comments	by	G	Collyer).	
94	Montrod	(n86)	[58]	per	Potter	LJ.	But	see	the	approach	in	Beam	Technology	(MfG)	Pte	Ltd	v	Standard	Chartered	
Bank	[2002]	SGCA	53,	[36]	per	Chao	Hick	Tin	JA,	Tan	Lee	Meng	J	where	the	matter	“can	only	be	answered	on	the	
facts	of	each	case.”	
95	 ICC	 Commercial	 Crime	 Services,	 ‘Trade	 Finance	 Documents	 Authentication’,	 https://www.icc-
ccs.org/icc/imb/services/due-diligence/trade-finance-documents-authentication	(accessed	17/07/2016).	
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transactions,	if	the	UCP	700	–	complete	with	a	strengthened	definition	of	compliance	–	was	
unacceptable	to	traders,	parties	could	simply	incorporate	an	earlier	version	of	the	UCP.	The	
author	would	suggest,	however,	that	the	likelihood	of	a	new	version	being	unacceptable	to	
traders	is	relatively	slim	given	that	the	drafting	process	includes	both	banks	and	traders.	
	
If	 the	 recommendations	 detailed	 above	 were	 reflected	 in	 the	 UCP	 700	 and	 English	
jurisprudence,	 a	 further	 issue	 would	 arise;	 the	 singularity	 of	 the	 remedy.	 Much	 like	 the	
simplistic	overview	of	deceit	first	identified	by	MacDonald	Eggers,96	the	remedy	for	fraud	in	
credit	transactions	operates	like	a	switch	to	deprive	the	fraudulent	beneficiary	of	his	entire	
right	to	payment.	There	 is,	as	the	rule	 is	currently	constructed,	no	scope	for	the	courts	to	
consider	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 fraud	 or	 the	 culpability	 of	 the	 beneficiary.	 To	 illustrate	 the	
problem,	 it	 will	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 fraud	 exception	 can	 be	 equally	 satisfied	 by	 a	
phantom	 shipment	 as	 by	 the	 falsification	 of	 documents	 to	 conceal	 late	 shipment	 of	 the	
contractual	goods.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	beneficiary	responsible	for	a	phantom	shipment	
is	more	 culpable	 and	 deserving	 of	 punishment	 than	 his	 counterpart	 in	 this	 example.	 The	
singular	nature	of	the	fraud	exception	would	result	in	similar	counterintuitive	effects	as	have	
been	demonstrated	in	the	insurance	context.	Similarly,	therefore,	a	framework	of	nuanced	
remedies	 to	 combat	 fraud	would	be	more	 appropriate.	 This	mirrors	 the	 recommendation	
made	above	in	respect	of	insurance	claims	fraud	and	MacDonald	Eggers’	conclusions	on	the	
tort	of	deceit.97	There	is	no	doubt,	however,	that	we	are	a	 long	way	from	such	arguments	
taking	root	in	the	documentary	credit	context.	
	
IV. Concluding	Reflections		
This	thesis	has	focussed	on	the	judicial	conception	of	fraud	in	insurance	and	in	transactions	
financed	by	documentary	credit.	The	discussion	now	reflects,	more	generally,	on	what	these	
findings	tell	us	about	commercial	law.		
	
The	English	commercial	courts	 fall	back	on	simple	phrases	to	explain	 intervention	 in	 fraud	
cases.	It	seems	unlikely	that	a	three-word	phrase	could	ever	accurately	explain	judicial	action	
and	yet	this	is	the	intention	when	‘fraud	unravels	all’	is	invoked	by	the	courts.	Simple	phrases	
																																																						
96	MacDonald	Eggers	(n2)	[1.4].	
97	Ibid	[9.7].	
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such	as	this	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	recognise	contextual	matters	which	distinguish	areas	
of	law	and	justify	different	treatment.	The	importance	of	context	is	particularly	apparent	in	
the	comparison	between	the	fraud	rules	in	marine	insurance	and	documentary	credits.	These	
bodies	of	 law,	and	the	rules	relating	to	 fraud,	serve	fundamentally	different	purposes	and	
trigger	 different	 policy	 concerns.	 It	 is	 likely,	 therefore,	 that	 a	 consideration	 of	 other	
commercial	fraud	rules	would	bring	to	light	additional	policy	concerns	to	be	balanced	against	
deterrence,	 and	 further	 demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding	 contextual	 issues	
affecting	the	operation	of	a	rule.	
	
Policy	arguments	have	been	critical	 in	 the	 judicial	 response	 to	 insurance	claims	 fraud	and	
fraud	in	credit	transactions.	There	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	a	similar	reliance	on	policy	
would	not	be	found	in	other	commercial	fraud	rules.	What	has	been	particularly	interesting	
is	that	the	courts	have	characterised	their	policy	choices	as	inevitable;	a	classic	example	of	
judges	‘finding’	the	law.	But,	if	we	recognise	policy	as	simply	a	“value-judgment,”98	typically	
employed	in	cases	where	“the	rules	of	the	legal	system	do	not	provide	a	clear	resolution”,99	
this	 notion	of	 inevitability	diminishes.	As	 Todd	has	 argued	 in	 the	 context	of	 documentary	
credits,		
	
There	 is	 nothing	 inevitable	 about	 these	 policies,	 and	 the	 autonomy	 principle	 in	
particular	 is	 less	 strongly	 developed	 in	 the	 United	 States…They	 represent	 the	
uncompromising	choice	that	has	been	made	by	the	English	courts.100	
	
The	same	conclusion	can	be	drawn	about	factual	assumptions101	made	by	the	courts	as	well	
as	the	assumed	behavioural	consequences	flowing	from	a	judicial	decision.102	This	should	lead	
academics	to	be	wary	of	simple	answers	indicated	by	policy	and	to	approach	such	questions	
																																																						
98	J	Bell,	Policy	Arguments	in	Judicial	Decisions	(Clarendon	Press,	1983),	36.	
99	Ibid	22-23.	
100	Todd,	Maritime	Fraud	&	Piracy	(n59),	[4-014].	
101	 A	 Kronman,	 ‘Mistake,	 disclosure,	 information,	 and	 the	 law	 of	 contracts’	 [1978]	 7	 J	 Leg.	 Stud.	 1,	 2:	 “Every	
contractual	 agreement	 is	 predicated	 upon	 a	 number	 of	 factual	 assumptions	 about	 the	 world.	 Some	 of	 these	
assumptions	are	shared	by	the	parties	to	the	contract	and	some	are	not.	It	is	always	possible	that	a	particular	factual	
assumption	is	mistaken.”	
102	P	Cserne,	 ‘Policy	arguments	before	courts:	 Identifying	and	evaluating	consequence-based	judicial	reasoning’	
[2009]	Humanitas	J	of	Eur.	Studies	9,	15-16:	“a	more	or	less	educated	guess	about	hypothetical	scenarios	as	to	how	
certain	groups	of	legal	subjects	would	change	their	behaviour	in	response	to	this	or	that	decision.”;	Bell	(n33)	67.	
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with	an	open	mind.	Robust,	empirically-informed	models	should	be	preferred	to	law	making	
based	on	simplistic	and	instinctive	rules	of	thumb.	The	costs	associated	with	this	approach	
would	no	doubt	be	justified	by	the	nuanced	and	more	efficient	legal	rules	which	would	result.			
	
The	piecemeal	nature	of	the	English	common	law	system	also	merits	consideration.103	The	
courts	 are	 limited	 by	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 instant	 case	 and,	 certainly	 at	 the	 lower	 levels,	
constrained	by	the	doctrine	of	precedent.	This	aspect	of	the	English	system	is	highlighted	by	
the	fact	that	foreign	jurisdictions	have	reached	different	answers	to	the	same	questions	of	
policy,	typically	after	lengthy	consultation	and	legislative	processes.104	On	a	related	note,	it	is	
difficult	to	dispute	the	suggestion	that	the	fraud	exception	in	documentary	credits	has	been	
hindered	by	the	absence	of	cases	reaching	the	appellate	courts.	This	contrasts	starkly	with	
the	much	greater	volume	of	judicial	discussion	of	the	forfeiture	rule.	The	common	law	courts	
are	necessarily	reliant	on	private	parties	litigating	disputes	and	this	limits	the	opportunities	
to	reflect	on	the	development	of	the	law.	This	should	be	remembered	on	the	rare	occasions	
that	courts	have	the	opportunity	to	reconsider	the	direction	or	shape	of	the	law.		
	
Rawlings	and	Lowry	have	described	Lord	Mance’s	dissent	in	Versloot	as	“unsurprising”105	and	
this	is	certainly	a	sentiment	the	author	would	endorse	following	a	brief	conversation	with	his	
Lordship	at	this	year’s	Society	of	Legal	Scholars	conference.	The	author’s	overriding	sense	of	
the	decision	in	Versloot	is	one	of	dissatisfaction.	If	the	pre-Versloot	position	was	criticised	for	
its	severity	and	pro-underwriter	stance,	it	is	no	better	for	the	Supreme	Court	to	have	replaced	
that	model	with	an	equally	simplistic	one	which	instead	favours	the	fraudster.	The	author	is	
equally	dissatisfied	with	the	simplistic	approach	to	fraud	which	has	been	developed	in	the	
context	 of	 documentary	 credits.106	 To	 develop	 the	 law	 with	 commercial	 need	 in	 mind	 is	
admirable,	but	the	courts	should	not	be	content	with	a	fraud	rule	which	is,	in	practice,	wholly	
“illusory.”107	This	thesis	is,	in	broad	terms,	a	rejection	of	simplistic	ideas	used	to	shape	legal	
																																																						
103	Rawlings	and	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(n16)	525,	described	as	“the	happenchance	
of	litigation.”	
104	For	example,	Task	Force	on	the	Study	of	UCC	Article	5	 (Letters	of	Credit),	 ‘An	examination	of	UCC	Article	5	
(Letters	 of	 Credit)’	 (1989-1990)	 45	 Bus	 Law	 1521,	 1532,	 1536;	 Australian	 Law	 Review	 Commission,	 Insurance	
Contracts	(ALRC	Report	20,	1982).	
105	Rawlings	and	Lowry,	‘Insurance	fraud	and	the	role	of	the	civil	law’	(n16)	529-530.	
106	Indeed,	this	was	the	author’s	headline	argument	in	her	SLS	presentation	(paper	on	file	with	author).	
107	WS	Chong,	‘The	abusive	calling	of	performance	bonds’	[1990]	JBL	414,	416.	
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policy.	It	is	also	designed	to	highlight	the	importance	of	challenging	seemingly	settled	judicial	
doctrine	in	favour	of	nuanced,	empirically-informed	legal	rules.	Indeed,	the	author	intends	to	
explore	 the	 shape	 of	 more	 flexible	 remedial	 regimes	 in	 future	 work,	 to	 mirror	 the	
recommendations	of	MacDonald	Eggers	in	his	convincing	restatement	of	the	tort	of	deceit.108	
																																																						
108	MacDonald	Eggers	(n2)	[9.5]-[9.9].	
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